Didn’t we already make the down payment 40 years ago?
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

As we’re approaching half-time of the Review Conference, the Main Committees and their subsidiary bodies seem to be making progress on their work.

In Main Committee I, states parties have “looked back” and reviewed the 13 steps from 2000 and “looked forward” and debated an action plan for disarmament in its subsidiary body. In Main Committee II, states parties have debated non-proliferation and the IAEA safeguards system the P5 and the Arab states have been meeting to explore options for the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. Main Committee III continues to discuss peaceful uses of nuclear energy and institutional issues and while it has been announced that MC I and II will circulate draft text today, MC III appears to need a few more days before the chair is ready to draw his conclusions.

However, the circulation of draft texts does not mean we are any closer to agreement on the substantive issues. Yesterday, the discussions in Main Committee II continued to focus around the IAEA safeguards system and its additional protocol. By engaging in an interactive debate, most western countries continued to argue that the additional protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement should be considered the verification standard. Delegations from the NAM continued to argue that the additional protocol was never a part of the original bargain and that new obligations should not be opposed automatically. This major disagreement, one day before the committee is supposed to discuss its draft text, led to some countries wanting to focus on the current common ground, such as the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement or the language agreed upon in 2000. However, while 2000 final document “encourages all States parties, in particular those States parties with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude additional protocols, as soon as possible”1, Iran hinted that they would not agree to anything similar this time. The German ambassador seemed convinced that strengthening the safeguards system was a pragmatic step to encourage nuclear weapon states to take further disarmament measures. He argued that if the nuclear weapon states had confidence in a strong and robust safeguards system, they might consider more reductions. “It’s like a down payment. We do it now, and reap the benefits later.”

The Brazilian delegation responded immediately, arguing that considering reductions of nuclear stockpiles that have over 5000 warheads in them should not be dependent on whether or not all of the non-nuclear weapons states have signed up for the additional protocol.

During these two first weeks, several countries have continued to emphasize the double standard over the modernization of nuclear arsenals, the insignificant reductions in numbers, and the empty promises of commitments to article VI. But a large group of non-nuclear weapon states remain vague and silent on these issues.

As the US government is now sending New START off to the Senate for ratification, together with an extensive package of nuclear weapons complex modernization plans, many non-nuclear weapon states still seem to accept this type of behaviour as a sufficient demonstration of commitment to nuclear disarmament. So when states parties are moving into concrete negotiations about words in a draft text, all non-nuclear weapon states must look beyond the words and colourful brochures of the nuclear weapon states and start demanding actual disarmament through measurable commitments and promoting efforts to reduce the asymmetry of the Treaty. We need more than a reaffirmation of vague commitments. We need more than a conference on the Middle East. Is it not time to eliminate nuclear weapons, before they eliminate us? •

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“Armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation.”

WMD Commission
Gendered obstacles deter disarmament
Emma Rosengren | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Sweden

The importance of women's participation in decision-making bodies has been given increased international attention in recent years. In particular, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) along with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) highlight the importance of women's participation on all levels of decision-making in the sphere of peace and security, as well as the need for an integrated gender perspective in these spheres. However, women's political participation, both nationally and internationally, continues to be very limited. This is especially true in spheres considered to be masculine, such as national defence including the military and arms control.

Women lack representation in disarmament negotiations to a great extent. In fact, between 1992 and 2002, only 33 out of 693 heads of delegations to the NPT Review meetings were women (Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick (2005), in Disarmament Diplomacy). However, not only numbers matter. In security politics today, gendered attitudes and ideologies continue to influence disarmament strategies and outcomes. In their report, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (2006) concluded that "armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation." Hence, not only do women lack numerical representation, but gendered perceptions of masculinity continue to prevail ideologically, in turn hindering international disarmament negotiations.

Gender can be ascribed as the social construction of the biological sex, leading to complex social understandings about men/masculinity and women/femininity. Perceptions of masculinity and femininity change over time, and are influenced by and interact with other variables such as ethnicity, religion, class, age, disabilities, and sexuality. Gender is extensively linked to power, in particular due to horizontal and vertical gender segregation. Horizontal segregation involves the division of the sexes; men and women do different kinds of work due to societal expectations. For example, men are more likely to be involved in public affairs (as diplomats, politicians, or executives), whereas women are more likely to take on the main responsibility of children and the household. Vertical segregation means that the work that men undertake is valued more highly than the work of women.

Ideas about gender matter when it comes to weapons of mass destruction, not only due to its relation to identity and power, but also because of its connection to security concepts. Traditional masculine concepts of strength, dominance and rationality privilege military security over human security in international affairs. Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, and Sara Ruddick (2005) argue, "Ideas about strength, protection, rationality, security, and control have a critical impact on governmental and intergovernmental policy, as well as functioning at a large-scale societal level, where a certain notion of aggressive masculinity is equated with human nature, as in the phrase, 'disarmament would be nice but it's against human nature.' We must be aware of, and find ways to address, these gendered assumptions if we are to transform the intellectual and political processes that have so long impeded effective WMD disarmament." Hence, masculinity is linked to the use of military means, because of the connection between strength, masculinity, and militarism in international politics. Likewise, deterrence is also linked to the same ideals. That is how gendered boundaries operate within the discourse of security politics.

Evidently, political participation and political agendas are influenced by gendered stereotypes and ideologies. Regardless of men's disproportionate representation in politics regarding peace and...
security, and gendered boundaries in these spheres, women have been working actively with these questions for a very long time, primarily through civil society organizations. Since 1915, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) has constituted a platform for women to participate in international affairs, in order to challenge the traditional militarist scope of international relations. WILPF was one of the first organizations to point to the consequences of the masculinized concept of security that diverts incredible amounts of money from investments in peace to investments in military means and war, including nuclear weapons. Instead of being invested in destruction, these resources should guarantee the economic, social, environmental, and political needs of citizens, through social justice and gender equity.

In order to reach a world free from nuclear weapons, the traditional security concept rooted in strength and dominance must be challenged, and investments in weapons and war must come to an end. The governments of the world have to take their responsibility and shift priorities, whether they are nuclear weapon states (NWS) or non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). WILPF Sweden is especially emphasizing the obligation of NWS to disarm their nuclear arsenals, while also highlighting the need for NNWS like Sweden to work for a legally binding document prohibiting all nuclear weapons, and guaranteeing their elimination. We therefore support negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). Similar conventions already regulate chemical and biological weapons. In recent years, civil society has successfully been campaigning for conventions on antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. Our efforts have resulted in strong legal documents prohibiting these weapons. Now is the time to learn from previous accomplishments, and to work for nuclear abolition through a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The old fashioned masculinized security doctrines which have deterred disarmament for way too long must be abandoned in the interest of human security, gender equality, and peace.

Emma Rosengren is an international board member of WILPF Sweden.

Operational status of nuclear weapons
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

This seminar, hosted by Nuclear Flashpoints, focused on whether high alert nuclear weapons create stability or instability and looked at the link between nuclear deterrence and alert levels.

The panelists noted that some people believe that high alert levels for nuclear weapons are crucial because a reduced level would reduce the credibility of nuclear deterrence. However, the Swiss publication Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons looks at the issue differently, noting, “The problem in trying to judge the truth of claims about nuclear deterrence is that proof—the essential ingredient of prudent judgment—is entirely missing. This suggests that what matters here is not objective assessments but political perceptions.”

Steven Starr, from Physicians for Global Survival, illustrated the risks of high alert nuclear weapons by reminding participants of close encounters with nuclear war. To avoid these cases in the future, panelists suggested reducing the alert levels of nuclear weapon systems, strengthening warning systems, improving transparency, and increasing the exchange of information. However, Nancy Gallagher, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, that transparency and confidence-building measures could do more bad than good. She emphasized the importance of legally-binding agreements.

Mr. Starr highlighted the environmental consequences of a possible failure of nuclear deterrence. He claimed that there seem to be a lack in the awareness of the long-term environmental costs of a nuclear attack, even among political leaders. A regional nuclear war would lead to deadly climate change, which could lead to a massive global famine killing up to 1 billion people. He said that no political and national goals are worth risking the destruction of the human race. Mr. Starr noted that the Nuclear Weapons Convention is one way to limit these risks.

Emma Bjertén is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
Dismantlement of French nuclear test sites and fissile material production sites
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Wednesday, the French delegation arranged a lunchtime event providing details of their dismantlement of nuclear tests sites and production facilities for fissile materials for weapons purposes.

Mr. Francois Bugaut, head of the strategic nuclear material division, emphasized that France is the only nuclear weapon state that has dismantled its test sites (at the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls in the Pacific Ocean) and fissile material production facilities (the military sections of the Pierrelatte and Marcoule facilities).

He explained that while the dismantling projects had not been carried out in cooperation with any international organization, such as the IAEA or Euratom, the French government made an effort to promote transparency by inviting diplomats from the CD, international think tanks, and journalists to visit the Pierrelatte and Marcoule facilities. He concluded by stating, “when France enters commitments, words are immediately followed by action,” and emphasized that these dismantling procedures had commenced immediately after the political decision was taken.

However, he did not mention that the political decision to stop nuclear testing was taken after a conclusion of a series of French nuclear tests carried out immediately before the CTBT was signed. These tests, carried out in 1995, provided France with enough data to further improve nuclear technology without needing additional series of tests. And while France has stopped the production of fissile material and plutonium for weapons purposes, it has an estimated stockpile of 35 tons of highly enriched uranium and 88 tons of plutonium. The IAEA adopts as its standard significant quantity that 25 kg of HEU or 8 kg plutonium are sufficient to make a simple, first-generation nuclear weapon, such as those used by Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When asked if the political decision to stop producing fissile materials for weapons purposes was based on reaching a certain amount or on implementing article VI, Mr. Bugaut chose to simply reaffirm France’s support of the negotiations of an FMCT. He stated, “we have stopped production of fissile material, we did so much already, we’re waiting for reciprocity now.” When someone posed an immediate question about what kind of reciprocity France would require to take any additional disarmament measures, Mr. Bugaut argued that other nuclear weapons states should dismantle their test sites, as well as dismantle and organize visits to old fissile material production facilities. When asked if France is currently modernizing its nuclear arsenal or producing new weapons, Mr. Bugaut emphasized that France had done a lot for disarmament but also noted that it has nuclear weapon simulation programmes.

Notes
2. Ibid.

Across
1. In 2008, Russia and _______ submitted a draft treaty for a ban on weapons in outer space.
5. This Treaty was adopted as a resolution (A/RES/50/245) by the General Assembly. It has been open for signatures since 1996, but has not yet entered into force.
7. What is the name of the strategic nuclear submarine of the French navy that was launched in 2008?
10. In which country will the next Nuclear Security Summit take place (two words)?

Down
2. A nuclear reaction in which the nucleus splits into smaller parts (two words).
3. Which country conducted a nuclear test explosion on 28 October, 2008 (two words)?
4. The South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty is also called the Treaty of ______.
6. Which chemical element has the atomic number 94?
8. Which country has not officially confirmed its nuclear possession but is considered to have a nuclear arsenal?
9. How many states originally signed the Antarctic Treaty?
I came to NY to raise my voice together with others against the existence of nuclear weapons and for the further development and implementation of a nuclear non-proliferation regime with full nuclear disarmament. I hope that this years NPT-Conference will have prosperous outcomes through willingness of the international governments to secure peace and justice in our world free of nuclear weapons.

Inga Kravchik, Russian Federation/ St.Petersburg, 25, IPPNW, studying political science at the Free University Berlin

This year, I'm here with an awesome team of students from all around Germany producing daily video interviews with diplomats and NGO reports for our website: http://npt-tv.net. We've been around since 2004 when I was 15 years old, and we hope to be able to give something back to the wonderful NGO community that helped us so much.

Jacob Romer, Germany, 21, NPT-TV

I was pretty much interested, how such a huge conference is about to work. I know that my dream, complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, is far away. But if not today's young generation is doing something against, who else?“

Lisa Eisenhardt, Germany, 17, Pressehütte Mutlangen, scholar

I came to the NPT-Conference to cover the development and different positions of the delegations from various states at the conference. I want to point out the huge impact of the NPT on young people all over the world and inform the delegates on their enormous responsibility.

Mehmet Fatih Özcan, Germany, 25, BANg-Europe, student of political science

I want to show, that disarmament and nuclear weapons are topics every young person should be interested in. And in fact: they are!

Barbara Streibl, Germany, 19, BANg Europe, doing a gap year,
Laying down the law on nuclear disarmament
Tim Wright | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

The tired old mantra of arms control and incremental steps is still dominating discussions at the NPT Review Conference, despite the growing push for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. All too many of the non-nuclear weapon states seem content in seeking only the most modest action on disarmament. Their calls, for the most part, lack any sense of real urgency — even though it is clear that meaningful action for abolition is needed now, and cannot continue to be postponed.

The prevailing attitude among governments is that the NPT must be gently nursed back to “good health”, when in fact the only effective remedy to the problem we face is for the nuclear weapon states to be jolted into action. A take-it-easy, business-as-usual approach will only reinforce the status quo of inaction on disarmament and the threat of nuclear proliferation. Unless we radically alter the current trajectory, we will see only further disintegration of the NPT regime.

The nuclear weapon states maintain that it is premature to pursue negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention — and thus to fulfil article VI of the NPT — even though four decades have now passed since the Treaty’s entry into force. Based on this logic, should we also consider it premature to expect full compliance with the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty? This apparent double standard is certainly not in the spirit of the NPT bargain, and should be vehemently rejected.

Under the NPT, disarmament is more than a mere aspiration — it is a legal obligation. This was emphasized on Wednesday at events hosted by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms. Not only must NPT parties “pursue” negotiations for disarmament, they must achieve that goal, as affirmed unanimously by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear weapon states purport to be living up to their obligations — and some have even produced glossy brochures for this Review Conference showcasing their “achievements” — but there is little reason to be satisfied. Despite all the hype surrounding New START, for example, this treaty is unlikely to result in any true reduction in Russian and US nuclear forces. It must surely count among the most celebrated non-accomplishments in recent political history.

The NPT stipulates that negotiations for disarmament be pursued in “good faith”. Modernizing arsenals and boosting funding to nuclear weapon laboratories is a clear manifestation of bad faith. And it is not enough to dismantle a few old nuclear weapons each year, when global stockpiles still number in the tens of thousands. Non-nuclear weapon states must express their clear dissatisfaction with the lack of progress, and demand that work begin now on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This is the most obvious and realistic way to realize the NPT’s core promise — the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

As Norway pointed out this week, the current rate of progress towards a nuclear weapon-free world is just not good enough. “After 65 years with nuclear weapons and 40 years with the NPT, we cannot claim that we are where we should be with nuclear disarmament ... We must establish a new international nuclear agenda with an action plan for nuclear disarmament with clear benchmarks and deadlines holding us all accountable.”

Norway argued that, if governments are to succeed in implementing article VI of the NPT and achieve the complete elimination of nuclear forces, they will need to negotiate an additional legal instrument. “This is a topic which is becoming increasingly relevant and important,” the Norwegian delegation said. “We are likely to see more discussions on this matter in the time to come.”

Indeed, on Wednesday in Main Committee I, the need for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention once again featured prominently, with Egypt, Malaysia and Libya, among others, raising the call. New Zealand — which votes in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on a convention — welcomed the UN Secretary-General's “strong push in his five-point plan for progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons”.

Last year, 124 governments — roughly two-thirds of all UN member states — backed the General Assembly resolution, which is a follow-up to the International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The court held, unanimously, that governments have a legal obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In addition to the legal obligation, they also have a moral responsibility to present and future generations to succeed.

Tim Wright is NWC Project Coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
US nuclear weapons production: good faith, irreversible disarmament?
Sameer Kanal | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Thursday, Nickolas Roth of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability moderated a panel entitled “US Nuclear Weapons Production: Good Faith, Irreversible Disarmament?” Jaqueline Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation and John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy joined Roth on the panel.

Mr. Roth noted that irreversibility “was identified as a key commitment” in 2000, but has been largely ignored by the US, who is “actively undermining” this commitment by slowing dismantlement from roughly 1000 warheads per year pre-1998 to roughly 300 per year today; this has resulted in a backlog of 4500 warheads needing to be dismantled. These warheads are waiting in the Pantex facility, which now engages in “life-extension” programs. Roth highlighted that each warhead that undergoes life-extension prevents Pantex from dismantling four, and noted that the program ensures that “Pantex’s priority is refurbishment and not disarmament.”

Roth also underscored the NPR’s “surge policy,” which states: “modest capacity will be put in place for warhead production [of warheads] in the event of significant geopolitical surprise.” Mr. Roth noted that the United States is quadrupling its warhead production capacity with the creation of three new large-scale production facilities. Roth quoted the DoD’s Jim Miller as stating a goal of increased capacity is to make nuclear production “a policy choice.” Roth also noted that the NPR “extends deterrence to the production facilities and infrastructure, not just the warheads themselves;” which contributes to an “enduring reliance on nuclear deterrence as a policy.”

In 2000, article VI of the NPT was interpreted as a call for “unequivocal undertaking to accomplish” complete disarmament, which Dr. Burroughs noted is incompatible with new production facilities. Burroughs highlighted that article VI calls for “negotiations in good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,” and defined this quantitatively and qualitatively.

Dr. Burroughs noted that irreversibility has been applied to nuclear warheads and delivery systems; France dismantled a fissile material production plant and identified this as a demonstration of a commitment to irreversibility, which links production facilities to irreversibility as well. Burroughs noted that if the US pursued new production, it would create a “circumvention of irreversibility” by retaining a “capacity to reconstitute.” Burroughs also defined good faith as “keep[ing] promises […] to work in a cooperative and sincere way,” and quoted former ICJ President Mohammed Bedjaoui as describing the concept as a “fundamental principle of international law without which all international law would collapse.” Burroughs highlighted the lack of an incentive for other countries to disarm if the US and Russia maintain “virtual deterrence”.

Ms. Cabasso drew attention to the “human victims” of nuclear weapons, including survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the people of the Marshall Islanders, the “downwinders” from nuclear tests, soldiers “used as guinea pigs,” victims of uranium mining, and anyone living near a nuclear reactor. Ms. Cabasso called for consideration of environmental and health risks, and Mr. Roth added the necessity of discussing the Rocky Flats plant, which closed after health and environmental revelations. Ms. Cabasso drew attention to the NPT’s preamble, which calls for “cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons.”

Cabasso noted that the US nuclear weapons budget is bigger than the entire military budget of all but four other countries. Cabasso also noted policies of “fewer but newer,” and that nuclear enterprises were “increasingly capacity-based.” She also labeled the 2010 NPR as “relegitimizing nuclear weapons.”

Finally, Cabasso focused on the “political price” of ratification of New START and CTBT, as well as the current US political discourse. The most recent US Defense Authorization bill contained provisions for “moderniz[ing] the complex,” and also instructed the administration to avoid discussion of missile defense, conventional weapons, or weaponization of outer space in further arms control negotiations. Not only does this make reversibility possible, Cabasso pointed out, but Russia publicly supports inclusion of these other topics in negotiations.

The panel was followed by free-flowing discussion between the panelists and audience members. Ms. Cabasso and Mr. Roth engaged on the cost of disarmament, with Cabasso highlighting that the disablement process was much simpler than dismantlement, stating, “give me a wire-cutter and a security clearance, and a ball-peen hammer, and I’ll do it myself.” Roth noted that 6 of the 54.5 billion USD spent on nuclear weapons was spent to clean up environmental impacts of weapons production, and that “disarmament is expensive.”

Randy Rydell of the UN Office on Disarmament Affairs provided a closing comment calling for conversation with US Senators and their staff, as well as with nuclear engineers. He invited the disarmament movement to “be like a pilot light, and keep burning.”
On Thursday, the UK and Norway presented their findings from a three year joint initiative evaluating the process of nuclear warhead dismantling verification. This is the first presentation of the findings since the start of the program in 2006 and has culminated in the release of working paper NPT/CONF.2010/WP.41.

The main focus of the project was to determine how a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) may play a constructive role in the dismantling process of nuclear weapons. This is the first time such an initiative has been undertaken. Project representatives from the UK, Norway, and VERTIC presented their questions, challenges, and findings. Panelists identified the security of proliferation sensitive materials and confidence-building as the most important challenges to overcome.

The UK and Norway constructed a simulated environment in which a NNWS would inspect the dismantling process of a nuclear weapon state (NWS). Two countries were invented for the scenario. The role of the “Kingdom of Torland,” a NWS, was played by Norway and the role of the “Republic of Luvania,” a NNWS, was played by the UK. For the simulation, the UK and Norway swapped roles where the UK acted as the inspector (NNWS) and Norway the weapon holding state. A mock nuclear device was constructed using Cobalt 60 as the radioactive material and included the construction of a dismantling facility, laboratory, storage location, documentation, and transportation routes to accurately replicate real world conditions of a verification procedure.

The panelists presented three main challenges: proliferation, security, and managing expectations. They controlled for these challenges through trust building, determination, clearly defined objectives, careful planning of realistic exercises, and shared responsibilities to develop technologies and methodologies.

They split the research component into two major sections: the information barrier and managed access. The information barrier is a device created by the UK and Norwegian teams that detects radiological materials. The barrier attempts to provide sufficient information for verification while avoiding a breach of security. The difficulty is that many devices may provide too much information regarding the nature of the nuclear material. Instead, a portable, modular, low cost, battery operated device provides a simple pass/fail notification to the user as to whether the nuclear contents match what has been declared. The geranium detector and electronic units were designed for off-the-shelf construction for cost effectiveness and reliability.

The managed access portion of the research focused on permitting un-cleared personnel access to a sensitive facility under the terms of an agreed upon protocol. This portion of the research was concerned with how to mitigate the security and proliferation risks associated with access to sensitive sites. The host state deployed many techniques including identity checks, metal detectors, changing of clothing, shrouding of sensitive areas of the weapon, exclusion zones, documentation control, and inspectors under persistent guard.

According to the findings of the project, security risks can be managed. The host needs to know what will be done with the bits and pieces of collected information. Health and safety considerations should be clear as they are often a stronger limiting factor than security concerns. It was also understood that the process demands a considerable amount of resources and requires extensive preparation.

For the inspector, the ability to access all the key areas of a facility is most important. All the tools available to inspectors need to be deployed in a multilayered, multifaceted approach. Physical presence at a facility, CCTV, seals, and technology are important for this process. The technical equipment used for verification needs to be secured and authenticated to ensure proper measuring. When these things are utilized together, a nuclear material chain of custody can be verified with a high degree of certainty.

One issue highlighted for the inspectors is known as the “initialization problem”. Whether an item as declared by a state is, in fact, what it is claimed to be cannot always be declared with 100% certainty. Revealing the entirety of the material poses a security concern for the host state.

The project found that not only can NNWS participate in the verification process; it is desirable they do so to contribute to its development. Trust and confidence are the most important elements in order to construct a robust verification process. The UK, Norway, and VERTIC are committed to continued research and exploration. They will continue to examine some of the key problem areas highlighted by the initiative and urge other states to engage these problems and expand on the work already done.

Joel Van Wagenen is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
News in Brief
Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Main Committee II

Export controls
- Hungary and Australia argued that the RevCon should recognize the importance of export controls in line with SCR1540 and 1887.
- Hungary also urged all countries to draw on the experience of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Middle East
- South Africa stated that the RevCon should call upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear weapon free zones
- Mongolia argued that states parties need to move beyond recognizing and reaffirming the status of Mongolia and recommended that the RevCon express support for its efforts to institutionalize its NWF status and that it should be implemented by NWS in the near future.

Vertical proliferation
- Mexico and Cuba argued that there should also be a focus on the issue of vertical proliferation.

Compliance
- Syria argued that Israel violated Syrian national sovereignty when it destroyed an industrial complex and argued that the attack was a violation of the UN Charter. Syria also stated that its cooperation with IAEA will continue on the basis of the IAEA Statute and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and according to the IAEA, Syria is working in line with what is expected of it.

IAEA safeguards system
- Germany, Czech Republic, Italy, the EU, Australia, Norway, Japan, France, Netherlands, and Ireland argued in favour of considering the additional protocol (AP) + comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) as the verification standard.
- Iran warned that IAEA inspectors should not use inspections to carry out intelligence activities.
- Iran pointed out that the CSA is the agreed mechanism for verification and it argued strongly against any political activities aimed at making the voluntary additional protocol mandatory.
- Iran also argued that as long as NWS do not accept any verification obligations for disarmament, NNWS will not adhere to new ones.
- Brazil and Egypt noted that the adoption of the AP in the IAEA was only made possible through a clear understanding that it was a voluntary instrument and not legally-binding.
- Netherlands and Canada stated that while it was optional to sign and ratify the AP, once it is in force, it is legally-binding.
- Switzerland and Sweden suggested the IAEA look into benefits for countries that adhere to the AP in order to ease the discussion on this issue.
- Australia, France, and the US welcomed the notification that Chad had signed and ratified the CSA and the AP.
- Norway, Ireland, and Egypt referred to the common language in the outcome document of 2000, which referred to the AP.
- Iran argued that there were nuances to be misunderstood in the 2000 outcome document and that this debate has clarified that there is no agreement on the AP.
- Mexico argued that any discussion on more safeguards should be applicable to the NSW as well.
- South Africa and Egypt recognized the divergence in views on the AP and argued that the RevCon should focus on the areas where there is agreement instead of confrontation.
- Egypt noted a disturbing trend which aimed at undermining the CSA as means of verification.
- The US argued that it permitted safeguards on its civilian facilities and that the US declaration on IAEA safeguards was to be updated in the coming weeks.
- Germany argued that if the NWS knew there was a strong and robust safeguard system in place, they might consider more reductions. Germany argued for the need to be more pragmatic and explained that it was like a down payment, “we do it now, and reap the benefits later”.
- Brazil countered this argument by stating that the reductions of stockpiles of 5000 nuclear weapons or more should not be dependent on APs in force in each country, saying that such an argument would only work once the nuclear weapon states are down to “very, very low numbers”.

Confidentiality
- Iran raised concerns over the confidentiality of information provided to IAEA inspectors, arguing that sensitive information is leaking to the media.
- Iran argued for the creation of a mechanism to address such cases.
- Australia argued that the issue of confidentiality would be more appropriately dealt with in the IAEA, rather than in the NPT.
- Ukraine also reported on its problems with confidential information being released and argued that it should not only be left to the IAEA.

continued on next page
News in Brief (cont.)

but instead be raised as a serious problem.

Nuclear security

- Argentina argued that for civilian use, LEU can be just as effective as HEU, and appealed to all countries to convert research reactors and production of radioisotopes to LEU for security reasons.
- Egypt stated that nuclear security was a national responsibility, but that the importance of disarmament for fostering such security is essential and should be mentioned in the outcome document.

Main Committee III

Nuclear safety and security

- Kyrgyzstan noted that uranium waste tailings could result in a global catastrophe if not dealt with properly. It highlighted its working paper and the regional conference it held last year on this issue.
- Jamaica argued that the transshipment of radioactive materials through the Caribbean poses an existential threat to the economic and ecological viability of the region. It called for an end to these shipments, for recognition that the concerns of small island states and coastal states are justified on this issue, and recognition that the responsibility of protecting the marine environment from the risks of such shipments should be borne by those doing the shipping.
- Iran and Libya argued that nuclear security is a national responsibility.
- Jamaica, Iran, and Singapore highlighted the valuable role of the IAEA in promoting and ensuring nuclear safety and safety standards.
- Iran expressed concern that some developing countries have not been permitted to participate in nuclear safety workshops due to political motivations and called on the IAEA to host nuclear safety trainings so that all members could participate.

Transfer denials

- Iran expressed concern that some nuclear suppliers deny transfers to NPT states parties on the pretext of nuclear security concerns and called on the RevCon to address transfer denials in a way that ensures without discrimination states parties access to peaceful uses as enshrined in the IAEA Statute and article IV.

Attacks on nuclear facilities

- Australia, commenting on the NAM’s call for a prohibition on attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities, agreed that an attack on such a facility could be in contravention of international law and hazardous to humans and the environment, but argued that the NAM language calling for a prohibition on all such attacks is “too prescriptive”.

Technical cooperation and assistance

- Egypt, Iran, and South Africa called for the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme to be funded from the IAEA’s regular budget.
- Indonesia called for a balanced approach to strengthen the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, urging states to avoid an approach based on the dichotomy between donor and recipient countries or between developed and developing countries.
- Egypt called on the RevCon to emphasize that technical cooperation shall not be subject to any political, military, or economic provisions except those in conformity with the IAEA Statute and article IV.
- Philippines called for the RevCon to reiterate that the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme is the primary vehicle for implementing article IV.
- Canada said the IAEA should take into account socioeconomic needs of developing countries through its Technical Cooperation Programme and that the Programme should be more transparent, accountable, and results-oriented.
- Egypt argued that the current guidelines for the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme are sufficient and that the IAEA is not a development agency and therefore is not equipped to assess the development needs of countries. It argued that the IAEA can only assess the technical feasibility and proliferation risks of a state’s request but that it is not up to the IAEA to assess whether that request is relevant.

Trade and cooperation with non-state parties

- Saudi Arabia noted that some supplier states employ double standards when dealing with non-NPT members, in contravention of article II. It called on all states to suspend nuclear trade with Israel unless it joins the NPT as a NNWS.
- Egypt said the RevCon should take clear action to cease all forms of technical cooperation with non-state parties and those without full scope safeguards.

continued on next page
Multilateral nuclear fuel assurances

- Egypt said it is ready to engage in discussing the idea of multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle but that any proposals have to be consistent with the NPT, cannot discriminate against those with IAEA safeguards, and cannot not benefit non-NPT states.
- Indonesia called on all discussions related to this issue to be transparent, comprehensive, and inclusive; that any discussion on basic mechanisms has to take place before discussions on specific proposals can begin; that only NPT states parties should benefit from such mechanisms as an effort to promote universality of the Treaty and prevent withdrawal from it; and that whatever conceptual framework is decided upon, it has to be a consensual agreement.
- Philippines called for the RevCon outcome document to: recognize that multilateral IAEA-based approaches to the fuel cycle would benefit states by providing options for supply and services while serving as tool to strengthen the non-proliferation regime; that the consultation process should be continued in a transparent way within the framework of the IAEA; and that any resulting mechanism would ensure equal access to nuclear fuel.
- Philippines agreed with Indonesia that discussions should discuss the issue in a broad way rather than focus on specific proposals at this time.
- Australia and Argentina noted that there seemed to be common ground that this discussion should take place in the context of the IAEA.
- Australia also argued that the idea isn’t to deny any NPT state its article IV rights but to encourage states to “at least consider” not developing a complete national fuel cycle.
- Brazil said it should be made clear that discussion of this issue cannot impinge upon article IV and that it should not hinder the international market of nuclear goods and services.
- Iran argued that if the IAEA is to establish a fuel assurance mechanism, it must first agree on common principles and objectives that would automatically apply to all of the proposals.
- Czech Republic argued that an effective and reliable fuel cycle mechanism would offset any interruption from the regular market; that it would be more cost effective than developing a national fuel cycle capacity; that it would help prevent concerns over proliferation; that it would be voluntary; and that it would be implemented independently by the IAEA.
What’s On
Today’s Calendar of Events

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 8:00–8:50
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Off-the-record government briefing for NGOs:
Delegation of Australia
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Interim Reports + Main Committee I
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean peninsula
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00
Contact: Ms. Oh Hye-ran, SPARK

Uranium Mining, the need for responsible development, and promoting Alternative Energy to nuclear energy
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Giorgio Alba, Ban All Nukes generation

Promoting Access to Civil Nuclear Energy and its responsible development
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Main Committee II
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00

Fissile Materials, FMCT, and Nuclear Disarmament
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–17:00
Contact: Zia Mian, International Panel on Fissile Materials

Nuclear Postures for Disarmament

Monday, May 17
1:15 to 2:45
Conference Room 2

“Why the outcome of the 2010 NPT Rev Con matters.”
-Jayantha Dhanapala, President, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; former Under Secretary General of the UN, Department of Disarmament Affairs

“What Role for Deterrence on the Road to Nuclear Disarmament?”
-Dr. Arjun Makhijani, President, the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
The NPT, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Disarmament

The International Panel on Fissile Materials will introduce proposals for how the 2010 NPT Review Conference can further disarmament and nonproliferation objectives by focusing on fissile materials, the ingredients in nuclear weapons.

Speakers will chart a way forward for achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons, including options for declaring and verifying stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the plutonium and highly enriched uranium that can be used to make them, monitoring nuclear warhead dismantlement and the disposition of fissile materials, ending the production of fissile materials for weapons, and the role of nuclear energy in a disarming world.

Speakers: Frank von Hippel
Zia Mian
Alexander Glaser
Harold Feiveson

Friday, May 14, 3:00-5:00 p.m., NGO Room A
North Lawn Building, United Nations, NY