Delegations continued their debates over the committee draft texts on Tuesday. As only Main Committee II held official meetings, much of the debate concerned non-proliferation issues such as safeguards, non-compliance, and the role of non-parties to the NPT.

The textual amendments called for by various delegations highlighted some key divergences. The western countries continued to propose more specific language on the role of the additional protocol, concrete conditions for export control, and the importance of compliance with IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions.

The Non-Aligned Movement, on the other hand, called for the deletion of all references to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), anything that implies that the additional protocol should be considered as a part of today’s verification standard, and any further measures than the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) as a condition for export of nuclear material.

As these opposing positions came to a head inside the UN, a few significant events occurred outside that have a direct bearing on the success of the Review Conference and the future of non-proliferation.

On Sunday, the governments of Brazil, Turkey, and Iran brokered a deal in Tehran for the Iranian government to send the bulk of its uranium to Turkey, under the supervision of the IAEA, for enrichment for its medical reactor. The deal accomplishes the same objective as a western-backed IAEA proposal from last year, which called for the nuclear material to be sent to Russia and then France for refinement and enrichment. The idea is to keep Iran’s uranium enrichment levels below that which is required for a nuclear bomb in order to bolster the international community’s confidence in Iran’s activities.

However, on Tuesday, the United States announced that it had reached agreement with the UN Security Council on a new sanctions resolution against Iran. US Secretary of State Clinton “shrugged off” the Tehran deal, arguing that “questions” about the deal still remain. Clinton described the new sanctions resolution to be “as convincing an answer” to this deal “as any we could provide”.

The pursuit of further sanctions at this critical point in time—right after the announcement of an international deal that addresses the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme in a manner previously endorsed by western governments and also right in the middle of the Review Conference—brings up the question if this is an appropriate way of achieving a successful RevCon or solving the crisis of confidence over Iran’s programme.

Then there is the recent press over the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, which is taking international flack for violating the NPT and for undermining the NSG. In the US media, the deal is also accused of hemming Obama’s push for nuclear non-proliferation. Ironically, most US press coverage has not drawn a parallel between this deal and the notorious US-India deal, for which the United States strong-armed the NSG into granting an exemption for its supplier states to engage in nuclear trade with India, a non-NPT state party. The aftermath of this deal and exemption has entrenched the double standards already inherent within the NPT, making it more difficult for states engaging in trade with India to legitimately argue that non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty should take on increased non-proliferation commitments, such as the additional protocol.

The effects of these double standards were clearly visible during the intensive debate in Main Committee II on Tuesday, during which Japan, the EU, and the US questioned the NAM’s call to delete any references to the NSG. In response, the Egyptian delegation strongly argued that it is not possible to speak proudly of the NSG in the context of the NPT. Egypt’s representative asked what it was the Conference actually should reaffirm—that the NSG violated the NPT? “Are we supposed to applaud this and the dire consequences it has for the Treaty?” he asked.

continued on page 9
What is this NPT RevCon all about? You might as well ask someone with multiple personality disorder to fill out a short biographical questionnaire.

The disarmament personality—let’s call her “Abby”—wants the Conference to produce a roadmap to a nuclear-weapons-free world. Abby, however, is having a hard time settling on whether the roadmap is a ramped up version of the 13-step action plan adopted in 2000, or Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s five-point disarmament plan, or the Nuclear Weapons Convention, which looks beyond the NPT itself to the actual fulfillment of Article VI.

NGOs have been advocating the comprehensive approach outlined in the Model NWC, which has also found favor with the UN Secretary-General and dozens of NPT states who have endorsed it in their Conference statements. In any case, Abby doesn’t much care for the one-step-at-a-time swamp in which the nuclear-weapon states are still mired, even with their newfound commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

Then there’s “Pandora,” the non-proliferation personality, whose main concern is that the box of nuclear demons stay closed on any state that hasn’t already gotten loose. Pandora has her mind on safeguards, and the tightening of loopholes, and punishments for non-compliance with Articles II and III. She’s also a bit obsessed with Article X—the withdrawal provision—and with keeping the lid on the box that she opened in the first place. Conveniently for them, the NPT nuclear-weapon states, who were outside the box when it got clamped shut, can’t seem to get back inside just yet. As long as they behave, Pandora won’t make a big issue out of that. The Nuclear Weapons Convention looks to Pandora like something out of ... well ... Greek mythology.

Pandora has a brother, Reg, who believes that the path to a nuclear-weapons-free world of necessity runs through the Middle East. Since Israel already has nuclear weapons and, as a non-NPT state, is the elephant in the room, Reg has to be taken seriously. The question is “Which comes first, global abolition or a WMD-free Middle East?” Reg and Abby don’t necessarily see eye-to-eye on that one.

Of all the NPT’s multiple personalities (“alters”), the loudest and most disruptive is “The Salesman.” This Review Conference has been dominated by the nuclear energy industry and its client states, who are relentlessly exploiting Article IV in an effort to remake the Treaty into a marketing platform for the global expansion of nuclear-generated electricity—what Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research calls an outdated 20th century technology for boiling water.

Article IV was bad enough when it was used as a means to assist states that had already shown the poor judgment to choose the “peaceful” nuclear option. Now the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy has become the bumper sticker slogan for a new consortium of state and corporate partners who are aggressively pushing reactors onto vulnerable, struggling countries and—surprise—positioning themselves to make a fortune in a potentially lucrative fuel reprocessing market. For The Salesman, a successful NPT Review means developing a business plan that can start the profits flowing while papering over the proliferation risks, not to mention the health and environmental consequences, of the so-called nuclear renaissance.

The NGOs who condemned this scheme during one of the presentations on 7 May are hoping that a new personality—Irena—will send The Salesman packing. If Irena can get heard over the noise, she will tell developing states that their real inalienable right to a strong, sustainable economy that takes global warming seriously will be best served by leapfrogging over the obsolete, unaffordable, and dangerous nuclear “option.”

I’m not a psychiatrist, but I’m told that the desired outcome for patients with multiple personality disorder is a functional person whose “alters” can come together around a common sense of purpose. Abby, Pandora, Reg, and Irena ought to be able work something out. The Salesman, on the other hand, is a mendacious troublemaker who requires a different kind of clinical intervention.
Division of timeframes for achieving abolition
Tim Wright | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

In Monday’s Main Committee I debate, governments provided preliminary feedback on the 26-point action plan on nuclear disarmament released last Friday. France argued that the language on elimination was too strong, preferring a watered-down commitment by States parties to create “the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”, rather than a commitment actually to achieve nuclear abolition.

The European Union said it would “not express itself on the issue of timeframes”, suggesting that there is division on this issue among member states. The two nuclear-weapon States in the EU, France and the United Kingdom, have resisted any attempts to set benchmarks for the implementation of their Article VI obligation to disarm, while one EU member (Austria) has been advocating strongly for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Iran also expressed support for timeframes on achieving abolition and stated its view that the Review Conference would not be successful unless it could reach an agreement to begin work on a convention: “We believe this is the time that once and for all we should set a clear deadline for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and it would be possible through the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.”

Many NGOs are making clear to diplomats that they support the specific proposal for the UN Secretary-General to convene an international conference before the next NPT Review Conference to consider a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe, including by means of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The consultations which would pave the way to such a conference should include all states, not just the nuclear-weapon States.

It is inauspicious that the very day the draft 26-point action plan on disarmament was released, the White House issued a press release outlining its plan to invest $US80 billion in modernizing its nuclear arsenal in order to ensure that it remains “safe, secure, and reliable”. This is not the kind of “new start” that disarmament advocates had hoped to see in the United States.

It is disingenuous for the United States to claim that it supports the “vision” of a nuclear-weapon-free world, when at the same time it is taking steps which will all but guarantee that its nuclear forces are maintained indefinitely into the future. This kind of mass investment in nuclear weapons is a violation of the “good faith” obligation under the NPT to disarm, and yet few governments have been willing to criticize the Obama administration. That must change.

The final outcome document adopted by this Review Conference should clearly reject all kinds of nuclear weapons modernization, and put a timeline on disarmament. President Obama said in Prague last year that we are unlikely to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world in his lifetime. His current actions make failure all but certain. There are 189 parties to the NPT, not five. The nuclear-weapon states must not be permitted to dictate the terms. Or else our dream of a future free from the nuclear menace will remain just that—a dream.

Tim Wright is the NWC Project Coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

Expanding Risk:
Nuclear Energy & Proliferation

Date: Thursday 20 May, 1.15pm-2.45pm
Conference Room A

Greenpeace cordially invites you to the unveiling of a new report on the risks posed by global nuclear power expansion and multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle.

Speakers (report authors):
Dr. Frank Barnaby
Shaun Burnie

www.greenpeace.org
Why the outcome matters
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

This event, hosted by the Institute for Energy and Environment Research and co-sponsored by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, asked why the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference matters and what is the role for nuclear deterrence on the road to disarmament?

Dr. Arjun Makhijani, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, described how the concept of nuclear deterrence goes back to the beginning of the nuclear age. At that time, the US intended to deter any kind of action that was considered to threaten its national interests. Dr. Makhijani said that the government believed that the possession of nuclear weapons can compel other countries to do what you want them to do and he emphasized that this still is still a mainstream believe today.

Even though we have an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, Dr. Makhijani argued that nuclear weapons are still used as a threat in the same way you are point a gun towards someone. He said that we have seen this kind of threats being used by states today and that we can see examples of this mindset still in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director and Co-founder of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, contended that it is not nuclear deterrence in itself that is the problem but rather whether you believe that nuclear weapons play a role in maintaining security. Dr. Johnson views the investments in modernizing nuclear weapons as a proof that the mindset not has changed enough. She emphasized that the argument of no first strike not is enough as it still legitimizes a second strike. Dr. Johnson requested the development of international law against nuclear weapons and said that if we worry about nuclear proliferation and terrorists we need to make it clear that nuclear weapons are illegal.

Jayantha Dhanapala, president of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, discussed why the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference matters. He warned that a conference without a document or a weak document could do incredible harm and damage to the survivability of the Treaty. He welcomed the new progress between Iran and the IAEA and hoped that this issue would be solved during the Conference. Dhanapala also noted the importance of mentioning a nuclear weapons convention in the final document, if not directly then at least indirectly.

Why the outcome matters (cont.)

The issue Dhanapala expressed most concern with was the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. He argued that the Arab states felt betrayed because of the lack of progress regarding this issue. He worries that it could break down the Review Conference if left unresolved. The situation in the Middle East became the main subject in the discussion that followed the statements of the panelists.

Cheaper, deeper security
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday, Mediators Beyond Borders held an event entitled, “Cheaper, Deeper Security—Conflict Transformation and Second Order Change”. The event offered a theory-based analysis of how to deal with challenges of thinking about nuclear weapons and security.

Diane Perlman, representative of Psychologists for Social Responsibility said that the way most people think about security is problematic. She argued that we have to think outside the box to be able to solve our security problems. She refereed to group think theory by Irving Janis, which says that people tend to surround themselves with people who agree with them and echo the same concepts, which leads to an exclusion of those who disagree. The way one frames and defines a problem affects the way everyone involved thinks about it. She underlined how a phrase like “oil exploration” is used instead of “drill for oil,” in order to affect the response by people. She urged everyone to demystify language to show people what it’s all about. It is not enough to know the fact that nuclear weapons are dangerous.

Karl Mercier from Mediators Beyond Borders gave practical advice in how to mediate. He said that it is important to focus on interests and not positions. Mr. Mercier underlined that opinions often are experienced as truths, especially when many share them. Ms. Pelman exemplified group thinking within the NPT as including discussions about the “three pillars” or “nuclear deterrence”.

Ms. Pelman also mentioned systems theory, arguing that delegates and NGOs are each stuck in their own, distinct systems. She argued that it is impossible to solve the problems inside of these frames. This statement was later followed by a general discussion on the importance of the interaction between delegates and the civil society. •
Christopher Ford of the Hudson Institute presented a series of paradigmatic questions on the nuclear disarmament dialogue of today. He premised his thinking on the recognition that the US is seeking a nuclear disarmament dialogue predicated on the three NPT pillars and that improved non-proliferation cooperation can be purchased by showing more disarmament credibility. A thought emerging from this theory is that the requirements placed on the US to make their disarmament activity credible are always almost being achieved, but are never quite enough to be truly credible—there are still nuclear weapons, and the end goal is still zero, therefore when will the disarmament community recognize that nuclear weapon states have made enough of a step down the road to disarmament that non-nuclear weapon states will make a stand against proliferation?

Ford argued that zero nuclear weapons will not be achieved by keeping the world we have today and just subtracting the nuclear weapons. Zero is not achievable in the presence of today’s unbalanced conventional power. Disarmament advocates appear to be increasing their attention on other US military capabilities because of this—yet risk blocking the entire nuclear disarmament process, much the way discussions in the Conference on Disarmament were blocked for years because of linkages between a fissile materials treaty and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. While the world overall must change, how are disarmament advocates approaching the need for that change, he asked?

Ford broke down his analysis of the theories by presenting alternative conceptual frameworks for consideration—peer group multilateralism and a predominant actor model. He explained that peer group multilateralism is predicated on an ethic of collective action among equals while the predominant actor model (which has been reflected in the thinking of multiple US administrations) considers multilateral institutions to be potentially inadequate for addressing challenges to international peace and security. This model requires a predominant actor around whom serious responses can crystallize, especially where military force is necessary. In this model, a degree of asymmetry is necessary to the global order so an actor is available to step in.

Ford argued, the issue of nuclear weapons cannot be totally separated from broader issues or conventional weapons discussions. Disarmament advocates, in requiring the smoothing of uneven distribution of military capabilities towards a peer group multilateralism may be stalling the progress for nuclear disarmament. This, according to Ford, may be creating a rather awkward time for the disarmament movement.

Whither nuclear weapons?
Susi Snyder | IKV Pax Christi
Where to go from here?
Joel Van Wagenen | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday, a panel discussion featuring Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala and sponsored by the Middle Powers Initiative looked at “where to go from here”. Amb. Dhanapala opened the discussion by indicating that to know where we are going is to know where we are currently. He expressed that he was hesitant to make a clear determination of that but explored some of the points contained in the current draft text and added his own interpretations from his past experiences.

One of the major limitations of the current document, argued Amb. Dhanapala, is the suspicious absence of an indication of the robust role played by nuclear doctrine. While the phrase nuclear doctrine is included in the document, Amb. Dhanapala suggested that it needs “more meat” and even a separate paragraph to highlight its significance.

During the discussion, several participants stressed the importance of NGOs engaging in discussions with diplomats. A few individuals noted the deep need for communication that not only facilitates an understanding of what civil society sees for the outcome of the NPT Review Conference but also a serious attempt to understand how different state representatives see this issue and what they need from civil society.

Several people noted that NGOs fill an important role within the broader international relations community but all need to take care in disseminating their message to the public, delegates, and the rest of civil society. Attention must be given to how each of these groups relate to one another and that the messages received from civil society match their intentions.

The second broad group of questions were in regard to what the outcome of the NPT Review Conference would mean for American politics. Of particular interest was how the Conference might affect President Obama. Amb. Dhanapala believed that, from his experiences in Washington, a failure to arrive at a consensus document would inflate an already vocal Tea Party and be used as a “stick with which to beat him.” Failure would indicate Obama’s inability to carry out his championed issue and may even risk a loss to Republicans during the November Congressional elections.

Contrary to this perspective, others argued the outcome of the NPT is of no real consequence to his administration, or rather, the effect will be the same no matter the outcome. A failure would indicate the president’s inability to carry out his goal and a success would be used to demonstrate the president’s willingness to delegate US security to an international body. Others still argued nuclear disarmament or arms control issues have never really played a serious role in US elections.
Main Committee II

Procedural issues

• The Chair of MCII explained that overlap issues would be sorted out by the Main Committee Chairs, and gave his personal view that the issues of CTBT and FMCT should be dealt with in MCI, the reverting of HEU to LEU in nuclear reactions should be dealt with in MCIII, and that all issues related to the physical protection, nuclear safety and nuclear terrorism should remain in MCII.

• The Chair also announced that he was collecting written amendments and proposals, and by Thursday morning he will circulate an amended draft, which could then be discussed on Friday.

• The US raised concerns over the amount of amendments proposed by the NAM.

Previous commitments

• Ireland noted the importance of recommitting to past agreements and argued that without that, we are building on a shaky foundation.

• Canada was concerned that some of the proposals from NAM included amendments to text agreed upon in 1995 and 2000 and suggested that perhaps the section of reaffirmation instead could consist of a paragraph or two that instead made factual references to past agreements.

IAEA institutional issues

• NAM explained that the language proposed builds on 2000 and moving forward, arguing that by simply reaffirming past agreements, the RevCon will move not make progress.

Nuclear weapon states

• Ireland supported full safeguard inspections on the peaceful nuclear facilities of nuclear weapon states.

• NAM suggested an additional paragraph that would emphasize the IAEA’s capability to verify nuclear disarmament and urge all nuclear weapon states, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to put their nuclear materials and facilities under the IAEA safeguards.

• NAM suggested an additional paragraph that called upon the nuclear weapon states to withdraw any deployed nuclear weapons from territories of other states parties.

IAEA comprehensive safeguard agreement (CSA) and additional protocol (AP)

• Australia also requested the draft to note that 100 APs are now in force and that once the CSA and AP are in force, they should be read and interpreted as one agreement.

• Ireland supported the strong role of the IAEA in the draft and welcomed that it noted that the CSA and AP now is the current verification standard.

• Norway argued that paragraph 49, which deals with implementation of integrated safeguards, was too passive and that integrated safeguards should be the norm.

• NAM suggested that the words “the understanding that the adherence to the Additional Protocol is of a voluntary nature” should be added to the endorsement of the AP in paragraph 10.

• NAM requested that a reference to strengthening safeguards to increase its ability to detect undeclared activities be deleted.

• NAM requested that references to the importance of entry into force and implementation of APs be deleted and proposed an additional paragraph to clarify the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations.

• Iran argued that the AP is not attached to article III, it is just a recommendation of the secretariat of the IAEA. Iran further argued that the AP is not legally-binding and no matter how many countries chose to join it, it is a sovereign decision.

• Egypt stated that if the IAEA could not function without AP, we would have seen more serious proliferation challenges. Egypt argued that the IAEA has done an excellent job so far, and to say that an AP is needed is to undermine both the IAEA and the wisdom of the treaty.

• The Republic of Korea noted that 100 countries have brought the AP into force and thought that this fact spoke for itself. While noting that it is a voluntary measure at this point, ROK argued that the standard needs to be upgraded.

• Brazil reminded delegations that while the CSA only deals with declared material, it actually includes an obligation to declare all relevant material and failure to do so is a violation of the agreement.

continued on next page
News in Brief (cont.)

- Brazil pointed out that if a country violates its obligation under article II of the NPT, it will violate both the CSA and the AP.
- Brazil expressed concern that countries without an AP are being looked upon as in non-compliance with the NPT. Brazil emphasized that this is not true and such kind of interpretation would be unacceptable.

Compliance

- Australia asked for the draft to reaffirm that states parties must fully comply with their safeguard agreements and their relevant UN Security Council resolutions as well as fully comply with the IAEA in implementing these.
- Australia suggested that the draft should include a paragraph that affirms that acceptance of safeguards under article III requires not only the state to bring such agreement into force, but also to fully comply with it.
- The United States suggested a new paragraph encouraging all states to comply with the Treaty by discouraging other states not to develop nuclear weapons.
- NAM suggested that paragraphs dealing with the fundamental importance of compliance should highlight that such compliance should concern all provisions of the Treaty.

Role of the UN Security Council (UNSC)

- Australia asked for the deletion of the word “sole” in paragraph 7 since it believes that the IAEA is not the sole body for ensuring compliance. Instead, Australia regards that the UNSC has an important role in ensuring compliance with safeguards.
- Iran argued that it could not permit the IAEA to be undermined by removing the “sole” role of this Agency.
- The Republic of Korea agreed that the IAEA is central, but argued that the role of the UNSC also is important, since this is built into the statute of the Agency.

Universality

- Ireland supported the calls for universality in the draft.
- The United States requested that the names Israel, India, and Pakistan be replaced by “states not parties to the NPT”.
- Iran voiced concerns over the US proposal, arguing that it implied that the US not only does not mind that these countries remain outside the Treaty, but that it is not even willing to send a simple message to them.
- Egypt argued that universality was a central theme of 1995 and a crucial requirement for the implementation of the Treaty.

Export controls

- New Zealand supported the paragraphs of the draft that dealt with export controls and argued that an AP should be a requirement for such agreements.
- NAM proposed an additional paragraph that would recognize that supply arrangements inconsistent with agreements from 1995 and 2000 are undermining the Treaty.
- NAM argued that all references to NSG and Zangger should be deleted.
- NAM proposed that paragraph 58 be deleted, which encouraged states to consider whether a recipient state has brought into force an AP in making nuclear export decisions and instead suggested a paragraph that would state that parties should refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on nuclear exports and another paragraph calling for existing restrictions or limitations to be removed.
- NAM requested any supplier arrangement to be transparent and take appropriate measures to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by states parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.
- NAM proposed a new paragraph that would call upon nuclear weapon states to refrain strictly from cooperating with non-parties to the NPT and undertake not to transfer any nuclear

Answers to yesterday’s Nuclear Crossword
material, equipment, information, knowledge, and technology to them.

- Ukraine suggested that the references should be kept, and argued that NSG and Zangger works on the administrative and technical measures to implement non-proliferation and failure to take note of this in the draft would be wrong.

- Iran argued that the NSG and Zangger are exclusive control regimes that have so far undermined the NPT. Iran further argued that the NSG is not committed to the principles of the NPT, because it violated such principles in the case of India and made compromises on political grounds. Iran stated that it could not be expected that the NPT could endorse such a double standard.

- Japan argued that the NSG simply consists of a group of countries that tries to fulfil article I and II of the NPT.

- Egypt asked what the Conference should reaffirm concerning the NSG, asking if states should reaffirm the NSG’s violation of the NPT or its cooperation with non-NPT states. Egypt argued that because the dire consequences that the NSG waiver for India caused, the RevCon should not proudly speak of the NSG.

- Egypt also questioned who gave the NSG its authority and what should be done about it.

**Nuclear weapon free zones**

- Ireland wanted the draft to urge all states to bring into force protocols to NWFZ and withdraw any reservations or interpretations that are incompatible with such treaties.

- NAM suggested an additional paragraph on this issue, underlining that the respect for the NWFZ by nuclear weapon and neighboring states constitutes an important nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitment.

- NAM proposed an additional paragraph expressing regret that no meaningful progress has been achieved since 2000 with respect to the ratification of relevant protocols or the withdrawal of any related reservation or unilateral interpretative declaration.

- The US proposed that paragraph 68, which calls on nuclear weapons states to reconsider their position on reservations and interpretative declarations to NWFZ, be deleted because such reservations and interpretations are unilateral rights of states under international law.

- Mexico asked to keep paragraph 68, since it does not impose any obligations on nuclear weapon states, rather only asks them to reconsider their reservations and interpretations. Mexico stated that they were willing to work on another wording, but that they wanted to keep the paragraph.

- Mexico proposed that the Meeting of States Parties of NWFZ should be held within the framework of the forthcoming NPT Review Conferences. The dates and other logistical arrangements of the first meeting will be decided during the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

**Nuclear security**

- The US proposed references to UNSC resolutions 1540, 1673, and 1810 as well as to the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

- NAM requested that paragraphs 62, 63, and 64, which deal with conventions on nuclear safety and security, should be moved to MCIII.

**Fissile material**

- The US said it wanted to remove paragraph 51, which calls on the nuclear weapon states to place fissile material no longer used for military purposes under IAEA verification, since it believed that this should be dealt with in MCI.

- Norway supported the inclusion of paragraph 51 for the moment, since it reflects the will of states parties and will eventually be synchronized with the other sections in a final document.

**HEU and LEU**

- NAM suggested deleting paragraph 29, which recognizes the benefits of the minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications and noted the contribution to non-proliferation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative for removal of highly enriched uranium

- Ukraine argued that diverting the use of HEU to LEU is a question linked to non-proliferation and should not be left to MCIII.

**Confidentiality**

- NAM suggested the inclusion of a paragraph noting the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards.

If the outcome of this Review Conference stands a chance of increasing international peace and security, of preventing proliferation, and of achieving disarmament, states parties must seek consistency between their words and actions and between their own behaviour and the behaviour they expect from others.
What’s On
Today’s Calendar of Events

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 8:00–8:50
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Government Briefing: Netherlands
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Plenary Meeting + Main Committee I
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00 (begins after plenary)

Strategy session for European NGOs
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00
Contact: Tarja Cronberg, Peace Union of Finland

Cry of Creation
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Charles Osango, CND Kenya

The CTBT: Is It Verifiable?
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Jenifer Mackby, CSIS

Main Committee II
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00

Film screening: Hibakusha, Our Life to Live
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00
Contact: David Rothauser

New publication from Reaching Critical Will
soft cover • 296 pages • March 2010 • 10USD

Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament is a collaborative work of 25 non-governmental researchers and activists who critically examine the mainstream discourse of nuclear weapons. The book explores some of the most important challenges that governments and civil society will face at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and beyond, highlighting the prospects and pitfalls for nuclear disarmament in the current world order.

Throughout, the authors demonstrate that nuclear disarmament must be pursued in the context of a broader movement for social and economic justice and equality. The military utility of nuclear weapons may be diminishing in the current world order, but nuclear weapons and nuclear power are still useful to the economic and political elite of many countries and will thus be pursued by others seeking the same elite status. The first step on this road is distinguishing the rhetoric from the reality and creating a new discourse for nuclear disarmament that promotes true human security.