Potential approaches toward building consensus for looking at a framework for consideration of preparatory measures that could change the conditions for progress toward a step-by-step approach for considering nuclear disarmament?

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Wednesday morning, Main Committee I engaged in a vigorous debate about the concept of a “timebound framework” for disarmament. This phrase refers quite simply to putting some sort of timeline on implementing nuclear disarmament commitments—an idea which has been supported by the overwhelming majority of delegations at this Review Conference.

The Treaty’s non-proliferation obligations are in force swiftly and perpetuity. As noted in the NPT News in Review editorial on 5 May, the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement must be concluded within 90 days of ratification and stays in force indefinitely, providing a clear benchmark by which to measure states’ compliance.

It is not so clear with disarmament. Most of the nuclear weapon states contend that they have acted in accordance with their obligations under article VI; some, such as the UK and France, have argued that they have complied with all of the 13 practical steps that apply to them. However, there is no benchmark by which to measure the pace at which they comply, the degree to which they comply, the sustainability, the verifiability, or the irreversibility, of said compliance. At the same time, some of the nuclear weapon states engage in activities that undermine the Treaty, such as nuclear sharing, supplying nuclear technology and materials to non-states parties, conducting subcritical nuclear tests, and modernizing or “refurbishing” their nuclear weapons and related infrastructure.

However, the nuclear weapon states clearly expressed their unwillingness to set benchmarks or timeframes for implementing their obligations. The French delegation called for the deletion of paragraph B5 from the first draft of the Chair’s text, which says, “The Conference agrees on the need to implement article VI within a timebound framework.” Ambassador Danon argued that the imposition of “artificial deadlines” in nuclear disarmament has never worked and said that timelines would weaken the non-proliferation regime because nothing is gained by imposing deadlines and not meeting them.

A critical look at this assertion reveals the double standard: that deadlines or timeframes for disarmament cannot be established, or if established, they cannot be expected to be met, because they are “artificial,” but that deadlines and timeframes must be imposed and met for non-proliferation in order to remain “in compliance” with one’s Treaty obligations.

While the US and Russian delegations supported France’s perspective and also argued against the “imposition” of “deadlines,” a number of delegations reacted strongly against this, including Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Iran, South Africa, the Philippines, Algeria, Libya, Cuba, and Canada. A few states, including New Zealand and Mexico, described some of France’s proposed amendments as “unacceptable”; New Zealand’s ambassador said they have “the effect of lowering the level of aspiration and warmth in the present draft.”

Specifically on the issue of timeframes, Indonesia’s delegation pointed out that when states gave up the option of pursuing nuclear weapons, they did so with the understanding that nuclear weapons would do the same at some point. South Africa’s representative cautioned that the non-nuclear weapon states are reaching levels of desperation because they have not yet seen concrete action on nuclear disarmament as specified in article VI. Algeria’s delegation noted that timelines simply offer a tool by which to measure progress, which is something uniquely lacking when it comes to article VI. And the Canadian delegation, in typical bridge-building fashion, called for language that avoids both overly prescriptive timeframes and no timeframes at all.

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Drafts in Contrast
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Overview of the new draft action plan on nuclear disarmament

- The revised draft action plan consists of 24 actions instead of 26.
- Most of the initial “objectives and principles” remain unchanged, but there is one addition emphasizing that states “not undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.”
- In Actions 1 and 2, dealing with objectives of achieving a world without nuclear weapons and principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency, the words “shall” has been replaced with “commit to”.
- In Action 3, which deals with reductions of all types of nuclear weapons, the words “shall undertake” have been replaced by “commit to undertake”. The modified action also states that the reductions are to be carried out verifiably, and adds a call upon all states possessing nuclear weapons to join concrete disarmament efforts.
- In Action 5, the undertaking to cease improvement and development of new nuclear weapons has been amended to “commit to constrain the development and qualitative improvement”. The references to ceasing developing new military missions and new military capabilities for nuclear weapons have been deleted.
- The specific deadline of 2011 for consultations to accelerate progress on nuclear disarmament laid out in Action 6 has been amended to convening “timely consultations”.
- In Action 6a, “rapid conclusion of negotiations on reductions of all types of nuclear weapons” has been changed to “rapidly pursue an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons”.
- In Action 6b, when addressing questions of weapons stationed on other territories, the words “all types” of such weapons and “related infrastructure” have been added.
- In Action 6c, the reference to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in strategic concepts of military and political alliances has been deleted.
- In Action 6d, declaratory policies for minimizing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are now emphasized to be an “interim measure pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.
- Action 6e has replaced “concrete measures to further reduce the operational status” to “consider further reducing operational status” and has deleted “with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status” replacing it with “in ways that promote international stability and security”.
- In the final part of Action 6 one finds parts of Action 7 from the previous draft. The deadline of 2012 for reporting on these measures has been deleted and replaced by a call to report back in the upcoming review cycle. In this new version, the UN Secretary-General is invited to convene an “open-ended high-level meeting” instead the previously suggested international conference, and the purpose of such a meeting is now “to take stock and agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including by means of a universal, legal instrument”.
- Instead, a new Action 7 has been added, which states that the Conference on Disarmament “should immediately establish an appropriate subsidiary body to exchange views on practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of elimination, including approaches toward potential future work of multilateral character.”
- The section on security assurances now emphasizes that the security assurances given to non-nuclear weapons under UNSC resolution 984 are “conditional or unconditional security assurances”.
- Action 8 remains unchanged.
- In Action 9, nuclear weapon states now “commit to fully respect” instead of “shall respect” their existing commitments with regard to security assurances.

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In Action 10, the establishment of new nuclear weapon free zones should now be done in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the UN Disarmament Commission and now also encourages nuclear weapon states to “consider the withdrawal” of reservations or interpretative declarations of such zones.

In the section on nuclear testing, the new draft adds that the CTBT is a core element of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and reaffirms the importance of the determination of the NWS to abide by their moratoria on nuclear test explosions.

In Action 11, a new sentence on the potential beneficial impact of ratification by NWS that have not yet done so in encouraging Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the CTBT.

In Action 12, the previous call that states “shall refrain” from nuclear weapon test explosions has been modified to “commit to refrain”.

In Action 13, “all states undertake to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made” has been changed to “signatories to the CTBT commit to report”.

In Action 14 remains unchanged.

In Action 15, the call on all states to develop the CTBT verification regime has been amended to only concern “all states that are signatories to the CTBT”. A new reference to the mandate given to the International Monitoring System by the CTBTO is also included.

In Action 16 in the new draft has been modified from a call that states “shall close and dismantle remaining sites for nuclear test explosions, to instead be “encouraged to initiate a process towards the closing and dismantling”.

In Action 18, instead of an undertaking to seek a global moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, states now “recognise” that such a moratorium is an important contribution to achieving goals of the treaty, and NWS should therefore uphold or “consider declaring” such moratoria.

In Action 19 from the first draft, where the NWS undertook to declare all weapons-usable fissile material stocks by 2010, is deleted.

In the new Action 19, NWS instead “commit to declare” all fissile material no longer required for military purposes to the IAEA.

In Action 20, states parties are “encouraged to support” the development of verification arrangements in the context of the IAEA to ensure removal of fissile material, instead of “shall support” as was stated in the old draft.

In Action 21, states are “encouraged to initiate a process” towards dismantling facilities used for producing fissile material for weapons purposes, a change from the old draft where it was stated that states “shall initiate a process”.

In Action 22 (the old Action 23), the statement that “the development of adequate verification capabilities will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for achievement and maintenance of nuclear weapon free world” has been deleted.

Action 23 combined and amends the old Actions 24 and 25. Whereas Action 24 of the old draft said that all NWS “should provide information with regard to their nuclear weapon capabilities, including information on the types, numbers and deployment status of their nuclear weapons, and on their delivery systems,” and Action 25 stated that NWS “undertake to agree, by 2012, on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals,” the new draft’s Action 23 says NWS “are encouraged to regularly provide information, preferably in a standardised form, with regard to their nuclear arsenals, including information on the types and numbers of their nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as stocks of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.” Action 23 also says that the UN Secretary-General “is invited to make this information publicly available.”

The final action in the new draft, Action 24, describes disarmament and non-proliferation education as “useful and effective means to advance the goals of the treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons”.

A new paragraph on the importance of promoting collective security and advancing other disarmament objectives, such as universality of the BTWC and CWC, as well as conventional arms control and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, has been added.

Action 25 is deleted. Action 26, which in the first draft recommended that the IAEA “continue to accept nuclear weapon state declarations as the basis for assessing and monitoring compliance with the treaty,” has been deleted.

In the new Action 26, NWS instead “commit to declare” all fissile material no longer required for military purposes to the IAEA.

In Action 27, states parties are “encouraged to support” the development of verification arrangements in the context of the IAEA to ensure removal of fissile material, instead of “shall support” as was stated in the old draft.
Plenary meeting
- The three chairs of the Main Committees provided updates on the progress since last Friday.
- Subsidiary Body I released a revised draft of the disarmament action plan (see Drafts in Contrast on page XX) and Main Committee I will circulate a new draft text on Thursday.
- Main Committee II will also circulate a draft text on Thursday and reported that this will most likely include a report from Subsidiary Body II.
- Main Committee III is still debating the first draft and did not indicate a specific day when a new draft could be circulated.
- Due to recent elections and change of government, the United Kingdom was finally able to deliver a statement in a plenary meeting, and reported on its implementation of the 13 steps from 2000.

Main Committee I
Overall text
- France and the United States argued that many of the NAM's suggestions will likely not meet consensus.
- New Zealand and Mexico described some of France's amendments as “unacceptable”.
- Mexico argued that some proposals do not represent progress but instead regress from 2000.
- Brazil noted that some proposals have been based on strengthening the document so that the RevCon reaches meaningful political results whereas others have aimed to dilute the document to make it more palatable, “to take salt from it”.
- Brazil also reminded the Committee that they are not negotiating a legally-binding treaty but a political document.
- Brazil also argued that it is not enough to rely on the language of 2000 because we are here to make progress and cannot be bound by that language.
- South Africa argued that the NAM amendments reflect developments over the last 40 years, look ahead to the next 40 years in an aspirational way, and take into consideration the “anxieties” of the NWS.

Elimination of nuclear weapons
- The NAC suggested deleting the phrase “the vision of” in paragraph 4 of Part B, so that it welcomes proposals aimed at achieving a world free of nuclear weapons rather than merely a vision of such a world.
- The NAC and the NAM called for Action 7 to take into account the consultations or negotiations of Action 6 but to not base the international conference entirely on their outcome.
- The NAM also suggested the conference in Action 7 should “achieve agreement” rather than “consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap” and that it should specify a deadline of 2025 for the conclusion of a NWC.
- The NAM also argued that the CD should start immediate negotiations on nuclear disarmament without prejudice to Actions 6 and 7.
- The NAM suggested adding the phrase “the total elimination of nuclear weapons” to describe the shared objectives of the Treaty in paragraph 7 of part I.
- The NAM suggested that paragraph 1 of part B be changed to specify that the NWS reaffirmed their unequivocal undertaking in 2010 and that it be accomplished “in accordance with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency”.
- The NAM suggested strengthening the language in paragraph 3 of part B to note “some” reductions, note the “estimated” number of nuclear weapons, note that “tens of” thousands of nuclear weapons still exist, and express its concern with “existence and consequent” risk for humanity.
- The NAM urged changing “welcomes” proposals from governments and civil society aimed at achieving “the vision” of a nuclear weapon free world to “takes note of” these proposals and taking out “the vision” in part B, paragraph 4. The NAM also suggested incorporating the UNSG's proposals here as well and deleting paragraph 7.
- France urged changing “welcome” to “take note” in paragraphs 4 and 6 of part B.
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph agreeing “that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes, and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermines disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.”
- The NAM's suggested changes to the action plan focused on emphasizing the necessity of a establishing a legal and time bound framework and achieving a nuclear weapon free world rather than simply a vision of such a world, applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability.
- The NAM suggested that Action 6 call on NWS to “commence negotiations” rather than “convene consultations” and that the specific actions within should: result in agreements...
rather than negotiations on eliminating rather than reducing nuclear weapons; abolishing rather than reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines; prohibiting unconditionally rather than discussing declaratory policies to minimize the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

- France called for the deletion in part B, paragraph 3 of “with concern” in noting that there are still many nuclear weapons despite reductions.
- France called for deleting paragraph 5 in part B on implementing article VI within a timebound framework.
- France called for reusing the 2000 language on the ICJ opinion in paragraph 10 of part B.
- France suggested adding the word “significant” before unilateral reduction measures and “announced by” with “taken” in paragraph 13 of part B.
- France suggested adding a new paragraph in part B welcoming unilateral and concrete disarmament measures including the closing down and dismantling of nuclear weapon-related facilities.
- Russia said that the NWS have reaffirmed the global undertaking for the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and said the document should underline that this is the final goal of a step by step process based on a comprehensive approach under favourable international conditions and that it implies implementing sets of measures aimed at enhancing transparency and confidence.
- Mexico said this language would represent a major step back from 2000 and therefore it does not support this proposed amendment.

**Timeframes**

- The NAC argued that the inclusion of a reference to a time bound framework for nuclear disarmament in paragraph 5 “is a sound reflection of the demands made by the overwhelming majority of States during our deliberations in order to concretely advance the objective of a world free from nuclear weapons. The exact details of this time bound framework need to be worked on.”
- Indonesia emphasized the importance of including a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament in the outcome document, arguing that this idea is gaining more validity especially when discussing reviewing how far has the Treaty has benefited all states parties.
- France argued that imposition of artificial deadlines in nuclear disarmament has never worked and that timelines would weaken the non-proliferation regime because nothing is gained by imposing deadlines and not meeting them.
- The US said it sees difficulties with imposed timeframes and called for the deleting of paragraph 5 in part B. It called for “language that will allow us to fulfill our article VI commitments responsibly”.
- Mexico noted that deadlines have been established for compliance with other international objectives such as the MDGs and greenhouse gases and that even if they are not achieved they can be used to measure political will. It argued that the time has come to measure political will in terms of article VI and that it therefore does not agree with deleting of paragraph 5.
- Indonesia argued that the document must have a reference to a timebound framework even if it does not list a particular date. It argued that this is not an artificial timeline because it is not a deadline but just a commitment and an acknowledgment that a timeframe is needed.
- Brazil noted that because of the lost decade on disarmament and because the goal of article VI has not been achieved, it seems that some NWS want to postpone their responsibilities indefinitely.
- Iran said the success of the RevCon is bound to agreement on this issue because after 40 years of hearing symbolic statements about a nuclear weapon free world it is this RevCon’s responsibility continued on next page
to make a decision about when it will happen.

- South Africa argued that timelines remove uncertainty and reduce the feelings of desperation that some NNWS have reached because they do not see progressive action on article VI.
- The Philippines said the issue of a timebound framework is not a whim but a reflection of what most citizens of the world want.
- France and Russia disagreed that no progress has occurred on nuclear disarmament over the last ten years.
- Algeria argued the progress has been very poor and that there is no way to evaluate the implementation of the 13 practical steps because they do not have timelines. It argued that even if the deadline is not met it would be a tool to evaluate what has been done and what still needs to happen.
- Libya and Cuba argued in support of timeframes.
- Canada called for language between overly prescriptive timeframes and no timeframes at all, arguing that the principle of a timeframe is valid.

**Nuclear doctrines**

- The NAC called for language pertaining to military nuclear doctrines of states and regional alliances and encouraged the incorporation of language from paragraphs 2, 6, 10, 11, and 13 of WP.8 into both the review portion of the draft and the action plan.
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph that notes with deep concern security doctrines of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), including the ‘NATO Alliance Strategic Concept’, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.”

**Operational status**

- The De-alerting Group requested a new paragraph be inserted, perhaps after current paragraph 15 with language recognizing that reductions of alert levels would contribute to process of nuclear disarmament by enhancing confidence.
- Mexico supported this suggestion.

**Nuclear sharing**

- The NAM suggested the addition of a paragraph stressing “the importance of reaffirmation by [NNWS] of their commitments to the full implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear weapon sharing with [NWS], [NNWS], and States not Party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in time of peace as well as in time of war, including in the framework of military alliances.”
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph to part II reaffirming “the commitment of all States Parties not to accord any status or recognition in any form contrary to the provision of the Treaty to any State not Party to the Treaty” and to not engage in nuclear sharing.

**Security assurances**

- The NAC argued that the language on security assurances “seems to be a step back from the recognition in UNSC RES 984 of the legitimate interest of NNWS to receive security assurances, and from the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference that legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the NNWS Parties to the Treaty strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime.” It called for a reference to the necessity of providing legally-binding negative security assurances in Part C and suggested recalling what was mentioned in Para 2 Article VII of 2000. For the action plan, it suggested that Actions 8 and 9 refer to paragraphs 20 and 21 of WP.8.
- The NAM suggested adding language to paragraph 10 on the ICJ advisory opinion reaffirming “that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the continued on next page
only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by nuclear weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons. Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.”

- The NAM suggested changing the heading of part C to “Article VII and security of non-nuclear weapon states”.
- The NAM suggested that paragraph 1 of part C reaffirm that legally-binding NSAs would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and urge for “the immediate commencement of negotiations on a globally-legally-binding instrument which provides for unconditional security assurances.”
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph noting “with concern the continued insufficiency” of NSAs “provided so far by NWS to NNWS”.
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph reiterating “that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some Nuclear-Weapon States, including certain States’ nuclear posture reviews, contravene the security assurances provided by Nuclear-Weapon States and violate the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT.”
- The US objected to this suggestion.
- The NAM called for the RevCon to welcome the accession of Cuba, Timor-Leste, Serbia, and Montenegro to the CTBT.
- The NAM urged the document to specify that it is the three non-state parties that operate unsafeguarded facilities.
- The NAM suggested a new paragraph in the action plan noting that NWS have a special responsibility to ratify the CTBT and to encourage its entry into force.
- The NAM suggested Action 12 specify that all states shall refrain from “the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system including the prohibition of nuclear weapons research and development” and that Action 16 call on states to refrain from “conducting nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways.”
- France called for part B, paragraph 7 to stick to the language in the CTBT preamble.
- New Zealand called for part B, paragraph 8 to welcome ratification of the CTBT by any state, not just Annex II states and that it should welcome “recent expressions by non-Annex II states, such as Papua New Guinea, of their intention to ratify”.
- Argentina called for stronger language regarding the International Monitoring System (IMS) such as, “The Conference stressed the importance of the IMS and commends the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in its establishment.”

Nuclear testing
- The NAM called for stronger language regarding the International Monitoring System (IMS) such as, “The Conference stressed the importance of the IMS and commends the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in its establishment.”

Balance
- The NAC and the NAM suggested adding paragraph one from the 2000 final document as an introduction.
- Brazil noted that balance will be addressed throughout the three texts but that this text deals with disarmament.

Universality
- The NAC said the RevCon should welcoming also the adherence of new states parties to the

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Treaty that have occurred since 2000 (and not just limited to 2005 onwards).
- The NAM suggested adding a new paragraph calling “on all States Parties to exert all possible efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.”
- The NAM suggested adding a section on universality to the action plan.

**Compliance**
- The NAC asked for clarification on the language in paragraph 9, which “recognizes the importance of consequences for breaches of all Treaty obligations.”
- The NAM suggested deleting this paragraph.
- The NAM suggested deleting paragraph 6 of part one.
- The NAM suggested that paragraph 8 specify that concerns over compliance include both NWS and NNWS and that responses be pursued in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty rather than the UN Charter.
- France called for para 8, part A to be replaced with language from 2000.

**Confidence-building, transparency, and civil society**
- The NAC expressed satisfaction with Actions 23–26.
- The NAM urged paragraph 15 to “note” rather than “welcome” the efforts made by some NWS and to encourage “further elaborated and detailed” declarations.
- France suggested deleting the phrase “in support of a nuclear weapon free world” in the paragraph on disarmament education, arguing that that concept is sufficiently covered elsewhere in the text.
- Japan and the Philippines said they would like to maintain this phrase as is.

**Verification**
- The NAM urged paragraph 18 to “take note of” rather than welcome efforts on verification and called for the deletion of the reference to cooperation between NNWS and NWS on establishing a system for nuclear disarmament verification.
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph to the action plan calling on all NWS to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
- The NAM suggested adding a paragraph establishing a standing committee “to monitor and verify nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.”
- The NAM suggested language in Action 19 for NWS to declare “in an internationally verifiable manner” all weapons-useable fissile material stocks and decommissioned nuclear warheads by 2012.

**Missiles, outer space**
- The NAC and the NAM suggested deleting paragraph 16 on the interrelationship between offensive and defensive weapons and paragraph 17 on missiles and space weapons because they are “beyond the scope of our Treaty”.
- Russia supported China’s proposals from Monday on paragraphs 16 and 17 and suggested adding another paragraph to this section supporting “the initiative to make global the application of the INF Treaty as a significant effort in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.”

**Security concepts**
- The NAM suggested changing “undiminished” security for all to “increased” security for all and nuclear disarmament as promoting “stability” to promoting “peace and security”.

**Machinery**
- The NAC called for action related to nuclear disarmament in the CD to be included in the action plan.
- The NAM urged a new paragraph in part B to stress “the necessity” of establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in the CD.
- The NAM suggested deleting the paragraphs in Actions 8 and 17 calling for the UN General Assembly to decide what do with the CD if it does not start working by the end of its 2011 session.
- France called for paragraph 12 in part B to be deleted.
- Thailand expressed concern that some items are being delegated to the CD, calling for member states to ensure that the work of the CD will be transparent and inclusive because the treaties it is called on to negotiate will have universal impact.
engage in a debate of pros and cons of nuclear power.
- NAM suggested a new paragraph that would emphasize that full and indiscriminate implementation of article IV is essential to realizing the object and purposes of the Treaty.
- Austria didn’t see the need for the NPT to pronounce itself on issues like climate change in paragraph 19. Austria also wanted to amend the text in paragraph 23, so it would reflect that not all states parties believe in and use nuclear power.
- Austria opposed the proposal of France, which concerned financing development of nuclear power here. Austria argued that financing nuclear power plants is up to the national states, and should not be an issue at the NPT.

**Transparency**
- The NAM, Russia, Brazil, and China suggested that paragraph 10, on transparency in connection with nuclear activities, should be deleted.
- The United Arab Emirates, Ireland, and France wanted to keep this paragraph.
- Libya and Switzerland shared concerns about the unclear content of this paragraph, but were ready to look at amended language.

**Technical cooperation**
- NAM suggested to move the reference to the MDGs from paragraph 9, which deals with the general applications of IAEA activities, to paragraph 17, where the MDGs would be better connected to the IAEA Technical Cooperation programme.

**Inalienable right**
- NAM suggested that the inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear energy should be in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT, instead of I, II, and III as paragraph 2 of the original draft stated.
- Australia, Norway, France, New Zealand, Japan, United Kingdom, and Ireland responded that it was very important that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is developed in conformity with articles I, II and III, especially since this was agreed upon in 2000.
- Egypt, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Cuba emphasized that the NAM proposal was consistent with the direct words of the Treaty.
- Iran clarified that the NAM proposals would not undermine the agreements from 2000.

**Safeguards**
- The EU suggested that paragraph 23 should further stress the importance of safeguard systems, including comprehensive safeguard agreements and the additional protocol as fundamental elements of developing nuclear energy.
- Norway and Japan proposed to include a reference to the additional protocol in paragraph 21.

**Export controls**
- NAM proposed an addition to paragraph 4, which would state that “the Conference express concerns for inconsistencies applied by export regimes and call upon them to remove such requirements for export”.
- The US, the UK, and Ireland objected to this suggestion, arguing that nuclear suppliers have normal requirements when supplying material and that the 47 NSG members would disagree that all such conditions should be eliminated.
- NAM proposed to delete “in a safe and secure manner” from paragraph 3, which dealt with the right of all states parties to participate in exchange of equipment, materials, and information for nuclear energy.
- France, Norway, and New Zealand argued that the words “safe and secure manner” should remain.
- Iran and Cuba argued that the implementation of article IV could not be realized if restrictions on exports were not removed.

**Nuclear security**
- NAM proposed to delete paragraph 22, which emphasizes the importance of the development of an appropriate infrastructure to support safe, secure, and efficient use of nuclear power.
- Germany, Norway, and France argued that paragraph 22 is essential and should be kept.
- NAM also wanted to remove references to the importance of having the highest levels of safety and security in paragraph 23, as well as references to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
- Argentina noted that the term “highest level” of safety and security used in paragraph 23 has not been defined yet and proposed amendment to “highest possible level.”

**Multilateral approaches to fuel cycle**
- NAM proposed to delete paragraphs 27, 28, and 30, which note a number of multilateral fuel cycle proposals and the establishment of a LEU reserve on the territory of Russia, and states that fuel assurances mechanisms can provide an effective back-up to the existing market.
- Russia wanted the RevCon to welcome the Russian initiatives to create fuel banks in paragraph 27.
- NAM instead suggested amending paragraph 31, to encourage continuation of extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations, aimed at developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

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News in Review

The EU wanted to include a reference that multilateral approaches to fuel cycle should not act to distort the existing well-functioning market.

Ireland wanted the inclusion of a reference to the back-end of the fuel cycle in paragraph 31.

The UK pointed out that the paragraphs on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle are a valuable way to improve access to nuclear energy, and that taking advantage of such measures is voluntary.

Radioactive waste

- The US argued that the language around radioactive waste in paragraph 20 was too negative and should instead refer to the importance of managing radioactive waste.
- The US, with support from Ireland, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and Germany proposed to add a section to paragraph 20 on the back-end of the fuel cycle that would state “nuclear fuel suppliers should work with and assist recipient states in the safe and secure management of spent fuel”.
- Ireland wanted to add the words “spent fuel” to the reference on radioactive waste.

Enriched uranium

- NAM wished to delete the references to minimizing the need for and stock-piles of highly enriched uranium for peaceful purposes, through international initiatives such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
- The EU proposed an additional paragraph that would state that the conference “stress the importance of minimization of HEU in peaceful activities, where it is technically and economically feasible”.

The CTBT: Is it verifiable?
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Wednesday, the Netherlands organized a lunch event on the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies, started off by focusing on the relationship between the NPT and the CTBT. She referred to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, who stated that the NPT and the CTBT are inseparable. Ms. Mackby gave us a brief summary of the history of the treaty and compared the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the CTBT. The PTBT banned all but underground explosions while the CTBT banned all nuclear explosions. The second speaker, Ola Dahlman, Chairman of the International Scientific Study on the Verification Capabilities of the CTBT, discussed what kind of weapons-related experiments are considered as prohibited according to the CTBT. Both Mr. Dahlman and Ms. Mackby deliberated on what the Treaty actually prohibits, as there is no definition of a nuclear weapon test in the text.

Dr. Hein Haak, Chairman of the Working Group on Verification at the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, looked at the scientific developments within the CTBT. He emphasized that the CTBT provides for international cooperation, wherein science and technology are connected with politics. The verification stations are distributed all over the world and Dr. Haak showed how instruments like radionuclide detection cover all areas, from the Antarctic to Africa.

While Dr. Haak spoke about the CTBT seen in an international perspective, Mr. Dahlman focused on the CTBT from a national viewpoint. He said that the verification of the treaty has three purposes and that is deter violation, detect clandestine activities, and to build confidence. He saw the CTBT as a tool to help states to make good judgments and underscored that the process is political. The panelists seemed to agree that the tools now exist and that the system has delivered beyond expectations.
However, after this resounding debate in Main Committee I, during which the majority of states who delivered interventions spoke in favour of timelines for disarmament, the Chair of Subsidiary Body I released a significantly weakened draft action plan—a compromise draft based on inputs received from delegations over the past three days—that eliminated all timelines included in the original draft (except for the time limit placed on the activities of the CD).

Action 6, which previously said the NWS “shall convene consultations not later than 2011 to accelerate concrete progress on nuclear disarmament,” now says that the NWS “are called upon to convene timely consultations.” The original document had NWS reporting back to NPT states parties in 2012; the new version calls on them to do it during the upcoming review cycle. Instead of the UN Secretary-General convening “an international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe, including by means of a universal, legal instrument,” the UNSG is now invited to convene “an open-ended high-level meeting to take stock and agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including by means of a universal, legal instrument.”

The new Action 7 punts the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament over to the CD, stipulating that it will be dealt with “in an appropriate subsidiary body, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work”—which means, in the current CD context, only within a programme of work that launches negotiations on a fissile materials treaty as well, even though the Pakistani delegation to the CD has made it clear they are not willing to accept a programme of work that includes negotiations on that item. Even then, this subsidiary body is only called on to provide a forum for exchanging “views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of multilateral character.” The breathtaking number of conditions in that single sentence effectively buries any opportunity this action had to make a significant contribution to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

It is not just timelines that have been removed. The emphasis on “action” in the revised action plan has been diluted. In almost every instance, instead of concluding, negotiating, doing, or adopting, states shall now pursue, discuss, or consider (see the Drafts in Contrast section on pages 2-3 for a detailed comparison of the two action plans).

At the end of the MCI meeting, the Irish delegate quoted from his foreign minister’s statement from 3 May, who in turn had quoted Irish poet Edmund Burke, who counseled “Never despair; but if you do, work on in despair.”

Despair will only grow stronger around the world if the nuclear weapon states expect everyone else to wait patiently for another 40 years for the elimination of nuclear weapons. By refusing to commit to measurable actions on disarmament, the nuclear weapon states are not only jeopardizing the potential success of the RevCon, they are also weakening the faith the world has in this Treaty.
The NATO Group of Experts released its report on 17 May as the next step towards establishing a new Strategic Concept. The report—arrived at by the Group after a series of seminars and consultations both with members of the Alliance and others—offers little new on the issue of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) in Europe.

The report does take into consideration (and borrows language directly from) the new US Nuclear Posture Review, including keeping options open for the future, but for the time being mostly maintains the status quo. It acknowledges the recent political dynamic towards a world free of nuclear weapons but fails to analyze the political shift around the issue of TNW. Although tasked with providing policy options for upcoming discussions on the Strategic Concept, it failed to present a slate of credible options for changing NATO's nuclear posture.

TNW are gaining more attention across the political spectrum, including within the European Union and at the current NPT Review Conference. If NATO was indeed an increasingly political rather than a predominantly military alliance (as the Expert Group seems to want to place it), then the Expert Group would have gone much further in reflecting the changed political landscape around nuclear weapons, especially TNW. The Group would have addressed the question of how weapons that have become militarily useless since the end of the Cold War can still be considered the political glue of the Alliance. And they would have made suggestions for a post-Cold War nuclear posture in NATO's new Strategic Concept rather than postponing this to future consultations and dialogue, which could leave this important matter unresolved when the new Concept is drafted, discussed and adopted.

The Expert Group report's section on "Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control" contains three elements: 1) an opening statement with a call for future consultations, 2) some 'parameters' for those consultations, and 3) two recommendations.

The recognition in the section's opening statement that many leaders from Allied nations also support a world free of the nuclear threat is a positive beginning. Apparently, the Expert Group is aware that the debate about the consequences for NATO's nuclear policy has just started: “Looking ahead, the Alliance should be prepared for in-depth consultations on the future role of nuclear weapons in its deterrence strategy.” Just because we’ve always done business this way doesn’t mean we can’t talk about whether this is the right way to do business.

The Group then formulates eight parameters for those consultations. Some reaffirm the status quo, for example that deterrence should retain “a nuclear component” (though it does not specify what this component should be) and that “the retention of some U.S. forward-deployed systems on European soil reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence”. It also says that the “[b]road participation of the non-nuclear Allies is an essential sign of transatlantic solidarity and risk-sharing. Participation by the non-nuclear states can take place in the form of nuclear deployments on their territory or by non-nuclear support measures” which affirms the status quo while providing a small window for change.

Among the parameters is the important call for both external dialogue (with Russia) and for internal dialogue (within NATO). The Expert Group recommends “an ongoing NATO dialogue with Russia on nuclear perceptions, concepts, doctrines, and transparency. These talks should help set the stage for the further reduction and possible eventual elimination of the entire class of sub-strategic nuclear weapons.” It is important to note the word ‘negotiations’ is absent in this text. Indeed, for the time being no new negotiations can be expected, as was confirmed by the US and Russian chief negotiators during a session on the new START treaty on 11 May at the NPT Review Conference. One of the many obstacles is that Russia sees movement on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty as a precondition for a next round. It is therefore encouraging to see that the NATO Expert Group Report also recommends the revival of the CFE process.

As to the internal dialogue, the Expert Group recommends re-establishing NATO's Special Consultative Group on Arms Control in order to facilitate this “internal dialogue about the whole range of issues related to nuclear doctrine, new arms control initiatives and proliferation.” Apparently, this recommendation reflects the current division within NATO about its future nuclear policy. Such a consultative group could, among other things, recommend a series of scenarios for NATO to uphold the commitments of its member states in reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons in their security strategy, including withdrawal as Germany has advocated.

Of the two recommendations in the report, the first one is ambivalent. It affirms the status quo in
No shelter under this umbrella
Tim Wright | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Yesterday’s debate on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I focused largely on the issue of a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition expressed strong support for retaining this reference in the chair’s draft report, while three of the nuclear-weapon States—France, Russia and the United States—rejected the notion of imposing a timeframe on the implementation of their Article VI obligation to disarm.

Brazil expressed its deep regret that the last decade was a lost decade in terms of nuclear disarmament. It said: “Among the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the one that has not been achieved at all is the Article VI obligation.” South Africa stressed the importance of providing some degree of “certainty” at this Review Conference to the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to avoid desperation and frustration: “When we come back for the next Review Conference, we want more members, not fewer members.”

Abolition statement

Yesterday morning the Abolition NGO Caucus for the Review Conference, which meets daily, released its response to the 26-point draft action plan on disarmament from Subsidiary Body I. Its statement welcomed the emphasis in the plan on the need to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as a matter of urgency and within a specified timeframe, and noted that the draft action plan “sets out a concrete and detailed programme for advancing a nuclear-weapon-free world”.

According to the Caucus, the plan “reflects a compromise between the overwhelming calls from civil society, together with a majority of countries, for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention and the positions of some States not yet ready to begin such negotiations”. However, it also offered a number of positive suggestions for improving the chair’s draft. The statement concluded: “Forty years after the entry into force of the Treaty, it is vital that parties adopt an outcome document that puts us clearly on track to nuclear abolition.”

Nuclear umbrella

One issue that has not been discussed nearly enough at this Review Conference is the effect that “extended nuclear deterrence” has on preventing meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. It is no coincidence that many of the governments that are opposed to beginning negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention rely on the so-called “protection” of the US nuclear umbrella for their security. These countries are the NATO members along with Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

By remaining under the nuclear umbrella, they give weight and credence to the misguided view that nuclear weapons bring security. A rejection of the concept of extended deterrence by any one or more of these states would contribute greatly to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons and the development of a global norm against reliance on them. It would also help to pave the way to a Nuclear Weapons Convention and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Tim Wright is the NWC Project Coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

NATO Expert Group Report released (cont.)
What’s On
Today’s Calendar of Events

Off-the-record government briefing for NGOs:
Ambassador Abdul Minty of South Africa
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–11:00

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Nuclear energy and proliferation
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Dominic Moran, Greenpeace International

Nuclear Crossword
Across
3. What is the acronym of the organization that was founded in 1945 by scientists who had worked in the Manhattan Project?
4. Who is called “The Father of the Soviet Atomic Bomb”?
6. Another name of the Soviet Union’s first nuclear weapon test (two words).
7. What is the Cuban Missile Crisis called in Cuba (two words)?
9. Which country was the third country to conduct a nuclear weapon test (two words)?
11. What was the name of the American missiles in Turkey which were taken down on 24 April 1963 and later removed?
13. This president decided to run a nuclear test series, which led to an embargo of French wine (two words).
14. This article of the NPT states that non nuclear weapons states will not acquire nuclear weapons, nor will they manufacture nukes.

Down
1. This Treaty opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and turned into force on 5 March 1970 (three words).
2. In which city does the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony take place?
5. How many nuclear bomb tests were conducted by Pakistan in May 1998?
8. What is the name of the Australian village where the United Kingdom tested nuclear weapons?
10. In which country were hundreds of protesters detained during the European Days of Action against nuclear weapons on 3 April, 2010?
12. What was the code name of India’s nuclear weapon test in 1998?