Thursday saw the release of two more draft texts, with the Chairs of both Main Committees I and II releasing their first revisions for consideration. At first glance, it appears that the two committees are in different places regarding their proximity to consensus.

The new MCI draft, which reviews the operation of the Treaty’s disarmament and security assurances-related obligations, is a weaker draft than its original. As with Subsidiary Body I’s draft action plan on disarmament, the MCI text moves further away from operationalizing the oft-expressed “vision” for a nuclear weapon free world. While the draft now expresses concern for “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons”, it reduces the urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament by replacing the call for implementing article VI in a timebound framework with an affirmation that “the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within a legal framework with specified timelines [emphasis added].” This phrasing endorses the perspective of the nuclear weapon states and countries that engage in nuclear sharing and that shelter under the US nuclear umbrella that the time is not yet “ripe” for a legal framework for nuclear disarmament.

In MCII, however, the amendments in the second draft seem to have at least somewhat balanced the text, moving it closer to mutually acceptable ground. Some of the most controversial elements have been eliminated or toned down and compromises seem to have been made. For example, references to the Nuclear Suppliers Group have been removed, but so has also the request for nuclear weapon states to reconsider their reservations or interpretations of NWFZ treaty protocols. Despite such compromises, there are still some paragraphs where solutions need to be found, such as those regarding the additional protocol and conditions on nuclear exports. The new draft still does not include anything on the Middle East, as these parallel negotiations have not yet produced any agreed outcome.

Progress also seems to have been made in MCIII, where a paragraph-by-paragraph review has moved into an advanced discussion on details and specific wordings. Some disagreements remains unsolved as of yet, but the detailed exchange of views and proposals signals that consensus appears to be in reach.

While compromises in MCII and MCIII can contribute to consensus of the final outcome document, many governments and civil society are still concerned about the large divergences in opinion over the disarmament action plan. If a third draft of the action plan will be released this week, most NGOs and governments will be hoping that it restores some of the strengths from its first version. Governments from all regional groupings have emphasized that this Review Conference must move forward from 2000, yet some of these same governments seem to have suggested language changes to the initial SBI draft that have caused the actions to move backwards from 2000. While nuclear weapon states were called upon to implement the 13 steps in 2000, they would in 2010, under the revised action plan, only commit to “convene timely consultations” on the outlined steps under Action 6.

This Review Conference has highlighted a clear disagreement on the nuclear weapon states’ compliance with their disarmament obligation. In the ten years since their adoption, the nuclear weapon states’ claimed implementation of the 13 steps has failed to convince the world that the article VI obligation to disarm is being fulfilled. It is therefore unacceptable to adopt a weaker text in 2010, with 24 actions that can be ignored even more easily than the 13 steps. A weak text, with actions that can be manipulated and reinterpreted to fit any preferred policy, is only setting the world up for continued disagreement, lack of trust, and increased disappointment in the current system.
ICAN, in partnership with Hibakusha Stories, is hosting a morning workshop on disarmament education. Hear from educator Dr. Kathleen Sullivan and A-bomb survivors.

Today, NGO Room, 10:00am

“Why can’t the countries trust themselves enough to abolish their nuclear weapons?”

Belinda, 12, Australia

View ICAN’s activity book at www.icanw.org/learn_peace
'Learn Peace': How students are playing a role in nuclear disarmament and world peace
Cat Beaton | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

In 2007, many governments supported a UN resolution that urged all governments to promote disarmament education. This was a result of a report on disarmament education tabled in the General Assembly that noted the importance of the issue globally. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in Australia has taken a leading step towards this aim, launching a multi-education package called ‘Learn Peace’.

ICAN takes literally the old slogan ‘think globally, act locally’. The ‘Learn Peace’ package for Australian students includes a workbook outlining activities that encourage students to enter the global arena of decision-making, treaties, and education about nuclear weapons and disarmament. The activities inspire and empower students to make a difference in their future and in their world. They also complement existing global, peace, and values education initiatives. The activities in the workbook are divided into four categories: English, arts and drama, social studies and outreach. In the classroom, students are guided in running a United Nations debate, organising writing and art competitions, conducting opinion polls, and designing their own peace symbol.

While the issues surrounding nuclear weapons are far from light, the education resource has been designed to encourage humour and hope and always keep the focus on taking positive steps for change.

Hawkesdale College in Victoria, Australia is a prime example of the success and breadth that a project like ‘Learn Peace’ can take. Middle year secondary students engaged with the activities in the ‘Learn Peace’ workbook for two years. The students opened up dialogue with other overseas students though online conferencing to discuss nuclear weapons issues. In a letter to the school, the Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, commended the students for taking pro-active steps on world issues.

The Hawkesdale College students who began working with ‘Learn Peace’ continue to involve themselves in this type of education, seek answers, and share with their families and friends. As 12-year-old Hawkesdale College student Belinda asks, “Why can’t countries trust themselves enough to abolish their nuclear weapons?”

Marg Murnane, a teacher at Hawkesdale College, a strong advocate of peace education and was responsible for introducing and driving the ‘Learn Peace’ project at the school. Marg believes that there is a frightening complacency amongst adults around the issue of nuclear weapons. She notes, “The threat of intentional or accidental launch of these weapons is as relevant today as it was in 1945. We must mobilise young people by giving our students a voice in abolishing the greatest threat to humankind and our future.”

Students and youth show a very real interest in this issue. They are quick to understand that there are still around 23,300 nuclear weapons in the world today, each posing a threat to global security and life as we know it. Like climate change, nuclear weapons have the power to destroy entire populations, change our environment, and affect health for many generations to come. Unlike climate change, it could occur in the blink of an eye, or the press of a button. The memories of the terror and loss at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have never left us as a global community and are the inherited legacy of this current generation.

Peace education is a vital contribution to our futures because it introduces students to an issue affecting the world they will one day be running. Through initiatives like ‘Learn Peace’, students also learn to consider problem solving and negotiation methods needed to make a difference.

The UN promotes disarmament education initiatives through its website www.un.org/disarmament/education. Disarmament education is an area in which civil society and governments can work strongly together to build the necessary global groundswell of public opinion and to excite change for the much called for “world without nuclear weapons”. The ‘Learn Peace’ education project takes the work of both civil society and governments into the classroom to help enable the change that must come about to abolish nuclear weapons.

Cat Beaton is the Disarmament Education Project Coordinator for ICAN in Melbourne, Australia.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative last week aired its recent documentary Nuclear Tipping Point at an NPT-related event. The half-hour film consists primarily of interviews with the so-called “four horsemen of the Apocalypse” — Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn — interspersed with archival footage. It ostensibly supports the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, but it is unlikely to do anything to advance that goal.

The main problem is that it focuses almost exclusively on the need to curb proliferation and prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. The documentary opens with dramatic footage of the September 11 attacks on the United States, the bombings in London and Madrid, and a number of other recent terrorist attacks. The narrator, actor Michael Douglas, then asks rhetorically: “What if terrorists had nuclear weapons?”

The notion that there is an impending “nuclear tipping point” assumes that we currently have things under control, more or less, but that things could get out of control if we fail to prevent it. The take-home message from the film is not “We must abolish nuclear weapons”; it is simply “We must stop the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and rogue states”. The film’s over-emphasis on nuclear terrorism as a potential threat is unhelpful if the goal is to put pressure on governments to do away with their nuclear weapons because it diverts attention from disarmament.

Even though the audience of the film will no doubt be predominantly American, it does nothing to alert viewers to the reality that the United States still possesses almost 10,000 nuclear weapons, more than any other country except for Russia, or that America is the only country to have used its nuclear weapons in war. This reinforces the US government rhetoric of “We need others to support our vision for zero”, which is an attempt at lulling an unquestioning public into believing that the nuclear problem lies elsewhere.

North Korea features prominently as a “rogue state”, as does Iran. Russia is also cast very negatively. One interviewee recounts an incident in the 1990s when President Boris Yeltsin was faced with the decision of whether to launch a nuclear attack after mistaking a Norwegian weather satellite for a missile. “It was lucky he wasn’t drunk at the time,” the man joked. No mention was made of the many similar incidents involving the near-use of US nuclear weapons. And the only reference in the film to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was when George Shultz said, as if in gratitude to the creators of the bomb, that the city’s obliteration had saved his own life.

There is nothing in the film that challenges in any way the current policies of the US administration. In fact, it supports in full the views of the Obama administration — which makes one wonder what is the purpose of the film. Is it intended simply to boost public support for the government’s non-proliferation and arms control agenda? Is it really the proper function of non-government organizations to uncritically accept their government’s positions?

Perhaps the most astonishing moment in the film was when Michael Douglas said that the United States would “of course” not eliminate its nuclear weapons until all other countries had first eliminated theirs. This is the position articulated by the Obama administration in the recently released nuclear posture review. The arrogance of this statement (based on the idea of US exceptionalism) was not missed on the mostly international audience. For some people, it was the metaphorical “tipping point” in the film — they got up and left.

There are a number of perhaps more general problems with the documentary. All of the “authoritative” opinions come from men who have had some form of involvement with the US military. Despite the widely held view that the “four horsemen” have had some kind of change of heart since their days in office, it is abundantly clear from their interviews in this film — and indeed from all three of their Wall Street Journal articles, particularly the one published this year — that they are still very much stuck in a narrow military-affected mindset.

This over-reliance on military men to provide authoritative statements about security devalues the opinions of women and those who reject the conventional notions that armies and armaments make us safer. This approach implies that one can only possibly have a well-formed opinion on security if one has been forced to decide whether to launch a nuclear attack against the people of another nation. Of course, only a certain type of person would allow himself/herself to be put in that position.

Much greater authorities on the necessity of nuclear abolition in creating security are the many hibakusha — but, naturally, they do not feature in this film. •
Main Committee I

I. Review of the operation of the Treaty

Part A: Art I and II and pp 1–3

- Paragraph 1 of the new draft is now the first paragraph from the 2000 outcome document.
- Paragraph 1 of the original draft has been deleted, even though it was the second paragraph of the 2000 document.
- Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 remain unchanged.
- Paragraphs 5 and 6 have been deleted. 5 had reaffirmed the need for “full and non-selective” application and implementation of the three pillars. 6 focused on “universal adherence” and “full compliance of all parties with all its provisions”.
- A new paragraph 6 stresses the importance of the reaffirmation by NWS of their commitments to the full implementation of article II and to refrain from nuclear sharing.
- The new paragraph 7 is similar to the old paragraph 8 except it calls for responses to concerns about compliance to be pursued in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, rather than the UN Charter as in the original draft.
- The new 8 is the same as the old 9, recognizing the importance of consequences for breaches of all Treaty obligations.
- The new 9 is similar to the old 10, which continues to deplore the DPRK’s nuclear test explosions and stipulate that the DPRK cannot have NWS status, but the new version adds a reference to UN Security Council resolutions.

Part B: Art VI and pp 8–12

- Paragraph 1 of the original draft, reaffirming the unequivocal undertaking, has been deleted (though reaffirmation of this commitment is still in Subsidiary Body I (SBI)'s revised action plan).
- Paragraph 2 of the original draft has been deleted. This paragraph reaffirmed states parties “commitment to vigorously pursue the implementation” of relevant past agreements from 2000 and 1995. (The preamble to the SBI action plan states that parties are “in pursuit of the full and effective implementation” of these commitments.)
- The new paragraph 1 is similar to the old paragraph 3, though the new version “notes with concern that despite some achievements in bilateral and unilaterial reductions” (adding the word some) and adds to the end of the sentence concern for “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons”.
- The new paragraph 2 is similar to the old 4, though instead of welcoming proposals and initiative of governments and civil society it now “notes” them.
- The new paragraph 3 replaces the old 5, which had the RevCon agree “on the need to implement article VI within a timebound framework.” The new version has the RevCon affirm “that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within a legal framework with specified timelines.”
- The old paragraph 6, which welcomed the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal, has been deleted (though it is referenced in the SBI action plan).
- New paragraph 4 is the same as old paragraph 7, regarding the CTBT.
- The new paragraph 5 is the same as the old 8, though it adds a sentence welcoming Papua New Guinea’s intention to ratify the CTBT.
- The language in new paragraph 6 (old 9) strengthens the language on the International Monitoring System by stressing its importance and commending the progress toward its completion made by the CTBTO PrepCom.
- The new draft deletes paragraphs 10 (recalling the ICJ opinion) and 11 (stressing the importance of the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty). Fissile materials are covered in the SBI action plan but all references to the ICJ opinion have been removed from either document, expect in the context of regular reporting.
- The new paragraph 7 is the same as old paragraph 12.
- The new paragraph 8 regarding START and other reduction measures is similar to the old paragraph 13 but now welcomes such measures that are “announced and implemented”.
- Paragraph 9 in the new document is an additional paragraph recognizing “that reductions in the alert levels of nuclear weapons and announced measures related to de-targeting contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament through the enhancement of confidence-building measures and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.”
- Paragraph 10 is also an additional paragraph welcoming moratoria on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
- Paragraph 11 is the same as the old 14, noting...
Drafts in Contrast (cont.)

regular reports.

- Paragraph 12 is similar to the old 15, but now notes instead of welcomes increased transparency of some NWS and it no longer encourages all NWS to make declarations about their nuclear arsenals.

- Paragraphs 16 and 17 from the old document, which recognized the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and arming ICBMs with conventional warheads or placing weapons in space will have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, have been deleted.

- The new paragraph 13 welcomes the cooperation of Norway and the UK on nuclear disarmament verification research, replacing the old paragraph 18, which welcomed efforts to toward developing verification capabilities.

Part C: Article VII and security assurances

- Paragraph 1 of each document is the same.

- Paragraph 2 now welcomes (rather than notes) the statements by some NWS regarding strengthening negative security assurances and notes the calls by NNWS for unconditional NSAs.

- The paragraph reaffirming that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from the original draft has been deleted but this is reaffirmed in the SBI action plan.

II. Role of the Treaty

- Paragraph 1 now welcomes the accessions to the Treaty of Cuba, Timor-Leste, and Serbia as well as Montenegro as in the original draft.

- The new paragraph 2 specifies that India, Israel, and Pakistan operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; otherwise it remains the same.

- Paragraph 3 remains the same though it also specifies the above three countries.

- Paragraph 4 on education remains the same.

Main Committee II

Reaffirmation of commitments

- Paragraph 2 has been amended to affirm the importance of compliance with “all provisions of the Treaty” instead of “the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty”.

- In paragraph 6, the IAEA safeguards are described as a fundamental component of the non-proliferation regime, instead of fundamental pillar as in the old draft. The paragraph no longer includes a reference to safeguards playing an important role for creating an “environment conducive of nuclear disarmament”.

- Paragraph 3 from the old draft, which noted that the integrity of the Treaty depends on full respect of all obligations, has been deleted in the new draft.

- Paragraph 10 from the old draft, which endorsed the Model Additional Protocol, has been deleted in the new draft.

- Paragraph 13 from the old draft, which dealt with physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, has been deleted.

- Paragraph 10 in the new draft introduces stronger language on NWFZ, and states that such zones contributes towards goals of the general and complete disarmament.

- Paragraph 16 from the old draft on Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status has been moved to the action plan section.

Review of the operation of the Treaty

- Paragraph 15 in the new draft adds that the comprehensive safeguard agreements (CSA) have provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, as well as notes that the additional protocol (AP), being voluntary in nature, once concluded, represents a legal obligation.

- Paragraph 16 notes that measures provided for in the CSA and AP increase the ability of IAEA to verify, but deletes references to efforts by the IAEA to strengthen such safeguards and the paragraph no longer support the implementation of such measures.

- Paragraph 17, on the importance of confidentiality of information related to safeguards, is new.

- Paragraph 23 from the old draft, which deals with the IAEA small quantities protocol, and paragraph 26, which notes discontinuing of HEU in favour of LEU, are both deleted in the new draft.

- Paragraph 28 in the old draft, which notes the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), is deleted, and the new draft contains no reference to the NSG.

- Paragraph 29 in the old draft, which noted steps to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in civil nuclear applications as well as the contribution to non-proliferation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, has been deleted.

- In paragraph 23 in the new draft, the Central Asian NWFZ was added as a contribution toward the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

- Paragraph 28 in the new draft now also welcomes the “vigorous efforts made by states parties and signatures of [NWFZ] Treaties in order to promote their common objectives.

continued on next page
Paragraph 38 in the old draft has been deleted.

**Forward looking action plan**

- In paragraph 31 of the new draft, the recommendation that the Director General of the IAEA continues efforts to assist states that have not yet concluded a CSA has been deleted.
- In paragraph 32 of the new draft, the reference to intense international concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, including to non-state actors, has been removed.
- Paragraph 44 from the old draft, which stressed that CSA is designed to verify the correctness and completeness of states declarations to the IAEA, has been deleted.
- In Paragraph 36 in the new draft, a reference to a plan of action to encourage wider adherence to CSA and AP has been deleted.
- Paragraph 37 in the new draft, which calls for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the NWS has been added.
- Paragraph 38 in the new draft, which urges all states parties with small quantities protocols to amend or rescind them, no longer calls on those states to bring into force the AP.
- Paragraph 41, which encourages the IAEA to further develop an international technology base for advanced safeguards, has been introduced in the new draft.
- Paragraph 42 in the new draft, which urges states to ensure that their exports do not assist the development of nuclear weapons has been complemented with a new reference to the decision on principles and objectives of non-proliferation from the 1995 conference.
- Paragraphs 55 and 56 from the old draft, on improving nuclear safety and security and on the safeguards system being able to meet both existing and future verification challenges, have both been deleted.
- In paragraph 43 of the new draft, the references to the Zangger Committee no longer includes taking note of its work in providing guidance to states parties.
- Paragraph 45 of the new draft now includes a reference to UNSCR 1540, 1673, and 1810.
- Paragraph 50 of the new draft no longer welcomes the establishment of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
- Paragraph 52 of the new draft no longer underlines that the respect for NWFZ by NWS constitutes an important nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitment.
- Paragraph 53 no longer includes a call on NWS to reconsider the removal of interpretative declarations or reservations to NWFZ.
- In paragraph 55, the establishment of a weapon of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East has been modified to a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.
News in Brief
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Main Committee III
Discussions of paragraphs 32–49 of the draft text.

Nuclear safety

- NAM emphasized that in paragraph 32, the IAEA should act based on best practices and in conformity with its mandate.
- Netherlands said it could accept this change.
- Belgium suggested deleting the world “international” from paragraphs 32 and 46 in describing the IAEA’s role in developing “international” safety standards.
- Egypt argued that the role of the IAEA is to ensure non-proliferation and not nuclear safety and proposed amendments to paragraph 33 to reflect this.
- Iran and Turkey supported this suggestion.
- NAM added language to paragraph 34 encouraging participation of states parties, especially developing states, “in training, workshops, seminars and capacity-building”.
- NAM suggested adding language describing the Code of Conduct on safety as “non-legally-binding”.
- NAM suggested deleting paragraph 41, which recognizes the importance of nuclear safety and the environment of implementing best practices in uranium mining and processing.
- France expressed confusion about why this should be deleted.
- NAM suggested paragraph 43 changing the language to “between the regulatory authorities of states parties and the nuclear industry, as well as the private sector.”
- NAM suggested adding two new paragraphs acknowledging the existence of a special responsibility toward people affected by nuclear-related contamination and calling upon governments and international organizations with relevant expertise to give appropriate assistance in affected areas.
- France argued that these issues have not been considered by previous RevCons and do not have a strong relationship to the work of MCIII.
- Australia, US, and UK argued these issues are being dealt with outside the RevCon.
- Algeria argued that these paragraphs seek to add content to what was agreed upon in 2000.
- Norway called for the replacement of “optimal” with “highest” in paragraph 34.
- South Africa and China called for precision in language when referring to the “highest standards,” which does not have a common definition.
- Germany argued that the “highest standards” means a dynamic process because of evolving technical and scientific tools.
- Austria concurred with Germany’s definition.
- Algeria argued the phrase is too vague and should not be used.
- Germany called for additional language in paragraph 35 noting the importance of “an independent regulatory body” in order to highlight that there has to be a legal separation between operator and regulator.
- Belgium, Norway, Ireland, Netherlands, Canada, Finland supported this proposal.
- Ireland called for “and spent fuel” to be added to the end of paragraph 35.
- Norway called for “and spent fuel” to be added to the end of paragraph 35.
- Iran suggested deleting all of paragraph 40.
- The US argued this is an important conference that should be welcomed.
- Brazil, Egypt, and Republic of Korea suggested the document could “take note” of the summit rather than welcome it.
- Netherlands and Canada urged for this paragraph to be kept as is.
- The US argued to replace IAEA “regulations” with IAEA “standards” and “in compliance with” with “consistent with” in paragraph 46 on transportation of radioactive material.

Maritime transport

- CARICOM, Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua and Barbuda voiced their support for maintaining paragraphs 44–46.

Attacks on nuclear facilities

- NAM called for the draft to use its proposed language on this subject.
- France, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Finland argued that the current language was agreed upon in 2000 and should be used.
- The US and UK argued these paragraph should be deleted because this issue is irrelevant to the Treaty but if it must be included should use the language from 2000.
- Algeria argued that the wording should evolve to reflect evolution of context.
- Egypt said it is difficult to understand the logic behind saying that issue of armed attacks is

continued on next page
The second draft of the 26-point action plan on nuclear disarmament was released on Wednesday. It’s now a 24-point plan, and many of the elements applauded by civil society groups at the start of the week have either been removed or significantly watered down. The weaker the draft becomes, the clearer it is that we cannot afford to rely on this NPT review process to provide the impetus for the urgent action needed to make abolition a reality.

The original draft required that the nuclear-weapon States hold consultations in 2011 aimed at accelerating progress on various issues related to disarmament—from ending the illegal practice of nuclear-sharing in Europe to taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert—but now such consultations need only be convened in a “timely” manner. Ultimately, it will be up to the nuclear-weapon States to define “timely”.

Under the revised draft, the UN Secretary-General will still be invited to convene a conference for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including by means of a universal legal instrument, but there is no longer a set date for doing so (originally, it was to be held in 2014). Like most other commitments in the draft, there is nothing to prevent states from postponing it indefinitely. The text implies that it may not even happen before 2015.

In general, the revised draft lacks any sense of urgency. NGOs have called for concrete steps with specified dates attached to them, but all that the parties have so far managed to agree on are vague commitments to “consider” ways to move things forward. Clearly, despite all the rhetoric about a nuclear-weapon-free world, there is a lack of genuine political will from all five nuclear-weapon States—and many NATO members, among others—to set us on the track to nuclear abolition.

The revised draft includes a new “action” for a subsidiary body to be set up in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to “exchange views and information” on steps towards reducing arsenals and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. Trying to hold such discussions in the CD—a body unable to produce anything in more than a decade and a half—will all but guarantee the further stagnation of the disarmament process.

What should we tell the 20 million people who signed petitions calling on their leaders to agree at this Review Conference to begin work now on a Nuclear Weapons Convention? Or to the hundreds of hibakusha who travelled to New York to make their desperate plea for no more Hiroshimas and Nagasakis? Or to the many thousands of people around the world who have suffered from the effects of nuclear testing and uranium mining?

That the best their governments could come up with at the Review Conference, 40 years after the NPT entered into force, were a few vague promises to “consider” among themselves possible options for one day, perhaps not any time soon, moving disarmament forward, but not too much?

Tim Wright is the NWC Project Coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
Talking about a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Jerusalem

Hillel Schenker

“This conference is a major first step,” said Iranian-born Prof. Farhang Jahanpour, who currently teaches Middle Eastern studies at Oxford. “We have discussed something hugely taboo.” “This is a ground-breaking exercise,” said Dr. Dan Plesch, Director of the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at London University.

They were referring to the first conference ever held in Jerusalem devoted to “A Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East: Realistic or Idealistic?” It was held on Monday, 10 May 2010, parallel to the NPT Review Conference taking place in New York, with the conscious intention of providing innovative input into the deliberations taking place in New York and in other policy and decision-making forums. We decided to organize this conference because, as Israelis, Palestinians, and as human beings, we are all concerned about the danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. We also believe that there is an inherent connection between progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace and the possibility of moving forward towards a nuclear free zone in the region. That is why the Palestine-Israel Journal decided to publish an issue and organize an international conference, together with SOAS and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, devoted to this issue. With the growing tensions between Israel and Iran, the NPT Review Conference in New York, and President Obama’s vision of a nuclear free world, we felt it was time to bring the debate back home, to Jerusalem, to the “eye of the storm.”

The conference was divided into three sessions: 1) “The Iranian and Israeli Nuclear Programs; 2) “A Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East: Realistic or Idealistic?”, and 3) “Conclusions and Recommendations”.

Following is a summary of key points and recommendations from a variety of speakers:

Dr. Avner Cohen, author of “Israel and the Bomb”, is considered the foremost independent authority on the Israeli nuclear program and policy. He argued, “It is important to have an internal debate about nuclear questions within Israel. The concept of a “nuclear Iran” which is being used in the internal Israeli discourse has to be clarified, and not just be called an “existential threat.” The issue involves much group thinking, emotional attachments to doctrines and complex psychological, sociological, political and anthropological elements.”

He also suggested, “A ME Nuclear Free Zone will remain an ideal in our lifetime, but perhaps it can be divided into separate elements. For example, a zone free of enrichment and reprocessing on all sides. No progress can be made as long as Israel clings to its policy of nuclear opacity, though I have no magic formula for ending the policy of ambiguity.”

Mr. Jamil Rabbah was a Palestinian delegate to the post-Madrid Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks, 1992-1995. He noted, “The environmental ramifications of earthquakes and the limited life span of nuclear facilities should be taken into account, particularly when dealing with Dimona.” He also argued, “Israel perceives that it is facing an existential threat from the Iranian nuclear program, but the Palestinians are facing a daily existential threat due to the ongoing occupation.”

He called for the inclusion of outside actors in the nuclear question and the peace process, arguing that bilateral agreements don’t work. He also suggested, “Solving the Palestinian issue is a first step towards removing nuclear weapons in the Middle East.”

Dr. Emily Landau, Director of Arms Control and Regional Security, National Institute of Strategic Studies (NISS) at Tel Aviv University, noted, “Israeli society, within think tanks and research institutes, is engaged with the nuclear issue today at a very high level.”

She also argued, “Any process that involves ending nuclear ambiguity needs to be thought out very carefully otherwise it will be a step backwards. Maintaining a policy of ambiguity has not prevented a serious discussion of the issue. If Israel were to join the NPT today it would mean complete disarmament, there is no other way of joining, and that is not viable today.”

She suggested, “As an alternative, we should propose a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. That would involve everyone in the region sitting around the table together, in an open dialogue, rather than trying to force Israel to do something that it will not do. Joining the NPT should be the last, not the first step.”

However, Mr. Issam Makhoul, former Member of Knesset, co-chair of the Emil Touma Institute of Palestinian and Israeli Studies, Haifa, and a member of the International Planning Committee for the NPT Review Conference, argued, “The debate should not start with what Israel is willing to do, but with what is necessary for the security of the world. Something new is happening on the issue, and at the NPT Review Conference we are taking new steps on a global level towards a new era.”

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He noted, “There is a major danger when one country in a region tries to maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons. There are two options, either everyone should be allowed to have them, or no-one. The fact that Israel wants a nuclear deterrence, maintains a policy of ambiguity, of ‘not being the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East,’ is irrelevant. And America maintains a double standard on this question, concerning Israel and Iran.”

He also argued, “Comprehensive peace would be a huge step, but I don’t think that Israel’s nuclear capabilities are the biggest obstacle to peace.”

Prof. Farhang Jahanpour, expert on Iranian affairs and lecturer on Middle East at Oxford, who was making his first visit to Jerusalem, noted, “We need a leap of imagination. The mutual demonization must end. Iran does not refer to Israel as Israel, but as ‘the Zionist entity’, and they are not alone in this. There are countries in the Middle East which have treaties with Israel, but it is a cold peace.

“Israelis are right to feel threatened, given their history, background and generations of persecution,” he argued. “The same is true for Iran. Chemical weapons were used against them, the great powers poured money into Saddam Hussein’s coffers, to fund the war against Iran, while preventing a debate on the international level. They felt alone and betrayed, why can’t we understand their sense of existential threat?”

He further pointed, “Iran is not ‘Iran’... everything cannot be summed up in one box. Iran is one of the most educated countries in the Middle East, 65% of the students are girls, 70% of the population is below 35, and it is one of the most literate and Internet savvy countries in the world, which we saw following the elections.”

He called calld on Arab states to “stop talking about ‘the Zionist entity’,” but also argued, “Israel should also decide whether it is a Middle Eastern country. We are an emotional lot in the Middle East, hot in animosity, but when there is friendship, we are generous and hospitable. Let us opt for the second option.”

Dr. Bernd Kubbig, director Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, said, “We have to find a way to fix the traumatized relationship between Washington and Tehran. If this process starts, difficult as it may be, it will probably solve 80% of the problems in the region.”

He argued, “Israel should optimize its relations with its Arab neighbors. They should be engaged via the Arab Peace Initiative.” This was affirmed at the Arab League Summit Conference in Beirut in 2002, which offers Israel peace and normal relations with the Arab world in exchange for a withdrawal to the 67 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem alongside the State of Israel, and an agreed upon solution to the refugee problem.

Dr. Kubbig argued, “Its current approach to unilaterism of arms building has not worked. Israel needs an exit strategy. It has to look for common ground, cooperative ways, with both the Arabs and the Iranians. Security, water, settlements, the environment and Jerusalem can all be dealt with together. We have to create a win-win situation.”

He said, “As academics, we should revitalize the approach of the 90s, the need for dialogue in the region, on all the issues. Your neighbor, your adversary, the mothers of children there, have the same fears as you over here.”

My own recommendations focused on the need to describe the potential devastating nature of a possible future war between Israel and Iran, in terms of the two peoples, the stability of the region and the world, and the vital importance of developing a constructive engagement between representatives of Israeli and Iranian civil society, to cultivate understanding and reduce the tensions between the two peoples.

My colleague, Palestinian co-editor Ziad AbuZayyad, wrote in his article in the issue that “achieving a comprehensive peace settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict will bring peace and security to all the countries in the Middle East, including Israel....and it will give a sense of legitimacy to the international demands made on Iran to refrain from achieving a nuclear capability.”

Hillel Schenker lives in Tel Aviv and is Co-Editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal, based in Jerusalem. http://www.pij.org •
Greenpeace International held a seminar on the proliferation risks of nuclear energy in advance of its new report on the subject. The discussion was led by the report authors, Dr. Frank Barnaby and Shaun Burnie.

The report is a reflection of the concerns regarding the growth of nuclear power and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel process. The report specifically focuses on the risks of proliferation surrounding light water reactors (LWR); the most prevalent nuclear reactor type. Dr. Barnaby outlined this concern simply: increase power, increase plutonium, increase state access to nuclear weapons. He explained plutonium can be used for nuclear weapons and is produced as a by-product of uranium, which is used as reactor fuel.

According to Dr. Barnaby, within the nuclear community there are lingering concerns that nuclear reactor grade plutonium is not sufficient for a nuclear weapon due to the high concentration of Pu-240. Weapons-grade plutonium has a much lower concentration of this isotope and is predominately Pu-239. However, Barnaby expressed his belief that while concerns remain, they are ill-founded. He states that much of the scientific community is in agreement that reactor grade plutonium may be used and that tests conducted by both the US and the UK verify this account. Those engaging in weapons construction need to take into account this variation in plutonium, but this may be achieved with little additional technical knowledge.

Dr. Barnaby elaborated on the issue of the separation of plutonium from spent fuel and how this might occur. A country may construct what he referred to as a “quick and dirty” reprocessing plant. This facility could be operated clandestinely where spent nuclear fuel is diverted from waste pools to the reprocessing facility. This could be a relatively small building that could be constructed within 6 months. It could possibly acquire the first 10kgs of plutonium in one week, which is sufficient for two nuclear weapons.

Mr. Burnie expounded on the multilateral aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle that have been trumpeted by the international community. Burnie explained that multilateral approaches have been proposed by many and have been welcomed by states already possessing a highly developed nuclear industry. However, these approaches mostly deal with the front-end of the fuel cycle and not with the fuel that has been used in a reactor. This, according to Burnie, is an important omission, as a recent nuclear power forecast produced by the IAEA suggests that LWR will grow by concerning numbers. Even more importantly, he argued, the spread of this technology will undoubtedly have political consequences; when one state acquires the latent ability to possess a nuclear weapon, neighbors may also desire to have this latent ability as a precautionary measure.

Many questions were raised when the discussion was open for comment. Most participants appeared to be troubled by the speaker’s oversight that states must have intention when it comes to developing nuclear weapons. It is not enough simply to have a latent ability. The NPT lays a legally-binding framework to prevent states from pursuit of nuclear weapons and if a state ratifies the NPT, these concerns are mitigated. Some participants argued that LWR are not as troubling as those states that have refused to participate in the NPT.

The panel agreed it is necessary for a state to decide to take on a nuclear weapons programme; however, they argued, safeguards are not 100% effective. Small amounts of nuclear material may be diverted which leads to serious potential for political consequences when one state has acquired this latent ability. They claimed that the current safeguard system is not up to the task and that the IAEA cannot admit to this problem, as it would draw into question what the organization has been doing for the last 60 years. States that have the ability to develop nuclear weapons do not necessarily do so, but they have a sufficient ability. Also, political situations change with time, there is nothing to say that today’s peaceful country is not host to tomorrow’s hostile government.

The panel further stressed that multilateral approaches, as proposed thus far, are insufficient to deal with this proliferation risk. Multilateralism has become the mantra of the nuclear industry and has effectively become a cover for further acquisition and development of nuclear markets. These multilateral approaches are pointed to as an example of safe nuclear energy when, in fact, this is not the case.

During the closing remarks, one last concern was raised about the plausibility of denying a state’s article IV inalienable right to nuclear energy. To this, Mr. Burnie suggested that article V, allowing for the peace explosion of nuclear weapons, has essentially been nullified. He asked, what makes article IV different?

Joel Van Wagenen is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
Students simulated negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Frederik Postelt | University of Hamburg

On 11 and 12 May 2010, more than 30 students of all subjects, mainly from the universities in Darmstadt and Hamburg, Germany, came together in New York to negotiate articles IX (Nuclear Weapons) and X (Nuclear Material) of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention (mNWC, UN document A/62/650) as a side event to the 8th NPT RevCon.

Preparations in Germany
The simulation was a part of two university seminars offered by the universities of Darmstadt and Hamburg. The students formed delegations of 2-3 students, chose which of the 13 countries they would like to represent in New York, and researched their countries’ positions on the NPT and the mNWC.

In a seminar in Hamburg on 16 and 17 April, all delegations came together and presented their countries’ positions to each other. Several expert talks were held during those two days, which helped the students to gain a deeper knowledge of the history of the NPT and international regime-building. Three non-German students from the USA and Japan participated in the simulation; these students attended this part of the seminar live via the internet to save travel costs and greenhouse gas emissions.

Preparations in the US
From 3 May on, all the students had the chance to attend the NPT RevCon as members of the INESAP delegation (International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation). In addition to the general debate and the wealth of NGO side events, the students took the chance to personally meet the real negotiators of their country and discuss these countries’ positions on the NPT and a NWC. These meetings were organized together with BANg (Ban All Nukes generation) and the Pressehütte Mutlangen. In daily evening meetings, the students exchanged experiences and discussed the events of the day.

On 8 and 9 May, the preparations peaked in another block seminar at Princeton University. On the first day, some of the world’s experts in the field, like Frank von Hippel, enlarged the student’s knowledge on verification of nuclear disarmament, managing fissile material stocks, and nuclear energy. A group of Princeton students who had held simulated negotiations on a new START treaty shortly before came to the block seminar. The student groups each presented their projects and engaged in a stimulating discussion about nuclear topics.

On the second day, the students had time to finalize their countries’ positions and start lobbying and forming coalitions for the upcoming simulation conference. The delegations met in well known blocks like the EU, NATO, and NAM but also formed new alliances to settle and agree upon mutual positions. They prepared working papers and draft resolutions.

Simulation
On 11 and 12 May, the simulation finally took place. The four sessions of three hours each were chaired by Dr. Sidhu from the East West Institute, Bill Kidd, a member of the Scottish parliament, and Ambassador Labbé from Chile. Observed by various members of NGOs and members of country delegations, the students slipped not only literally into their business dresses but behaved just like the real negotiators.

They were facing a hypothetical scenario:
After Israel accidentally confirmed the possession of nuclear weapons, the 22 countries of the Arab League threaten to withdraw from the NPT. The imminent danger of the NPT losing its claim of near-universality and its credibility and thereby opening the door for uncontrolled proliferation led to negotiations on a NWC, as requested by the Arab League.

The students succeeded the negotiations of the preceding years, namely in Geneva at the PrepCom 2008 on Article I (Obligations) and in New York at the PrepCom 2009 on Article IV (Phases of Implementation).

The simulated delegations quickly filled their roles as representatives of countries as different as Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Libya, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, and the United States. They learned how not only to follow, but to use the adopted rules of procedures to influence the proceedings. They issued right of replies, inquiries, and informal caucuses and some contradictory opinions seemed to obstruct any progress. But using a lot of tact, the considerate guidance by the chairs and the informal caucuses and breaks between the sessions helped all clashes of interests to be solved and nearly all decisions were made by consensus. Therefore, the simulated conference revised not only both articles on Nuclear Weapons and Materials but also passed two additional resolutions on clandestine nuclear weapons and expressing the will to summon a working group on nuclear energy.

Conclusion
The successful outcome of this simulation showed once more that negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention are not only preferable but also achievable. By playing the roles, the students

continued on next page
Off-the-record government briefing for NGOs:
Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Main Committee I
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Main Committee II
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Disarmament education and Hibakusha stories
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–12:00
Contact: Tim Wright, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 12:00–13:00
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Peacemaking and the Middle East nuclear weapon free zone
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Dominic Moran, Greenpeace

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00

NWC simulation (cont.)
got not only to know what it means to defend an opinion which they not necessarily share, but also realized the importance of speaking to each other and cooperating in order to achieve agreements. The students benefited a lot from the meetings and discussions with delegation members of different countries and the numerous NGOs. But it was more than just receiving information, they also gave an input on what their desire is: a nuclear weapons free future.

The simulations were organized by the Interdisciplinary Working Group on Science, Engineering and Security (IANUS), Darmstadt University and the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker-Centre for Science and Peace Research (ZNF), Hamburg University and has been supported by INESAP, Princeton University, NWIP (Nuclear Weapons Inheritance Project) and CISP (Center for Interdisciplinary Syllabus). •