Time to turn in the platinum credit card of nuclear weapons
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During the final day of general debate, several delegations called for a change in thinking about security and nuclear weapons. Many governments highlighted the fallacies of relying on nuclear weapons for security and called for the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Yesterday, Mexico’s Ambassador Heller noted that it is paradoxical that in the post-Cold War world, some states rely on weapons that threaten humanity to ensure their security. He argued that states should undertake a profound review of military doctrines, noting that nuclear weapon doctrines create false assumptions that security depends specifically on possibility of obtaining them.

The representative of the Holy See pointed out that nuclear weapons “are no longer just for deterrence but have become entrenched in the military doctrines of the major powers.” And Singapore’s Ambassador Menon noted, “Some NWS consider the possession of nuclear weapons essential to maintaining their self-image of their place in the world and not just a military necessity… we need to find ways to convince all states that nuclear weapons reduce rather than increase their security, and do not enhance prestige.”

Many civil society representatives will be heartened to hear these strong condemnations against the false conception that nuclear weapons provide security. This afternoon, when NGO representatives deliver presentations to the official plenary (at 3:00 PM in Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building), there will be statements addressing concepts of nuclear deterrence and security doctrines, among many other topics. But it is not just people in the conference rooms that have something to say about security and nuclear weapons.

In his chapter in Reaching Critical Will’s book Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament, Michael Veiluva of the Western States Legal Foundation argues that the “political, ideological, and even theological attributes attached to nuclear weapons” and the resulting perceptions of their role and value is a critical component in any decision to obtain and retain them. As the “platinum credit card of state power, influence, and nationalistic pride,” he argues that nuclear weapons are “endowed with more complex and significant political attributes that combine to create units of international exchange as well as conflict.”

This perception of power inevitably attracts others. But part of the value of nuclear weapons is that they offer admittance into a very exclusive club. Newcomers challenge the privileged status afforded by nuclear weapons; thus the concept of proliferation in the mainstream debate tends to characterize some nuclear weapons as a problem while turning a blind eye to others.

It is difficult but imperative to force an examination of the assumptions and language surrounding nuclear weapons and their role in maintaining security. Carol Cohn notes that part of the difficulty arises because assumptions in established discourses are treated as “objective reality” rather than as beliefs stemming from personal identities, values, or position. As the Holy See’s representative said yesterday, “Now is the time to profoundly rethink and change our perception of nuclear weapons.” This will need to happen inside and outside of the conference rooms, at all levels of society, from seasoned government officials to children in the schoolyard—but it is already happening, as evidenced by the sheer volume of general debate statements highlighting this problem and the civil society determination to tackle it.

To start, both the Swiss and Holy See delegations have recommended this week, nuclear weapons must be considered in the context international humanitarian law; and, as John Borrie of UNIDIR recommended in his chapter in Beyond arms control, “Both governments and civil society should develop a discourse that draws attention to the impact of development, production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons rather than accepting untested claims or assumptions favour inertia.”
June 5
A Global Day of Action for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

On June 5, 2010, thousands of people across the world will take part in coordinated local events to mark Nuclear Abolition Day. Our message is simple: it’s time for governments to begin negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

2010年6月5日、世界中で何千人もの人々がそれぞれの地域で核兵器廃絶の日を記念する協調イベントに参加するでしょう。私たちのメッセージはシンプルなものです。つまり、今こそ各国政府が全ての核兵器を禁止する核兵器禁止条約の協議を始める時なのです。

www.nuclearabolition.org
The case against nuclear deterrence doctrine
John Loretz | International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

By some accounts, nuclear weapons are like the flu. As long as they exist, we will continue to need the most powerful flu vaccines we can get our hands on; in this case, “effective” nuclear arsenals to prevent an outbreak. According to this analogy, deterrence is a prophylactic against a threat we have no other means to address.

There are two big problems with this viewpoint, which appear to be held in common by all the nuclear weapon states and by those who aspire to join the club. Nuclear weapons are not our inevitable lot in life; they don’t just happen to exist. And insistence that the nuclear threat can only be fended off by a nuclear deterrent is a tautological trap: “we will need nuclear weapons as long as they exist.”

Today, NGOs will make the case to the NPT states parties that abandoning deterrence doctrine is the key to achieving a world in which nuclear weapons do not exist, a world that is safer and more secure than the one we currently inhabit. That case is straightforward and, we believe, irrefutable.

Nuclear weapons are uniquely and obscenely destructive. Threatening such destruction as a basis for security (the bottom line of nuclear deterrence) is morally reprehensible.

Unlike other forms of deterrence, failure of which can have tragic consequences, we cannot afford for nuclear deterrence to fail because the consequences are unthinkable. Therefore, we should not put ourselves in a position where it can fail. The truth deterrence theorists refuse to face is that nuclear deterrence sooner or later will fail; the history of war has taught us that sooner or later desperation trumps rationality.

There is a strong basis in international humanitarian law for the illegality of invoking nuclear deterrence in the first place.

Finally, continued adherence to deterrence doctrine fuels proliferation and undermines alternative pathways to security, including the pathway to a nuclear weapons free world, which is now the declared goal of the US government, echoed by a growing chorus of international leaders.

Despite that goal, the nuclear weapon states have continued to rationalize deterrence and to sell that rationalization to willing buyers. Some non-nuclear weapon states are convincing themselves that they need nuclear weapons to deter others. The virus appears to be unresponsive to the vaccine.

If nuclear weapons were, in fact, as endemic as the flu or the common cold, our only resort might well be to keep reformulating the deterrence “vaccine” in an attempt to stay one step ahead of a devastating outbreak. But we actually have an alternative. We have the option and the means to rid the world of nuclear weapons and, in the process, to see nuclear deterrence in terms of a more appropriate medical analogy: snake oil.

John Loretz is the program director of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

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Answers to yesterday’s Nuclear Crossword

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John Loretz is the program director of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
Global Zero sponsored a screening of the film *Countdown to Zero* on Wednesday afternoon. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon introduced the film and prominent Global Zero figures Bruce Blair, Lawrence Bender, and Jeff Skoll took questions afterward. Audience comments on the film were almost all very favorable, yet there are problems with this film which may arise from its American perspective.

Here is the trouble: consider an American whose understanding of the nuclear danger comes from *Countdown*. How will that American react to the proposition that United States nuclear policy is the perennial biggest engine of proliferation—that the US is right at the heart of the problem? For there are good reasons to think so. Except for Soviet numerical superiority for warheads at astronomical levels on both sides, the US has been the world leader in nuclear weapons and delivery systems since the beginning.

But our hypothetical American Countdown viewer will not have heard that. Rather, (s)he will have been hammered with ways in which Islamic terrorists, Pakistanis, North Koreans, Iranians, and Russians are the problem, while America’s friend Israel joins America in getting off easily.

Images suggesting a terrorist bomb striking Manhattan abound. On the other hand, there is no reminder that the potential for a terrorist nuclear holocaust is exactly zero, in stark contrast to the shameful inability of governments to give up preparing to carry it out on a moment’s notice, now almost 20 years after the Cold War.

In this film, the task of asking America about its bomb, “If it is bad, why do you have it?” falls to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a surefire way to cause the greatest possible number of Americans to dismiss that important question as a sinister trap.

After the film played, the panel assured Wednesday’s audience that there was no effort to tailor the film to avoid offending American sensibilities, and they can speak to that with authority. Yet the outcome of their work may again show that conscious effort isn’t necessary for the end result to unfairly favor one’s own national perspective. This is an important thing to remember in all that we do.

We need a broader abolition movement, and infighting can be destructive of that, so it is with some reluctance that I make these complaints. However, a message whose strength is production values and whose weakness is a pro-American slant can exert great influence in a harmful direction. We should reflect on that.

If *Countdown to Zero* succeeds in energizing the nuclear abolition movement as its makers hope, we can only be grateful to them. But there is the risk that this film will persuade Americans only of the danger of nuclear weapons in “wrong hands”. If so, American viewers may remain susceptible to arguments that the American nuclear arsenal enhances security, and should be retained for the foreseeable future. To that extent, this film could be a step backward.

Chuck Baynton is a delegate from the Wisconsin Network for Peace and Justice.
Disarmament

- Chile argued that NPT states parties do not need to renegotiate previous agreements such as the 13 steps but should update them.
- Chile voiced support for the “so-called new package” proposed by Australia and Japan and the UNSG’s 5 point plan for disarmament. It also supported laying the foundations for an NWC.
- Chile supported the proposal made by the de-alerting coalition on reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons.
- Mexico expressed support for the establishment of an accounting system on nuclear arsenals, expenditures, and materials.
- Mexico called on NWS should adopt no first use policies.
- Mexico asked, if we have a timeline to achieve the MDGs or reduce emissions in the framework for climate change, why don’t we have deadlines for nuclear disarmament?
- Poland argued that disarmament efforts are instruments to make nuclear weapons less attractive to potential proliferators.
- Poland called for future reductions to include tactical nuclear weapons, noting that instead of enhancing security they make it more volatile. It noted that along with Norway it has taken a joint initiative to include “sub-strategic” nuclear arsenals in the arms control framework in a step-by-step flexible process without deadlines.
- Ecuador said it supports the UNSG’s five point plan and called on NWS to comply with obligations under article VI.
- Senegal said the reaffirmation of 13 steps is important and urged the RevCon to draw up a specific list of actions to be undertaken to implement article VI with a timetable and transparency, monitoring, and verification. It argued that strengthening the authority of the NPT requires the RevCon to take a stand on ways and means to produce general agreement on article VI.
- Solomon Islands argued for the acceleration of negotiations on a time bound plan of action to take concrete steps to eliminate nuclear weapons and supported the idea of establishing a standing committee to review, monitor, and verify disarmament undertaken unilaterally and bilaterally.
- Solomon Islands also proposed that to increase confidence between states, nuclear weapons should be transferred to a secure storage under international supervision.
- Zimbabwe argued that the RevCon must agree upon a clear action plan and a time frame for the implementation of article VI by nuclear weapon states.
- Thailand voiced support for the UNSG’s 5 point action plan for disarmament.
- Belgium argued for continued reduction of nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic weapons, by Russia and the United States and emphasized that it had actively helped to launch a debate on the future role of nuclear weapons in the new strategic concept of NATO.
- The Holy See argued that preparatory work should begin as soon as possible on a convention or framework agreement leading to the phased elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Tanzania argued that the RevCon should make irreversible commitments to disarmament.
- Guatemala argued for a verification mechanism to ensure the full compliance with the obligations of all three pillars and noted that initiatives related to the elaboration of national reports and for a
programme of action for nuclear disarmament are especially relevant.

- Jamaica stated that it expects the nuclear weapon states to demonstrate the necessary political will to fulfil their agreed responsibility on nuclear disarmament and to commence discussions on a treaty to achieve general and complete disarmament.

- The International Parliamentarian Union stated that parliamentary resolutions supporting a nuclear weapons convention have been adopted in a number of parliaments, including Austria, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and Norway as well as the European Parliament.

- The League of Arab States welcomed all initiatives calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide, in implementation of article VI of the NPT, and called upon the conference to translate such initiatives into practical plans with a timeframe.

- The League of Arab States also called upon the RevCon to issue a decision banning the development and production of new nuclear weapons.

**Non-proliferation**

- The Marshall Islands reminded the Conference about the large-scale surface tests of nuclear weapons that were carried out on their territory, and pointed out the devastating impacts of these tests and emphasized that their exiled local communities are still struggling with resettlement. The Marshall Islands also urged for the entry into force of the CTBT.

- Papua New Guinea argued for the strengthening of non-proliferation measures, including safeguards and compliance.

- Papua New Guinea announced that it is in the process of ratifying the CTBT.

- The Vienna Group of 10 announced that they have submitted working papers on issues related to non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, where the 10 states proposes specific draft review language for the final document.

- San Marino urged all state to support the effort of IAEA, reaffirming its authority and providing new resources to carry out its mission.

- Mr. Tibor Tóth from the CTBTO argued that the CTBT would be a strong and verifiable final barrier to a nuclear weapons capability. He also noted that the verification regime is nearing completion.

- Chile said the RevCon should condemn existing risks of proliferation and seek prevention mechanisms.

- Montenegro said it is committed to strengthen national security systems and cooperation in implementing export controls. It noted that it has

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**Cont.**

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**CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE**
• Singapore announced that ASEAN countries have started a conversation on an ASEAN nuclear safety regime.
• Turkey called for further strengthening and universalization of the Agency’s verification authority.
• Moldova pledged for actions towards ensuring compliance and promotion of non-proliferation obligations in accordance with relevant resolution of the Security Council, including by building adequate capacity for prevention and response to challenges posed by states or entities that are non-compliant with the non-proliferation regimes and threaten regional and international security.
• Albania argued that the IAEA safeguards system is fundamental for the nonproliferation regime and the verification instruments of the IAEA need to be strictly observed and further strengthened. Albania further stated that the comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol are very important tools for the preservation of the world's peace and stability and the fight against nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear energy and the fuel cycle
• Sri Lanka supported any international initiative to enhance and strengthen nuclear energy development related technical cooperation within and out of the IAEA framework.
• Thailand argued that the issue of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be addressed within the framework of IAEA.
• The Kyrgyz Republic attached great importance to the issue of mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities, and called on all governments and organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes.
• Botswana called for sufficient, assured, and predictable funding for the IAEA Technical Cooperation programme.
• Mexico said it supports a multilateral fuel bank that guarantees supplies for all states, emphasizing that it must have the involvement of the IAEA and that it shouldn’t limit article IV rights.
• Chile, Poland, Senegal, Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the Kyrgyz Republic called for universal acceptance of the additional protocol.
• The Arab League reiterated that the comprehensive safeguards agreement represent the legal commitment within the scope of the Treaty, and stressed the optional nature of the additional protocol, emphasizing that they would not agree to render it a mandatory instrument.
• Montenegro said that it would ratify its safeguards agreement, additional protocol, and small quantities protocol by the end of this year.
• Singapore expressed support for a multilateral fuel bank.

Institutional mechanisms
• Sri Lanka argued for the need to have an institutional mechanism with a standing bureau and a Secretariat.

Universality
• Belgium argued that honouring the commitments under the NPT is the best way to promote universality of the treaty, but also called upon Israel, Pakistan, and India to join it and to bring their nuclear posture fully in line with the treaty.
• Oman argued that Israel's nuclear capabilities are threatening to the region, and the silence of the international community is encouraging the continuation of such programme.
• Saudi Arabia stated that it would make every possible effort to agree on a plan of action for achieving universality of the treaty.

continued on next page
New Technologies for Verifying the Additional Protocol

Can clandestine production of nuclear materials be uncovered using environmental sampling?

A presentation by iGSE experts.

Monday, May 10
1:15 - 2:45 PM
at the
Church Center for the
United Nations
Conference room on 2nd floor
777 United Nations Plaza
New York NY 10017

visit www.igse.net

The Additional Protocol to the NPT introduces environmental sampling to the safeguards regime.

➢ Can a clandestine production of weapons grade plutonium or uranium be detected under the Additional Protocol?
➢ Which technologies are available to provide the IAEA with advanced measurement capabilities for this task?
➢ How can scientists and NGOs help to make novel technologies available to safeguards inspectors?

These questions will be addressed and discussed by scientific experts of the iGSE.

Speakers:

Ole Ross
Meteorological Institute,
University of Hamburg

Alexander Glaser
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University

Simon Hebel
iGSE Coordinator;
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg

Yemen argued that Israel’s refusal to join the NPT was a threat to security and stability in the region and urged the IAEA to implement their resolution on the Middle East, as a step towards building a NWFZ.

Jamaica welcomed the outcome of the Second Conference of NWFZ and Mongolia and urged the Review Conference to take careful note of the final document if that meeting.

Chile said the RevCon should proclaim the importance of NWFZs as intermediate stage toward NWFW, urging expansion of such zones to the northern hemisphere.

Mexico noted that the creation of NWFZs is only possible if regional problems that cause tensions and conflicts are addressed and resolved. In the Middle East, it said a NWFZ is only viable as part of a global political arrangement.

Ecuador said it supports the creation of a NWFZ in South Asia and called on India and Pakistan to join the NPT as NNWS.

Ghana urged the US and Russia to ratify the relevant protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty.

Singapore argued that a NWFZ in the Middle East can only be developed in the broader geopolitical context of the region and “in tandem with the creation of conditions that make a MENWFZ a realistic objective that will be regarded as being in

continued on next page
the security interests of all the states in the region, including a two-state solution for Palestine and recognition of Israel by all states in the region.

**Security doctrines**
- Mexico said it is paradoxical that in the post-Cold War world, security relies on weapons that threaten humanity. It argued that states should undertake a profound review of military doctrines to adopt them to newer circumstances, noting that nuclear weapons create false assumption that individual and collective security depends specifically on possibility of obtaining them.
- Singapore called for ways to reduce the concept that nuclear weapons afford security or power; it called on NWS to reduce their role in security doctrines and adopt a no first use policy and to significantly reduce their arsenals transparently and verifiably.
- The Holy See stated that it is time to profoundly rethink and change our perception of nuclear weapons.
- Zimbabwe raised concerns that despite the glaring danger of nuclear weapons, some countries continue to maintain military doctrines that are based on the possession of such weapons and contradict the spirit of the NPT as well as constitute a major impediment to progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Thailand argued that a no first use principle should be an essential guarantee for the global non-proliferation regime.
- The Holy See argued that the military doctrines which continue to rely on nuclear weapons as a means of security and defence or even measure of power, de facto slow down disarmament and non-proliferation processes.
- Yemen shared their concerns over doctrines containing nuclear deterrence rhetoric and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.
- Jamaica remained convinced that the continued development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons to serve for defence purposes or as a deterrent will undermine the explicit intent and purposes of the Treaty.

**Civil society**
- Mexico said NGOs are important allies for governments in disarmament education and echoed the call from the DPI/NGO conference held in Mexico City in 2009, to “Disarm Now!”
- Croatia noted that support for the NPT can be seen through strong involvement of civil society on the margins of this RevCon.

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**Russian compliance with article VI**

Sameer Kanal | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Russian Federation held a briefing Thursday to address Russian compliance with Article VI of the NPT. The briefing was conducted by Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, the head of the Russian delegation to the Review Conference, and Colonel Sergey Shushlebin of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Mr. Antonov outlined Russian commitments to disarmament, noting that the Russian nuclear arsenal was 25% the size of the Soviet arsenal of 1991. Russia had met its obligations under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter range missiles, and Antonov asserted that Russia had met its obligations under the START and SORT agreements. Antonov also noted that Russia had not conducted a nuclear test since October 1990.

Mr. Shushlebin addressed new START, which covers “all strategic systems.” Addressing both submarine control and regional security, Shushlebin said that the new START also ensures that conventional missiles also cannot be reconverted to carry nuclear warheads. He said that Russia supports negotiations on the principle that “the core for international agreement” consists of equality and parity. Mr. Shushlebin also called for all nuclear weapons to be stored within the borders of the country owning them and for all countries to make “an active contribution to the disarmament process.”

Mr. Antonov noted that Russia favored reciprocity in disarmament and was not receiving it in Europe, where the Secretary-General of NATO had spoken in favor of retaining nuclear weapons. Even though five members had asked for weapons to be removed from their countries, Mr. Antonov noted that a NATO decision for nuclear withdrawal requires consensus and “no such decision will happen.” Mr. Antonov quipped that he was “not authorized to speak on behalf of the US” and that Ellen Tauscher had spoken Wednesday for the US; he also stated, apparently in reference to Ms. Tauscher’s comments, that if “countries’ nuclear weapons are now under the control of NATO, then NATO is a nuclear actor.”

Both Mr. Antonov and Mr. Shushlebin said the next steps included ratification of the new START and US ratification of the CTBT, with Antonov noting “difficult political circumstances” in the US. Shushlebin wanted to make sure that ratification of the new START happened before any future negotiations. Mr. Antonov said Russia first wanted to see ratifications and then further steps, including possible joint action by the P5. Antonov supported...
The Obama Administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review offered the following assurance about the possible use of nuclear weapons by the United States: “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”

On April 22, 2010, during Q&A at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington DC, Gary Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism was asked about this negative security assurance and provided some answers. Samore’s responses raise some important issues that require clarification.

**Question 1: What specific obligations will a non-weapon state have to comply with?**

MR. SAMORE: “Well, I think that the latter half of the NSA is in compliance with nuclear nonproliferation obligations, which are broader than safeguards agreements. … It’s hard to imagine such a fine distinction but we’re trying to, in the latter part of the negative security assurance, we’re trying to make it broader – we’re trying to make it as broad as possible so that it includes things like U.N. Security Council resolutions; 1540 is another mandatory obligation; nuclear-weapons-free zones are obligations that countries undertake.”

Q. “ …you suggested that the negative security assurances would not apply to countries who were not in compliance with Resolution 1540, which would mean that if a country does not have what the United States deems to be sufficient export controls that it would not qualify for a negative security assurance. Is that right?”

MR. SAMORE: “…Obviously I wasn’t saying that countries that have inadequate export controls are automatically excluded from the NSA. The point I’m making is that there are the clause in the NSA that says incompliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations is intended to be a broad clause and we’ll interpret that – when the time comes, we’ll interpret that in accordance with what we judge to be a meaningful standard.”

This suggests that being in compliance with the NPT and associated IAEA safeguards obligations is not sufficient to ensure a non-weapon state will be free from the threat of use of nuclear weapons by the United States.

In order to determine whether a state is eligible for the negative security assurance, the United States intends to use a currently unspecified list of nonproliferation obligations that is intended to be “as broad as possible.”

The list of obligations is said to include “things like U.N. Security Council resolutions.” What current Security Council resolutions does the United States intend to consider as a nonproliferation obligation for the purposes of the new negative security assurance?

Will any current or proposed US-supported informal or voluntary arrangements count as nonproliferation obligations? Is the list of possible nonproliferation obligations open-ended?

Will the United States determine unilaterally what new nonproliferation obligations non-weapon states must accept to be eligible for the new negative security assurance?

**Question 2. Who decides whether a non-weapon state is in compliance?**

Q: “…who determines if a country is in noncompliance?”

MR. SAMORE: “…On the question of who determines, that’s a U.S. national determination. I mean, obviously, we’ll be influenced by the actions of other parties. If the IAEA Board of Governors decides that a country is not in compliance with their safeguards obligation, that it would be difficult or – not impossible, but difficult – for the U.S. government to ignore that…."

This suggests that the United States alone will decide whether a non-weapon state is in compliance or not. In making this judgment, the United States explicitly reserves the right, if necessary, to over-ride judgments by the IAEA Board of Governors.

This means that it may be possible for a non-weapon state to be seen as in compliance with its obligations by the IAEA but not considered in compliance by the United States.

What will be the role of the United Nations Security Council?

What role will international law play in the United States’ process of arriving at a ‘national determination’ that a non-weapon state is in noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations?

**Question 3. What will be the U.S. response to a finding of noncompliance, who will decide, and on what basis?**

On April 6, at a press conference to explain the Nuclear Posture Review, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered:

SECRETARY GATES: “if you’re not going to play by the rules, if you’re going to be a proliferator, then all options are on the table in terms of how we deal with you.”

The position that “all options are on the table” is a continued on next page
On Thursday afternoon, IKV Pax Christi organized an event that dealt with NATO’s nuclear sharing, and strategies on how to end this.

Wimmed Verhagen of IKV Pax Christi introduced the term battlefield nuclear weapons, a term that unlike “tactical” or “sub-strategic” nuclear weapons highlights the fact that these weapons are old and obsolete relics of the Cold War. While Ms. Verhagen argued that the number of governments referencing these weapons in their general debate statements is a welcome development, she also pointed out that decisions about these weapons cannot be made at the NPT, it’s instead a question for NATO. Therefore, this seminar focused on how civil society can work to influence the new NATO strategic concept to be adopted in November of this year.

Laurens Hogebrink, also of IKV Pax Christi, outlined the major reasons for getting rid of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Although the US “only” has around 500, Russia possesses over 2000 tactical nuclear weapons. That means that at some point, as disarmament progresses on strategic nuclear weapons, there will be more tactical than strategic nuclear weapons in the world. Another reason pointed out by Mr. Hogebrink was that such tactical weapons are relics of the Cold War and no longer serve any military purpose. It was emphasized that articles I and II of the NPT prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. While recognizing that the world has changed, Mr Hogebrink noted that NATO strategies have failed to follow suit.

Susi Snyder of IKV Pax Christi elaborated on the political aspect of nuclear weapons as well as on how the NATO strategic concept is formed. Operating by consensus, as NATO does, is often an obstacle to progress. Consensus could however be quite helpful in this case, as it means that all countries are heard. Ms. Snyder also proposed that the burden sharing aspect of nuclear weapons within NATO should be replaced by a new form of alliance glue—a sharing of the economic burden of nuclear disarmament.

Regina Hagen (Germany), Lisa Clark (Italy), and Steven Staples (Canada) presented some concrete ideas that are pursued in their respective countries with regard to NATO’s nuclear sharing. In Germany, campaigns directed at both the public and the government have led to concrete steps being taken by the parliament. In Italy, a civil lawsuit against the US has been promoted. An Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is an issue that resonates with the people in Canada, who according to Mr. Staples quickly have forgotten that nuclear weapons were placed in Canada up until the 1980s.

Ms. Verhagen presented a summary of what should be done, how to do it, and who to lobby. Issues of special importance include increased transparency, limiting the role nuclear weapons play in security doctrines, burden sharing, and a solution to make the new NATO countries feel secure without the existence of tactical weapons in Europe. These objectives can be achieved by greater cooperation in civil society, sharing of best practices and linking up with issues that grab people’s attention.

Malin Nilsson is a member of the Swedish Section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

Russian compliance with article VI (cont.)

Mr. Shushlebin answered a concern regarding Russian weapons’ high-alert status, stating that Russia “excludes [the possibility of] human error”; Mr. Antonov added that the risk of accidental nuclear launch was reduced when stockpiles and the nuclear role was reduced; the latter, Antonov noted, was in the new START and “is not a slogan.” Mr. Antonov was dismissive of questions asking for greater Russian transparency, which he stated was in its regular reports and in its compliance with treaty obligations. Antonov said that the purpose of the event was to discuss Russia’s Article VI compliance, though some questions made him “dream of working for an NGO.” He was apologetic that he was unable to discuss certain things in his position, but did offer to meet with any member of the audience and answer their questions later, “if you invite me for lunch.”

US negative security assurances (cont.)

direct restatement of the Bush administration policy. It was and is intended to be a threat to use force.

Will the United States explain how this policy complies with the obligation in the United Nations Charter that:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

References

Grassroots diplomacy
Aaron Hayman | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

When world leaders gather and engage at the highest diplomatic levels, the media is always present and the outcome, whether success or failure, is sure to make the front page the following day. Grassroots diplomacy on the other hand often attracts far less media coverage. But despite the cameras being off and few reporters taking note, grassroots diplomacy’s can be just as effective as high-level summits.

Grassroots diplomacy takes many shapes, but it is generally viewed as the cooperation between local government officials in different countries working towards a specific goal with international ramifications, such as nuclear disarmament. On Thursday morning, a host of local government officials from Japan, South Korea and New Zealand reported on their efforts and initiatives to collaborate with, and construct a network of, their counterparts around the world.

The focus of the session was on the efforts promoting a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NANWFZ). The participants heard from members of the Japanese and South Korean Parliaments who recently led an effort that produced a joint statement (signed by seven South Korean MPs and 86 Japanese MPs) calling for regional and global nuclear disarmament. The mayors of Fujisawa, Hirakata, and Nagasaki, all of whom are involved in the Mayors for Peace, also spoke of various efforts and initiatives that they are currently involved in.

Participants were also able to listen to the story of Takashi Yoshihara, the current Chair of the Nagasaki City Council and a survivor of the atomic bomb attack. He provided a vivid story of that fateful day in August, 1945 and the pain, suffering and passing of several relatives. His involvement with Mayors for Peace and the broader abolition movement was founded in his desire that Nagasaki be the last city ever destroyed by a nuclear weapon.

There were also officials from New Zealand present. Robert Harvey, Mayor of Waitakere, highlighted recent work with Waitakere’s sister cities, and specifically his upcoming efforts to engage with a city in China to be the first nuclear free zone in that country. He also noted President Obama’s remarks that New Zealand’s nuclear weapon free zone status was a positive step towards a world without nuclear weapons. This is a major US policy change as in the 1980’s when the Nuclear Free Zone Act was first passed in Wellington, was met with much hostility from the US Congress.

Aaron Hayman is an intern at Reaching Critical Will of WILPF. •

The role of parliamentarians
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During this panel discussion hosted by Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND), the role of parliamentarians within the nuclear disarmament was discussed. UN Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki-moon attended the event and showed his appreciation for the work of the PNND. He stated that parliamentarians are the link between global and local, between political institutions and the grassroots. He continued to emphasize that this is the momentum for change, how people are now waking up and starting to understand the consequences of the military spending. He pointed out that it is the world’s taxpayers that are paying for nuclear weapons and this money could be used differently.

Ban Ki-moon also said that the PNND has showed that grassroots and governments can cooperate and forward the message. Nicky Wagner, a member of parliament in New Zealand, illustrated this cooperation by explaining how the demand for nuclear disarmament first was driven by the civil society, then adopted by the parliament, and later resulted in the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone.

By comparing nuclear weapons with environment issues, Jonathan Granoff from Global Security Institute made it clear that the multilateral work becomes more and more crucial as no region can isolate itself from such threats. Raphael Chegeni, parliamentarian of Tanzania, emphasized the problematic situation for some African countries, where there is a lack of institutional systems to deal with these issues. He said that most African countries depend on budgets that are driven of the interests of the people who funded them, arguing that results in a lack of power. He voiced concerns over such lack of power, by pointing out that the discovery of resources of uranium in Tanzania and that they had to relay on other countries to help them.

The discussions during the session were based on exchanging experiences and how to meet new challenges. The panel seemed to agree on that the parliaments are playing an important role in being a bridge between the grassroots and the government, and together are able to meet such challenges within nuclear disarmament. While it was pointed out that the challenges are different in each country, there is no question that multilateral work is needed to reach to nuclear disarmament.

Emma Bjertén is an intern at Reaching Critical Will of WILPF. •
On Wednesday, a film screening hosted by Global Zero gave participants at the Review Conference the opportunity to see the documentary *Countdown to Zero*, which will premier in New York the 9th of July. Present at the screening, Lawrence Bender, producer of the film, said that the aim is to educate people to be aware of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to encourage them to join the movement. He underlined the special importance of educating the younger generation, as they never experienced the threat of nuclear weapons during the cold war.

The film presents the threat of nuclear bombs detonated by accident, miscalculation, or madness. The movie shows accidents where military airplanes blow up, tells about broken computer chips causing false alarms, and emphasizes how close we have been to nuclear attacks.

Unfortunately, the film fails to mention that two nuclear attacks, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have already occurred—with devastating consequences. Instead of moral considerations about consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the film shows pictures from surveillance cameras of subways and videos of the terrorist attacks in cities like Madrid, London, and Bali to make the audience believe that the proliferation of nuclear material might cause a nuclear attack in our city. The visions of nuclear bombs conducted in western cities tries to convince us that the threat comes from terrorists or “bad states”, in this film exemplified by Iran and North Korea. However, that in other countries of the world the security threat looks different, and that the American nuclear weapons are the source of fear is never addressed. After the movie, this one-sided perspective of the nuclear threat came up in the question and answer session. Mr. Chuck Baynton from Peace and Justice emphasized that the movie should have addressed that the US nuclear policy have threaten and forced other countries to possess nuclear weapons. He underscored that this film shows exclusively and American perspective and it was questioned whether the film would be able to reach an international audience.

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What’s On
Today’s Calendar of Events

Morning Vigil (all faiths and none are welcome)
Where: Isaiah Wall, Ralph Bunche Park
When: 7:30–8:00
Contact: Patricia and Michael Pulham, Christian CND

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 8:00–8:50
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Registration
Where: Lobby of the Visitor’s Entrance
When: 9:00–12:00
Contact: Soo-Hyun Kim, UNODA

Government Briefing: Ambassador Jurg Lauber of SWITZERLAND
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Main Committee I
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00
Contact: Holly Lindamood, Daisy Alliance

Getting to a Middle East NWFZ
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00
Contact: Holly Lindamood, Daisy Alliance

Arms Down! Religious Youth respond to Nuclear Weapons in dialogue with a Hibakusha
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Allison Pytlak, Religions for Peace

Sustainable Security and the 21st Century
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Rhianna Kreger, rtkreger@gsinstitute.org

NGO Presentations to the Review Conference
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

What’s On
Weekend Calendar of Events

Saturday, 8 May

Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting
Where: Judson Memorial Church
239 Thompson Street (between Washington Square South and West Third St)
When: 9:00–18:00
Contact: Alice Slater, NAPF
All are welcome!

Book Talk, Book Signing, and Complimentary Buffet Lunch
Apocalypse Never, by Tad Daley of the Nobel Peace Laureate organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Where: The Corinthian, 330 East 38th Street, 19Q
When: 12:00–14:30

Sunday, 9 May

Global Network Annual Space Conference
Where: Church Center, 777 UN Plaza (1st Ave & 44th St), 2nd Floor
When: 9:00–16:00
Contact: Bruce Gagnon, Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space

Docs on Nukes: Nuclear Narratives through the Art of Film
Films: Witness to Hiroshima (16 mins);
Atomic Mom (87 mins)
Panel discussions with filmmakers
Where: Maysles Institute, 343 Lenox Avenue
When: 17:00