Unsustainable asymmetry
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

As the second week started and Main Committees II and III took up their work, discussions mostly concerned issues of non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In Main Committee II, the discussions primarily focused on IAEA safeguards and compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Many western states argued that an additional protocol should be the new standard for the safeguard system that non-nuclear weapon states are obliged to accept under article III. While the widely accepted safeguard standard currently consists of a comprehensive safeguards agreement, Australia argued that the safeguard system is “evolutionary in character” and that an additional protocol is needed in order to address the problem of undeclared nuclear activities.

This view is contested by many states from the NAM. Venezuela’s delegate argued, any additional requirements of the safeguard system will be a reinterpretation of the NPT and its obligations. Adding the additional protocol as the new standard is seen as unjust by many non-nuclear weapon states. The Brazilian delegation emphasized that it’s simply not fair to expect non-nuclear weapon states to implement stronger verification measures, while the international community has yet to be presented with a timeframe within which to expect the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. Iran’s delegation argued that as long as nuclear weapon states have not fully complied with their obligations under article VI of the NPT, acceptance of additional legal obligations are unjustified.

In Main Committee III, aside from peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the issue of withdrawal was discussed. The delegations of Japan, the EU, Canada, and the US all discussed appropriate actions to take when faced with withdrawal “and its consequences”. However, the Egyptian delegation expressed concern with attempts to restrict the right to withdraw from the treaty, noting that calls to impose selective considerations as a precondition for nuclear cooperation and calls to restrict the right of withdrawal emanate from the same sources.

These tensions are illustrative of the broader concern many non-nuclear weapon states have about the NPT: that it is imbalanced and unjust. Many of the challenges facing the NPT today arise from double standards applied in implementing the Treaty. While enhancing safeguards would be a useful contribution to preventing new states from acquiring nuclear weapons, the lack of concrete and measurable disarmament from nuclear weapon states, instances of the major powers and allies engaging in nuclear technology trade with non-parties to the NPT, continued reliance on nuclear weapons for national security as well as nuclear sharing within NATO and extended nuclear deterrence, create the perception of imbalance of both obligations and implementation of those obligations.

In Main Committee III, France’s delegation talked about civil nuclear energy as potential “cement of a new international solidarity” and argued that the NPT, “a vector of a shared project for peace, mutual development and shared prosperity, is the cornerstone of this nuclear solidarity.” But at the same time, in Main Committee II, France’s delegation argued that civil nuclear cooperation with countries who do not comply with their obligations should be suspended. The Iranian delegation pointed out that such obligations did not seem to matter in nuclear cooperation deals with non-NPT states. It argued, “the growth of US-Israeli nuclear cooperation and a recent decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have shown being a non-party to the NPT is more privileged and even being awarded by western countries.” These double standard do not only affect the willingness of non-nuclear weapon states to strengthen non-proliferation commitments in the NPT context: the NSG exception for India is currently used by Pakistan in the Conference on Disarmament as an argument to prevent the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

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Human security

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The Soka Gakkai International (SGI) Buddhist network and its People’s Decade for Nuclear Abolition campaign are proud partners of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
Response to the Nuclear Posture Review Report
John Burroughs | Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Nuclear Disarmament

The Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR) released April 6, 2010 has a marked improvement in tone and direction regarding nuclear disarmament over previous reports released by the Bush administration in 2001 and the Clinton administration in 1994. The report

- states that the “long-term goal of U.S. policy is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”;
- identifies this objective to be pursued after entry into force of the New START agreement signed April 8, 2010 and “substantial further nuclear force reductions with Russia”: “engage other states possessing nuclear weapons, over time, in a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide”; and
- decides upon this step: “Initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies.”

Regarding the legal obligation of good faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the NPR contends that “reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons” will demonstrate “that we are meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament.” While welcome, such reductions do not suffice.

In its 1996 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that Article VI requires that states “pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”1 The United States is therefore obligated to go beyond the measures outlined in the NPR to support and actively work toward the commencement and conclusion of negotiations on a convention for the global elimination of nuclear weapons.2

In many respects, however, the NPR conveys quite the opposite intention, projecting reliance on nuclear forces as central instruments of national security strategy for decades to come:

- No substantial changes are made in the US nuclear force structure of heavy bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), or in their alert states (“nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time”);
- The arsenal of operationally deployed warheads and bombs the United States will field under New START limits – probably several hundred in excess of 1550 due to a counting rule equating one bomber to one warhead – would enable a full-scale, Cold-War style preemptive or responsive attack upon Russian nuclear forces, airfields, command and control centers, military-industrial targets, etc.

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Answers to yesterday’s Nuclear Crossword

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Reaching Critical Will
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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will project.
Response to the Nuclear Posture Review Report (cont.)

- The United States is planning to develop and deploy new generations of nuclear weapons delivery systems in the next two decades, including ballistic missile submarines and ICBMs; is replacing existing nuclear-capable fighterbombers with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; will study whether and how to replace the current air-launched cruise missile; and will not accept limits on its ongoing missile defense program.

- Warhead “life extension” work will proceed for the W76, deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the B61, deployed on fighter-bombers, and the W78, deployed on ICBMs. While the NPR claims that the work will not “support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities,” in fact life extension for the W76 is adding to the capability to hit hard targets. Also, the military capability of a nuclear weapon does not depend on the warhead alone, and there are ongoing improvements in delivery systems, for example the F-35, targeting, command and control, etc.

- Major investments in new weapons production facilities are approved, supposedly to hedge against further reductions in deployed and nondeployed nuclear warheads (now amounting to about 5,000, not counting the several thousand awaiting dismantlement). Hedging against unexpected technical problems and “geopolitical surprise” was a central theme of previous reviews.

Taken as a whole, the modernization of nuclear forces and the nuclear weapons complex now underway or planned is contrary to the requirement that the United States meet its disarmament obligation in “good faith”. Good faith is required both by the terms of NPT Article VI and by general international law. As Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, former president of the ICJ, has explained, good faith requires states “to respect the integrity” of the NPT and “to refrain from acts incompatible with [its] object and purpose,” and it proscribes “every initiative the effect of which would be to render impossible the conclusion of the contemplated disarmament treaty.”

- US plans also are contrary to commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and to the application of principle of irreversibility to nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. In particular, building weapons facilities that among other things provide the capability for expanding arsenals is a circumvention of the principle of irreversibility.

Doctrine on Use of Nuclear Weapons

The NPR signals that it is desirable for the United States to move toward a policy of “deterring” only nuclear attack, though not a policy that would rule out preemption. For now, however, the longstanding elements of US doctrine remain in place: the United States may use nuclear weapons, preemptively or responsively, in relation to both nuclear and non-nuclear (conventional, chemical, biological) capabilities and attacks by other states possessing nuclear weapons, or states deemed not to be in compliance with the NPT. In this regard, the NPR is fundamentally deficient in its treatment – or rather ignoring – of law. It is inescapable that the use of nuclear weapons, with their uncontrollable collateral effects, is incompatible with requirements of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. Yet despite the fact that the US military accepts and applies these rules in its conventional military operations, they receive no mention in the NPR.

It is true that the NPR evinces no enthusiasm for use of nuclear weapons. It states: “It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.” And: “the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” However, in those circumstances as in others, the rules apply. Thus in its 1996 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice characterized this rule as “fundamental” and “intransgressible”: “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” The Court also restricted the area where it could not reach a definitive conclusion regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness of threat or use of nuclear weapons to “an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” This is considerably narrower than the NPR’s reference to “vital interests.”

A positive aspect of the NPR in relation to doctrine concerns a US assurance dating back to 1978 of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. The NPR prominently features the assurance and retracts a Clinton administration qualification reserving the option to respond with nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear weapon state’s chemical or biological weapon attack or capability. Here the NPR is acknowledging a basic element of the NPT bargain: states that have renounced possession of nuclear weapons are entitled to a guarantee that the weapons will not be used against them. The assurance indeed appears to be legally binding. The United States formally

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restated it in 1995, joined by three other NPT nuclear weapon states (China already had a declared policy of no first use). Non-nuclear weapon states relied upon the assurances that year in agreeing to extend the NPT indefinitely, and reliance is a key factor in determining whether promises are binding. The United States should now support a process to make assurances by the nuclear weapon states legally binding without any question, by a treaty, or by a Security Council resolution that makes them mandatory as a matter of international peace and security.

One aspect of the NPR’s statement of the assurance is problematic. That is the addition of the requirement that states receiving the assurance be “in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”24 The NPR offers no detail on who is to decide this, but the implication is that in the end it is up to the United States. Nor does the NPR explain what the degree of non-compliance must be. In commenting on the NPR, however, US officials have said that they do not consider Iran to be covered by the assurance. Yet Iran does not have nuclear weapons and has not been found by any international body to be in breach of the fundamental NPT obligation set forth in Article II not to “manufacture or otherwise acquire” nuclear weapons. Other states have, like Iran, violated safeguards reporting rules; states parties are obligated to enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA by Article III of the NPT. Further development of the assurances should clarify that determinations of non-compliance are to be made by authoritative international bodies and that only a breach of the Article II obligation of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons renders a state ineligible for the assurances.

John Burroughs is the executive director of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy.

Notes
1. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 105(2)F (July 8).
2. See Good Faith Negotiations Leading to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice, 2009, pp. 25-28. See also the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated by the UN Secretary-General to member states.

“Few Americans know that more than forty years ago, in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, our country committed to eliminate its entire nuclear arsenal. In Apocalypse Never, Tad Daley traces the tortured history of this promise—and charts a course toward at last fulfilling it.”

—Michael Douglas, Academy Award–winning actor and United Nations Messenger of Peace

“In a fresh, lively, accessible style, Apocalypse Never goes to the essence of complex issues of why and how to leave the age of nuclear weapons behind. Read, act, and survive!”

—John Burroughs, executive director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, and co-editor of Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security?

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—Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired and chair, Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation

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—Congressman Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio, 1997–present
News in Brief
Beatrice Fihn and Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Main Committee II
Nuclear weapons free zones
- The NAM and Venezuela said the RevCon should urge all NWS to withdraw or modify any reservations or unilateral interpretations that affect the denuclearization status of the zones.
- Algeria noted with interest that the US announced that they would ratify the Pelindaba Treaty and urged all other NWS to do the same.
- The EU hoped that outstanding issues concerning some NWFZs can be resolved through consultations and in accordance with the UNDC guidelines.
- Indonesia argued that NWFZ should be more active in promoting the establishment of new zones and hoped that nuclear weapon states will sign and ratify a protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ.
- Mongolia hoped that after a decade of “reflection” about its status as a NWFZ, the NWS could finally provide security assurances. Mongolia also hoped that the RevCon would express support for its policy to institutionalize its nuclear weapon free status.

Middle East
- The NAM recommended the establishment of a Standing Committee to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, and called upon all states parties to facilitate the implementation of the IAEA resolutions on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.
- The NAM also called upon states parties to disclose all information available on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities.
- Philippines argued for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East at the earliest possible time.
- The US stated that it fully supports the objective of a Middle East verifiably free of WMDs and they supported concrete and realistic measures to implement the 1995 resolution.
- Japan said it fully support the Middle East resolution and stands ready to work with all parties to take practical steps towards its implementation.
- Venezuela argued that Israel should renounce their weapons and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon states.
- Libya argued that one should not attach impossible pre-conditions to the NWFZ in the Middle East
- The EU stated that it is prepared to consider and work out practical steps to prepare the ground for a full implementation of the Middle East resolution.
- Norway argued that one main avenue for moving closer to a NWFZ in the Middle East is through improved safeguards.

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Brazil stated that the RevCon should recommend concrete measures to fulfil the goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

**Vertical proliferation**
- Brazil argued that proliferation both within and outside the Treaty is stimulated not only by the existence of nuclear weapons, but also by the ongoing qualitative development of such weapon and their delivery systems.

**Compliance**
- Canada argued that the RevCon must reaffirm the fundamental importance of full compliance with article III.
- The EU argued that the RevCon should include in its action plan measures to determine “the consequences of a state’s non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”
- Brazil pointed to nuclear sharing in the context of military alliances and argued that each article of the NPT is binding and that all parties must be in strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.
- France suggested that all civil nuclear cooperation with countries who do not comply with their obligations should be suspended.

**IAEA Safeguards**
- The NAM said the RevCon should acknowledge the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguard obligations.
- The NAM also requested that all NWS and non-parties to the NPT should place their nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards.
- Egypt argued that the efforts to redefine existing obligations of the Treaty undermine the efforts of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards.
- Australia, France, the US, Netherlands, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, Norway, and the EU argued that the safeguard system under article III is evolutionary and the additional protocol should be the verification standard.
- Australia and New Zealand said the additional protocol should be established as a condition of supply for all nuclear material and equipment.
- Philippines argued that the IAEA could be strengthened through the universalization of the additional protocol agreements.
- The US stated that it is committed to enhancing IAEA safeguards’ ability to respond to both known and emerging threats as well as to future, unanticipated threats.
- Venezuela stated that any additional requirements of the safeguards will be a reinterpretation of the NPT and its obligation.
- Canada argued that the RevCon must urge the 21 states parties that haven’t signed the safeguards agreement to meet their obligations under article III.
- Iran stated that as long as the comprehensive safeguards agreement is not universally applied and NWS have not fully complied with their obligations under article VI, acceptance of additional legal obligations, such as additional protocols, are absolutely not justified. Iran reminded the participants of that the additional protocol is a voluntary and non-legally binding instrument.
- Iran and Libya argued that it is essential to establish a similar verification mechanism for dealing with article I as exists for article III, and that IAEA should be entrusted with verifying reductions of nuclear weapon stocks.
- Iran also proposed that the IAEA should establish a mechanism to deal with the breaches of confidentiality.
- South Africa argued that while additional protocols are voluntary, they have a great importance for confidence-building measures and called upon all states to conclude such additional protocol with the IAEA.
- Indonesia and China argued that the additional protocol is vital for strengthening the safeguards system and urged all states to adopt it.
- Norway said all nuclear activities should be brought under IAEA control and monitoring.
- Brazil argued that the additional protocol is not a part of the balance of obligations under the NPT and stated that it’s simply not fair to expect NNWS to implement further enhanced verification measures, while the international community has yet to be presented with a timeframe within which to expect the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

**Export control**
- France argued for the need of rigorous and universal control of exports of sensitive nuclear technologies, and that the Zangger Committee must continue its activities with a view to universalize its general principles for controlling exports.
- France also argued that the Nuclear Suppliers Group is an essential instrument for the promotion of a credible and balanced approach to export controls.
- France, Japan, and Argentina highlighted the value of UN Security Council resolution 1540.
- Canada emphasized the importance of national export control systems and should encourage states parties that have such systems to provide

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assistance to those that require it.

- The EU called for the strengthening of exports controls including recognition of the Zangger Committee Memoranda A and B as the minimal NPT export controls for conducting nuclear trade.
- Iran argued that nuclear cooperation between the US and Israel, as well as the recent exception by the NSG for nuclear trade with India have shown that being a non-party to the NPT is more privileged and even being awarded by Western countries.

**Iran’s nuclear programme**
- Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway expressed concern with the Iranian situation and called on Iran to comply with relevant UNSC resolutions and cooperate with the IAEA.
- France argued that Iran was in violation of its safeguard agreements and that there are no civil justification for its programme. France stated that the situation calls for the strongest response from the international community.
- The EU called upon Iran to engage seriously with the international community in order to find a negotiated solution that will address Iran's interests as well as the international community’s concerns.
- South Africa and the Republic of Korea urged Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
- China argued that it is actively committed to solving Iranian problems by peaceful means, since sanctions are not an effective solution.

**DPRK’s nuclear programme**
- Australia, Japan, the EU, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea called upon the DPRK to meet its Six Party Talks commitments, comply with relevant UNSC resolutions, and/or come comply with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
- France encouraged the RevCon to send a strong message to DPRK that it will not tolerate its nuclear ambitions nor its nuclear proliferation cooperation with other countries, particularly in the Middle East.
- Japan urged the RevCon to condemn the DPRK’s nuclear tests.
- South Africa called upon DPRK to eliminate any nuclear weapons programme, rejoin the NPT and ratify the CTBT, as well as place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards.
- China and Norway called for the resumption of the diplomatic process.

**Institutional issues**
- Canada proposed three measures for strengthening the NPT regime institutionally: convening annual meetings and extraordinary meetings; creating a circle of former chairs of the NPT conferences; and establishing a support unit that could bolster the Treaty’s capacity.
- The Netherlands argued that a institutional reform could enhance the effectiveness of the review process and thus contribute to progress on substantive issues.

**Main Committee III**

*"Inalienable right"*
- The NAM urged the RevCon to underscore that nothing in the Treaty can affect article IV rights without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.
- Australia and Japan urged the RevCon to reaffirm the right of article IV without discrimination and in conformity with arts I, II, and III.
- Brazil and Venezuela said the RevCon should reaffirm the right of article IV.
- Canada and the US said the RevCon should stress that compliance with the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the NPT is the essential basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
- Brazil said the RevCon should recognize the legitimacy of peaceful uses programmes carried out under international safeguards.
- Cuba called for the establishment of a NPT standing committee to address concerns expressed by any state with respect to specific cases of denial of transfers of nuclear material in accordance with article IV.

**Technical cooperation**
- The NAM urged the RevCon to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries persist; to emphasize that NPT does not prohibit the use or transfer of equipment based on their sensitivity but only that it be subject to full scope safeguards; that IAEA technical cooperation will not be subject to political, economic, military conditions incompatible with the provisions of its Statute; and that technical cooperation should be undertaken exclusively in accordance with the decisions of the IAEA's policy making organs.
- South Africa called for funding of technical cooperation programmes to be sufficient, assured, and predictable and to be incorporated into the IAEA's regular budget.
- France said it will create an international institute of nuclear energy with scholarships and grants for foreign students and called for investments from financial institutions.
- Canada said the RevCon should encourage technical cooperation programmes to become more transparent, accountable, and results-oriented.

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The NAM and Brazil said the RevCon should reaffirm the importance of international cooperation and agree on strengthening the capabilities of IAEA.

The Netherlands said technical cooperation programmes should be conducted under the best safety, security, and non-proliferation conditions.

Venezuela urged states parties to avoid restrictions on technical cooperation predicated on political consideration.

**Nuclear safety and security**

Australia called on all states planning or building nuclear power facilities to join the four conventions on nuclear safety and security and urged all states to take further measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities.

France said it supports creation of a European Institute of Safety Training, which would form the basis of an international network of nuclear safety experts, and called for the development of independent evaluations of the safety of nuclear power plants under the IAEA.

Brazil said the RevCon should request states parties bring into force the highest possible standards of safety and security.

The EU called on states parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention.

**Multilateral fuel cycle**

Egypt expressed its concern with initiatives related to multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle that contain inherent restrictions on access to fuel.

Brazil argued that any multilateral fuel cycle should not impinge upon the article IV or hinder the normal functioning of the international market of nuclear goods and services.

Cuba called for comprehensive and transparent negotiations on these issues, based on premise that the supply of nuclear fuel can’t become a monopoly of a few. It said that any decision on supply of nuclear fuel should be adopted by consensus with participation of all countries.

Mongolia said a multilateral fuel bank should not be subject to political consideration.

France expressed support for the establishment of a uranium bank under the IAEA.

Canada, the EU, and Netherlands welcomed the decision to establish in an LEU reserve in Russia.

Canada called on the RevCon to acknowledge the value of multilateral fuel supply assurance mechanisms and establish basic parameters for such mechanisms.

The Netherlands said the RevCon should endorse the multilateralization process and encourage all states to remain engaged in the discussions.

**Waste**

France said it wishes to develop long term solutions for managing spent fuel and final waste and that it will continue to let other states use France’s processing and recycling facilities.

**Attack on facilities**

The NAM and Cuba called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Non-proliferation and PUNE**

The NAM said the RevCon should emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through strict observance of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements.

France said the first condition on peaceful uses should be to ensure that the development of civil nuclear energy will never aid proliferation.

The US said that efforts to prevent proliferation should not restrain the facilitation of peaceful uses.

Brazil argued that there is no automatic link between the increasing interest in nuclear energy and a purported increase risk of nuclear proliferation.

Egypt expressed concern that preconditions on nuclear supply and cooperation and added obligations are completely ignored when some states enter into new agreements with non-states parties without comprehensive safeguards.

**Withdrawal from NPT**

Egypt expressed concern with attempts to restrict the right to withdraw from the treaty, noting that calls to impose selective considerations as a precondition for nuclear cooperation and calls to restrict the right of withdrawal emanate from the same sources.

Japan argued that collective efforts are warranted to make sure that violators do not take undue advantage of the right to withdraw from the Treaty and that proposals should be considered without revising article X.

Canada said NPT states parties should be able to convene extraordinary meetings of states parties in cases of withdrawal notification, as per WP.4.

The EU said states parties should respond to a notice of withdrawal and its consequences with urgency and purpose and should require the UNSC to act promptly.

The US said the international community should respond to a notice of withdrawal by getting together and taking common sense measures to determine whether withdrawal would result in serious consequences.
Bad Faith: Disarmament rhetoric vs. reality
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

At an event organized by the Los Alamos Study Group (LASG) entitled “Bad Faith: Disarmament rhetoric vs. reality—How hypocritical “disarmament” initiatives are enabling militarism abroad and at home,” LASG executive director Greg Mello outlined some of the key challenges to concrete disarmament today; board member Willem Malten looked at proposals to build a new nuclear weapons facility in New Mexico, and Francine Lindberg looked at how the reality of the US nuclear military complex affects ordinary citizens and the future of the country.

Looking at new START and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in concert with the Obama administration budget request for nuclear weapon funding and plans for construction of new weapons facilities, Mello argued that there is no disarmament going on in the United States today and that none is being contemplated. He argued that new START is a “status quo force protection treaty” rather than a disarmament treaty and that it only has value in stabilizing the relationship between the US and Russia. Meanwhile, the NPR keeps the role of nuclear forces in US policy unchanged. At the same time, the Obama administration has offered a nuclear weapons budget increase beyond the budget of former President George W. Bush and has plans to build a new nuclear weapons facility—but this is not enough to satisfy the US Senators who want something in exchange for any potential ratification of new START. According to Mello, Senator Kyl, the loudest opposition to Obama’s “disarmament” initiatives, says that he would need an assurance of $15 billion more this decade for him to feel secure that Obama can carry out his promises of nuclear weapon buildings and programmes.

Meanwhile, there has been little public outcry about the Obama administration undermining concrete measures for a world without nuclear weapons. Mello argued that the administration’s disarmament rhetoric has been a very effective form of propaganda, wherein the left-end of the political spectrum has become defined by NGOs who repeat what Obama says and support his initiatives without question. Mello called for a serious discussion about the role of civil society in promoting nuclear disarmament, noting that the rhetoric in the United States has allowed people to give up on substantive change.

Willem Malten focused on the proposed nuclear weapon facility for the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory in New Mexico, known as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR). He noted that the starting price for the facility was $300 million, but after consultations with its corporate sponsors such as Bechtel, which would provide the 24,000 trucks of cement needed for the project, the price has skyrocketed to $4.2 billion or more. He noted that this is six times the cost of the Golden Gate bridge and that it is more expensive than any other project in New Mexico other than the highway. Arguing that the construction of this facility is a real and symbolic provocation that will undermine global efforts toward disarmament and non-proliferation, Malten explained that CMRR would allow for pit production with a maximum capacity of 200 pits per year, thus undermining any political or diplomatic advantage that may come from dismantling other parts of the US arsenal. He also noted that with such high costs, all of the money New Mexico desperately needs for education and renewable energy will wind up in the pit of the CMRR.

Francine Lindberg followed on this message, explaining how the nuclear military machinery in New Mexico is devouring the state’s economy. Arguing that deterrence and national security are clever marketing terms designed to fool the fearful, she called on US citizens and the international community to criticize the US nuclear military complex for using tax money on weapons of mass destruction whose use can never be justified.

During the Q&A, activists from Norway, Germany, Sweden, and the UK spoke about how the Obama rhetoric has affected their ability to push for concrete nuclear disarmament. In Norway, one participant argued that it has become difficult to talk about any other peace or disarmament issue than what is on the Obama agenda. In Germany, however, another participant said there have been good critiques of US rhetoric versus the reality of its actions, while in the UK, where work at the nuclear weapon labs is closely tied to the US labs, people are paying attention to the connections and the challenges therein.

More information about the CMRR can be found on the Los Alamos Study Group’s websites: www.lasg.org and www.lasg.org/CMRR/open_page.htm •
Sustainable security and the 21st century
Sameer Kanal | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Monday, the Global Security Institute hosted a panel discussion entitled “Sustainable Security and the 21st Century.” Moderated by Jonathan Granoff, GSI President, the panel included Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute and former Director of the UN Millennium Project; Dr. Jane Goodall, anthropologist and UN Messenger for Peace; and Thomas Stelzer, Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Inter-Agency Affairs.

Mr. Granoff began by naming the world’s 22,000 nuclear weapons “eyes of death, on us every day,” and noted the 1 billion people affected by poverty, as well as examples of environmental degradation. Noting that all three problems require global cooperation, Granoff highlighted a statement by Nobel peace laureates, which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons, “before they eliminate us.”

Mr. Sachs highlighted the challenges of “human-induced environmental devastation,” extreme poverty, and nuclear proliferation. Quoting US President Kennedy, who stated, “man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty, and all forms of human life,” Sachs asked which option humanity would choose. He noted that without addressing the environment, poverty and security simultaneously, none could be solved.

Sachs pointed out that the US spends one million USD annually on each soldier in Afghanistan. Each million, Sachs noted, could “rescue a village.” Noting that the US spends 15 times more on the military than on peaceful development assistance, and that military spending in Afghanistan is 10 times Afghanistan’s entire GDP, Sachs called US spending “a pathetic failure of our imagination.”

Ms. Goodall stressed the importance of other life forms to security and the environment, noting from her own study of chimpanzees that they are “so like us, yet unable to speak.” She asked how it was possible that intelligent beings such as humans are destroying their only home. Goodall lamented that decisions are not made about “how it will help our people later,” but rather with an eye only to today. She stressed that “the trend can be reversed,” and drew attention to her Roots & Shoots program as a way forward “out of the mess that we have made.”

Mr. Stelzer noted that all three problems mentioned by the previous panelists were the result of “unsustainable imbalances,” and cited US Admiral Dennis Blair, who stated that the largest security threat to the US was “eroding national structures in the face of successive crises.” The food crisis led to financial and economic crises, and then social and employment crises. Mr. Stelzer believed that the world needed to collectively “take ownership” of the climate change problem, and that the path forward is shifting from “they should fix it” to ‘we should fix it.” He stated that “there are a billion people starving [...] either they rise up, or they migrate, or they die,” each of which also leads to security implications.

Mr. Granoff called nuclear weapons the “paradox of the modern age – the more the weapons are ‘perfected’, the less secure we become.” He proposed new principles of security: first, that “we are one human family”; second, that equity be applied to security issues including the global nuclear regime; and third, that a “reverence for life” be included in all discussions. Granoff concluded by calling for “an expansion of conscience [...] wanting for others what we want for ourselves.”

Ms. Goodall stressed actions that could be taken to protect the environment, including avoiding tropical forest wood products, eating less meat, and talking to youth to ensure that progress continues. As the event closed, Goodall asked for consideration of plants and animals as well as humans, noting that “this planet is not here for humans alone.”

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a serious threat to international peace and security and an obstacle to our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. However, increased inspections cannot be the sole method of preventing such threats. Without addressing the reason for states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, we can never guarantee that they would not try. By continuing to rely on nuclear weapons for national security, nuclear weapon states effectively emphasize that such weapons are useful tools in international politics. And by continuing to provide nuclear technologies to India and Israel, they implicitly emphasize that it is more advantageous to remain outside the NPT than under increasing obligations as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Brazil noted that the inherent asymmetry is dangerous and unsustainable in the long run. These are serious issues and states parties must adequately address such double standards and restore confidence in the NPT.
Prospects for a shift in NATO’s nuclear posture in 2010
Emma Rosengren | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Sweden

This seminar, chaired by Trevor McCrisken of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), focused on the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security doctrine in the context of the new US Nuclear Posture Review.

Ambassador James Goodby (Hoover Institute) argued that the future of NATO’s nuclear weapons doctrine is extensively linked to the American context today. According to him, the Nuclear Posture Review has opened for NATO to pick up the ball thrown by the US administration, and to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance’s security doctrine.

According to Hans Kristensen (Federation of American Scientists), recent estimates show that the total number of nuclear weapons in Europe is significantly lower than ever before. Ironically, the lowering in numbers has not been followed by a change of NATO’s nuclear weapons doctrine. Even though a quick withdrawal is not very likely to occur, Mr. Kristensen emphasized that NATO needs to reconsider the need for nuclear weapons to be placed in Europe. He also underlined that the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe should not be conditioned on bilateral negotiations between the US and Russia, since that would turn back the clock to the Cold War landscape. Instead, nuclear sharing missions should first be phased out, followed by the complete withdrawal of forces.

Paul Ingram (BASIC) highlighted the explicit link between NATO and the Review Conference, namely the legal basis for nuclear sharing under articles I and II of the NPT. Mr. Ingram stressed that NATO arrangements should not undermine the NPT, and questioned the reasons for the existence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. He recognized that if the military alliance sticks to the status quo, we will face unilateral moves that in turn will weaken the alliance. He argued that it is necessary for NATO to address this issue in a proactive manner. Furthermore, extended deterrence is no longer a relevant argument for nuclear weapons to be kept in Europe, since none of the European countries holding US weapons are reliant on their presence for their security.

The political dimension of nuclear weapons was especially highlighted by Nickolas Roth (Alliance for Nuclear Accountability). He focused on the 10 percent increase in nuclear weapons funds presented by the Obama administration earlier this year. Mr. Roth argued that even though technical aspects continue to drive costs, political aspects also do the same. According to Mr. Roth, the increase in funds for nuclear industries is a political cover for those who would oppose the ratification of START and the CTBT. Thus, political considerations have real influence on priorities.

The Q&A session covered issues such as the military use of modernized arsenals, the role of European countries in withdrawing nuclear weapons from Europe, and the need for parallel reductions of conventional and nuclear weapons.
New technologies for verifying the additional protocol
Malin Nilsson | WILPF Sweden

On Monday, the Independent Group of Scientific Experts on the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons usable materials production (iGSE) hosted a panel to examine new technologies for verifying the additional protocol, a type of safeguards agreements that allows the IAEA to carry out enhanced verification procedures. The main topic covered by the panel was the question of whether clandestine production of nuclear materials can be discovered using environmental sampling.

The panel was chaired by Wolfgang Liebert and consisted of three panelists: Simon Hebel, Ole Ross, and Alexander Glaser. Mr. Hebel began by explaining that the additional protocol introduces the possibility of environmental sampling and remote monitoring. He also explained that the stated goal of the iGSE to work for the development and promotion of advanced capabilities for sampling and analysis in support of the verification of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation treaties.

Mr. Ross elaborated the detectability of plutonium production. He explained that when plutonium is separated from spent nuclear fuel, the fission gas isotope krypton-85 is released into the atmosphere. Because krypton-85 has no relevant natural sources, it can be used as indicator for the clandestine production of plutonium. The signatures of plutonium separation can be found in liquid effluents and off-stream gas. The inspection procedures proposed by Mr. Ross included regional temporal measurement networks, random spot sampling and flexible air sampling in the field.

Mr. Glaser discussed the possibilities of detecting uranium enrichment through environmental methods, a project that is at a much earlier stage than the detection of plutonium production. He stated that the main process by which uranium is enriched is by centrifuge and since centrifuge technology has a rapid breakout capability and leaves small traces, it makes it suitable for clandestine use. Centrifuge technology, unlike older technologies, cannot be detected by satellite imagery. It is therefore crucial to investigate the possibility of environmental monitoring. Mr. Glaser also encouraged multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

The next generation: free of the Cold War mentality
Aaron Hayman | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Monday morning began with an opportunity for the next generation of peace activists and NGO leaders to showcase their vision of a nuclear weapon free world, during the annual international youth meeting. US President Barack Obama has suggested on several occasions that nuclear weapons may not be eliminated in his lifetime. However, the majority of the participants on Monday morning were born and raised in a post-Cold War world. What has not been politically achievable under the guidance of “cold warriors” may become possible once the next generation assumes the reins of disarmament and non-proliferation policy and negotiation.

It is clear that youth involvement in nuclear weapons issues is significant. From student interns, to NGO staff, and even young diplomats, the next generation has actively engaged in two of the biggest challenges of the 21st century: preventing nuclear proliferation while simultaneously realizing global nuclear disarmament.

One organization represented at Monday’s meeting, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, is made up of both physicians and medical students. Starting with the view that nuclear war represents the “final epidemic,” this group has partnered with other NGOs, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, in an effort to educate individuals about the medical and scientific consequences of nuclear war.

Several other groups, including the Hague International Model United Nations used the opportunity to network and reach out to other students involved in the Review Conference. The group Ban All Nukes generation (BANG) also showcased their efforts to pressure governments through a postcard campaign in which citizens can express their views to their respective foreign ministries.

Following the presentations, Retired Royal Navy Commander Robert Green presented his thoughts on the entrenchment of nuclear weapons in the security policies of nuclear weapons states. He recounted his time in the Royal Navy and his extensive experience with the British nuclear arsenal. It was that experience that led Green to re-evaluate the security value of nuclear weapons and ultimately write his book Security Without Nuclear Deterrence.

After his presentation, the group engaged in a far-reaching discussion of the value of nuclear deterrence today, the viability of a nuclear weapons convention in the future, and the upcoming NATO nuclear policy review.
CAMPAIGN FOR UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (IRENA)

Since 1995, when nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was renewed and extended, civil society called for the establishment of an international agency to promote renewable energy sources to take the place of fossil fuels without resorting to nuclear power.

Recognizing the “inextricable link” between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, Abolition 2000, a global network for the elimination of nuclear weapons, drafted a model statute for the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and promoted it around the world. Joining with other grassroots networks working to avoid catastrophic climate change they lobbied their governments seeking support for an energy agency focused solely on clean, safe, renewable energy.

In January 2009, Germany, Denmark, and Spain launched IRENA. Today, 143 of the 192 member states of the United Nations, as well as the European Union, have signed the IRENA statute. IRENA is headquartered in Abu Dhabi with branch offices in Bonn and Vienna.

TAKE ACTION: If you’re country has not yet joined IRENA, write to your government officials and ask them to join the global campaign for universal participation in IRENA.


COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF IRENA, 4-10

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More than four decades have passed since the NPT was negotiated. Yet many governments, particularly those in the Western Group, continue to regard nuclear weapons as legitimate instruments of national security. The few “privileged” states that possess nuclear weapons still attach great prestige to them. If we are to succeed in the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons through a binding convention, we must effectively break down the perception of these weapons as an ultimate expression of state power. The process of negotiating a convention would itself have a delegitimizing effect.

Yesterday the Swiss government, along with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Monterey Institute, launched the results of a significant study aimed at debunking the theory of deterrence and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The five authors have expertise in international law, nuclear physics, philosophy, global politics, and history. They suggest that a like-minded representative group of states, including nuclear-armed states and committed non-nuclear states, should stimulate the negotiation of a global convention prohibiting nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. This approach, they note, is also the most likely to gain widespread public support.

Parliamentary activity
As discussions take place between diplomats in New York on advancing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, parliamentarians are also engaging in the debate back home. Last week, for example, the New Zealand parliament passed a unanimous resolution endorsing the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal on disarmament, which includes consideration of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In March, German legislators called on their government to play an active role in the debate on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and the Bangladeshi parliament made a similar call in April. Many of the members of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament have recently signed a declaration supporting a convention.

Progress in Week 1
ICAN is closely monitoring debates at the NPT Review Conference, and has compiled a list of statements in support of a Nuclear Weapons Convention that were made during the first week: www.icanw.org/statements. At least 25 nations expressed their individual support for negotiations on a convention. Two large groups of states also endorsed the call: the Non-Aligned Movement and the parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones. •
What's On
Today's Calendar of Events

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 8:00–8:50
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Off-the-record government briefing for NGOs: Delegation of Austria
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Simulating Negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Where: Salvation Army, 52nd Street b/w 2nd and 3rd Aves
When: 9:00–18:00
Contact: Regina Hagen, INESAP

Main Committee I
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Film Screening: Path to Zero
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–12:00
Contact: Alicia Godsberg, Federation of American Scientists

Footprints for Peace/International Peace Walk: The destructive cycle to nuclear weapons
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 12:00–13:00
Contact: Marcus Atkinson, Footprints for Peace

The NPT Review Process: The Need for Reform
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Canadian Delegation to the NPT RevCon

Security Without Nuclear Weapons: Challenges and Opportunities
Where: Church Center, 12th Floor, 777 UN Plaza
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Anthony Enriquez, International Peace Institute

A Briefing on US and Russian Perspectives on New START
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: U.S. Department of State

Film Screening: No More Hiroshima, No More Nagasaki
Where: 57 Screening Room, 140 West 57th Street
When: 17:00
Contact: Yuki Nakamura

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The Federation of American Scientists Paths to Zero

**Screening with Discussion**
The world's combined stockpile of nuclear weapons - more than 24,000 - remains at a frighteningly high level despite being two decades past the end of the Cold War. FAS Vice President Ivan Oelrich explains the history of the nuclear armed world in the new documentary film Paths to Zero. Please join FAS for the screening of the film followed by a discussion of how we can move down a global path to zero nuclear weapons.

*For more information, please visit: [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org).*

**What:** Film Premier with Discussion
**When:** Tuesday, 11 May 2010
**Where:** Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
**Time:** 10 am - 12 pm

In 1945, FAS was founded by scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project and created the first atomic bomb. FAS provides decision-makers and the public with analysis and research in international security, education technologies and earth systems.