Filling the “fact gap”: reductions vs. elimination, rhetoric vs. reality

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

As Main Committee I concluded its general debate and started reviewing the implementation of articles I, II, and VI on Tuesday, the frustration of many non-nuclear weapon states with what they see as a lack of real progress became clear.

In terms of articles I and II, several delegations have expressed concern over the last two weeks with the continued practice of nuclear sharing between the US and select NATO countries. In terms of article VI, while the majority of states welcomed the conclusion of new START, many delegations also expressed concern that the US and Russia have been characterizing this treaty—which has not yet been ratified by either country—as a concrete demonstration of compliance with article VI. Similarly, the French delegation routinely points to its arsenal reductions as compliance with article VI and on Tuesday explained that it has implemented all of the 13 practical steps that apply to it.

Both the South African and Irish delegations pointed out that arsenal reductions do not automatically translate to a commitment to nuclear disarmament. South Africa’s ambassador noted that reductions could be undertaken for a variety of reasons, such as strategic stability, financial constraints, or safety issues. The Irish delegation said that reductions alone do not tell the whole story and that one can only judge a state’s true intentions by surveying the full range of its actions and pronouncements. In this regard, he noted that French President Sarkozy’s remarks at the UN Security Council summit in September 2009 were not very comforting in terms of demonstrating France’s commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Civil society has voiced these concerns repeatedly. Several NGO representatives have undertaken to compare the reality of the actions and policies of nuclear weapon states with their rhetoric. For example, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has noted that while new START “reduces the legal limit for deployed strategic warheads, it doesn’t actually reduce the number of warheads. Indeed, the treaty does not require destruction of a single nuclear warhead and actually permits the United States and Russia to deploy almost the same number of strategic warheads that were permitted by the 2002 Moscow Treaty.”

Both Ivan Oelrich of FAS and Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group have described new START as a “force protection” treaty rather than a disarmament treaty.

Similarly, they, along with John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, have criticized the new US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) for also maintaining the status quo rather than moving toward nuclear disarmament. Dr. Burroughs noted that while the NPR contends that reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons will demonstrate that the US is meeting its NPT article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament, the NPR actually conveys the opposite intention, “projecting reliance on nuclear forces as central instruments of national security strategy for decades to come.”

Many delegations have welcomed the new NPR for its “improved” negative security assurances and for its statement that it will not develop new nuclear warheads. However, in an article in NPT News in Review No.5, Zia Mian of Princeton University pointed out that the security assurance offered in the NPR actually raises some important questions, such as what specific obligations will a non-nuclear weapon state have to comply with to receive this assurance; who decides whether a NNWS is in compliance; and what will the response be?

Furthermore, Oelrich notes that while under the NPR, warheads will be “refurbished” rather than “modernized,” some nuclear components could be replaced with new components. Oelrich argues that this would be a “new” warhead by his definition but not by the NPR’s. And in fact, on 5 May, the US National Nuclear Security Administration sent a mid-year funding...
DROP THE RHETORIC, NOT THE BOMBS.

IT’S TIME TO TURN THE VISION OF A NUCLEAR–WEAPON–FREE WORLD INTO A REALITY. AGREE AT THIS REVCON TO BEGIN WORK ON A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION.
Filling the “fact gap” (cont.)

“reprogramming” request to four congressional committees asking permission to modify the nuclear explosive package within B61 nuclear bombs. Mello argues that this “upgrade” will cost billions of dollars and would require either a new facility or a surge of production at an aging, unsafe facility; that the result “may not be reliable, and it’s possible it will not be certifiable”; and that it would constitute building a new bomb, even if it builds around some of the old parts.5

On Tuesday, the Norwegian delegation argued that the process to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons would imply that nuclear weapon states should refrain from developing new nuclear weapons. Ambassador Kongstad reminded delegates that “a world without nuclear weapons cannot continue to be just a vision. It is an objective which we, states parties to the NPT, are committed to achieve.”

The majority of delegations at this RevCon have called on nuclear weapon states to seriously reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, noting that doctrines that continue to include nuclear weapons only serve to promote them as the ultimate guarantor of state security, power, and prestige, preventing both non-proliferation and disarmament. Arguing that nuclear weapons are irrelevant and counterproductive to security, both the Swiss and Norwegian delegations have now called for an examination of how nuclear weapons relate to international humanitarian law as a way to delegitimize their existence. As Zia Mian has argued, the strategies and policies for the development, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons are not contained within them: “Nuclear weapons are given meaning and purpose by the politics of nuclear weapon states.”6 It is past time to undermine that meaning with the truth about the illegality, immorality, and uselessness of nuclear weapons and about the policies and practices of the states that wield them.

Notes

Law Versus Doctrine: Assessing US and Russian Nuclear Postures

Sponsored by Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Wednesday, May 12, 10 am – 12 noon
Conference Room A, North Lawn Building

Speakers:
John Burroughs, LCNP Executive Director
Alicia Godsberg, Research Associate, Federation of American Scientists
Charles Moxley, LCNP Board; author, Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Post-Cold War World

Peter Weiss, LCNP President
The state of the tactical nuclear weapons debate
Wilbert van der Zeijden and Susi Snyder | IKV Pax Christi

US President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech in which he pledged “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”1 rekindled the debate on the necessity and desirability of keeping US “tactical nuclear weapons” (TNWs) in Europe. The US has been forward deploying B-61 free fall gravitational nuclear bombs in NATO countries since the 1950s. There were reductions at the end of the Cold War, but about 200 to 240 B61s remain in Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Turkey.

In October 2009, the new German government coalition agreed to “advocate[s] within NATO and towards our U.S. allies a withdrawal of remaining nuclear weapons from Germany”.2 In the same month, the Belgian parliament passed a resolution with similar language. Early in 2010, the Dutch government signaled its willingness to remove the US B-61s, though only if the decision were made within NATO and would not undermine broader non-proliferation and disarmament goals.

The sensible thing to do would be to remove these Cold War relics. The short range of the airplanes designed to drop them mean they have no conceivable use on the battlefield. However, the sharing of the nuclear burden has long been considered a cornerstone in the NATO alliance, and according to some, withdrawal would undermine alliance solidarity. In addition, there are geopolitical ‘fault lines’ within NATO membership that make the debate hard to move forward.

**Alliance Glue**

The limited range of airplanes delivering these nuclear bombs renders the bombs militarily obsolescent targets are no longer deemed threats. However, the opponents of removal stress that the B-61s are ‘the glue that holds NATO together’. They are seen as a political guarantee that the US will continue to defend European allies, and that Europeans are willing to share the financial and political burden of hosting and possibly using these weapons.

Maintaining B-61s and their delivery systems will prove costly. The F-16s and Tornado jets now in operation will retire between 2015 and 2025. Europeans are considering a replacement with a ‘dual capable’ plane—the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)—requiring an upgrade of B-61s, from ‘analogue’ to ‘digital’, which is estimated to cost the US $2010 billion over the next four years.3 Given the military irrelevance of the bombs, few politicians in Europe are willing to justify these expenditures only for Alliance stability. There are better ways to bolster intra-Alliance commitment to the security of Europe that are less costly, and still help NATO build a rational, consistent, transparent posture to deal with 21st century challenges.

The B-61 bombs were originally developed to create a “flexible response”—to be able to engage the Warsaw Pact in a limited nuclear confrontation—or to deter the Cold War enemy from starting one. They were targeted not against Russia but its Warsaw Pact satellite states. Ironically, it’s now those countries who are voicing objections to their withdrawal. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States regard the B-61 bombs as a hedge against a possible resurgence of Russian aggression. However, if that is the purpose, then bombs are deployed in the wrong place. Nevertheless moving them closer to the Russian border would force Russia to respond.

Recent statements by US Secretary of State Clinton and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen linking Missile Defense (MD) to NATO solidarity and nuclear deterrence seem tailored to counter concerns about Alliance solidarity. However, moving ahead with MD blocks progress in the bilateral US-Russia negotiations. Russia’s concern is that MD will eventually limit Russia’s grip on the Caucasus and Central Asia. US efforts to move MD closer to the Russian sphere of influence led Russian president Medvedev to state that the April 2010 START agreement “can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.”4 MD, while meant to reassure ‘New Europe’, may well do the opposite by driving Russia towards a more adverse posture.

**The future of US TNWs in Europe**

The April 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review confirms that the process of formulating the NATO Strategic Concept will determine the future of TNWs in Europe. A package deal in which Eastern European concerns about Alliance solidarity is ‘repaired’ with MD deployments close to the Russian border, and continued deployment in Turkey and perhaps Italy to hedge against hypothetical threats, seems likely. This would mean that national concerns trump the international effects of NATO’s nuclear policies, because it would aggravate Russian concerns about NATO’s intentions and it might tip the balance in Tehran and other capitals in favor of nuclear weapons development.

A full withdrawal of the B-61s would send a positive signal to other NPT signatories, while at
the same time allowing NATO to develop a more rational, consistent, and transparent nuclear posture. And it would save millions of Euros annually. A package deal including security assurances to and from Russia, and a fair offer to Iran, would, together with withdrawal of the B-61s, be exactly the kind of change in nuclear deterrence logic that Obama called for, and that the large majority of NATO’s populations hope to see.

Wilbert van der Zeijden is the researcher for the Nuclear Disarmament programme at IKV Pax Christi. Susi Snyder is the Programme Leader for Nuclear Disarmament at IKV Pax Christi. IKV Pax Christi is the largest ecumenical and peace organization in the Netherlands.

Notes
3. Todd Jacobsen, Nuclear Weapons and Materials Monitor, 4/12/10

Paths to Zero
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) held a film screening showing Paths to Zero, a new film by FAS that will be used as an information tool on the internet. Ivan Oelrich, vice president of the Strategic Security Program at FAS, explained that it would be an interactive tool, with a scrolling list next to the film where viewers will be able to find more information about the issues that are raised. Since the film is still under construction and the idea is to add links where one can find more information, the Q&A session included an interesting discussion of what would be relevant to add.

The film gives a brief history of the nuclear bomb, from the Manhattan Project to today, mainly focusing on the deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States. As one of the comments in the Q&A section later remarked, the film has a scientist’s perspective and does not touch upon the human costs. However, this was something that Mr. Oelrich said they could add links to. Instead, the film questions the relevance of nuclear weapons for deterrence. It underlines that despite arguments by the nuclear weapon states that they are reducing their arsenals, much of the situation of today remains the same as during the Cold War. The film shows how the world’s stockpile grew to the high level of today. It also provides examples of how to reduce these numbers and ultimately how to reach zero.

The film was criticized for focusing too much on how to reduce weapons instead of eliminating them. Mr. Oelrich responded by saying that he didn't think it was realistic to go from thousands to zero in one day, and that the world needs different tools to get from here to there. The film mentions some issues on the arms control agenda, such as the CTBT, but some questioned why the Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) was not included. This led to a discussion of the important role scientists had for the implementation of the CTBT and how their work helped the negotiations move forward. Some of the participants requested that the film describe what would be required to implement a NWC and Mr. Oelrich said this is something they could link to.

Issues like translation of the film into other languages was brought up, as well as suggestions to look closer at the different nuclear weapon states. While Mr. Oelrich emphasized that the film has an American perspective, he agreed that they could add information about the perspective of other nuclear weapon states as well. He was also positive about translating it into different languages. The film without the added info can be seen at www.fas.org.
Main Committee I

**Action plan for nuclear disarmament**

- Brazil, South Africa, Norway, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia said the RevCon should reaffirm the 13 steps but also go beyond them, adding benchmarks and timelines for implementation.
- The Netherlands said the RevCon should build on the 13 steps.
- Mexico said the 13 steps should be the minimum basis for agreement.
- Cuba called on the RevCon to carry out a review of compliance with what was agreed on in 1995 and 2000 and to discuss on corrective actions designed to ensure full compliance. It called for the start of negotiations of a phased programme leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025 at the latest.
- Algeria argued that a disarmament action plan should include a mechanism to ensure follow-up of implementation.
- Libya said all NWS should place all of their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguard as part of a negotiated agreement concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the NPT and IAEA Statute in order to verify the implementation by NWS of their commitments to achieve full and complete nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible.
- China called for a phased approach to elimination resulting in a NWC.
- Norway argued that a nuclear weapon free world will need an additional legal instrument as the “ultimate implementation” of article VI.

**Reductions**

- The Netherlands urged Russia and the US to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in their reductions.
- Malaysia said reductions cannot replace irreversible cuts and elimination.
- South Africa and Ireland emphasized that reductions do not necessarily reflect a commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as reductions can be undertaken for many reasons, including strategic stability, financial constraints, or safety issues.

**Vertical proliferation**

- Cuba criticized NWS for continuing to perfect their arsenals and trying to downplay the dangers of vertical proliferation.
- Egypt called on NWS to refrain from modernizing their arsenals or creating new types of nuclear weapons.
- Norway said the process to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons would imply that NWS should refrain from developing new categories of nuclear arms.

**Doctrine**

- Cuba argued that security doctrines based on nuclear weapons are unjustifiable.
- New Zealand said a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security strategies must be a guiding principle for the RevCon’s work.
- Egypt said that retaining a role for nuclear weapons in security doctrines is one of the biggest challenges to nuclear disarmament.
- Norway said nuclear weapons should be seen as irrelevant and counterproductive in future security strategies.
- China, Mexico, and South Africa encouraged NWS to adopt no first use policies.

**De-alerting**

- The “De-alerting Group” explained its three frontal process on this subject: UNGA resolutions, engaging foreign ministers of P5, and WP.10, which recommends the RevCon: recognize that reductions in alert levels will contribute to nuclear disarmament by signalling reduced reliance on nuclear weapons; urge NWS to take additional measures to reduce alert levels of nuclear weapon systems; and call on NWS to report regularly on measures they have taken.
- Egypt called on NWS to take further steps to de-alert their weapons pending their elimination.
- Malaysia said de-alerting is a qualitative step to disarmament.
- New Zealand and Norway said de-alerting is a positive way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear sharing**

- Cuba, Egypt, China, and Iran called on NWS that deploy nuclear weapons abroad to withdraw them.

**Negative security assurances**

- Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia, Algeria, Venezuela called for the negotiation of a legally-binding, non-discriminatory, comprehensive treaty on NSAs.
- Malaysia voiced support for the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee in CD on NSAs with a mandate to negotiate.
- China called on NWS to grant unequivocal assurances to NNWS and to not target anyone.

**Nuclear weapon free zones**

- China said it has reached agreement in principle with ASEAN regarding the Southeast Asian
NWFZ and that it is ready to sign relevant protocols of the Central Asian NWFZ.

**Transparency**
- New Zealand said ad hoc reporting does not serve the NPT and called for a systematic approach to article VI reporting.

**CTBT**
- The Netherlands, New Zealand, Algeria, China, Norway called for entry into force of CTBT.
- New Zealand welcomed Indonesia and Papua New Guinea’s intentions to ratify the CTBT.

**FMCT**
- The Netherlands, Cuba, New Zealand, Malaysia, Algeria, China, Norway, and France called for negotiations of FM(C)T.
- Cuba said the treaty must take into account disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
- Norway said the treaty should address the issue of existing stocks.

** Preconditions**
- Egypt expressed concern with some attempts to link nuclear disarmament with the establishment of certain political situations or the implementation of new non-proliferation obligations, which put the onus for disarmament on states that do not possess nuclear weapons and are not compatible with legal obligations inherent in the NPT.
- Mexico argued that compliance with article VI is not simply a desire but an obligation, that parties must always comply with their obligations, and that is unacceptable to say that compliance with article VI depends on whether or not there are favourable conditions in global security.

**PAROS**
- China called for a multilateral treaty on preventing an arms race in outer space as a contribution to creating conditions conducive to nuclear disarmament.

**Machinery**
- Norway said the international community has to address the relevance of the CD as a disarmament forum.

**International humanitarian law**
- Norway said the international community should look at how nuclear weapons related to international humanitarian law.

**Civil society**
- New Zealand said raising awareness and educating the general public is vital.
- Japan introduced its working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education, highlighting the role of education in eliminating nuclear weapons and empowering people to make contributions and informed choices.

**Main Committee III**

*“Inalienable right”*
- Iran called on the RevCon to reaffirm article IV and urged the removal of limitations pursued in contravention of the Treaty.
- Lebanon argued that one has to be careful not to blur the frontiers between what is legally-binding, what is voluntarily agreed, and what could seem desirable as confidence-building measures.

**Technical cooperation**
- Ukraine, Norway, Colombia, Iran, and Republic of Korea called for the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme to be adequately and predictably funded.
- Malaysia said that the Technical Cooperation Programme should continue to be developed in a professional, impartial, and non-discriminatory manner, in line with the IAEA Statute and implemented based on the needs of member states.
- Lebanon argued that the RevCon needs to steer away from any initiative or set of measures that would dwarf the technical cooperation activities in favour of other activities.

**Export controls**
- Iran called for the establishment of a mechanism within the framework of the NPT review process in order to address the challenge of existing export control regimes that create undue restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies in contravention of the letter and spirit of article IV.
- Iran described the Nuclear Suppliers Group as “exclusive and non-transparent” and said that its decision to engage in nuclear trade with non-NPT states parties was in defiance of paragraph 12 of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives.
- Iran called on the RevCon to emphasize that the NPT does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear material or equipment for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity” and only stipulates that it must be subject to full scope IAEA safeguards.

**Fuel cycle**
- Iran pointed out that article IV, the IAEA’s Statute, and comprehensive safeguards agreement, and additional protocol do not provide for the restriction of the right of states parties to fuel cycle activities.
- Iran argued it is premature for multilateralization of the fuel cycle to be considered.
- Lebanon noted that in the absence of thorough analysis and consensus over nuclear fuel supply, half measures or hasty initiatives may create more problems than they solve.

continued on next page
News in Brief (cont.)

- Ukraine and the Republic of Korea welcomed the agreement between the IAEA and the Russian Federation to establish a LEU reserve for supply to the IAEA.
- New Zealand called for multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle to address the back end of the cycle, such as reprocessing, spent fuel, and waste management and for any assurance mechanism to be transparent, independent, inclusive, and equally applied, using defined criteria, and come under the auspices of the IAEA.
- Sweden stated that a multilateral nuclear fuel assurance mechanism would be a useful instrument to ensure supply to a state where need for LEU has arisen, and argued that recourse to such assurances, as a backup mechanism, would be entirely voluntary. Sweden also suggested that the Conference should take note of such important work done by the IAEA.
- Malaysia called for the establishment of an open-ended working group to discuss all aspects of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply.

Nuclear safety and security

- Iran said the IAEA should play the key role in the development of international nuclear safety and security standards.
- Ukraine called on all states to accede to all IAEA conventions on safety and security.
- New Zealand called on states to improve their national measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building. New Zealand also called on states to strengthen international cooperation on radioactive material shipments.
- New Zealand and Norway urged states to join the relevant safety conventions.

Nuclear waste

- Finland argued that each nation should have a strategy on how to plan the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.

Withdrawal

- Republic of Korea noted that though the right to withdrawal existed, an abuse of that right, especially combined with treaty violations, would be detrimental to the undiminished security of all. The Republic of Korea also stated that the RevCon should reach a common understanding on an effective response mechanism.
- Colombia stated that they would oppose any modification of the text of the NPT, including article X, as well as any attempt to abuse the interpretation of its clauses that amounts to a weakening of the regime.

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SVENSKA LÄKARE MOT KÄRNAVAPEN
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

SWEDISH SECTION OF IPPNW
Security without nuclear weapons: challenges and opportunities
Emma Rosengren | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Sweden

This seminar, sponsored by the International Peace Institute and the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations, featured David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen, editors of recently launched report Towards Nuclear Zero, which examines the obstacles and possibilities of practical steps on the road to zero.

Raimo Väyrynen (Finnish Institute of International Affairs) argued that even though nuclear policies are changing, particularly due to the recent move in US and Russian nuclear policies, there is still a widespread feeling that this is not enough. In order to reach further accomplishments, Mr. Väyrynen emphasized the need for realistic steps that players on the international field are willing to accept. He also recognized that the changing structure of the international order has created a non-polar structure with more actors. His conclusion was that nuclear weapons therefore no longer have the same influence and clarity as they used to, and that countries realize that nuclear weapons do not serve the same security interests anymore. However, the changing world order and new power relations also bring about certain dilemmas. According to Mr. Väyrynen, it influences new actors in the international system and effects the perceptions of relative power giving asymmetric benefits to even a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Mr Väyrynen argued that regional conflicts and security doctrines of certain military alliances continue to influence the nuclear agenda. Trust, transparency, and security assurances must be strengthened in order to overcome these dilemmas.

David Cortright (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame) argued that working for nuclear zero is becoming both a state policy and a practical reality. He especially emphasized that nuclear weapon states must achieve nuclear disarmament in order to prevent proliferation, that they can do this thanks to a new political momentum, and that they should do it because of the moral and ethical principles involved. Mr. Cortright recognized that security concerns drive states both to acquire nuclear weapons and to decide not to have them. Likewise, security can also be enhanced by getting rid of these weapons. Mr. Cortright also reasoned on different aspects of deterrence. According to him, the multilateral disarmament process should take its starting point in minimum deterrence, followed by a convention prohibiting all possessions of nuclear weapons. He also spoke about virtual deterrence as an alternative, as long as it is regulated under mutual international agreements. Furthermore, he also stressed the need for enhanced political cooperation as a strategy to reach the greatest security.

The Q&A session brought attention to relative power relations in the new geopolitical context, the role of conventional weapons in future international relations, the simultaneous processes of solving regional conflicts and disarming existing nuclear and conventional stockpiles, and the role of civil society in pushing the political process forward. In sum, the neo-realist approaches put forward in this seminar clearly provide approach of the winding way forward. However, other approaches challenge the state centric and militarist focus immanent in realist theory. Thus, future discussions need to put an emphasis on human security, and challenges and possibilities for reaching an international system based on gender equality, respect for human rights, and economic and social justice for all.
US And Russian Federation perspectives on New START
Sameer Kanal | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday, the lead US and Russian diplomats from the recently concluded new START negotiations held a briefing entitled “US and Russian Federation Perspectives on New START.” The briefing was conducted by US Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller, and Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of Security and Disarmament, Ambassador Anatoly Antonov.

Mr. Antonov noted that “marathon” negotiations took into account the history of the original START and Moscow treaties, and that the recent agreement included Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as well as Russia and the United States. Antonov emphasized the personal and direct work on the agreement performed by Presidents Medvedev and Obama, who had over a dozen direct conversations regarding the deal.

Antonov stated that the central premise of the new START is “equal and indivisible security of the parties,” and then proceeded to summarize the main points of the agreement (see sidebar). He also explained changes in counting rules and the new agreement’s two types of inspections. Mr. Antonov drew specific attention to “unique identifiers” for weapon delivery systems, which he described as “kind of a license plate” that could be used to track such systems, and a special consultative body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission, which was established to solve treaty implementation problems.

Ms. Gottemoeller began by noting that the event was the first joint US-Russian briefing on a newly signed treaty. Giving a brief overview of the negotiations, Gottemoeller stated that treaty ratification in the US Senate and the Russian Duma and Federation Council are about to begin. She highlighted the US stockpile’s reduction from a peak of 31,255 warheads to the current 5,113, and stated that transparency is vital to nonproliferation. Returning to the new START, Gottemoeller stated that it will “provide a new impetus” and serve as a framework to engage all nuclear powers.

Both diplomats were appreciative and effusive regarding the efforts of the other delegation during the treaty’s negotiations, with Gottemoeller extending thanks to her “incredibly professional [...] Russian colleagues and friends in the room.” Antonov highlighted the spirit in which the groups negotiated, stating, “we are obliged to keep it alive.” Each invited the other’s delegation to visit their country, with Antonov hoping they could “[sit] on the bank of a river, just smiling, and drinking Russian vodka.”

Sameer Kanal is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
The destructive cycle to nuclear weapons
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

This Tuesday, Footprints for Peace held a briefing on “the destructive cycle to nuclear weapons,” during which the facilitators described their work and informed participants about the consequences of the nuclear industry. Footprints for Peace is organizing walks from different uranium mines, nuclear bases, and nuclear power stations around the world to inform the general public about nuclear issues. Their most recent walk, which started on 11 February 2010, took them from the Y12 Nuclear Research Facility in Oakridge, Tennessee to the NPT Review Conference in New York.

Markus Atkinson from Footprints for Peace emphasized that people need to be aware of the link between uranium mining, nuclear power, and nuclear weapons. He said that we not can divide these three issues. Atkinson told about his experiences of uranium mining in Australia, which had consequences especially for the aboriginal population. He expressed concern that the new increased investment in nuclear power will lead to increased uranium mining. He explained that uranium mining jeopardizes the environment, as it requires enormous resources to extract uranium and produces hundred thousands tons of radioactive slurry. Nuclear energy companies talk about nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly energy and it has become a general belief that it will help combat climat change. However, Atkinson did not have the same view and is worried that people are not aware of the consequences on the environment and health. It might take 3 or 4 years until the mines are up running but when they are there it will be hard to stop them. Therefore he called for immediate action to stop this development. He was especially worried about the discovered resources of uranium in parts of Africa where he found the environmental laws less strict.

Footprints for Peace is working with people in countries where they have experienced the consequences of uranium mining. He said that people forget about the local people and the effects of nuclear industry. Atkinson argued that if the supply source of uranium is cut off, it would be easier to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, nuclear waste, and pollution.

Emma Bjertén is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

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The US Nuclear Posture Review: Analysis and opportunities for progress
Josefin Lind | International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Sweden

In this seminar, hosted by the Bipartisan Security Group and moderated by Jonathan Granoff from Global Security Initiative, Ambassador James Goodby from the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and Mr. Ivan Oelrich from the Federation of American Scientists analyzed the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review.

Ambassador Goodby started off by highlighting that the NPR was written by “someone who believes in nuclear disarmament”. He purported that its long-term goal is abolition and its short-term goal is to prevent proliferation. Furthermore, Ambassador Goodby stressed the aims for deeper reductions. However, he also pointed at the current challenges of getting CTBT and new START ratified and therefore argued that the NPT had to be realistic in order to facilitate such approval domestically. Ambassador Goodby argued that the NPR is a call for all countries in the world to join the moratorium on production of fissile materials for weapon purposes.

Ivan Oelrich complemented the NPR for being unusually well written and being unclassified in contrast to many other NPRs. However, he also expressed that his high hopes were not met and that he was disappointed with it. Mr. Oelrich argued that he had wanted a document that would more adequately reflect the Prague speech. However, he stressed that if it would have been more aggressive it could have undermined the support for new START and CTBT. Mr. Oelrich however saw one significant positive thing, that the NPR actually discusses the nuclear deterrence issue. Furthermore Mr. Oelrich also pointed out that the NPR explicitly states that Russian quantities are setting the framework for the US quantities, something that has never been admitted before. He also recognized the discussion of alert status in the NPR, which has never been openly discussed before.

After these remarks the Q&A session started. Many of the questions and reflections were based on the view that the step-by-step method presented in the NPR is not good enough. Ambassador Goodby argued that the NPR is setting out a course for eliminating nuclear weapons in a strong language. However, Mr. Granoff pointed out that nuclear weapons neither prevent proliferation nor deterrence. The argument that we need them as long as they exist is a very weak one and the best way to prevent proliferation is to get rid of the weapons in the first place. Mr. Granoff ended the session by pointing out that behind all the words is megadeath, horror, and huge theft of money without reason, purpose or enemy. He argued that nuclear weapons are unworthy of the civilization, but that we have to deal with this kind of documents since we cannot let them stand as unchallenged policies. •

Across
4. Who was the Chair of the 2010 UN Disarmament Commission?
6. This independent commission was established by the Australian government in 1995 to propose practical steps towards a nuclear weapon free world (two words).
7. Which Treaty bans nuclear testing everywhere except underground?
8. Plutonium-244 has a half-life about ____ million years.
10. What is the name of the B-29 bomber that dropped the atomic bomb over Hiroshima (two words)?

Down
1. During the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington 2010, Mexico, Canada and _____ promised to give up their highly enriched uranium.
2. Which university was first to synthesize plutonium in 1940 (three words)?
5. How many signatories has the Treaty of Pelindaba?
9. In 2006 the Security Council passed resolution 1673. For how many years did the resolution extend the mandate of the 1540 committee?

Nuclear Crossword
Nuclear Ban Treaty Provisions
by Frederick N. Mattis

Following is a summary of provisions for a treaty [convention] banning nuclear (and chem-bio) weapons. For details, please see the book Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Frederick N. Mattis [ISBN: 978-0-313-36538-6], published by ABC-CLIO/Praeger Security International (also available at Amazon.com).

1. All states must join the treaty before it takes effect. [Obviously, this would help induce states to join, and would give the enacted treaty unprecedented geopolitical, psychological, and moral force.]

2. Only states already parties to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) can sign the nuclear ban treaty. [Aside from the inhumanity of chem-bio weapons, at least one state (Israel) that possesses nuclear weapons will not renounce them if other states—being nonparties of the CWC and/or BWC—could with relative impunity maintain chem-bio arsenals. (See chapter 6 of Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction for discussion of the nuclear ban and particularly “problematic” states: North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, Russia.)]

3. After nuclear ban treaty entry into force, the warhead elimination period does not begin until: (a) All states enact national implementing legislation, and also for the CWC; (b) All states accept their fellow states’ implementing legislation (for nuclear ban and CWC) as adequate; (c) All states submit treaty-required declarations of nuclear material, facilities, and weapons; (d) The nuclear ban’s Technical Secretariat completes and reports on baseline verification of declarations; (e) All states agree to proceed to the “next step” of warhead elimination. [#3(b) and #3(e) are thus junctures at which a single state could halt (presumably temporarily) further treaty implementation. If, to the contrary, states could not do so in event of perceived, major problems with another state’s implementing legislation or with a state’s declarations, then some at least of the current nuclear powers probably would decline to join the treaty.]

4. (a) The enacted treaty does not permit withdrawal; and (b) Treaty parties (all states) are pledged by treaty terms not to withdraw from the CWC and BWC. [Note, however, #5 below; for further legal points of a non-withdrawal treaty, see chapter 4 of Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction.]

5. If a state under color of Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ever undertakes otherwise treaty-prohibited activity pertaining to any of the three agreements (nuclear ban, CWC, BWC) because another state is in “material breach,” the former state must declare beforehand which state it arraigns as in material breach. [This prevents a state from being able to undertake or attempt to undertake treaty-prohibited activity in secret and later on citing as justification that “another state was in material breach.” It also confirms, although indirectly, the important principle (to gain accession to the treaty by today’s nuclear powers) that states would be the ultimate, sovereign determiners of whether another state was in “material breach.”]

6. (a) World stocks of highly-enriched uranium (HEU)—which is the nuclear material for a relatively simple, “gun-type” weapon—are blended-down to low-enriched uranium (LEU) over a span of years, which may need to extend beyond the weapons elimination period (depending on how much current HEU is blended-down to LEU before treaty entry into force). (b) HEU use in reactors (mainly naval and research) must cease six months before weapons elimination ends, with an exception therefor for any highly-protected projects approved by three-quarters treaty Executive Council vote, including votes of all permanent Council members. [See chapter 5 of Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction for discussion of HEU and plutonium, plus treaty verification (inspection). For the USA in particular, conversion of HEU naval propulsion reactors to LEU would be a big step, but necessary in all likelihood to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. If, instead, nonsafeguarded HEU (in reactors of vessels at sea) was permitted, then the nuclear ban—which must treat states equally—would also have to permit states such as North Korea to possess nonsafeguarded HEU, in which case nuclear ban verification would be vitiated.]

The provisions summarized above, plus eleven more in Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction, are largely in addition to (and some different from) those of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. However, without the meritorious MNWC, nuclear abolition would be years farther away. A finalized nuclear ban, ready for states’ signatures, will surely employ the vast majority of MNWC provisions.

“Frederick N. Mattis’s book deals with a complex and deadly subject. It does so with clarity, great intelligence, and the appropriate sense of urgency. I hope it is widely read.”
- Ambassador Richard Butler, former Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector in Iraq
Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 8:00–8:50
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Off-the-record government briefing for NGOs: Ambassador Suda of Japan
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Simulating Negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Where: Salvation Army, 52nd St b/w 2nd and 3rd Aves
When: 9:00–18:00
Contact: Regina Hagen, INESAP

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Law Versus Doctrine: Assessing US and Russian Nuclear Postures
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–12:00
Contact: John Burroughs, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Quick and easy disarmament: EU style
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Welmoed Verhagen, IKV Pax Christi

Youth Say No to Nukes!
Where: Church Center, 10th Floor
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Hiro Sakurai, Soka Gakkai International

Dismantlement of French Nuclear test and fissile material production sites: Lessons learned for the Disarmament Community
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Developing the UK’s new Nuclear Centre of Excellence and the UK’s interest in multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle
Where: Conference Room B, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations on behalf of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)

Presentation of the White Book NPT: How to strengthen the regime
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

Main Committee I
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00

Main Committee II
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00

Nuclear Weapons Convention and the NPT- Legal Challenges and Prospects
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–16:30
Contact: Robin Borrmann, IALANA Germany

On the way to banning uranium weapons
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 16:30–18:00
Contact: Robin Borrmann, IALANA Germany