An obligation to reality
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During Wednesday morning’s debate in Main Committee III, Ambassador Labbe of Chile said that the first obligation of diplomats is to look at the reality of any given situation, noting, “reality cannot be imposed upon us.” He went on to argue that governments cannot just put forth allegations regarding the nature of the NPT so that they end up with the interpretation they want.

At the time, he was speaking about the articles of the Treaty dealing with the “peaceful uses” of nuclear energy. However, his comment is equally applicable to all of the NPT’s provisions and the decisions and commitments made in 1995 and 2000. His comment is also applicable to the rhetoric, assumptions, and allegations about many issues related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy that are routinely made in conference rooms, repeated ad nauseam in the media, and integrated into the beliefs, efforts, and analysis of governments and civil society alike.

It is indeed an obligation of diplomats—and of journalists and NGO representatives—to look at reality. It is our job to question, explore, and investigate that which our colleagues purport to be reality. It is our job to ask hard for clarification, to challenge our colleagues to be forthright, transparent, and honest, and to apply critical analysis to all that we do. As singer Ani DiFranco says, “we have to be able to criticize what we love, to say what we have to say, ‘cause if you’re not trying to make something better, then as far as I can tell, you are just in the way.”

Several delegations have demonstrated their willingness to do this at the Review Conference. They have asked questions, challenged the rhetoric, and pushed for changes to the status quo. The result is more engagement and fruitful deliberations, not less, as purported by many who oppose criticism.

The delegations of Ireland and Austria continued this positive demonstration of critical thinking and critique in Main Committee III. In the midst of a discussion about the benefits of nuclear power, they noted that this form of energy brings with it many questions of long-term sustainability, legacies for future generations, health and environmental risks, and economic burdens. Austria’s delegation pointed out that the Chernobyl disaster left a legacy that has affected millions of people and required billions of euros to address. Both the Irish and Austrian delegations also expressed concern with the common refrain that nuclear energy is a possible solution to climate change. Austria’s delegate noted that discussions on this issue in the competent forums have not included recommendations to bring nuclear power into the energy mix to combat climate change, and therefore questioned the value of bringing those types of discussions into the NPT forum. The Austrian delegate urged states to make decisions about their energy mix on the basis of aiming for a more efficient use of power in general and noted that while the IAEA has tools to help states make these decisions, so do other organizations, such as the International Renewable Energy Agency.

Of course, this debate about the merits of nuclear energy takes place in a rather heated context—many NPT states parties are sensitive about any discussion that could be perceived as intending to limit their right to make their own choices about energy sources or to limit their access to relevant materials, technologies, and expertise (see News in Brief, pp.4-5, for details of the MCIII debate). This sensitivity is not unjustified. It stems from the inherent imbalances of the NPT between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”. On Wednesday, the debate in Main Committees I and III clearly charted the lines between states that possess nuclear weapons and/or “peaceful” nuclear technology on the one hand, and those who seek guarantees that they will not be attacked with the first and that they will have access to the second.

In both cases, we need transparent, straightforward, and honest commitments and implementation of obligations in order to build a safer world and a stronger system of international relations based on trust and equity.
News in Brief
Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Procedural issues
- The RevCon decided to move consideration of NPT institutional reform matters to Subsidiary Body III from Main Committee II.

Main Committee I
Action plan for nuclear disarmament
- Ukraine called on the RevCon to reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
- Iraq called on NWS to respect their commitments under article VI, 1995, and 2000.
- South Africa said this RevCon needs to build on the unequivocal undertaking and NWS need to engage in accelerated negotiations that will entail concrete, transparent, irreversible, and verifiable disarmament.
- Philippines called for the RevCon to focus on “Four Rs”: reducing arsenals, reducing roles, reducing alert status, and regular reporting.

Reductions
- Ukraine called on all NWS to apply principles of irreversibility and verifiability to the disarmament process.
- Canada welcomed the will of the US and Russia to expand their reductions process to other NWS and said that multilateralization of this process must form the next stage and linchpin of disarmament.

Security doctrines
- Lebanon said that continuing to include nuclear weapons in security doctrines undermines international nuclear disarmament obligations and contradicts the NPT in letter and spirit.
- Ukraine called on all NWS to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.
- Iran expressed concern with NATO and new NPR that “maintain unjustifiable concepts” of reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

Operational status
- Ukraine called on all NWS to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

Modernization
- Lebanon said NWS manufacturing new or new types of nuclear weapons undermines international nuclear disarmament obligations and contradicts NPT in letter and spirit.

Transparency and reporting
- Ukraine called on NWS to report regularly on the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and their deployment status.
- Japan noted that increased transparency is most fundamental basis for nuclear disarmament, arguing that without transparency, verifiability and irreversibility are impossible to determine. It said this RevCon should review how transparency can be enhanced.
- Canada welcomed NWS transparency initiatives and called for regular reporting.
- Ireland highlighted the importance of transparency by NWS.

Security assurances
- Lebanon, South Africa, Egypt, Ireland, Philippines, Cuba, Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria called for negotiations of a international legally-binding instrument on NSAs.
- Egypt called for the RevCon outcome document to launch the process of negotiations for such a treaty. Ireland, Philippines, Cuba, Algeria, and Nigeria supported this suggestion.
- Algeria suggested the RevCon could recommend that such negotiations take place in the Conference on Disarmament in order to help it restart its substantive work.
- The Republic of Korea said the provision of NSAs can enhance the relevance of the NPT regime and give states that are not party incentive to accede to the NPT.
- The ROK also emphasized that it should be clear that assurances are only granted until the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

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South Africa explained that a NSA is not an ultimate objective in of itself—it is a pragmatic, interim measure aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the course of developing a nuclear weapon free world.

South Africa argued that NSAs should be granted under the NPT, as called for by the 1996 ICJ opinion and the 2000 NPT outcome document, not just by UNSC resolutions or NWFZ protocols.

Cuba argued that current NSAs are insufficient, noting that except for one NWS, unilateral NSAs have so far been tied to conditions and that the majority of NWS have ratified NWFZ protocols with interpretations that create conditions on the security assurances.

Algeria noted that not all NWS have ratified the relevant protocols to NWFZ treaties.

**Nuclear weapon free zones**

- Egypt, Ireland, Libya, and Australia noted the importance of establishing NWFZs for strengthening nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
- Australia welcomed entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and the NWFZ Conference held on 30 April 2010.

**CTBT**

- Ukraine called for ratification and entry into force of the CTBT.

**FMCT**

- Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq called for the negotiation of an FMCT and for states to declare or maintain their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

**Machinery**

- Canada called on the RevCon to refrain from linking any recommendations it may come out with to the Conference on Disarmament, arguing that the CD has not been able to demonstrate its capacity to move forward on important issues.

**Main Committee II**

**Middle East**

- Saudi Arabia argued that the UN Security Council should exert pressure on Israel to make progress on NWFZ in the Middle East and called upon the UN to hold a conference which would set up a timetable for the completion of such zone.
- Lebanon, the Arab League, Iraq, Kuwait, Ukraine, Switzerland, and Nigeria called for the implementation of the 1995 resolution.
- Nigeria called for a stakeholder conference on a NWFZ in the Middle East, which would include Iran, Israel, and the P5, and be convened within the framework of the UN.
- Kuwait urged states parties to put pressure on Israel to join the NPT and submit its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
- Iraq pointed out that stability in the Middle East could only be achieved through the removal of weapons of mass destruction.

**Nuclear weapon free zones**

- Uzbekistan and Ukraine reaffirmed the importance of establishing NWFZs in order to promote international peace and security.
- Uzbekistan commended the readiness of the US to discuss ratification of NWFZs and called for all other NWS to follow this example.
- Nigeria called for closer cooperation between the different NWFZ.

**Non-proliferation**

- Lebanon encouraged a paradigm shift in the way states view their own national security and argued that the most effective barrage against proliferation remains elimination of nuclear weapons and acknowledging their irrelevance for fostering security.
- Iraq argued that non-proliferation only can be achieved once all states join the NPT and sign and ratify the CTBT and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
- Switzerland argued that the debate on avoiding proliferation of nuclear weapons is linked to a debate on confidence and pointed out that NWS still have a long way to go in order to meet such confidence-building obligations.

**IAEA safeguards**

- Russia argued that states should consider the additional protocol to be a mandatory commitment for nuclear export.
- Russia, Malaysia, and Iraq called upon all states to adhere to the additional protocol.
- Ukraine argued that the additional protocol is now an integral part of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
- Lebanon recognized the importance of additional protocol, but emphasized that it is a voluntary, confidence-building instrument and not a legally-binding one.
- Switzerland suggested that the RevCon request the IAEA to initiate an internal debate to enhance the attractiveness of implementing the additional protocol, and argued that countries that implemented the additional protocol should get additional benefits.
- Malaysia said the IAEA needs to enhance rules and modalities on preserving the confidentiality of safeguards related information.
- Iraq highlighted that it had signed the additional

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protocol and pending its ratification would voluntary implement it.

**Nuclear exports**
- Russia commended the work of the NSG and Zangger Committee and argued for the universality of its arrangements and their check lists of nuclear exports.

**Nuclear safety**
- Russia highlighted its decision to give a significant voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, and expected this contribution to further facilitate the strengthening of its physical security regime.
- Russia supported the IAEA programme designed to reduce the level of enrichment of nuclear fuel in all IAEA member countries to less than 20%.
- Russia supported the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

**Iran**
- Russia argued that Iran had every right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as long as it complied with its obligations under the NPT.

**Institutional issues**
- Switzerland argued that nuclear issues are constantly undergoing development and called for the establishment of a support unit for the NPT.

**Main Committee III**

**Rights vs. obligations**
- France argued that the right to nuclear energy exists in a balance with the responsibilities of states.
- Switzerland said there must be return to confidence among states based on the links between articles I, II, III, and IV.
- Indonesia expressed concern with the potential of a two-tiered system of haves and have-nots developing over nuclear power under the guise of non-proliferation and urged the outcome document to reflect the rights of article IV.
- Iran argued that states parties should avoid linking peaceful uses to any other provisions or conditions other than those specified in the Treaty, arguing that there is threshold or limit to the extent to which a state party might exercise its rights under article IV.
- Iran argued that states parties should avoid linking peaceful uses to any other provisions or conditions other than those specified in the Treaty, arguing that there is threshold or limit to the extent to which a state party might exercise its rights under article IV.
- Australia argued that some states’ call for no undue restrictions on article IV implies that there are “due” restrictions. It argued that compliance is an important consideration and that acceptance of safeguards means more than just bringing them into force.
- Australia argued that the IAEA safeguards system is evolutionary in nature and that article III, which refers not just to safeguards but to the safeguards system, could include the additional protocol. It urged for the outcome document to note that safeguards + the additional protocol is the verification standard.
- Chile argued that states cannot just put forth allegations regarding the nature of article IV so that it can get the supplies it wants and suggested the outcome document could include a sentence that underscores the importance of good will so that article IV can be met in a voluntary, fluid, and natural manner.
- Ireland called for a strong reaffirmation of the right to nuclear energy without discrimination in conformity with articles I, II, and III.

**Nuclear transfers**
- Egypt, noting that NPT states parties seem to be at a comparative disadvantage in terms of nuclear trade when compared to states outside the Treaty, said the outcome document should request as a precondition for nuclear transfers full scope IAEA safeguards and legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Cuba called for the cessation of unilateral restrictions to nuclear trade.
- Australia said it is not attracted to the proposal to establish a committee to hear cases of transfer denials. It suggested using the Vienna Group of Ten language that in transfers, states parties will aim to facilitate the greatest possible cooperation in safe and secure environment in accordance with the NPT.
- The United States said that the decision of transfer by a supplier state is a sovereign decision and is not something that can be taken to an arbitration body. It said the proposal for a mechanism to assess denial decisions is not appropriate.
- Brazil, Chile, and Ireland agreed that nuclear transfers are sovereign decisions.
- Ireland said it would be concerned about efforts to affect national sovereign decisions in the context of this RevCon and that it does not see a role for a body dealing with transfer denials.
- Iran and Algeria did not agree that nuclear transfers are sovereign decisions.
- Iran argued that all obligations under the Treaty are equal and states parties have an obligation to trade with states that act in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. It argued that there needs to be an international framework for these decisions.
- Algeria argued that export regimes exist to ensure compliance with provisions of the Treaty,
News in Brief (cont.)

especially article III, but that the mandate of the regime stops there. It argued that if there is a refusal to supply nuclear materials to another state party then the motivations should be explained and justified in detail.

Export controls
• Australia argued that export controls should be reflected positively in the outcome document, which should recognize that they are legitimate, necessary, and desirable.
• Ireland argued that export controls, when properly implemented, have an important role in implementing provisions of the NPT.

Sensitive materials
• Australia said that while the NPT does not prohibit transfers based on the sensitivity of materials, the IAEA Board has characterized several technologies as sensitive, based on their dual-use nature. It argued the outcome document should recognize that some technologies are sensitive.
• Brazil noted that it is not the particular technology that is sensitive but the way it is potentially used.

Safety and security
• Switzerland and Norway called on all states with nuclear infrastructure to ratify the relevant safety conventions.
• Austria recalled that states that possess nuclear power facilities hold the primary responsibility for maintaining the safety of their installations, noting that the risks of nuclear power far outweigh any potential benefits if safety is not upheld.
• Brazil and Ireland said that safety, security, and safeguards are integral to any responsible energy programme.
• Ireland and France urged the outcome document to reaffirm the role of the IAEA in facilitating countries to reach the highest levels of safety.
• Brazil noted that the safety of nuclear facilities is evolving, arguing that safety does not involve just procedures but the constant development of technologies that are built along with the reactors themselves.
• Indonesia said it maintains a “safety first” principle in all of its nuclear activities.
• Ireland and Norway emphasized the importance of safe transportation of nuclear materials.
• France noted that the development of the nuclear field should be based on solid infrastructure, regulations, technological levels, and in human resources to ensure safety and urged the development of a “culture of safety”.

Technical cooperation
• South Africa called for states to provide the IAEA with additional resources for its technical cooperation programme.

Multilateral fuel cycle
• Russia and Belarus argued that a guaranteed fuel supply will contribute to a new architecture for international cooperation in nuclear energy.

Nuclear vs. renewable energy
• Austria noted that the Chernobyl disaster left a legacy that affects millions of people and requires billions of euros in resources, which led to Austria enshrine its nuclear free status in its constitution in 1999.
• Austria also argued that nuclear power applications are not a viable means to address climate change; noting that discussions on this issue in the competent forums have not included recommendations to bring nuclear power into the energy mix to combat climate change, Austria does not see the value of bringing those types of discussions into the NPT forum.
• Austria noted that while it fully respects the right of all states to decide what energy mix they want, it noted that this decision should be made on the basis of aiming for more efficient use of power in general. It noted that while the IAEA has tools to help states make decisions about this matter, other organizations like IRENA can also help provide guidance.
• Ireland also noted that while it is right of every state to determine its own energy mix, as with Austria, it has taken the decision not to pursue nuclear power due to concerns related to sustainability, legacy for future generation, and concerns with inappropriate linkages to climate change.

News: Scottish First Minister calls for a NWC

On 10 May, the same day the new UK coalition government was announced, Scottish First Minister the Rt Hon Alex Salmond called for a Nuclear Weapons Convention along with a renewed call for the removal of Trident nuclear weapons from Scotland.

In a letter delivered to NPT President Libran Cabactulan by Scottish parliamentarian Bill Kidd, First Minister Salmond “calls upon all States parties attending the NPT 2010 at the United Nations in New York to take a leadership role in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.” He reported that “The Scottish Government is firmly opposed to the possession, threat or use of nuclear weapons, and supports the removal of Trident nuclear weapons. We therefore welcome plans for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Convention to help reduce and ultimately prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons by all States.”

The letter also reports that “In a vote on 14th June 2007 the Scottish Parliament voted by 72 to 16 against the continuance and replacement of Trident.”
Assessing US and Russian postures
Sameer Kanal | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF


Ms. Godsberg explained the background of the new START, which was presented as a “bridge” to keep and expand the original START’s verification regime in place. However, she said that “it would be disappointing if this is the only arms control we can get” during new START’s lifespan. Ms. Godsberg underscored the agreement’s “political price,” a 13% increase in the budget of armament facilities in order to get conservative Senators to support new START and CTBT ratification. Ms. Godsberg also explained new START’s counting rules, including the “major counting flaw” regarding heavy bombers (see sidebar 1). This system undercounts 450 US and 860 Russian warheads today.

Ms. Godsberg and Mr. Moxley cited improvements in the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but noted that it was still “focused on cold war thinking.” Mr. Moxley said that it had a new “aspirational overlay” that directed the US towards eventual abolition, but otherwise it was a “status quo document.” Ms. Godsberg cited the change in declaratory policy justifying deterrence of nuclear attack, as well as committing to continue refraining from nuclear testing and ratify the CTBT. However, she said that the NPR leaves open the possibility of “indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons.” Mr. Moxley added that it lacked any reference to law, or a “conceptual thrust that these weapons are so horrendous they must never be used.”

The omission of law from the NPR was particularly noteworthy to Mr. Moxley because of the broad body of law which applies to nuclear weapons. Additionally, he noted that the general US position on the laws of war is of commitment, and humanitarian law is included in US military manuals and policy statements; generals make decisions with lawyers present to advise them. On nuclear weapons, however, there is no such application of law.

Mr. Moxley cited a 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of use or threat of nuclear weapons. He underscored that the rules of necessity, proportionality, and distinction (see sidebar 2) are “beyond dispute” even to Russia, France, and the US, who have acknowledged their applicability; he stated that any US use of nuclear weapons would fail all three. Mr. Weiss also stressed that despite the ICJ’s statement that “we cannot decide [...] whether the use of nuclear weapons could be illegal in a situation in which the very survival of a country was involved,” the remainder of the opinion created an “absolute

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prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.”

Furthermore, Mr. Moxley noted that the threat of an unlawful act was considered itself unlawful by the ICJ, and that this “illegalized deterrence as a philosophy.” Finally, NPT article VI obligates nuclear weapon states to conclude “negotiations related to nuclear disarmament,” but the NPR says that this obligation will be fulfilled by “making progress towards” abolition, which led Mr. Moxley to conclude that the “NPR continues where we were during the Cold War.”

Mr. Weiss lamented the lack of discussion of legal restrictions at the Review Conference’s debates and side events. He also stated that the attitude of nuclear weapon states had a “missing link, [a] myth that if we go down to 1550 this year and maybe 1200 five years from now and maybe to 500 just before our lifetimes end that somehow this will do something for abolition.” Mr. Weiss stated that the US, France, the United Kingdom, and China all believed that reductions should be done by a fixed percentage in each round, which leads to an infinite reduction period without ever achieving nuclear zero. He also called attention to Ellen Tauscher’s statement last week that the US was “prepared to talk to anybody, but not in the [context] of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.” Mr. Weiss called the current reduction process “a shell game” and emphasized the “rising chorus of voices” in support of abolition.

The audience engaged in the discussions, particularly on Mr. Weiss’ suggestion of asking the ICJ to rule on whether nuclear weapon states were acting “in good faith” as required by the NPT. Jacqueline Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation cited numerous examples of “American bad faith,” noting specifically the “long-term planning” associated with programs such as a new line of submarines to be completed in 2017. Tim Wright of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons cited increasing involvement from NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the necessity of grassroots and local organizing on the issue. Bev Delong of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons followed up a question on the attribution counting of heavy bombers by noting that “fake counting rules are the direct result of not having NGOs at the table [...] this sort of nonsense would have become public in advance.” Alice Slater of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation stated that non-US citizens should also lobby their governments to leave the US nuclear umbrella in order to remove that justification for nuclear weapons within the US.

Assessing US and Russian postures (cont.)

**SIDEBAR 1:**
Selected portions of New START as outlined by Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov as well as Alicia Godsberg of the Federation of American Scientists:

- Limit on warheads reduced to 1550 from 6000 (START I) and up to 2200 (Moscow)
- Limit on deployed delivery vehicles lowered to 700 from 1600 (START I); no Moscow limit
- New limit placed on deployed and non-deployed delivery of 800 (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers)
- New counting rules focusing on real numbers (“just deployed warheads on delivery vehicles”) rather than “attribution” *
- Attribution numbers changed for heavy bombers from 10 (START I) to 1 †
- Two types of inspections; type 1 “more intrusive” at deployed ICBM/SLBM sites
- Type 2 inspections at non-deployed storage sites, “less sophisticated.”
- Maximum number of inspections per year raised to 18 (10 type 1, 8 of type 2)
- ICBMs and SLBMs will get a “unique identifier” (the “license plate”), allowing lifetime tracking

* “Attribution” counting (an assumed number of warheads per type of delivery vehicle) remains for heavy bombers, each of which is counted as 1 regardless of the number of warheads stored on them.
† US and Russian bombers can hold, on average, 12-20 warheads; both countries claim that generally their heavy bombers are not loaded with any nuclear weapons. (This means that each heavy bomber, counted as 1 warhead, could represent from 0-20 real deployed warheads.)

**SIDEBAR 2:**
Necessity, Proportionality, and Distinction (as explained by Charles Moxley)

- Necessity essentially implies that if conventional weapons (or any “lesser force”) are sufficient, nuclear weapons are unlawful.
- Distinction requires the weapon to be able to discriminate between combatant and civilian
- Proportionality requires parity between the value of the military objective and the cost of possible collateral damage.

Sameer Kanal is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of WILPF.
Presentation of the White Paper NPT: How to strengthen the regime
Emma Bjertén | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Wednesday, the Permanent Mission of the Federation of Russia sponsored a seminar in which the Russian think tank PIR Center presented the “White Paper NPT 2010—Strengthen the Regime”. Vladimir Orlov, the founding director of the PIR center, pointed out that they would present a non-governmental view on these issues and opened the session with remarks of the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, which emphasized the belief that NGOs play an important role in the work of the NPT.

The paper provides an overview of the NPT and discusses its main challenges and possible solutions. The aim is to develop policy recommendations on how to move beyond current stalemates and strengthen the regime. Mr. Orlov presented a list of key urgent issues, such as the ratification of CTBT, nuclear disarmament, challenges in Middle East, challenges in Europe, states outside the NPT, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the role of the IAEA, and the importance of education in non-proliferation.

Mr. Orlov said nuclear weapon states have to undertake disarmament of their nuclear arsenals first. He emphasized that we need to ensure sustainability of the reduction and requested a prompt ratification of the new START by Russia and the United States. As a whole page of the paper was devoted to the CTBT, Mr Orlov underlined that it was a shame that the Treaty has not been ratified yet and urged all states to sign and ratify it. He also discussed the necessity of Israel and Pakistan to sign the CTBT, to place nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

In the Q&A session, someone asked why the PIR Center didn’t urge India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. While Mr. Orlov recognized that this is a controversial issue, he argued that India should be treated as the sixth member of the P5. So instead of signing the NPT, he wanted India to make similar commitments in parallel with the official nuclear weapon states. However, he still wished to see India sign and ratify the CTBT, the Treaty that the PIR Center saw as one of the key challenges for the disarmament agenda.

Emma Bjertén is an intern with Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

Quick and easy disarmament: EU style
Allison Pytlak | Religions for Peace

The Dutch organization IKV Pax Christi hosted a side event on Wednesday that examined nuclear disarmament within the context of Europe and NATO. Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey continue to host American tactical nuclear weapons on their territories as part of a nuclear sharing agreement within NATO that dates back to the Cold War. Therefore, the removal of these weapons would constitute a significant step toward disarmament. But exactly how and when the countries can make that happen is what this panel considered.

The event was moderated by Susi Snyder of IKV Pax Christi and included Ambassador Paul van den IJssel of the Netherlands, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Laurens Hogebrink of IKV Pax Christi, and Paul Ingram of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC).

Ambassador IJssel was supportive of a world without nuclear weapons but cautioned that this is a day-to-day process and that we cannot expect a “miracle tomorrow”. He argued that the road to success lies in lowering the strategic value of nuclear weapons and thus officially rendering them obsolete and pointed out that such discussions took place when foreign ministers from NATO countries met in Tallinn, Estonia last month and will be continued here at the Review Conference.

Mr. Hogebrink’s statement spoke about the structural weaknesses in the European Union (EU) that impede progress in disarmament—namely, that sometimes “common defence” may result in the prevalence of the lowest common denominator. He reflected on the development of the EU common position on the NPT and discussed some of the statements that have been delivered by various members of the EU. Mr. Hogebrink noted that negotiations are not always the best way to resolve all disarmament related problems currently facing the European states; instead he argued that each one is different and might require a different solution.

Mr. Kristensen recognized that nuclear sharing is an increasingly less applicable foundation for the NATO alliance than it was during the Cold War. He pointed out that the existing widespread deployment across many bases in Europe creates safety issues that are more important than many realize and argued that nuclear sharing is not important enough to justify the double standard that it creates.

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On 10 May, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (PNND) presented to NPT President Libran Cabactulan a Parliamentary Declaration Supporting a Nuclear Weapons Convention and Compilation of parliamentary resolutions supporting a nuclear weapons convention and/or the UN Secretary-General's five point plan. PNND had also presented the two documents to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 6 May at an NPT side event.

The Parliamentary Declaration Supporting a Nuclear Weapons Convention was launched by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on the 40th anniversary of the NPT. Its 100 MEP endorsers include former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene. It is now endorsed by parliamentarians from across the political spectrum and around the world including fro Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The declaration says that such a NWC is required in order to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure fulfillment of the NPT’s aims for complete nuclear disarmament. It recognizes that “the complete abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons is a complicated process that might take a number of graduated and consecutive steps as well as a range of concurrent measures, and that a Nuclear Weapons Convention could therefore be achieved either as a single treaty or as a package of agreements.”

The Compilation of parliamentary resolutions supporting a nuclear weapons convention and/or the UN Secretary-General’s five point plan includes resolutions recently adopted in the national parliaments of Austria, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Italy and New Zealand, as well as resolutions adopted in the European Parliament and by the Inter-Parliamentary Union which represents over 150 parliaments including those of most of the nuclear-armed countries and the countries under extended nuclear deterrence relationships. The document also lists resolutions and motions submitted, but not yet adopted, in the parliaments of Belgium, France, Scotland, United Kingdom and the United States.

The Parliamentary Declaration and the Compilation of parliamentary resolutions indicate the overwhelming support of parliamentarians from around the world for a nuclear weapons convention. The Inter-Parliamentary Union, in its presentation to the NPT plenary on 6 May delivered by New Zealand parliamentarian Nicky Wagner, reported on the extensive consultations amongst all its member parliaments on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament prior to adopting its unanimous resolution in 2009 which supported UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s five-point plan.

The IPU statement notes that “The Nuclear Weapons Convention provides a non-discriminatory approach which builds on currently existing mechanisms, such as the CTBTO and IAEA - and fills in the gaps,” and that “Current barriers to nuclear disarmament could be overcome through commencing a preparatory process which would explore the legal, technical, institutional and political requirements for a nuclear-weapons free world. This process could be guided, but would not be bound by, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated by the UN Secretary-General.”

Alyn Ware is the global coordinator for Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Quick and easy disarmament: EU style (cont.)

Mr. Ingram focused on NATO's Strategic Concept Review. The Review is in progress and its recommendations are scheduled to be presented next week, at which point it will enter a phase of consultation and input, with a final version due in November 2010. Based on the meeting in Tallinn last month, it is evident that the United States remains “backward looking” and favors maintaining the status quo in regards to the value of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. Ingram stated that it is important to discuss the review and the opportunities for change in the context of the Review Conference.

In her conclusion, Ms. Snyder emphasized the increasing importance of transparency in nuclear policies and the need to reaffirm past agreements to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in security strategies. Unilateral actions within NATO can be detrimental, but they can also help to re-frame the debate and make it possible for NATO to advance a strategic concept in which nuclear sharing does not exist.

Allison Pytlak is the disarmament program coordinator of Religions for Peace.
What’s On
Today’s Calendar of Events

Abolition Caucus
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 8:00–8:50
Contact: Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Off-the-record government briefing for NGOs:
Delegation of France
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 9:00–9:50
Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Main Committee II
Where: Conference Room 2, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00

Operational status of nuclear weapon systems
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 10:00–13:00
Contact: John Hallam, Nuclear Flashpoints

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production: Good Faith, Irreversible Disarmament?
Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building
When: 13:15–14:45
Contact: Nickolas Roth, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Main Committee III
Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building
When: 15:00–18:00

Reception and Film Screening: Nuclear Tipping Point
Where: Church Center, 12th Floor
When: 18:00
Contact: RSVP to Meiko Boynton, International Peace Institute, boynton@ipinst.org