Editorial: Insecurity of the status quo
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Friday, 11 May the NPT PrepCom wrapped up its work with the adoption of its procedural report. Only one amendment was made to the draft report: paragraph 19 referring to the Chair’s factual summary was removed. The factual summary is now only listed in the report’s annex of working papers. This probably was done in an effort to preclude the unfortunate habit in other fora of heavily caveating chairs’ summaries with language suggesting it has no relevance to the proceedings of states parties.

Regardless of the change in the draft report, however, the Chair’s summary will be kept as part of the background documentation leading into the 2015 Review Conference. This summary mostly reaffirms the 2010 NPT action plan, which still requires serious implementation efforts. However, it also carries some issues forward, highlighting new opportunities for advancing the agenda throughout this review cycle (see NPT News in Review No. 9).

The PrepCom itself, unfortunately, did not do much to advance the agenda. States parties neither conducted a thorough review of implementation-so-far of the 2010 action plan nor did they utilize all of the time at their disposal to begin exploring options for moving forward. Many governments and civil society experts expect that the next Review Conference will need to make significant advances on a range of critical NPT issues, especially nuclear disarmament, in order to sustain the credibility and integrity of the Treaty. With a few exceptions, this PrepCom did not begin to engage with this difficult task.

One particularly important initiative at this PrepCom, however, was the 16 country statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament, which calls on nuclear weapon states “to give increasing attention to their commitment to comply with international law and international humanitarian law.” The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly important for giving impetus to their elimination, especially in a financial and environmental climate in which it is not only the use of nuclear weapons that has negative and lasting impacts on the safety and security of humanity and the planet, but also their continued possession and modernization. Yet, while the majority of participating delegations demanded an end to modernization of nuclear weapons and called for their irreversible, verifiable, and transparent elimination, including through the full implementation of article VI of the NPT, there were signals emanating from some states during their concluding remarks that full implementation of article VI is in as much danger as ever. While most other delegations were thanking the Chair, his team, and the Secretariat for their excellent work in facilitating a remarkably smooth meeting, the Russian and Chinese delegations both warned that the unilateral (i.e. US) development of anti-ballistic missile programmes will effectively preclude multilateral nuclear disarmament. They called for the international community to focus on “creating the conditions” for nuclear disarmament by maintaining “strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all”.

Not only are these warnings concerning for the possibility of nuclear disarmament and for the future credibility of the NPT, but they stand in stark contrast to a world increasingly unified in its demand for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the call for “undiminished security for all” overlooks the fact that it is the current state of affairs—the continued possession, modernization, and potential use of nuclear weapons—that creates undiminished security for all, not their elimination. The idea is absurd that the retention of nuclear weapons and the continuous threat of their use through “deterrence” policies provide security to any state. No weapon that poses a threat to the survival of humanity can legitimately provide security. As the 16 states said at the beginning of the PrepCom, it is of great concern that “the threat of nuclear annihilation remains part of the 21st century international security environment.” They questioned the “utility of these instruments of mass destruction to confront traditional

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From the P5 to the TNW5: nuclear sharing and the NPT
Susi Snyder | IKV Pax Christi

At the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, states recognized the opportunity to deal with an ongoing mosquito in the tent of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. With NATO undergoing a Strategic Concept review, the time was ripe to send a clear and unequivocal message to NATO members that nuclear sharing (i.e. between the US and the five states in Europe that host nuclear weapons on their territories—the TNW5) is no longer appropriate.

The Non-Aligned Movement tried to make the language as specific as possible, when it suggested (in NPT/CONF.2010/MC.1/C.RP.2*) that nuclear weapons states “withdraw nuclear weapons stationed on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article I and II of the Treaty”. Unsurprisingly, that language was not kept in the final document. Instead, states agreed that the nuclear weapon states should “[a]ddress the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process” (NPT/CONF.2010/50 Vol. 1). That is still a pretty clear diplomatic signal to NATO states to get their act together and begin addressing nuclear sharing. Of course, NATO missed the opportunity in its 2010 Strategic Concept to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy, and instead set up a process, called the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) to continue addressing the issue. The DDPR was agreed upon at the last NATO ministerial meeting and will be made public at the forthcoming Chicago Summit later in May 2012.

NPT states parties, however, did not miss the chance during the 2012 PrepCom to continue raising this issue. Language even appeared in the Chair’s factual summary, such as paragraph 23’s note that some states “stressed the need for progress in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons which continued to be stationed outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States.” Paragraph 23 also notes concerns expressed “regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines” and emphasis on “the need to diminish further the role of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.” One NATO state described the summary as having “too much” language on nuclear sharing.

Where does the continued push come from? Is it solely the Non-Aligned Movement calling for an end to this outdated practice? Does anyone in the northern or western hemisphere really care about this? Is there a vocal minority of NATO allies pushing for a change? What about NATO partners? Examining the statements and working papers submitted to the 2012 PrepCom, one can make a few assertions.

In the general debate, the Non-Aligned Movement did indeed ‘name and shame’ NATO for its continued reliance on nuclear weapons, when Mr. Ahmed Fathalla, First Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, stated, “The Group remains deeply concerned by the strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and NATO which justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.” Egypt went further it its national capacity to say that “the continued deployment of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear weapon States through nuclear sharing arrangements of military alliances, undermines the objectives of the Treaty”. It was not particularly surprising to hear this from the Non-Aligned Movement, as it has for years called for changes to NATO nuclear sharing policies.

The New Agenda Coalition strengthened its stance on the nuclear sharing issue in its working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.1/WP.29). In 2010 the NAC working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8) focused on transparency, encouraging States “that are part of regional alliances which include nuclear-weapon States to report as a significant transparency and confidence building measure, on steps taken or future steps planned to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in collective security doctrines.” At the 2012 PrepCom, the working paper was much more specific, saying, “Nor has progress been evident in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons that continue to be stationed outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States.”
Switzerland also brought attention to the TNW5 issues in its disarmament cluster statement, saying, “In addition, no steps have been taken to deal with both non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons which are still not addressed by any international agreement. In this regard, we hope that NATO will not miss the opportunity to open a door for future progress at its forthcoming Summit.”

Poland, considered a key state for any changes in NATO nuclear policies, brought up the issue in the general debate, saying, “The key issue for Poland is to address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type and location—that is so called tactical nuclear weapons, which in contrast to the strategic nuclear arsenals have not been covered by any legally binding arms control agreement. A world free of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved without making non-strategic weapons an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.”

Even the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) referred to TNW5 issues, saying in the general debate that New START and other announced reductions “need to be followed by continued and systematic reductions in all nuclear weapons categories, including non-strategic nuclear weapons”. NPDI includes three states that host US nuclear weapons (Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey), as well as other NATO members Canada and Poland.

It is useful that states are paying attention to the issue of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, and helpful to have a reference in the Chair’s non-negotiated summary. As in 2010, the issue of nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear weapon states is a relatively easy one to solve. The disarmament and non-proliferation benefits, as well as the ability to save an estimated US$6 billion by not extending the life of the B-61 gravity bombs, are tremendous incentives. While the NATO summit in Chicago is not expected to make any grand announcements on this issue, it would be absolutely nonsensical for, at least the TNW5, not to be negotiating to squash this mosquito by removing the weapons, at least before reports are due at the 2014 NPT.

We talk about the P5.

What about the TNW5?

Belgium Germany Italy Netherlands Turkey

Nuclear sharing is against the NPT.

Editorial, cont’d

security challenges” and argued that they are “useless in addressing current challenges such as poverty, health, climate change, terrorism or transnational crime.”

Overcoming the counter-intuitive security paradigm of the nuclear weapon states will be necessary for achieving nuclear disarmament. And demanding their compliance with article VI throughout the 2015 review cycle will be necessary for ensuring the continued integrity of the NPT. Just as non-nuclear weapon states are expected to comply with their non-proliferation obligations regardless of external security circumstances, so too must the nuclear weapon states comply with their disarmament obligations. The most important—and only real—condition for a world free of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament.
Side event report: Taking the apocalypse off the agenda
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

PND Flashpoints hosted the last NGO side event for the NPT on the issue of de-alerting. Ambassador Alfredo Labbé of Chile opened the session with a quote by US President Obama and spoke about the risk of accidental nuclear warfare. De-alerting is among the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Review Committee, which Ambassador Labbé refers to as “the mother of all practical steps”.

John Hallam, People for Nuclear Disarmament, spoke on the reversible physical changes to nuclear weapons or weapon systems in order to lengthen the time required to use them in combat. Mr. Hallam argued that because thousands of strategic nuclear warheads remain on high-alert, launch-ready status, capable of being launched in only a few minutes, de-alerting will reduce the likelihood that these forces will be used deliberately or accidentally. He argued that accidental or unauthorized nuclear war, remains possibly the single most short-term threat to civilization as we know it. Mr. Hallam stated that maximizing decision time is core to what de-alerting is about, and although this will require deep changes in current systems and thinking, it is paramount.

Colonel Valery Yarynich’s presentation entitled “De-Alerting Nuclear Forces: it is possible, if we follow logic,” assessed mutual “deterrence” through the attacker’s risk. He argued that the ultimate goal of nuclear strategy in general is to leave both sides fully confident of their “deterrent” capabilities, while minimizing the possibilities of an accidental or unauthorized launch. As a result, he claimed that the first priority of the disarmament process has to be to ensure that neither side will face incentives to adopt riskier policies, rather than to reach particular levels of warheads. Mr. Yarynich believes it is important for Russia and the United States to share information and undertake mutual activities. •