On Friday morning delegations concluded the cluster one debate and conducted in full the debate on specific issue one, nuclear disarmament and security assurances. Despite the Chair’s encouragement for states to conduct their work in an interactive session and raise questions and comments about each other’s positions or statements, the discussion was largely route and dependent on prepared statements.

That said, a few delegations did take the opportunity to address specific issues of concern that have come up at the PrepCom so far and in other contexts. For example, the Australian delegation expressed concern about the lack of transparency around the P5 joint meetings about which that the nuclear weapon states reported in their joint statement. The Australian representative noted that the references to transparency, confidence building, verification, terminology, and the development of a standard reporting form were all “somewhat vague”. He acknowledged that the idea of non-nuclear weapon states asking for more information makes the nuclear weapon states uncomfortable, but emphasized that the fundamental bargain of the NPT requires the nuclear weapon states to go beyond their comfort zones and the benchmarks they have set for themselves and to be more transparent about issues other than what they’ve reported on already.

Indeed, leaving the reporting form—not to mention the other issues outlined in action 5 that the nuclear weapon states are obligated to address—solely up to the nuclear weapon states is not in the best interest of the rest of the international community. The NPT itself was negotiated behind closed doors by the United States and the Soviet Union, which is why we now have a Treaty rife with double standards and loopholes. Non-nuclear weapon states have a right and an obligation to demand increased transparency from the nuclear weapon states and an active role in processes addressing disarmament and non-proliferation. It is the only way to ensure that the interests, concerns, and rights of the rest of the world—the vast majority that do not rely on arsenals of mass destruction and terror to “defend” their interests—are fully taken into consideration.

Last week, the nuclear weapon states paid some attention to the concerns of others, but ultimately rejected each of the concerns as having been already addressed or as illegitimate. For example, four of the P5 reiterated their commitment to and implementation of the NPT disarmament provisions, describing the steps they have taken in this regard over the past several decades. Some insisted that their modernization programmes are completely compatible with their disarmament obligations; others argued that the security assurances they have already issued are sufficient. Realizing that the issue of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons is receiving more international attention and concern, the UK delegation argued that the International Court of Justice did not unanimously conclude that the use of nuclear weapons is unlawful in all circumstances, while the US delegation said that it is impossible to discuss the “hypothetical” use of nuclear weapons and that the issue has to be considered in a specific context.

These examples demonstrate the danger of leaving disarmament and non-proliferation processes and discussions up to the P5 alone. Not only have they continued to be dismissive of the legitimate arguments and concerns of non-nuclear weapon states, but they also continue to make claims about the legality and necessity of their arsenals despite their obligation to disarm. Brazil’s delegation addressed on Friday some of the comments made individually and collectively by the nuclear weapon states throughout the week. For example, the Brazilian ambassador argued that citing non-proliferation cases as an excuse to justify the retention of nuclear weapons is a “self-fulfilling prophesy,” since as long as there are nuclear weapons other states will want them. Similarly, he argued that the statement that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the nuclear weapon states will retain them is “delusional”. This position—expressed frequently by the Unit-
Editorial, cont’d

... Kingdom and United States in particular—is indeed a catch-22 of epic proportions. If the nuclear-armed states do not eliminate their arsenals, then nuclear weapons will always exist!

Non-nuclear weapon states have a vital role to play in operationalizing the so-called “vision” of a nuclear weapon free world espoused by the nuclear weapon states. While using NPT and General Assembly meetings to criticize the policies of the nuclear weapon states is useful, it is also necessary to actively seek creative solutions to the continued existence of nuclear weapons. In this context, the 2013 meeting on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons will be a vital contribution to establishing the “conditions” for nuclear disarmament and promoting justifications for the end to nuclear weapons rather than their indefinite retention. Brazil’s suggestion that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty be firmly embedded into the context of nuclear disarmament, to ensure that it is not simply a discriminatory, status quo-reinforcing agreement, is another example of creative thinking to overcome the current stalemate on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

The most important thing is that non-nuclear weapon states actively take the reins. On Friday, the afternoon plenary meeting was cancelled because no one was interested in taking the floor after the first few speakers. Delegations squandered three hours they could have spent questioning the policies and positions of the nuclear weapon states and making suggestions for alternative courses of actions. The nuclear weapon states keep reiterating that nuclear disarmament is everyone’s responsibility; it’s time for the non-nuclear states to embrace this claim and determine the path forward. •

Nuclear crossword

Puzzles by Lily Gardener

Across
4. The IAEA was set up in 1957 as the world’s “… for Peace” organization.
5. Acronym of the term used to describe systems to design to counter ICBMs.
6. The CD started out as the … Nations Disarmament Committee in March 1962.
8. Which state announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003?
10. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was founded in 1974 in response to which country’s nuclear tests?
11. Nuclear weapons have four main destructive effects: blast, thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, ...

Down
1. ‘Boys toys’ are also known as?
2. On 9 October 2006, the DPRK announced it had conducted a nuclear test in the north of what province?
3. W.H. Auden wrote that a poet can write about a man slaying a dragon, but not about a man pushing a button that releases a ...
4. In 1985 the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior was bombed and sunk by the French DGSE in the port of which city?
5. On 3 October 1952 the UK detonated its first atomic device in the lagoon between the Montebello Islands, Western Australia. What was the name of the operation?
7. In which month of 1970 did the NPT enter into force?
Side event report: Nuclear abolition: The role of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Emma Rosengren | Swedish Section of WILPF

The theme of this event organized by Mayors for Peace was how experiences from Japan can contribute to collaboration between NGOs and to strengthening the disarmament regime.

Mayor Kazumi Matsui of Hiroshima emphasized the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the still ongoing human suffering from radiation, environmental breakdown, and trauma in his city. Mayor Matsui emphasized that the people of Hiroshima have not given up the vision of a peaceful world without nuclear weapons. With support from and in cooperation with civil society organizations around the world, Mayor Matsui believed the people who have experienced nuclear bombings will overcome their anger and trauma and use it in order to contribute to a world free from nuclear weapons institutionalized in a nuclear weapons convention (NWC). He stated that the city of Hiroshima will engage in the preparations leading up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference and he invited civil society organizations to participate in this work.

Mayor Tomihisa Taue of Nagasaki underscored that the theme of this event organized by Mayors for Peace was how experiences from Japan can contribute to collaboration between NGOs and to strengthening the disarmament regime.

Japanese Ambassador Mari Amano emphasized that even though the number of nuclear weapons is decreasing, further reductions are both urgent and necessary. Ambassador Amano ensured his country’s sincere commitment to nuclear disarmament exemplified in Japan’s resolution on nuclear disarmament presented to the United Nations General Assembly since 1994, the work through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), and Japan’s ongoing work on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Akira Kawasaki of Peace Boat proposed that the NPDI conference to be held in Hiroshima in 2014 could be turned into a conference on the initiation of negotiations of a NWC. He also emphasized that all countries, both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have the responsibility to contribute to nuclear abolition. Thus, as a NNWS, Japan has the task to challenge its reliance on nuclear weapons in its security strategy and to withdraw from the nuclear weapon umbrella. Mr Kawasaki also elaborated on the relation between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and said that the Fukushima accident further demonstrated the importance of questioning future nuclear power plans.

Comments included information about a recently established research centre about nuclear abolition at Nagasaki University, the importance of coordinated action among civil society organizations, and the necessity of keeping the memory of Hibakusha’s experiences alive even once there are no survivors left to tell their story. The side event showed that the statement on catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons presented to the NPT PrepCom by the governments of Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland is one important step to keep these experiences alive. Hopefully other governments, such as Japan, will endorse this statement during this PrepCom or in the process leading up to the 2015 Review Conference.

Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Who, How and Why?
The Advantages of Involving Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

A Discussion Meeting, hosted by VERTIC and ISS Africa

To be held from 10:00am to 12:30pm, on Tuesday 8th May 2012 at the Vienna International Centre, Room M2 (NGO Room)

The advantages of a multilateral approach to verification of future nuclear disarmament activities – David Cliff, VERTIC

Multilateral nuclear disarmament verification: applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency – New Agenda Coalition

Technical challenges and opportunities for multilateral verification of future nuclear disarmament activities: the technology and the gaps – David Keir, VERTIC
News in Brief
Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Highlights from the cluster one debate

Disarmament

• Argentina, Indonesia, and Mexico called on NWS to engage in a process to eliminate nuclear weapons.
• Argentina criticized the unjustifiable delay of NWS in complying with their disarmament obligations but argued that this can’t be a reason to free NNWS from their commitments assumed in article II.
• Argentina opposed interpretations of article VI that aim to condition advances in nuclear disarmament to those in the conventional field.
• Indonesia said that without disarmament, the non-proliferation regime will always be in peril.
• Indonesia called on NWS to prove that their vision of a world without nuclear weapons is not just rhetoric by operationalizing it, and reminded delegates of the NAM proposal to the 2010 review cycle about a phased programme for disarmament.
• Russia said its commitment to a world without nuclear weapons is not just a statement but a policy supported by deeds; it then outlined its bilateral arrangements with the US since the INF Treaty.
• Russia also indicated conditions for disarmament, including continued reductions by all NWS; prohibiting weapons in space; providing guarantees of “the absence of recoverable nuclear capacities;” prohibiting building-up conventional capabilities; prohibition on the development of unilateral anti-missile systems; elimination of the imbalance in conventional forces; settlement of regional conflicts; entry into force of CTBT; and viability of key multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation tools.
• Russia also said that it is increasingly clear that the efforts of two NWS aren’t sufficient to move toward nuclear disarmament and called for a multilateral process.
• Brazil said that the citation of non-proliferation cases as an excuse to prolong disarmament efforts is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
• Brazil also argued that if there is no commitment to disarmament with timelines, there will always be countries wishing to emulate example of the NWS, and that the lack of a clear horizon for elimination is mine driver for proliferation.
• Brazil also described as “delusional” the argument from some of the NWS that until nuclear weapons are eliminated they will retain their arsenals. Brazil urged the NWS to just make a commitment not to have nuclear weapons.
• Belarus expressed concern that implementation of NPT action plan in the field of disarmament leaves room for further improvement and that most of the 13 steps still have to be implemented as well.

Modernization

• Argentina called on NWS to abandon their vertical proliferation including on non-strategic weapons or the using advanced technology to use more modern technology in conventional scenarios.
• Brazil noted the indications of arsenal reductions by the France, Russia, the UK, and the US and pointed out that during debate some delegations have said that these reductions have been tempered by modernization.
• Belarus expressed concern that existing stockpiles are being modernized.

Nuclear sharing

• Brazil said that the argument that nuclear sharing arrangements pre-date the NPT and therefore NPT rules aren’t applicable is difficult to understand legally and logically. Brazil’s ambassador emphasized that he isn’t necessarily saying such arrangements violate the NPT but that they are relevant for discussion in the NPT context.

Negative security assurances (NSA)

• Argentina emphasized that the demand for a legal instrument on security assurances in no way replaces obligations undertaken by NWS to destroy their arsenals, but it may at least contribute to restoring confidence.

International humanitarian law (IHL)

• Mexico noted that the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons would risk the security of those very states that say they feel protected by those weapons.

Fissile materials

• Mexico said it is ready to negotiate and willing to explore in a constructive spirit different possibilities for a future legally-binding instrument on fissile materials with an effective verification system. It also argued that for future treaty to be a real contribution with added value to disarmament, it should include existing stocks.
• Indonesia called for a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty on fissile materials.
• Brazil called for negotiations of a fissile materials treaty to be conducted in the context of nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)

• Mexico urged all NWS that have placed reservations on their ratification of the Treaty of Tlateloco’s protocols to amend or withdraw these unilateral interpretations.

Highlights from debate on specific issue one: nuclear disarmament and security assurances Disarmament

• Australia said that NWS reductions are welcome but noted that so far the US and Russia have acted bilater-
ally, while the UK and France have acted unilaterally, and wondered what can be expected from the P5 working together.

- Malaysia called on all states to commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament that can lead to an NWC.
- NAM argued that implementation of action 5 of the 2010 action plan is essential and called on NWS to accelerate this.

**Reporting**

- Australia further noted that the details coming from the P5 meetings are somewhat vague and leave the NNWS wanting more. The delegate noted that some of the P5 disliked the NPDI reporting form, but argued that while it will be uncomfortable for some of them to report using a standardized form they cannot just continue to act based on the benchmarks they’ve set for themselves so far. He argued that this issue comes back to the question of the NPT’s grand bargain—that it is critical for all states parties to see the NWS reporting as not just being something purely of their prerogative, that reporting is not a matter of what they are comfortable with or a compilation of what they’ve reported already.
- Poland highlighted the importance of transparency for further nuclear reductions and stated that the draft reporting form submitted by NPDI was an attempt to facilitate this.
- NAM called on NWS to submit substantive reports on action 5 as soon as possible.

**Modernization**

- NAM argued that nuclear weapon modernization undermines the minimal reductions that have taken place.
- South Africa argued that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and qualitative improvements to existing arsenals has led to increased insecurity among NNWS.
- Iran said that nuclear weapon modernization, construction of new facilities for nuclear weapons, and threats against NNWS are against the UN Charter and violations of article VI.

**IHL**

- The US said it has “taken note of the interest that has been expressed about the legal aspects of the use of nuclear weapons” and said it strongly agrees that states must comply with applicable international law, including IHL. However, the US also said, “A serious analysis of the legality of a hypothetical use of nuclear weapons would have to consider the precise circumstances of that use, and cannot be evaluated in the abstract.”

**Doctrines**

- China called on NWS to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
- Japan called on all nuclear-armed countries to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.
- The US argued that it has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its national and military strategies but that “further steps can and should be taken”. It emphasized that the “fundamental role” of its nuclear weapons is to “deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners.”

**NSAs**

- Ukraine welcomed the new security assurances by the US and UK and encouraged other NWS to make similar progress.
- Ukraine, Malaysia, and NAM called for the conclusion of a legally binding treaty on NSA and specified what obligations it should include.
- Ukraine proposed to hold a UN conference on NSAs.
- NAM expressed concerns that existing security assurances to NNWS are limited, conditional and insufficient.
- China argued that all NWS should make no-first-use pledges.
- China and South Africa said the fundamental solution is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of these weapons.
- South Africa argued that since some NWS claim they have already given NSAs through resolutions in the context of NWFZs, there should be objection to codifying such assurances in a universal, legally-binding instrument.
- Japan called on NWS to “make their existing NSA pledges credible to the rest of the world and should provide stronger assurances to [NNWS] that comply with the NPT.”
- Australia encouraged the NWS to go further than the current NSAs, perhaps by including stronger assurances in a new UN Security Council resolution.
- Iran noted that the UNSC itself considers its resolutions on NSAs to be only a step in the direction of providing full assurances to NNWS.
- Iran also argued that new doctrines such as the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), developments of “mini-nukes,” and increasing threats by NWS officials have put NNWS under real threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons.
- The US said it “recognizes the importance of security assurances to states that have foresworn nuclear weapons and that abide by their non-proliferation obligations.” It outlined the NSAs contained in its 2010 NPR.

**Fissile materials**

- Germany drew attention to the working paper submitted by NPDI on a fissile material cut-off treaty and announced that two scientific experts meeting on the topic will be held in May and June in Geneva.
Side event report: Increasing transparency as a step toward disarmament
Susi Snyder | IKV Pax Christi

The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) hosted an event “Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material Stocks as a Step Toward Disarmament” on Friday morning. The panel focused on how nuclear weapons states (NWS) could fulfill their transparency commitments through a series of successively more detailed declarations of the numbers, status, and histories of nuclear warheads and fissile material inventories.

Dr. Zia Mian of IPFM opened the session and described how there are varying degrees of transparency in the nuclear weapons states. Through various arms control agreements, the US and Russia offer the deepest insights into their current and past fissile materials holdings. Dr. Mian discussed the necessity for states to establish a baseline to ensure accountability with future warhead reductions commitments, with a special focus on fissile materials past production capacities and stocks. He argued that states must prepare now to make such information available, as future obligations will require it. In addition, as arsenals are growing smaller there is a need to establish what happens to the fissile materials that went into the bombs in the first place. He noted that reductions cannot be verified without this information.

Dr. Frank von Hippel of IPFM discussed the information currently available from various declarations made to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), especially those submitted under INFCIRC/549 requirements. He noted that European Union member states are also required to declare information about civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles as well. Dr. von Hippel suggested that future declarations include details of fissile materials in and available for weapons, reserved for naval fuel, in irradiated naval fuel, planned for disposal, at research and development sites, and reserved for research reactors.

Dr. Harold Feiveson of IPFM illustrated the benefits of published detailed accounts of nuclear weapons production histories as a confidence building measure. He argued that such declarations can form the basis for future declarations. In examining these histories, he noted that some of the most important pieces of information to include are the numbers build, the numbers retired and the numbers dismantled each year. Some of this information has already been provided by, at least, the US. Dr. Feiveson believed that these transparency efforts could be a path to disarmament.

Dr. Alexander Glaser of IPFM discussed nuclear archeology (referred to in some circles as nuclear forensics) as a way to verify fissile materials declarations. He noted that it is important to agree on the most important types of operating records to be preserved and the need to catalogue, characterize, and preserve waste materials. He also suggested that it would be a good idea to offer test areas to do this, at single facilities and to prioritise those that are scheduled for decommissioning in order not to give up information on existing inventories.

Mr. Michiru Nishida from the Japanese government was the final speaker and presented an overview of the Non Proliferation Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) transparency suggestions and also offered a bit of a peer review to the suggestions from IPFM. He reinforced that NPDI is not only calling for transparency on actions 5 and 21, but on the whole 2010 action plan. He emphasized that both the NPDI and the IPFM proposals have the same goal: to offer mechanisms to facilitate the accepted obligations of verifiability, transparency, and irreversibility in nuclear disarmament commitments. Mr. Nishida emphasized that, from his personal perspective, transparency is most important, as transparency provides the baseline from which to measure.

The discussion following the presentations ranged from questions on UK declarations and whether they include HEU fuel purchased from the US for naval propulsion to questions about delivery systems, and transparency on nuclear weapons infrastructure. One panelist suggested that using the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs’ web page designed to hold reports would be an excellent mechanism to increase transparency and enhance security.

The proposals made by IPFM are available online at http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2012/05/ipfm_presents_proposals_o.html.

Nuclear cryptoquote: answer
Puzzles by Lily Gardener

The following is the answer to the nuclear cryptoquote in Friday’s NPT News in Review:

While we sleep, death is awake. Death keeps watch from the warehouses that store more than 23,000 nuclear warheads, like 23,000 eyes open and waiting for a moment of carelessness. Death is incited and spurred on by those who perfect weapons of mass destruction instead of destroying them, and by those who each year allocate tens of billions of dollars to vertical proliferation. - President Óscar Arias of Costa Rica, 24 September 2009 at the UN Security Council summit on nuclear weapons.
Side event report: Modernization of nuclear arsenals—a new arms race?
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Friday afternoon, an event entitled “The modernization of the nuclear arsenals—a new arms race?” was organized by the International Network of Engineers and Scientists (INES) and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). The session, moderated by Reiner Braun (INES, IALANA), began with Jackie Cabasso, Mayors for Peace, who provided an overview on modernization and the US administration’s position. Subrata Ghoshroy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Program in Science, Technology and Society, spoke on South Asia. And John Burroughs from Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy spoke on his chapter on modernization and international law in Reaching Critical Will’s latest publication, Assuring destruction forever: nuclear weapon modernization around the world.

Ms. Cabasso began by reading part of the New Agenda Coalitions (NAC) statement from the Cluster One deate. The NAC are “concerned at the continued modernisation of nuclear arsenals, together with the vast resources allocated for this purpose, which runs contrary to the NPT undertakings.” She argued that this illustrates that modernization has finally made its way into the NPT discourse. She discussed military spending in the United States and other nuclear weapon states (NWS), and underscored that due “largely to government secrecy it is almost impossible to say what the exact budget is” for nuclear weapons in these countries. However, a good indication can be found in a Global Zero study, which claims that global nuclear weapons spending will surpass one trillion in the next decade. She also talked about the unprecedented public discussion in the American administration on increasing spending to sustain and modernize its nuclear arsenal. Ms. Cabasso provided a realistic, albeit disappointing, overview of the increasing budgets in NWS for nuclear projects. She argued that the danger of nuclear conflict is much more likely between current NWS than states that do not currently possess them.

In his presentation on the nature and culture of the debate on nuclear weapons in South Asia, Dr. Ghoshroy offered an insight into the development of the current situation. He explained how both India and Pakistan have aggressive missile programmes, which are surrounded by jingoism. He argued that India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme has both regional and global ramifications: despite the technical flaws, it is destabilizing the region and causes both conventional and nuclear arms build-up. He also maintained that it causes further strain on India’s bilateral relationship with Pakistan and China. He explored the issue of space weapons and the US-India strategic partnership, arguing that the unstated goal is to contain China.

India ranks 126 and Pakistan 125 out of 177 countries on the human development index, yet huge budgets continue to be allocated to military spending. While Dr. Ghoshroy maintained that there are prospects for peace in South Asia, since the commonality of culture, social mores, and language are strong unifiers, there is also a lack of trust between the leaders of the two nations, with the Pakistani military continuing to consider India as its biggest threat.

Dr. Burroughs, the last speaker on the panel, provided further insight on his chapter on modernization and international law, in RCW’s latest publication. He spoke about article VI of the NPT, which outlines the legally-binding obligations for five (of the eight) nuclear weapon possessors to achieve an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons. He argued that none of the five are in compliance with this obligation. He argued that one of the obligations of the NPT, which is often forgotten, is the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. Modernization is incompatible with cessation of the arms race. He also contended that states outside the NPT are still bound by the Treaty: because universal nuclear disarmament obligations under international law exist, there is, at least, a political norm and/or obligation that applies to non-NPT states.

The panel discussed a number of issues in the Q&A session, including South Asia’s military norms and NWS motivation to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenal.
**Side event report: Bringing the CTBT into force**

*Sofia Tuwestad | Swedish Section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom*

This event was arranged by the Mission of Mexico to the International Organizations in Vienna and it featured Dr. Hein Haak, Chairperson of the CTBTO working group on verification issues; Ambassador Nils Daag, Permanent Representative at the Embassy of Sweden in Vienna; Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Director of the CTBTO International Data Centre; Dr. Ellen Williams, National Academy of Sciences; Ambassador Gusti Puja, Permanent Representative of Indonesia; and Ambassador Alejandro Diaz, Permanent Representative of Mexico. Tom Collina from the Arms Control Association chaired the seminar.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is more important than ever before, said Mr. Collina in his introduction. The situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and possibly also in other states, clearly shows the need for a ban on nuclear explosions and there is momentum right now, with an increasing number of ratifications. Since the CTBT was opened for signature in September 1996, it has been signed by 183 states and ratified by 157 of these. However, it is most likely a long way to go until the Treaty can enter into force and become international law, as this requires that China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, DPRK, Pakistan and the USA sign and ratify the treaty.

Dr. Williams presented a newly released report by the National Academy of Sciences on technical aspects of the CTBT. The report committee has analyzed a number of issues such as what kind of nuclear weapons development is possible under the CTBT. It judges that the US has the technical capabilities to maintain a so-called “safe, secure and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons” into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosive testing. This might make the US government more inclined to ratify the Treaty. However, while the report confirms the non-proliferation potential of the CTBT, which was also in focus at the side event, the disarmament dimension must not be overseen but endorsed by all current and future parties. The CTBT preamble stresses not only non-proliferation, but also “the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.”

As mentioned above, the report concludes that the CTBT would have a serious and positive effect in restraining possibilities for proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US cannot deploy new types of strategic nuclear weapons without the kind of testing that would likely be detectable under the CTBT, and this most likely goes for China and Russia as well. Should another state try to develop double-stage thermonuclear weapons (which requires multi-kiloton testing), this would likely be detected by “appropriately resourced US national technical means and a completed IMS network” according to the NAS report. IMS stands for the International Monitoring System, which is one of three pillars in the CTBT verification regime. The other two are the International Data Centre at the headquarters of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO) and, once the Treaty enters into force, on-site inspections.

In order for the CTBT to contribute effectively to the prevention of proliferation, said Dr. Haak, we need to acknowledge that the extensiveness of the verification system makes the Treaty somewhat unique. Implementation will require trust and confidence from the states parties to the CTBT, not only in how they relate to the Treaty text but also in how they relate to each other. Inter-state cooperation is crucial: partly for the implementation of the monitoring system, but also in order to secure that the CTBT verification regime maintains an adequate technical level over time. This issue was also brought up during the Q&A. “We need all the hands to keep up,” said Dr. Haak, as the verification system is part of a technical field in which new research and development is made continuously and fast. •
Side event report: EU cooperation on nuclear energy
Josephine Lind | IPPNW Sweden

This seminar explored EU support to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was led by H.E. Ambassador Györgyi Martin Zanathy from Hungary and included Mr. Wolfgang Martin Rudischhauser from the European External Action Service; Mr. Kwaku Aning, deputy director general and head of the Department of Technical Cooperation at the IAEA; Mr. Khammar Mrabit director of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security; and Karin Burmester, project coordinator for EU activities at the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security.

The purpose of EU cooperation is to ensure a safe and secure culture for nuclear energy worldwide and to provide information and knowledge in order to lower the ratio of fear of nuclear issues. The end goal is to enhance the everyday use of nuclear energy. Mr. Rudischhauser emphasized that the EU activities support existing strategies preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through various instruments such as European Union Council Decisions. EU cooperation involves technical cooperation, technical support to the IAEA, and nuclear research projects under Nuclear Cooperation agreements.

Mr. Aning highlighted that the programme also aims to accelerate the use of nuclear energy. The IAEA has had successful collaborations with the EU concerning nuclear safety and safeguards. He also argued that through different financial instruments, nuclear and radiation safety has been advanced.

Ms. Burmester presented some of the means of implementation, such as support to improved infrastructure, recovery and removal of vulnerable radioactive sources, radiation detection, and human resource development. So far 82 countries have benefited from the four joint actions, 300 tasks have been implemented, and 70 training courses have included 1400 participants. The work is conducted through individual support country by country.

The Q&A session included remarks on the budget and possibilities to further strengthen cooperation and the EU position on earmarking budgets for specific projects. Clearly, the well-organized cooperation shows that there is political will to invest in institutional support regarding the nuclear power pillar of the NPT, while at the same time institutional support for disarmament is not prioritized nearly enough.

Side event report: New nuclear power programmes
Elin Liss | Swedish Section of WILPF

This seminar was arranged by the IAEA to inform about the Agency’s work with countries that have the wish to develop nuclear power programmes in line with article III of the NPT. The panel consisted of Ali Boussaha (TCAP); Anne Starz (NENP); and Wolfram Tonhauser (OLA).

Mr. Boussaha made a presentation on the role of the IAEA and the Agency’s mandate. Its core function is to assist countries in the effective development and use of nuclear energy and to ensure safety, security, and non-proliferation. Embarking on a nuclear programme is a major undertaking, Mr. Boussaha stated. It is a long process and there needs to be a strong commitment by the government in order to go through the many steps of the process. The IAEA gives different types of support to states that want to start a nuclear power programme, such as security guidelines, peer reviews, knowledge networks, international legal instruments, safety standards, advisory services, education, and training.

Mr. Tonhauser presented the legal assistance that the IAEA can provide to member states. The purpose is to support the infrastructure for nuclear power programmes. Mr. Tonhauser stated that there has been little knowledge in states about the legal framework of nuclear power. It is important, according to him, that the states adopt a comprehensive legal framework in regard to safety, security, safeguards, and liability.

In the Q&A session the issue of the IAEA’s mandate and the Agency’s potential control over which states can start a nuclear power programme came up. The answer was that there is no legal base for such a control system. In the end it is up to the states themselves to decide. All states have the right to obtain and use nuclear power with the support from the IAEA according to article III of the NPT. Another issue discussed was dialogue. Mr. Tonhauser stated that it is important not to underestimate dialogue. There is a frankness in the discussions with the member states, an openness, which can be more effective than law enforcement. Ms. Starz added that there is a lot of bilateral cooperation when someone builds a power plant, which gives the opportunity of dialogue between several actors. Finally, with the disaster at Fukushima in fresh memory, safety was a main theme in the Q&A session. Obviously, the consequences of nuclear power accidents are devastating for human health and the environment for generations to come. All speakers emphasized that safety comes first, that safety can not be outsourced, and that it is the government’s responsibility to provide it. Ms. Starz ended with the message: Be responsible and be transparent.
Working paper review
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

This article surveys working papers submitted to the 2012 NPT PrepCom that were available as of Saturday, 5 May 2012 on the UN Official Document System. We have only pulled out specific recommendations or proposals contained within the papers. The order in which proposals are presented does not necessarily reflect their priority or likelihood of achieving consensus.

**Disarmament**
- WP.16 by the Arab League includes a list of proposals for making progress on nuclear disarmament, such as implementing the 13 steps from 2000 and action 5 of the 2010 NPT action plan; rapid reducing all types of nuclear weapons according to a short-term time frame of no later than 2017 and a long-term time frame of no later than 2025, under international monitoring; addressing the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or location; further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies; further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.
- WP.20 by the United States reports on measures taken on nuclear reductions, nuclear testing, fissile material, verification and transparency, and non-nuclear disarmament.
- WP.32 by Iran suggest that 2015 review cycle should address the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery means, and consider a decision on the prohibition of development, modernization, and production of any new nuclear weapons. It also suggests that the 2015 Review Conference adopt a clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI by 2025.
- WP.33 by Iran suggests that the 2015 Review Conference establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft of a legally-binding instrument on the illegality of nuclear weapons.
- WP.36 by the NAM calls on the NWS to implement action 5 from 2010 and the 13 steps from 2000, and make immediate progress on, inter alia: overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; addressing all nuclear weapons regardless of type or location; discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination; lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament; further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons.
- WP.29 by the NAC suggests that the current review cycle should focus on turning the commitment to accelerate implementation into concrete action, as reflected in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions set out in the 2010 Final Document. It asks the NWS to fulfill their obligations flowing from article VI through systematic and progressive efforts.
- WP.29 by the NAC calls on Russia and the US to address all deployed and non-deployed weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, in follow-on measures relating to New START.
- WP.30 by the IAEA should be called upon to take all necessary actions to support the development of new legally-binding arrangements for verification of nuclear disarmament and the necessary technical capabilities that would be required for this purpose.

**Modernization**
- WP.36 by the NAM express concerns that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of New START undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein, and that development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.
- WP.25 by the NAM emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the NWS at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, which aims to prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The paper proposes that states refrain from such actions contrary to the objective and purpose of the Treaty.
- WP.29 by the NAC argues that the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals and the development of advanced and new types of nuclear weapons, together with the vast resources allocated for this purpose, run counter to the undertakings made by the NWS.

**International humanitarian law (IHL)**
- WP.36 by the NAM states that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of IHL and calls upon NWS to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.
- WP.29 by NAC proposes that the 2015 Review Conference should explore and further consider the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including consistency with international law and particularly IHL.

**Nuclear doctrines**
- WP.29 by the NAC suggests that all states that are part of military alliances that include NWS should report on steps taken or future steps planned to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in collective security doctrines.
• WP.36 by the NAM calls for further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

**Disarmament education**

• WP.11 by Australia and Japan notes several disarmament education initiatives by these two countries and encourages states and international and civil society organizations to join such efforts of education in order to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

• WP.14 by NPDI calls on states to take three concrete actions to promote disarmament education: educating young people; collaborating with international, national, and local organizations and NGOs; and utilizing new tools, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

**Middle East**

• WP.13 by Egypt proposes that the 2012 conference must launch a sustained and serious process towards the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, leading to the establishment of the zone and involving steps and measures to be taken in this regard within specific time frames.

• WP.13 by Egypt suggests the urgent announcement of the dates of the 2012 conference, in order to allow for appropriate preparation by participating states, the finalization of the agenda and structure of the conference, and the preparation of background documentation as stipulated in the action plan, as well as the provision of the necessary financing, through the fund created by Finland.

• WP.13 by Egypt proposes an ad hoc preparatory group to work on substantive and procedural preparations composed of the Secretary-General in his capacity as convener of the 2012 conference (or the facilitator, on his behalf); the mandated Arab delegation; the three depositary states; the remaining nuclear weapon states; and the other participating regional states.

• WP.17 by the Arab League suggest that any resolutions that are adopted by the 2012 conference should propose genuine steps, specific undertakings, and a schedule for talks on establishing a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

• WP.17 by the Arab League urges states to support the voluntary fund for the convening of the 2012 conference on the establishment of the Middle East WMD free zone.

• WP.29 by the NAC calls on the Secretary-General of the United Nations and depository States to continue to make all efforts to assist the facilitator in securing a successful conference.

**Nuclear weapon free zones**

• WP.28 by the NAM calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations attached to the Protocols of NWFZ treaties.

**Negative security assurances**

• WP.32 by Iran proposes that the 2015 Review Conference prepare recommendations on unqualified negative security assurances to all NNWS on a non-discriminatory basis.

**Nuclear testing**

• WP.4 by the Vienna Group of Ten calls on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty, and on all states to maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear test explosions.

• WP.20 by the United States calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from further provocative actions, including any nuclear tests, and take concrete and demonstrable steps to fulfill its international obligations and commitments.

**Non-proliferation**

• WP.2 by the Vienna Group of Ten suggests that comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) are essential for verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but should be supplemented by an additional protocol (AP). It also argues that all states that have yet not concluded a CSA should do so, and all states found to be in non-compliance should move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.

• WP.15 by the Arab League proposes that no new commitments for non-nuclear weapon states should be accepted until genuine progress on universality of the NPT, nuclear disarmament, and the resolution on the Middle East has been achieved.

• WP.20 by the United States calls on all remaining states to bring CSAs into force. It also suggest that a CSA, together with an AP, should be considered the international standard for IAEA safeguards, and encourages remaining states to bring an AP into force as soon as possible.

• WP.20 by the United States proposes that Iran and Syria take urgent practical steps to build confidence and to fully cooperate with the IAEA.

• WP.24 by the NAM suggests that proliferation concerns should be addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, and non-discriminatory agreements.

• WP.26 by the NAM suggested that strict observance and adherence to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards should be a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with states not parties to the NPT.

• WP.26 by the NAM argues that it is necessary to separate between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, and stays that voluntary
undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.

• WP.37 by NPDI proposes that efforts should be stepped up through IAEA and bilateral and regional means to address the political challenges to bringing an AP into force, and proposes seminars or outreach activities tailored to specific regions to provide relevant technical assistance for implementing an AP.

**Fissile materials**

• WP.8 by Japan and Australiadescribes the side events on FMCT that they organized in Geneva in 2011, as a way for these two countries to encourage implementation of action 15 of the 2010 NPT action plan.

• WP.10 by NPDI announces that Germany and the Netherlands will organize two scientific experts’ meetings on an FMCT in June–July 2012. The paper notes that these meetings are intended to continue feeding ideas related to an FMCT into the CD.

• WP.30 by the NAC proposes that all NWS should initiate or accelerate the development of multilateral arrangements for placing fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA verification and make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, ensuring that such material remains permanently outside military programmes in a verifiable manner.

**Highly enriched uranium (HEU)**

• WP.1 by Norway and Austria included a report from the second International Symposium on the Minimization of HEU in Vienna. The paper includes a set of recommendations for minimizing highly enriched uranium, civilian naval propulsion reactors, transparency, and expansion of efforts.

• WP.6 by the Vienna Group of Ten encourages states to further minimize HEU stocks and use, and to convert radioisotope production to LEU targets.

**Nuclear export**

• WP.7 by the Vienna Group of Ten suggests that states should apply the understandings of the Zangger Committee to their export control regimes and proposes that new supply arrangements for the transfer of fissile material should require the acceptance of the IAEA full-scope safeguards and an AP as a necessary precondition.

• WP.15 by the Arab League suggests that the IAEA suspend any cooperation with Israel on nuclear issues until it accedes to the NPT as a NNWS and places all its nuclear facilities under safeguards.

• WP.24 by the NAM suggests that transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among states in conformity with the NPT shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination and that constraints that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty should be eliminated.

• WP.27 by the NAM proposes that states refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material, and technology to other states parties that comply with CSAs.

• WP.33 by Iran suggests that the 2015 Review Conference make a decision on the prohibition of any nuclear assistance to non-parties to the NPT.

• WP.38 by Syria proposes that the PrepCom underline the responsibility of NWS to cease placing technical and trade obstacles on NNWS.

**Nuclear energy**

• WP.2 by the Vienna Group of Ten suggests enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the IAEA technical cooperation programme.

• WP.19 by the United States encourages all states to support the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme by ensuring that it has the resources needed and that those resources are used efficiently and effectively.

• WP.24 by the NAM suggests that since the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, that no additional criteria should be imposed.

• WP.31 by Iran suggests that the 2015 Review Conference establish a mechanism to examine cases of non-compliance with article IV and the consequential damages inflicted on states through the violation of this article.

• WP.46 by the European Union includes a report on recent activities by the EU to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Nuclear safety and security**

• WP.2 by the Vienna Group of Ten suggests that nuclear energy must be accompanied by adherence to the highest levels of safety and security.

• WP.5 by the Vienna Group of Ten emphasizes the need to develop adequate national technical, human, and regulatory infrastructure to ensure the safety and security of all fuel cycle activities in line with international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. The paper also suggests that all states become parties to all conventions and agreements relevant to nuclear safety and security.

• WP.6 by the Vienna Group of Ten suggests that all states should apply the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It also recommends that all states parties should adhere to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment as soon as possible.

• WP.18 by Switzerland suggests that all states should rapidly implement the IAEA action plan on nuclear security, in particular the actions related to national regulatory bodies, operation and peer reviews, and transparency.
transition of nuclear disarmament. The paper suggests any possible review of nuclear safety standards should be carried out by the IAEA in an inclusive, gradual, and transparent manner and should incorporate the views of all states. The paper also calls for full for the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

Nuclear fuel cycle
- WP.24 by the NAM stresses that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security should not be used as a pretext or lever to violate, deny, or restrict developing countries from developing, researching, producing, or using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The paper suggests any possible review of nuclear safety standards should be carried out by the IAEA in an inclusive, gradual, and transparent manner and should incorporate the views of all states. The paper also calls for full for the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

Nuclear fuel cycle
- WP.9 by Sweden notes that multilateral nuclear fuel assurance arrangements, in either the form of a backup reserve or a more developed form of new enrichment capacity, can play a useful role for various categories of states. The paper also suggests that such assurance arrangements could lead to enhanced supply assurance and positive non-proliferation and confidence-building effects with regard to important parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.
- WP.19 by the United States notes that countries in compliance with non-proliferation obligations and considering or expanding nuclear power programmes should be assured that they will have reliable access both to peaceful nuclear technologies and to fuel services and that they need not consider the expense and difficulty of developing indigenous enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. The paper supports the development of such mechanisms.
- WP.31 by Iran suggests that the 2015 Review Conference should reaffirm the right to develop a national fuel cycle and decide that any explicit or implicit decision or act that is intended to hamper such right shall be avoided.

Universalization
- WP.26 by the NAM calls on all states outside the NPT to accede to the Treaty without preconditions as non-nuclear weapon states.
- WP.38 by Syria proposes that all NWS should stop supplying Israel with any form of nuclear technology and also cease obstruction of consideration of the Israeli nuclear file, which contravenes international legitimacy.
- WP.39 by China suggests that Israel accede to the NPT as a NNWS and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Transparency
- WP.12 by NPDI includes the draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form, which was shared with the NWS in June 2011. The paper notes that any future standard reporting form should include: a) the number, types and status of nuclear warheads; b) the number and, if possible, types of delivery vehicles; c) the number and types of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as a part of disarmament efforts; d) the amount of fissile material produced for military purposes; e) the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. The paper also suggests that the NWS submit such reports at each preparatory committee.
- WP.29 by the NAC urges the NWS to report regularly and substantively on progress made in the implementation of action 5 and other elements of the action plan, and give effect to action 21 of the 2010 action plan by agreeing as a matter of priority on a standard reporting format and intervals. The paper suggests that annual reporting would represent an appropriate interval.
- WP.30 by the NAC suggest that NWS should commit themselves to annually submitting accurate, complete, and comprehensive reports on their nuclear arsenals, weapons-grade HEU and plutonium stockpiles, and production histories.
- WP.32 by Iran suggests that the 2015 Review Conference shall consider national reports of the NWS to be furnished in accordance with actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 action plan and in line with the 13 steps from 2000.
- WP.36 by the NAM calls for further increasing transparency.

Procedural issues
- WP.22 by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) suggests a list of procedural improvements for the 2015 Review Conference, such as 1) inclusion of implementation of the 1995 decision on the Middle East and the 2010 Action Plan in the agenda; 2) that the NWS should submit reports to each PrepCom on the implementation of the 13 steps and the disarmament-related action of the 2010 action plan; 3) agreement on establishing subsidiary bodies at the 2015 Review Conference on implementation of the 13 steps and the 2010 action plan, on implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, and on a legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances; and 4) enhancing of the review process, promotion of disarmament education, and support participation of NGOs.
Calendar of side events for Monday, 7 May 2012
See www.reachingcriticalwill.org for a complete listing of events and regular updates

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
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<tr>
<td>7:30</td>
<td>Interfaith prayer vigil</td>
<td>Square outside the VIC</td>
<td>Christian CND UK</td>
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<td>8:00–8:50</td>
<td>Abolition Caucus</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00–9:50</td>
<td>Government Briefing for NGOs: Germany</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Reaching Critical Will</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00–13:00</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons and climate change</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>IALANA and WFC</td>
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<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Nuclear Famine: Unacceptable Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>CR M3</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00–15:00</td>
<td>Testimony of A-Bomb Survivors</td>
<td>MoE Exhibition Area</td>
<td>Gensuikyo</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00–18:00</td>
<td>Security in Northeast Asia</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Peace Depot</td>
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The other members of the NPT ‘nuclear club’

You too have a legal duty to disarm.