Editorial: Selective compliance
Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday morning, the conference room went quiet when the facilitator of the 2012 conference on a WMD free zone in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ) took the floor to report on progress on the eagerly awaited conference. However, it was not a very detailed report that Mr. Jaakko Laajava presented. There is still no agreement on the dates of the conference, nor has he yet received confirmation that all states in the region will participate. Mr. Laajava reported that he had carried out over one hundred consultations with all stakeholders, such as states in the region, conveners of the conference, nuclear weapon states, relevant international organisations, civil society, and other interested parties. He indicated that December seems like a possible time for the meeting and stated that logistics were in place to host the event in Helsinki. In conclusion, he noted that further and intensified efforts were needed from the conveners, the states in the region, but also from the facilitator himself.

No such self-reflection was found in any of the statements on the topic following Mr. Laajava’s report. Most delegations focused on what others should do to ensure success. While statements from the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab Group, and individual states from the region highlighted the importance these governments put on implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, they mostly argued that Israel should renounce its nuclear arsenal and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon states and that efforts by the facilitator, the UN Secretary-General, and the three co-sponsors (United Kingdom, United States and Russia) must be accelerated. They made very few concrete suggestions or proposals for ensuring success of the 2012 conference.

The three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution delivered a joint statement that basically only noted that all states in the Middle East should be represented at the conference and that it’s ultimately those states that are responsible for “creating and establishing the political and security conditions that will provide a sustainable foundation for such a zone” and the success of the conference. That the primary responsibility for the conference lays with the states in the region was reiterated by the US in its national statement, although that didn’t stop it from proposing a detailed and comprehensive agenda and stipulating that the conference must operate by consensus.

In addition to this, the US reiterated its usual caveat that regional peace is a necessary prerequisite to the creation of a MEWMDFZ. It also warned countries against singling out Israel, while at the same time emphasizing that “two states in the region, Iran and Syria, are currently in non-compliance with their nonproliferation obligations”. A few hours later, the US statement on other regional issues only called upon India and Pakistan to “restrain” their nuclear arsenals, but did not ask them to disarm or join the NPT, leaving no doubt that no concrete initiatives for promoting the universality of the treaty is currently taking place. The US also did not ask the Israel to take any action on nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation, further undermining universalization of the Treaty as well as prospects for all countries to be treated equally at the MEWMDFZ conference—which is another of the US caveats for the success of the conference.

When comparing statements by the co-sponsors on the 1995 Middle East resolution to those on from cluster one on disarmament, a clear pattern emerges. As the 1995 resolution was adopted in exchange for the indefinite extension of the NPT, it simply creates another “bargain” of the Treaty. Just as with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty, this issue puts in place immediate binding requirements on one part, while the other part can be left un-implemented for a long time. And just as is seen with disarmament, conditions and external circumstances are used as an excuse for not achieving the goals of the commitments and for not fully implementing previous decisions.

In addition, just as with the disarmament obligations of the Treaty, failure by states to achieve progress on the 1995 resolution, a
Editorial, cont’d

The success of the 2012 conference will be crucial for maintaining the trust in the NPT by states in the region. And strong support and willingness to engage in constructive negotiations by both states in the region and the co-sponsors, in particularly the Unites States, remains essential for progress. Currently, there is a significant risk that each country continues to voice support for a WMD free zone while blaming other countries and issues for standing in the way of its success.

The co-sponsors must not allow the conference to derail and need to make constructive efforts to get all states to come to the table; otherwise the credibility of the NPT regime and its effectiveness in the Middle East will be seriously undermined. 17 years after the resolution was adopted, progress on the Middle East is not just important for the region, but for the entire NPT regime’s ability to provide security for parties to the Treaty.

Middle East WMDFZ conference
Consultations

Jaakko Laajava, the facilitator for the 2012 conference on establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ), gave a report on his consultative efforts since his appointment in October 2011. He emphasized that during his consultations with states of the region as well as other interested parties and the nuclear weapon states he has been warmly welcomed and that everyone has engaged constructively and with an open mind. He reported that he has also had good exchange of views with academia, think tanks, and other civil society actors. He explained that his consultations have covered a range of issues, including scope and parameters; verification and compliance; confidence-building measures; nuclear energy; safety and security; and relevant treaty frameworks. He indicated that while all states of the region support the goal of the WMDFZ, views differ on how and when it should be created.

Laajava indicated he would continue his consultations immediately after the NPT PrepCom and that he would now focus on the agenda, modalities, and outcome of the conference as well as follow-up steps.

Syria said it was still waiting for his visit to Damascus.

The NAM called on Laajava to “exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination” with all states of the region.

Australia encouraged Laajava to continue consulting.

Russia called for the creation of a group of friends of the facilitator in the region to help with preparations of the conference.

The NAM called for all NPT states parties, especially the depository states and the facilitator, to submit reports on implementation of the 1995 resolution and for the 2015 review process to conduct substantive discussions on the reports and to evaluate them.

Egypt said after this PrepCom, consultations will need to intensify to create a mechanism for procedural and substantive preparation for the 2012 conference and follow-up of progress achieved, through an ad hoc preparatory group. This “process phase” will “require a clear road map containing concrete goals which are time bound” and linked to the 2015 review cycle. This road map would be reviewed by each of the PrepComs based on facilitator reports.

Date of the conference and other modalities

Laajava announced that Finland is prepared to host the 2012 conference at any point during the year and noted that December has recently been mentioned in consultations.

The Arab Group, NAM, Egypt, Qatar, Russia, and South Africa said the conference must be held in 2012.
• The NAM and Egypt argued that any delay in convening the conference will seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 NPT RevCon.

• The Arab Group called for the swift decision on the conference’s date, agenda, and measures to guarantee its success.

• Russia called for concentration on the modalities of preparing the conference, including the agenda, list of participants, and financial arrangements. Russia also called for work to begin on drafts of the outcome and for informal discussions to be held on these texts.

• Switzerland called for a decision on the date as soon as possible.

• Egypt said this PrepCom should “pave the way for the prompt finalization of all pending procedural matters pertaining to the convening” of the conference.

• Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen called for decisions on, inter alia, the date, agenda, structure, list and level of participants, preparation of background documentation, and financing.

• The US declared that for the conference to be constructive, “its purpose should be to exchange views on a broad agenda, including regional security issues, adherence, verification and compliance, and all categories of weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery.”

• The US also demanded that the conference operate by consensus of the regional countries.

• Iran called for an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the NPT in the Middle East to be a priority item for the agenda of the conference. It called for sustained pressure on Israel during the conference to accede to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

• Lebanon called for the agenda and scope to closely follow the 2010 mandate but to examine new concepts and ways forward with an aim to achieving tangible results.

• Japan said the conference should focus on confidence building in the region.

**Participation**

• Laajava reported that not all states of the region have confirmed their participation in the conference.

• Laajava, Russia/UK/US, the NAM, the Arab Group, Austria, France, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US called for full participation of all states in the region.

• The Arab Group and Sudan called on the depository states to help ensure full participation.

• China called on the depository states to continue taking a leadership role.

• Laajava, Russia/UK/US, the Arab Group, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and the US noted that the ownership and ultimate responsibility for the creation of the MEWMDFZ rests with the states of the region.

• Russia/UK/US said the IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO, and BTWC ISU could play a helpful role to support efforts to create the MEWMDFZ and hoped for their active support for this process.

• The US argued the conference can only take place if all countries feel confident that they can attend and condemned “attempts to single out Israel”. It argued that all states “must attend the conference on an equal basis, “regardless of their status vis-à-vis the various international arms control treaties.”

**Follow-up measures**

• The Arab Group called for follow-up measures to be discussed in consultations before August this year.

• Egypt called for the conference to result in a continuation of its sessions on a regular basis under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General and UNODA “with the objective of launching a negotiating process at the Conference” in order to conclude a treaty for the zone.

• Iran called for Main Committee II of the 2015 RevCon to establish a subsidiary body on the issue of a MEWMDFZ.

• Iran also called on the RevCon to establish a standing committee to monitor the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the relevant agreements of the 2000 and 2010 RevCons.

• Lebanon called on the 2015 RevCon to assess the MEWMDFZ process and conference and the philosophy governing the 1995 resolution.

• The UAE said the conference should establish a clear mechanism for moving forward, noting that the process may be long so states need a structured road map coming out of 2012.

**Postponement and linkages**

• The US argued, “Just as our efforts to seek peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons will not be realized quickly, we understand that a WMD free zone in the Middle East can only be achieved once essential conditions are in place, most critically a comprehensive and durable peace and full compliance by all countries in the region with their nonproliferation obligations.”

• The US also argued that the “timing and pace” of the “fundamental political shifts” ongoing in the region will have an impact on determining how to move forward on the conference.

• The US further argued that the 1995 resolution is “inextricably tied to efforts to address cases of Treaty non-compliance in the region.”

• Canada said the political developments in the region may impact the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, “particularly on the participation of some states

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in the conference.” Canada argued that it is “important to proceed with caution to ensure a more secure region in the long run.”

- Russia argued that talk of the conference being postponed until complete stabilization in region or talk of creating necessary political conditions is erroneous and not helpful; it argued that if countries showed political will than they can carry out the necessary measures for finding a political settlement to the situation in the Middle East.
- Syria warned against postponing the conference due to the recent political developments in the region, arguing that this is an attempt to “dissipate attention and efforts” away from the WMDFZ issue. It also warned against linking the zone to establishing peace in the region.
- Oman said the current situation in the region shouldn’t affect the conference.
- Jordan noted that it has a peace agreement with Israel and is a state party of the NPT and said that from this perspective, it cannot be convinced of linking peace efforts in the region to creation of the zone, arguing that progress on these two tracks is very important but linking them is not logical.
- Libya argued against linking establishment of peace in the region and Israel’s accession to the NPT.

Results of failure

- South Africa wondered what impact failure to hold the conference would have on this review cycle and implementation of 2010 action plan.
- Lebanon argued that the failure of the conference would have dire consequences for long-term international peace and security and would debilitate peace efforts in the region, erode the luster of NPT, and harm non-proliferation worldwide.
- Oman said if progress is not made all efforts to strengthen the NPT will have a set back.
- Yemen warned that failure could lead to an arms race in the region.
- Norway reported on the forum it chaired in November 2011 and listed some of the lessons learned from other NWFZ treaties including: that each new NWFZ treaty introduced innovations including creative legal arrangements and unique features; these treaties need to strike balance between prior experience and uniqueness of region; areas of application had to be defined and accepted by parties concerned; involvement of NWS from the outset was important especially for NSAs; establishment of NWFZs was possible despite serious obstacles such as geopolitical complexities, lack of trust, lengthy process of entry into force—could be achieved through a combination of political will, flexibility, steps, and dialogue; and that the zone in the ME shouldn’t be seen separate from broader context of international peace and security.

Specific countries

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

- The Republic of Korea noted efforts made to resolve the DPRK issues through six-party talks and condemned its recent missile launch and continued nuclear programme.
- Japan argued that the DPRK’s missile launch was a provocation and violation of the UNSC resolutions and against the spirit of the 2005 joint statement.
- ROK and Japan welcomed the UNSC presidential statement against the missile launch.
- The US called on DPRK to refrain from nuclear tests and other provocations, abandon its nuclear weapons programme, and return to IAEA safeguards and the NPT.

India

- Japan urged India to accede to the NPT as a NNWS.
- Japan called on India to maintain its commitments to a moratorium on nuclear tests and to sign/ratify the CTBT; and to maintain and advance a series of commitments and actions in field of non-proliferation.
- Japan called on India to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes pending the entry into force of an FMCT.
- The US said it has called on India to restrain its missile and fissile materials programmes and to support FMCT negotiations.
- The US argued that its bilateral relations with India are consistent with it NPT and NSG.

Iran

- Japan called on Iran to take the resolutions seriously and to cooperate with the IAEA.
- Japan welcomed the resumption of E3+3 talks with Iran.
- The US called on Iran to meet its “nonproliferation obligations” and to “approach negotiations with the P5+1 seriously.”
- The US emphasized that Iran’s engagement with the P5+1 is “separate from the equally urgent obligation for Iran to cooperate fully” with the IAEA.
- Iran noted that it has a high record of accession to non-proliferation and disarmament instruments and reiterated that the Supreme Leader issued a fatwa on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Israel

- The NAM, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, and Syria expressed concern with Israel’s nuclear weapons and called for Israel to join the NPT as a NNWS and to place its relevant facilities under IAEA safeguards.
Morocco said that creation of a MEWMDFZ would require adherence to the NPT and application of safeguards of all states in region.

The NAM and Libya called on states to comply with article I of the NPT and to not transfer nuclear weapons or explosive devices to Israel or to assist Israel with its nuclear weapons programme in any way.

Lebanon argued that failure of the 2012 conference on the Middle East would mean that Israel would keep its arsenal and policy of opacity.

Lebanon called on Israel to depart from its attitude of devaluing the NPT and trying to score political points by accusing other countries of violations of their commitments under this Treaty even though they are under scrutiny of international community and IAEA inspectors while Israel is not.

Qatar called on all countries especially the depositaries to create a climate favourable to positive and tangible results of the 2012 conference, particularly Israel’s accession to NPT as a prelude to establishment of a WMDFZ in the region.

Pakistan

Japan urged Pakistan to accede to the NPT as a NNWS.

Japan called on Pakistan to maintain its moratorium on nuclear tests; to sign/ratify the CTBT; and to and strengthen its export controls.

Japan called on Pakistan to join the other 64 CD member states in agreeing to FMCT negotiations.

Japan called on Pakistan to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes pending the entry into force of an FMCT.

The US said it has called on Pakistan to restrain its missile and fissile materials programmes and to support FMCT negotiations, noting with concern and disappointment Pakistan’s reluctance to begin negotiations.

The US argued that its bilateral relations with Pakistan are consistent with it NPT and NSG.

Syria

The US called on Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA and return to full compliance with the NPT and safeguards agreement, arguing that Syria “has not taken any concrete steps to address the outstanding questions about its clandestine nuclear activities.”

Syria argued that it has signed work plan with the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues and is waiting its implementation.

Across

4. The voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing between Russia, the UK, and US from 1959-1960 ended after which country became a nuclear weapon state?

5. The 13 days referred to as the Cuban missile crisis is also known as the October Crisis or the ... Crisis.

7. Where did China test its first nuclear device (2 words)?

9. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament is a joint initiative of how many governments?

11. 45 years ago, the world’s first nuclear weapons free zone in a populated area was established when Latin American and Caribbean states approved the text of which treaty?

12. Ronald Reagan claimed that all the waste in a year from a nuclear power plant can be stored under a ...

Down

1. India’s last nuclear test took place in which state?

2. Founded in 1945 (2 words).

3. One of the biggest problems during the Soviet atomic bomb project was the procurement of what (2 words)?

6. What was the name of the test series that released the most radiation to the continental US and produced significantly increased levels of leukemia among soldiers?

8. Dr. Sakharov and Dr. Kurchatoy are known as the ... of the Soviet nuclear programme.

10. Presidents George H. W. Bush and and Mikhail Gorbachev signed START on 31 July 1999 in which city?
In addition, the Australian Labor Party has recently moved to facilitate uranium sales to India. The prospect of uranium from Mirarr land making its way to the poorly regulated nuclear industry of a NWS that is not even a signatory to the NPT is also of grave concern to Mirarr.

The Mirarr are also concerned at nuclear material originating from their lands causing injury, distress or illness as the result of a nuclear accident. The recent UN post-Fukushima system-wide study acknowledges the inadequacy of current threat assessments and mitigation planning, including risks from severe and unpredictable weather events. This is of grave concern to Mirarr, particularly given the horrific impacts of just such a nuclear accident currently being experienced in Japan. The risk of further accidents at nuclear reactors elsewhere in the world continues to grow as reactors age and extreme weather events and other impacts of climate change heighten.

In April 2011, following the earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster in Japan, Yvonne Margarula wrote to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. In the letter Yvonne expressed her sorrow at the impacts the radiation is having on the lives of Japanese people. She noted that “it is likely that the radiation problems at Fukushima are, at least in part, fuelled by uranium derived from our traditional lands. This makes us feel very sad.”

It has since been confirmed by Dr Robert Floyd, Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, that, “Australian obligated nuclear material was at the Fukushima Daiichi site”.3

In relation to the nuclear industry Yvonne Margarula told the UN Secretary-General that this “is an industry that we have never supported in the past and that we want no part of into the future. We all are diminished by the awful events now unfolding at Fukushima. I urge you to consider our viewpoint in your deliberations with governments in relation the Fukushima emergency and the nuclear industry in general.”

This sentiment is now extended to all delegates to the current NPT PrepCom: please consider the viewpoint and deeply held concerns of the Mirarr, from whose traditional lands uranium is mined and shipped overseas beyond their control.

Notes
2. Ibid.
Throughout this PrepCom, non-nuclear weapon states have expressed deep concern over the substantial programmes that are under way in each of the P5 nations to modernize their nuclear arsenals. Such programmes are incompatible with article VI of the NPT, which obliges states parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”. By squandering billions of dollars bolstering their nuclear forces, the nuclear-armed nations are potentially delaying disarmament by decades.

In addition to speaking out against modernization at forums such as this, non-nuclear weapon states should take steps to ensure that their public funds are not being invested in companies that are heavily involved in nuclear weapons work. A report released this year by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Don’t Bank on the Bomb, documents the extensive involvement of the private sector in nuclear weapons production in the US, Britain, France, and India. It encourages financial institutions, including government-owned banks and pension funds, to divest from all nuclear-weapon-producing companies.

There are two notable examples of government divestment from nuclear weapons. In 2005 the Norwegian pension fund disposed of its shares in BAE Systems, Boeing, EADS, Finmeccanica, Honeywell International, Northrop Grumman, Safran, and United Technologies because of the involvement of these companies in the nuclear weapons industry. Other nuclear weapons corporations such as Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and Alliant Techsystems had already been excluded owing to their involvement in landmine or cluster bomb production. The fund considered it necessary to divest from nuclear weapons companies even though nuclear weapons are not yet subject to a universal prohibition.

More recently, the New Zealand government’s accident compensation fund and superannuation fund divested from a smaller number of companies involved in nuclear weapons activities. It should extend its exclusion list to cover at least the 20 companies opposite. Australia’s “Future Fund”—which was set up in 2006 to meet an expected shortfall in pension costs for retiring public servants and lawmakers—has come under pressure to divest also. The fund has more than US$130 million invested in 14 nuclear weapons companies. This is inconsistent with the government’s stated commitment to nuclear disarmament. While the fund has divested from cluster munitions and landmines, it considers nuclear weapons to be legitimate. The relevant minister has refused to intervene.

Many of the banks and other financial institutions identified in Don’t Bank on the Bomb are either wholly or partially owned by governments. If non-nuclear weapon states are serious about challenging modernization and stigmatizing nuclear weapons, they should ensure that their institutions adopt clear policies to exclude investments in nuclear weapons producers. One of the banks in the report is Allied Irish Banks, which the Irish government bailed out in 2009. The following year, it provided an estimated US$28 million to the company that operates the Pantex plant of the National Nuclear Security Administration, where nuclear warheads are modernized. This is an example of clear inconsistency between a government’s policies on disarmament and the activities of its financial institutions.

20 Major Nuclear Weapons Companies

- Alliant Techsystems
- Babcock & Wilcox
- Babcock International
- BAE Systems
- Bechtel
- Boeing
- EADS
- Finmeccanica
- GenCorp
- General Dynamics
- Honeywell International
- Jacobs Engineering
- Larsen & Toubro
- Lockheed Martin
- Northrop Grumman
- Redhall Group
- Rolls-Royce
- Safran
- Serco
- Thales

Concerned about nuclear weapon modernization? Divest.
Tim Wright | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
The dance

Douglas Roche

There are, of course, two conferences going on at the Vienna International Center these days under the Non-Proliferation Treaty flag.

One is the ritualistic gathering of the NPT states, who conduct their elaborate dance to a song appealingly, if somewhat euphemistically, called, “World Without Nuclear Weapons.” A few of the dancers extend their arms upward appealing to the gods to do something, but most are content to circle around one another, a bow here and a hissing glance there.

The other conference is composed of the civil society representatives, many of them veterans of nuclear disarmament conferences. They don’t dance very much, but play out their dramas with well-rehearsed lines that express their consciences in speaking “truth to power.”

Once in a while, the two groups intersect, but it can hardly be said there is an intermingling of minds. The main conference reserved an afternoon to hear NGO speeches, as it customarily does. Indeed, one would have to have a heart of stone to dismiss the pleadings of the hibakusha to never again conduct nuclear warfare.

But, in the main, most of the official delegates care not a whit for what civil society is saying. They consider the NGOs repetitious, speaking from too many viewpoints, and insufficiently appreciative of the progress this PrepComm is making just by having an agreed agenda.

Actually, it is civil society that is lifting up the intellectual quality of the proceedings, notably through the range and depth of the subjects tackled at the side events. These events themselves constitute a college-worthy course in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, everything from the present modernization of nuclear weapons to strategies for establishing a nuclear free Middle East. The level of sophisticated discourse at the NGO events puts the official debates to shame. And all this is reflected admirably in the pages of the RCW daily journal.

While the level of NGO discussion this year is notably high, there is nothing new in this. The NGOs have been at this for years (indeed, if they had had their way in 1995, the NPT would never have been extended indefinitely without conditions). Neither is there anything new in the blandness of the official speeches, which are mostly parrying between the NWS and the more advanced NNWS thinkers (occasionally, one hears a jabbing riposte, such as Brazil’s claim that the NWS are “delusional” for insisting that until nuclear weapons are eliminated they will retain their arsenals). To say—again—that the NWS stance reeks of hypocrisy is...well, slightly boring.

The fulminations and somnolence go on. So why do we have these chin-fests? I suppose the answer lies in Churchill’s dictum that it is “better to jaw jaw than to war war.” Certainly, the outstanding representatives of the very few governments that really care about this situation need to be shored up by the creative civil society representatives.

The music plays on. It is time to find the right notes for a crescendo. The leading government representatives and the leading NGOs must now come together and unite their work with a visible intent to achieve: a legal ban on all nuclear weapons.

A global law against nuclear weapons (call it a Nuclear Convention or a Framework of Instruments or whatever you want) must be constructed before the nuclear disarmament machinery, now stultified and ossified, breaks down completely. A single message—ban all nuclear weapons—needs to resound from both camps. And preparatory work by those who truly understand the dimensions of the problem and are committed to protecting human security needs to start now.

A solidarity is waiting to be formed. This solidarity can do much more to inspire a bewildered world than the ritualistic facade now presented on the stage of the Vienna International Center.

Senator Douglas Roche is the former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and the author, most recently, of How We Stopped Loving the Bomb. •

Handoko Tjung, Indonesia
Message from the Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting to Japan welcoming nuclear reactor shut-downs

The participants of the Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting, gathered in Vienna on May 5, 2012, celebrate the shut-down today of the last operating nuclear power reactor, out of 54 reactors previously operating in Japan.

The reactors have been shut-down temporarily for normal and special maintenance.

In light of the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences from the Fukushima disaster unfolding now and into the future, we support the majority of people in Japan and worldwide calling for a phase-out of nuclear energy, and specifically that the Japanese reactors are not restarted, but are closed permanently.

The facts that the Japanese society is now functioning without nuclear energy—and that the majority of other societies continue to function and develop successfully without nuclear energy—indicate that such a dangerous energy source is not necessary, particularly if we increase renewable energy sources.

The phase-out of nuclear energy also closes a door to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and helps create the conditions for a sustainable nuclear-weapon-free world.

We send this appeal to the Japanese government, parliament and civil society.

Side event report: Toward cooperative security in Northeast Asia

Gabriella Irsten | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

With the objective to facilitate an agreement on a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Northeast Asia region, the side event “Towards Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia” focused some of the obstacles standing in the way of this goal. The seminar started with two statements delivered on behalf of the mayors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, endorsing an NWFZ in the region.

In light of the importance of denuclearizing the region, especially when the current six-party talks are facing difficulties, a NWFZ would be a key tool to overcome these difficulties. Some of the main points discussed were the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear weapons programme, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s participation in the US nuclear umbrella, Japan’s stockpile of plutonium, and the development of missiles in the region. The sponsors of the event included Peace Depot, Peace Boat, Peace Network, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, and Nautilus ARI.

The first part of the event started off with Wooksik Cheong from the Peace Network speaking on the topic of the Kim Jong-un regime and the six-party talks. Mr. Cheong outlined the origins of the Korean War and the relationship between nuclear weapons and the role of the United States in the conflict. Mr. Cheong was followed by Ichiro Yuasa from Peace Depot, who provided details on the cooperation between ROK and Japan towards a NEA-NWFZ.

The second part of the seminar dealt with more specific issues of the region. Takao Takahara from Peace Depot gave an overview of the region’s missile development, including the DPRK, ROK, and Japan’s programmes. Akira Kawasaki from Peace Boat spoke on Japan’s plutonium stockpile, which is the biggest of the non-nuclear weapons states, and its implications for non-proliferation. Making a final comment, Mr. Cheong of Peace Network spoke on the issue of the naval base on Juju Island and missile “defence”.

The Q&A session touched upon the paradox that peace cannot be built with the presence of nuclear weapons and that nuclear disarmament cannot be reached unless the region finds peace. Other issues raised were the special character of the region and what implications this might have on the future NWFZ, with a specific focus on how future security assurances would work with the high mistrust in the region.

In his final conclusion Mr. Takahara of Peace Depot stated that confidence building across the region through multiple channels is needed. He emphasized the importance of reaching security through disarmament and demilitarization and not the contrary.
Side event report: Multilateral nuclear disarmament verification
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) together with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) hosted a session on multilateral nuclear disarmament verification on Tuesday. Noel Stott (ISS Africa) chaired the three-speaker panel that included two VERTIC staff members, David Cliff and David Keir, and Mr. Michiel Combrink (South Africa and the New Agenda Coalition).

Mr. Cliff spoke about the relationship between disarmament and the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The definition of dismantlement, he explained, has not been internationally agreed and therefore differs between countries, class, and size. He contended that if nuclear disarmament efforts ever become the subject of multilateral negotiations, a multilateral approach to verification would be called for. He conveyed an array of challenges associated with verification including health and safety, potential proliferation, and perceived threats to national security. He also discussed whether the process of multilateral disarmament verification should include only nuclear weapon states (NWS), only non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), or both NWS and NNWS. He claimed that the UK-Norway Initiative illustrates and explores the kind of role NNWS could potentially play in the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. He maintained that there is strong case for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be involved in multilateral disarmament verification efforts.

Mr. Combrink spoke on the NAC working paper presented to the Preparatory Committee, Multilateral nuclear disarmament verification: applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. He argued that the verification of nuclear disarmament measures is an indispensable element in the fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT. Reasoning that warhead dismantlement and the verification of fissile material being permanently removed from military programmes are important in creating a world free of nuclear weapons. He also called for NWS to annually submitting accurate, complete, and comprehensive reports on their nuclear arsenals, weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, and plutonium stockpiles and production histories.

Mr. Keir spoke on technical challenges and opportunities in future multilateral nuclear disarmament verification. He outlined the difficulties in ensuring the decommissioning and permanent retirement of warheads from a technical perspective. He claimed that although the last thirty years has seen significant technology developments, the interception between technical and policy issues still requires further improvement. He spoke about his experience participating in multilateral verification exercises and called for more to be run.

Side event report: Assistance for safeguards implementation
Mia Gandenberger | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday, the United States hosted a follow-up panel to Monday’s side event by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the application of safeguards. After a short introduction by the chair, Ambassador Susan Burk of the United States, all panellists gave a short presentation before the floor was opened for questions.

Ambassador Hamad Ali Al-Kaabi of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reported on the development of the comprehensive safeguards system in his country. The UAE had signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) in 2003 and the Additional Protocol (AP) in 2010 and is now in the process of developing larger nuclear activities.

Mr. Taisuke Mibae of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan highlighted the benefits of signing an AP and Japan’s recent efforts in providing technical assistance to other states. He highlighted that the Japan Atomic Energy Agency offers safeguards training programmes especially for states in the Asian region.

In his presentation Mr. Jinho Chung of the Korean Institute of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Control, laid out the cooperation initiatives with the IAEA and the US as well as the UAE. He also pointed out the need for human capital development and announced that in 2014 the International Nuclear Security Academy will open in Republic of Korea.

Mr. Mathew of the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Administration talked about the International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program, which is a key component of the US Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. The programme’s mission is to collaborate with international partners to strengthen safeguards at all stages of nuclear development.

The final panellist, Mr. Andreas Persbo of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) gave an overview of his organisations activities. VERTIC provides states with legislative assistance and has started a new programme working towards the universalization of the AP.

Questions afterwards mainly focused on ways to improve coordination and harmonisation of exercises aimed at building and re-building expertise. Furthermore, possible obstacles that might keep states from adhering to the AP were discussed. In her closing remarks, Ambassador Burk again highlighted the importance of human capital development in connection with any nuclear activities.
Side event report: Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: Ideas from Russia, ideas for Russia
Wilbert van der Zeijden | IKV Pax Christi

The Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and the PIR Center organised this overloaded session. Overloaded in a positive way, in the sense that the density of information and ideas was inspiring. Overloaded in a negative way too, as the question period was entirely eaten away by the long list of speakers.

The session had two distinctively different panels. The first panel consisted of Russian speakers who shared their ideas about current Russian disarmament and non-proliferation policies and initiatives—ideas from Russia. The second panel had presentations from outsiders who were asked to comment on what Russia can or should undertake to advance the non-proliferation and disarmament agendas—ideas for Russia.

In the first panel Victor L. Vasiliev, Russian delegation to the NPT, Vladimir Orlov, President at PIR Center, and Albert F. Zulkharneev, also of the PIR Center looked at different aspects of current Russian non-disarmament and non-proliferations issues. Mr. Vasiliev argued that Russia recognises the growing attention for disarmament and in that discussion places special importance on the principle of equal security for all. According to the speakers, this includes a renewed focus on reciprocal disarmament steps, the search for a ban on the weaponisation of space, more attention for imbalances in conventional armament in Europe, and restrictions on delivery platforms. Russia achievements in this field include the ratification of New START, bringing nuclear stockpiles to the lowest levels since the 1960’s. Mr. Vasiliev also noted that Russia has reduced its stockpile of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons by more than 75% after the Cold War. Of the remaining 25%, many warheads are relocated to central storage or taken off hair trigger alert. He stated that Russia is open to discuss the future of this particular type of weapon, provided that the US start by returning their non-strategic nuclear weapons back to their own territory first, end sharing arrangements with European allies and stop maintaining the infrastructure in Europe for nuclear sharing.

Vladimir Orlov proposed a list of practical steps that Russia could take to advance non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, including the internationalisation of the INF Treaty and the integration of disarmament in a broader global process to dramatically cut military expenditures. With regard to the troubled relations with NATO, Orlov questioned whether the Conventional Forces in Europe framework should not be replaced by a new security framework that allows for more transparency on numbers and types, on missile defence, allows for sharing of early warning radar data, deals with weaponisation of space issues and promotes a mutual reassessment of the reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Albert F. Zulkharneev, also of the PIR Center, concluded the first panel asking attention for the role of public education on nuclear disarmament. He noted a shortage of new, young experts, a low public awareness, a growing skepticism, and the fact that knowledge about nuclear issues tends to be limited to the capital.

In the second panel, presenters Ambassador Tibor Tóth, Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, Dr. William Potter and Dr. Tariq Rauf—all speaking from their personal perspectives—offered a rich list of suggestions ‘to Russia’ with—they stressed—love.

Love notwithstanding, panelists did not shy away from criticising the lack of progress in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and from pointing out the specific shortcomings of Russia in that respect. Panelists highlighted issues like complacency on the health of the NPT, stale ideas about disarmament, denial of the danger of nuclear terrorism, the refusal to take weapons off hair trigger alert, the lack of imagination in finding new venues and methods to bring down the numbers of warheads and delivery means, the trading of nuclear sensitive material to non-nuclear states, and the acceptance of the US-India deal. It led Austrian Ambassador Kmentt to conclude that there is a huge disconnect between NWS and NNWS that increasingly erodes international treaties and treaty regimes. The credibility of the NPT is at stake.

The ‘ideas for Russia’ offed by the panelists corresponded with the issues raised above. Dealerting, decommissioning, transparency, a ban on space weaponisation, a reassessment of the role of nuclear deterrence and support for the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone came up. Dr. Tariq Rauf ended the session in style with a quote from Albert Einstein, on the foils of mice and men: “Mankind invented the atomic bomb, but no mouse would ever construct a mousetrap.”


Atoms for Peace; Then and Now

Jacqueline Cabasso | Western States Legal Foundation

In connection with the March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, President Barack Obama addressed an audience at Hankuk University. Reprising the rhetoric of his 2009 Prague speech, he stated

American leadership has been essential to progress in... taking concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this is our obligation, and it's one that I take very seriously. But I believe the United States has a unique responsibility to act — indeed, we have a moral obligation. I say this as President of the only nation ever to use nuclear weapons.

However, just as in Prague, Obama went on to reinforce the US commitment to the doctrine of deterrence and all that it implies.

[We] have more nuclear weapons than we need.... I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal.

After sternly warning Iran and North Korea that nuclear weapons aspirations on their parts would not be tolerated, without a trace of irony, Obama declared

For the global response to Iran and North Korea’s intransigence, a new international norm is emerging: Treaties are binding; rules will be enforced; and violations will have consequences. We refuse to consign ourselves to a future where more and more regimes possess the world’s most deadly weapons.

This was the transition to “[A] renewed commitment to harnessing the power of the atom not for war, but for peaceful purposes.” Obama explained,

After the tragedy at Fukushima, it was right and appropriate that nations moved to improve the safety and security of nuclear facilities....

As we do, let’s never forget the astonishing benefits that nuclear technology has brought to our lives. Nuclear technology helps make our food safe. It prevents disease in the developing world. It’s the high-tech medicine that treats cancer and finds new cures. And, of course, it’s the energy — the clean energy that helps cut the carbon pollution that contributes to climate change.... That’s why, in the United States, we’ve restarted our nuclear industry.... We supported the first new nuclear power plant in three decades.”

In a stunning expression of “magical thinking,” President Obama concluded by describing perfectly the inextricable link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and then wishing it away.

We all know the problem: The very process that gives us nuclear energy can also put nations and terrorists within the reach of nuclear weapons. We simply can’t go on accumulating huge amounts of the very material, like separated plutonium, that we’re trying to keep away from terrorists.

And that’s why we’re creating new fuel banks, to help countries realize the energy they seek without increasing the nuclear dangers that we fear.... And today I urge nations to join us in seeking a future where we harness the awesome power of the atom to build and not to destroy.

The eerie similarities to President Eisenhower’s famous “Atoms for Peace” speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953 – nearly 60 years ago – are striking. In that speech, Eisenhower acknowledged the terrible destructive power represented by the growing US nuclear arsenal.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total [explosive] equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of World War II. [Author’s note: There were 1,161 US nuclear weapons in 1953; today there are approximately 8,500 in total.]

Eisenhower warned of the dangers of a looming nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, and that “the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.” Seeking a way out of this conundrum he declared

“My country’s purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well-being.

Calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons, he boldly proposed,

The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here, now, today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage?

continued on next page
Side event report: Implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba
Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War

The International Network of Emerging Nuclear Scientists (INENS) hosted a roundtable discussion on implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba (the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty [NWFZ]). The discussion was chaired by Meena Singelee, Executive Director of INENS. The discussion was based on the outcome of a 2011 INENS conference, co-sponsored by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, entitled “Africa in the Global Nuclear Regime”. The conference report offers recommendations to African states to strengthen their role in the global nuclear regime underscoring the role Africa has to play in the development of the Middle East zone. Entering into force in July 2009, the Pelindaba Treaty has been signed by all African states, with the exception of South Sudan, and ratified by 31 states.

Atnatiwos Zeleke Meshesha, Commissioner of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and Secretary of the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA), offered a presentation on the Treaty’s main elements, the status of AFCONE, and the major milestones of its work. As AFCONE serves as the compliance body of the NWFZ in Africa established in Article 12 of the Pelindaba Treaty, Mr. Meshesha noted that building greater capacity for the body will help ensure better implementation of the Treaty’s provisions and, thus, the sustainability and strengthening of the zone. At the First Conference of States Parties in Addis Ababa in November 2010, states elected 12 members, each for a 3-year membership term, for AFCONE. Mr. Meshesha noted AFCONE’s important role in collating reports, supporting information exchange among states, arranging consultations, and assisting in the settlement of disputes. He also underscored some of the current challenges of the zone—securing necessary financial resources for the operationalization of AFCONE, obtaining ratifications from the remaining 21 states, and participating in the formation of the Middle East zone given the geographic overlap with Northern Africa. He also noted that few resources have been set aside for the Pelindaba Treaty, but, rather, a function of priority setting. Several participants suggested framing the nuclear disarmament issue as a humanitarian one underscoring the humanitarian and development consequences of weapons of mass destruction. Many offered support for the upcoming conference sponsored by Norway on this issue. Moreover, one participant asked the question, how do these regional treaties affect socio-economic development?

Mr. Meshesha encouraged active participation in the Middle East negotiations, while recognizing the inherent sensitivity of the nuclear issue in that particular region. When asked if there were legal difficulties to be anticipated in the negotiations as there is still no clear definition of what constitutes the Middle East, Mr. Stott stated that states that would be part of both treaties would presumably seek a Middle East zone with provisions just as strong as its African counterpart. The legalities of the overlap are still undefined. Other participants highlighted that it is not due to a lack of political commitment by African states to fully implement the Pelindaba Treaty, but, rather, a function of priority setting. Several participants suggested framing the nuclear disarmament issue as a humanitarian one underscoring the humanitarian and development consequences of weapons of mass destruction. Many offered support for the upcoming conference sponsored by Norway on this issue. Moreover, one participant asked the question, how do these regional treaties affect socio-economic development? This question, he explained, is crucial for strengthening implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty given Africa’s most pressing concerns of the moment such as AIDS, poverty, and small arms proliferation.

Atoms for Peace, cont’d

Nuclear weapons and nuclear power are preeminent examples of the irrationality of the whole. Nuclear energy risks destroying society in order to power it; nuclear weapons risk destroying the people to save the State. As global tensions rise over speculation about Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear intentions, apparently we haven’t learned anything. If we are to achieve a world of human and ecological security, we must phase out and move beyond nuclear power, as well as fossil fuels.
### Calendar of side events for Wednesday, 9 May 2012

See [www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org) for a complete listing of events and regular updates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:30</td>
<td>Interfaith prayer vigil</td>
<td>Square outside the VIC</td>
<td>Christian CND UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>8:00–8:50</td>
<td>Abolition Caucus</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00–9:50</td>
<td>Government Briefing for NGOs: United States</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Reaching Critical Will</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00–10:15</td>
<td>Discussion with Amb. Jaakko Laajava and Dr. William Potter on “The 2012 Conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East: Progress and Prospects”</td>
<td>Conference Hall of the PM of Japan Andromeda Tower, Floor 24Donau-City-Straße 61220 Wien (next to VIC)</td>
<td>VCDNP Registration required via email to <a href="mailto:info@vcdnp.org">info@vcdnp.org</a> NGO representatives are encouraged to attend</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00–13:00</td>
<td>Set the pace with character education towards a nuclear free future</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Women’s Federation for World Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>NATO and its NPT obligations</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>IKV Pax Christi</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Nuclear Energy in the Future: Meeting the Need for Training</td>
<td>Hall G</td>
<td>UK Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Background Briefing on the Zangger Committee</td>
<td>CR M3</td>
<td>Zangger Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Tour of the CTBTO Reservation required</td>
<td>Meet: M01 Exhibition Area 2</td>
<td>RSVP to <a href="mailto:pablo.mehlhorn@ctbto.org">pablo.mehlhorn@ctbto.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00–18:00</td>
<td>Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World!</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>Nuclear Abolition Forum</td>
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Available in English, Swedish, Norwegian. Now supplemented with summaries in Russian!