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#### NWS labelled “persistent underachievers” in the NPT yearbook

**Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF**

According to the P5, the step-by-step approach is the “most effective” path to nuclear disarmament. They argue that any initiatives other than those explicitly listed in the 2010 NPT action plan undermine this plan and that a “comprehensive” approach to nuclear disarmament is unrealistic. This assertion, however, is not grounded in fact. The agenda of the incremental approach has existed since the 1960s and its provisions have yet to be fulfilled. Furthermore, the P5 activities to implement the action plan have been extremely underwhelming—yesterday, China said it would report on the P5’s “nuclear definition glossary” ... at the NPT Review Conference in 2015. Thus as several non-nuclear weapon states have argued during this PrepCom, all paths to zero must be supported in good faith.

The P5 consistently reiterate that nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of all states, not just those possessing nuclear weapons. They often demand that non-nuclear weapon states establish the “conditions” for nuclear disarmament—implying that those that do not possess these weapons of terror are somehow preventing their elimination. Yet the P5 also tend to reject disarmament discussions or efforts initiated by non-nuclear weapon states. In response to the draft reporting form developed by NPDI, some of the nuclear weapon states have cautioned against a “one size fits all” approach to transparency. They collectively boycotted the conference in Oslo on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. They have expressed their intention to boycott the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament scheduled to begin its work in Geneva on 14 May.

As the Swiss delegation said, these decisions to not participate in initiatives supported by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapon states does not help improve either transparency or confidence. Not only do these initiatives not undermine the NPT, said Ambassador Laggner of Switzerland, but they actually constitute good faith efforts to fulfill the Treaty’s objectives. Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand asked how it is possible for countries to undermine the NPT when trying to advance nuclear disarmament, given that this is one of the Treaty’s central goals?

The Brazilian ambassador, in an attempt to respond directly to the P5 mantra of incrementalism, argued that the distinction between a comprehensive and step-by-step approach is false. Even if nuclear weapon states agreed today to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention, those negotiations would develop a roadmap to get to zero. He also argued that any assurances against proliferation must be part of those negotiations, not preconditions for them.

As the Irish delegation emphasized, the “persistent underachievement” in nuclear disarmament is no longer acceptable. The discourse focusing on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons has sharpened the opposition to the continued possession of these weapons, while it remains apparent that the risk of their use is as high as ever. Nuclear weapons remain on high alert level, embedded in security doctrines, and, as Ireland said, just because they have not been used for 68 years does not mean they will never be used again.

But the P5 are devoted to their step-by-step process, despite its consistent failure to achieve results. This failure, of course, suits the P5 just fine. They still cling to the belief that nuclear weapons bring security, while incomprehensible indeed to us that we should tolerate, much less seek to justify, the continued retention of such uniquely destructive and dangerous weapons when we know they could, in an instant, change human life as we know it forever,” said Mr. Gerard Keown of Ireland. “Is this the best blueprint for security that we can devise?”

Clearly, the answer must be “no” if we are to have any hope of survival as a species.
The problem with NATO state compliance
Wilbert van der Zeijden | IKV Pax Christi, the Netherlands

“Yes, but we need to take into consideration the complex and diverse views in NATO.” If I got a penny any time a diplomat said this to me at the NPT, I would have earned roughly a pound, this morning alone.

It is bewildering how states—during discussions in the NPT framework—keep using NATO as an excuse for not fulfilling agreements, or for not even having much needed discussions. Article II of the NPT states, “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons.” But the five states hosting US nuclear weapons as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements argue that hosting these weapons, and preparing to drop them by purchasing dual-capable aircraft and training pilots, does not actually violate Article II. When asked about it, delegates will tell you that only consensus among Allies can change this policy and that you need to take into account the complex and diverse views of Allies as a reason to avoid changing these practices.

Of course Russia is no longer regarded an enemy by most European states, but you have to take into account ... so NATO seeks to modernise its nuclear weapons and keep them in Europe just in case. The US is doing everything it can to achieve a further round of deep reductions ... but it has to take into account the needs of NATO allies ... and therefore the US government spends $11 billion on modernising B61 bombs instead of announcing reductions.

What, one wonders, is the special prerogative of NATO, that it can block and obstruct proceedings at a meeting of a Treaty to which it is not party in such a profound and resilient way? The answer is: NATO has no prerogative and that is exactly why this strategy works. Formally, NATO is not a factor in the proceedings of NPT (or the UN General Assembly, for that matter). NATO does not make statements, it does not produce working papers, there are no NATO delegations, and NATO members claim they do not vote as a block. This however, this also means that NATO is not accountable to the NPT and that the behaviour of the Alliance, as a collection of individual members, is not adequately reviewed. It provides a perfect escape clause: NATO states deny their sovereign accountability, pointing at NATO. And NATO cannot be held accountable.

This is all clearly understood. But why do the non-NATO states allow the NATO states to get away with this so easily? Why do they not challenge this escape clause? NPT states parties could write a working paper in which they investigate this issue and propose to do either of the following things:

- NPT states parties, as part of the NPT review process, can investigate compliance issues in relation to the NATO Military Alliance. The Alliance’s obstruction to reducing the numbers of its nuclear weapons in good faith could be reviewed, as well as NATO’s bad practice of deploying nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapon states as a potential violation of Articles I and II. The practice of threatening the use of nuclear weapons on behalf of others—the nuclear umbrella—can then be reviewed too.

- NPT states parties could, as part of the NPT review process, restate the irrelevance of NATO as a factor in debates on national policies and compliance. That is, they could establish that all states parties have voluntarily joined the NPT as sovereign states, will be held accountable as such, and that complexities caused by being part of a military alliance are not acceptable excuses, but need to be dealt with by each state party in such a manner that NPT obligations are met.

More than twenty years after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it is time that the NATO alliance members too, become individually fully accountable.

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Reaching Critical Will
A programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.
Civil society expresses disappointment at Japan’s refusal to endorse joint statement on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

After days of intense deliberations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and despite strong calls from civil society and parliamentarians both at the UN in Geneva and in Tokyo, the Japanese government decided not to endorse the joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons delivered by South Africa on behalf of 77 states.

As the only country that has experienced the devastation by the use of nuclear weapons, Japan has the moral authority and therefore a unique responsibility, to lead—or at least participate—in global efforts to promote a humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament and abolition.

Utterly disappointed by this decision, almost 100 people from 20 countries, including Hibakusha (survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), ICAN campaigners, disarmament activists, students and youth groups, came together and spontaneously organized a peaceful and cheerful march of protest from UN headquarters to the Japanese mission to the Conference on Disarmament. On their way, protesters joyfully booed at the Canadian and Australian missions—two governments that also refused to sign the joint statement.

A small delegation, composed of Mr. Sakuma Kunihiko, a hibakusha from the Hiroshima Association of A-bomb Sufferers (Hiroshima Hidankyo) and Mr. Akira Kawasaki, Co-Chair of ICAN and Committee Member of Peace Boat, met with Minister of the Japanese delegation Yamamoto Hiroyuki, to remind their government of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, hand him some materials including visuals compiled by ICAN and Hibakusha organizations, and asked him to convey to the Japanese government that many around the world urge it to take the lead in promoting nuclear disarmament and abolition.

The debate over Japan’s participation in the joint statement to the Second NPT PrepCom Review Conference has been widely reported in Japanese mass media, including on national television and major newspapers, as well as in the international press.
Roose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance for the United States, and Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Defence Minister for the Russian Federation, spoke to a packed room on the implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on Wednesday.

Ms. Gottemoeller started with an overview of the various tools and arrangements in the Treaty, designed to allow reciprocal verification, data exchanges, cooperation, and confidence-building. On the verification side, this includes on-site inspections of both deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms and delivery systems. The regime is more intrusive than previous agreements in the sense that not only the delivery systems are counted and verified, but also the individual warheads.

The Treaty also provides opportunities to organise ‘exhibitions’ to voluntarily show conversion or dismantlement of delivery systems. The two countries exchange comprehensive sets of data twice a year but updates are done on a daily basis. Also, both countries exchange telemetric data on launches and flights to be better able to understand each others’ capabilities. Issues arising during the implementation are discussed in a Bilateral Consultative Commission that meets twice a year. Ms. Gottemoeller concluded that so-far, the implementation of New START is progressing very smoothly.

Mr. Antonov agreed that the regime is effective, constructive, and leads to tangible results. He added that he believes the regime strengthens global security and that with this Treaty, the US and Russia are living up to their NPT obligations. In his presentation, Mr. Antonov provided an overview of the current force levels.

(per March 1) START Target Russia U.S.
ICBM/SLBM deployed 700 492 792
Warheads 1550 1480 1654
Non-deployed 800 900 1028

Questions from the audience focused largely on the next steps that could come after START. Antonov reiterated the Russian viewpoint that a next round of negotiations on reductions should include China, the UK, and France. Gottemoeler seemed to disagree with this idea, noting that even with reduced numbers, the US and Russia still hold over 90% of all nuclear weapons and that this gives them a special responsibility.

The idea was raised in the audience that perhaps France and the UK could voluntarily join some of the Treaty requirements. Both Gottemoeller and Antonov indicated that while the idea is appreciated, practical implication would be very difficult, as New START is very complex and designed to meet the specific demands and needs of only Russia and the US. The French/British Teutatis cooperation and their unilateral disarmament are regarded as positive steps by Russia and the US.

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Reaching Critical Will has published a new report on nuclear weapon modernization, Still assuring destruction forever.

Non-governmental researchers and analysts, leading and knowledgeable experts about nuclear weapons programmes and policies, provide information on the plans of China (Hui Zhang), France (Hans Kristensen), India (M.V. Ramana), Israel (Merav Datan), Pakistan (Zia Mian), Russia (Pavel Podvig), the United Kingdom (John Ainslie), and the United States (Andrew Lichterman).
Side event report: The Iranian nuclear crisis and steps towards a Middle East WMDFZ
Wilbert van der Zeijden | IKV Pax Christi

The Program on Science and Global Security of Princeton University organised an event on Iran and the Middle East chaired by Dr. Zia Mian of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

Finnish Ambassador Hannu Kyrolainen, Deputy to the Middle East WMD free zone (MEWMDFZ) facilitator, explained how attempts to convene in 2012 a first conference on the establishment of a zone have failed. He assured that postponement of the conference will not lead to a cancelation. Facilitator Laajava is consulting with all states in the region to get all countries to engage in a conference at the earliest possible date. That date, however, does not seem very close. The facilitator is now trying to engage the states parties in multilateral rather than bilateral meetings on this subject, but the first multilateral meeting has yet to take place.

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former negotiator for Iran in EU3+3 talks and currently a visiting scholar at Princeton University, gave an elaborate presentation of the history of Iran’s nuclear programme, current contentious issues, and possible paths to a sustainable solution. Mr. Mousavian reminded the audience that the Iranian nuclear programme was started with support from the US and European powers. In those days, the plan was to build 23 nuclear reactors in Iran. After the 1979 revolution, Western powers withdrew en masse from existing contracts and projects and de facto denied Iran the right to a civilian nuclear programme. This, according to Mr. Musavian, led to Iran’s decision in the 1980s to develop domestic civilian nuclear capabilities. In 2002, Iran accepted an Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Code 3.1, giving access to IAEA inspectors, voluntarily suspending enrichment of uranium for two years, and deciding not to build up excess stockpiles of fissile material. Iran also repeated its commitment to staying within the NPT. From 2005 however, Iran has been faced with sanctions, and more recently with cyber warfare, the killing of nuclear scientists, and political isolation. In 2005, Iran resumed nuclear enrichment, withdrew from the Additional Protocol, expanded the amount of centrifuges from 1200 to 12,000, started to enrich uranium up to 20%, and built underground facilities to protect the programme from outside interference.

There are currently five demands put forward by the E3+3: Iran should ratify the Additional Protocol, implement Subsidiary Code 3.1, allow access to sites beyond NPT requirements, cap enrichment at 5%, and export the current 20% stockpile. Iran demands recognition of its right to enrich uranium and eventually an end to the sanctions. Musavian then went on to sketch several options that Iran has to try in order to end the current crisis. The most talked about option is one in which all demands from all sides are resolved in a step-by-step approach. In step one, the EU would remove unilateral sanctions in return for an end to 20% enrichment and the export of existing 20% stockpile. In step two, Iran would implement the Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Code 3.1, and access arrangements in return for the recognition of its right to domestic enrichment. Step three would remove all sanctions against Iran and Iran would resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA.

Other scenarios sketched out by Musavian included the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. A minority in Iran believes that this would end the threats made against Iran, would secure enrichment rights, force Israel to discuss a MEWMDFZ and make it possible to develop strategic relations with the US. Yet another scenario involved Iran withdrawing from the NPT. The logic here would be that Iran in the past has been confronted with obligations and punishment, but been denied rights and benefits; that the NPT currently is used against it as an instrument for sanctions; and that the NPT has ultimately caused a security threat for the state of Iran. Iran would leave the NPT, but in return it would ‘secularise’ the fatwa against nuclear weapons and adopt national laws forbidding the production or use of all WMD. This would mean the end of Iran’s support for a MEWMDFZ in the Middle East.

The final speaker, Princeton professor Frank von Hippel, laid out a step-by-step approach to make a MEWMDFZ possible in the future. The first hurdle would be for states in the region to strengthen the non-proliferation regime on a regional basis. Layered on top of international arrangements there would have to be additional arrangements for arms control and verification. Positive steps that states should undertake include: a regional ban on plutonium separation and use; ending the use of HEU as a reactor fuel; limiting enrichment to below 6%; no stockpiling of LEU; no expansion of enrichment capacity beyond requirements; and the multinational control of enrichment.

The second big hurdle outlined by Dr. von Hippel would be the gradual nuclear disarmament of Israel. Israel could start by shutting down its plutonium production. Verification would not have to be done on site. Israel could then declare its stockpiles of plutonium and HEU and declare excess stockpiles for disposal through IAEA to be completed when Israel enters into a regional WMDFZ.
Side event report: UK-Norway initiative on verification of nuclear dismantlement

Anina Dalbert | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The United Kingdom and Norway hosted a side event about their cooperation in the research, development, and testing of techniques, tools, and methodologies that could possibly be used in the future for the verification of the dismantlement of nuclear warheads.

This initiative is the first time a non-nuclear weapon state and a nuclear weapon state have investigated what methods and tools could be used for verification. The objective is to build confidence while at the same time ensuring non-proliferation. The initiative will hopefully be used in a future disarmament regime. However, the exercise does not explicitly deal with political questions such as the actual access to declared as well as undeclared locations and materials.

Several experts from six different organizations from both countries are working on the initiative. Their aim is to explore the challenges by using fictional scenarios, and to research, develop, and test tools as well as techniques and methodologies for the future. It is clear that there are many different phases of disarmament and that this is of course only one step. The Norwegian representative stressed several times how this serves as a good example of how non-nuclear weapons states can show their true commitment to disarmament. At the same time such an initiative can make the disarmament process more transparent and verifiable.

Hoping that the principle learning points would be useful for future initiatives, the two experts from Norway and the UK on the panel presented the some problems they encountered. The main obstacle, in their opinion, is that the host party has an obligation to protect both nationally-sensitive and also proliferation-sensitive information. At the same time, the inspecting party has a duty to confirm the information and must therefore be able to trust the results. This is why the inspectors must be able to fully trust the results from equipment controlled by the host. They concluded that the design must be as simple as possible and that both sides must be able to fully understand the scope and functions as well as the limitations and must be able to verify the operation of the tools.

In the near future the two countries are planning to continue to analyze and improve the performance, develop procedures of high confidence deployment, and prepare technical conference papers. The main learning points and the key achievements will be presented in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The questions and the presentation reminded us that verification depends heavily on the political circumstances and that there is still a long way to go. Both the panel and the audience expressed their sincere hope that others will follow this example and initiate similar discussions and projects about other phases of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately this has not been the case so far.

Come and observe

Students negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Monday, 29 April 2013, 10:15 am – 12:30 pm, 3 - 6 pm
Tuesday, 30 April 2013, 10:15 am – 12:30 pm, 3 - 6 pm

at
Geneva, Palais des Nations
Room XI

Chairs:
Delegates to the NPT PRepCom

Participants:
30 German university students

30 German university students simulate the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In four sessions, they will negotiate Article I (Obligations) of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (UN document A/62/650).

Come to observe for an hour or the whole day!
This event featured Vladimir A. Orlov, President of the PIR Centre; Andrey A. Baklitskiy of PIR Centre; Mikhail Ulyanov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation; Ambassador Wael Al-Assad, League of Arab States; Sameh Aboul-Enein, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt; and Thomas Countryman, US State Department.

Vladimir A. Orlov and Andrey A. Baklitskiy presented a PIR Centre white paper, “Ten steps towards a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East”. They explained what role Russia has in this issue, arguing that it is a very active player that tries to achieve a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

Mikhail Ulyanov lauded the white paper from the PIR Centre, saying that it contributes intellectually to the achievement of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. However, he noted that to achieve this goal, all countries of the region must participate in the conference. He also argued that the fact that Israel is hesitating to participate is not helping. He believed that Israel government should join the conference because it would enhance its regional security interests.

Sameh Aboul-Enein highlighted steps he felt are particularly helpful in the paper. He believed the second step regarding a road map towards the gradual placement of all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards is a pertinent point to achieve universality of the NPT. Moreover, he argued the fourth step regarding the formation of a regional mechanism for confidence-building measures is a useful method to move forward. Aboul-Enein thought that even if the white paper is valuable there are some items missing, such as practical and technical dimensions and clear terms of references. In addition he believed it missed a specific time frame and security guarantees.

Thomas Countryman stated that the United States supports the goal of a WMDFZ in the Middle East and highlighted that this project was not factual but based on a matter of opinion. He believed projects like the PIR Centre paper helps to build confidence but pointed out that neither the UN nor NGOs can negotiate this zone, only the countries in the area involved can do that. He argued that it is very difficult for agreement on an agenda for this conference because some countries do not recognise the existence of other countries.

After the presentations, the discussion touched upon many questions about an eventual agenda and Israel’s position on the zone.
Are you failing your attempts to stop using nuclear weapons? Are you doing things under the influence of nuclear weapons that you would not do otherwise? Are you spending your money on nuclear weapons even if you cannot afford it, and are you feeling that you need nuclear weapons to deal with your problems? That means you have a problem.

Based on clinical listings of substance addiction behaviour, this analogy between drug addiction and nuclear weapons possession was introduced by Jonathan Frerichs at the side event “Moral and Ethical Impressive for Nuclear Abolition”. IKV Pax Christi organized the event and Susi Snyder, programme manager for nuclear disarmament, facilitated the discussion. Together with Mr. Frerichs on the panel was Monsignor Silvano Tomasi, apostolic nuncio and permanent observer of the Holy See to the United Nations in Geneva.

Mr. Frerichs, programme executive for peace building and disarmament at the World Council of Churches (WCC), laid out the foundation on which the WCC forms its position on nuclear weapons. WCC categorically reject nuclear weapons, seeing that they “ignore those norms that are essential to living”. The policy is based on a broad rejection of war in favour of strengthening the rule of law, recognising that nuclear weapons destroy the very basis on which law itself exists. Possessing them is bad practice for basic rights as well as for the dignity of others, argued Mr. Frerichs, as these weapons do not respect either the rights or dignity of human beings. Even when not used, he continued, nuclear weapons change the behaviour of their owners—“having nukes is using nukes”. As no possessor that has deployed nuclear weapons has been able to abandon them, turning to behavioural thinking could provide insights on how to stop the using and bring about disarmament through good faith negotiations.

Monsignor Silvano Tomasi also addressed the inconsistency between nuclear weapons and human-centred ethics by drawing on the three essential elements of nuclear deterrence: threat, fear, and mutually assured destruction (MAD). These ideas, he explained, generate a system where the possibility of survival is based on threat and force, and where fear becomes the engine that determines human behaviour. Monsignor Tomasi advocated a shift from an ethics of fear to an ethics of responsibility and trust. While threat and fear will trap individuals and societies, a system built on responsibility and trust “reflects the complexity of interpersonal and inter-state relations”. Nuclear deterrence simply has no place in an ethical system built to reflect human needs and relations.

At the centre of any moral and ethical imperatives for disarmament stands the acknowledgement of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. “This perspective is not going away,” said Susi Snyder as she spoke on the growing recognition of the humanitarian dimension. We need to address “the right or wrong issue,” as one of the panellists put it, which has been blatantly missing from disarmament debates in the multilateral arena.

We can use many perspectives to show why possessing and (thus) using nuclear weapons is wrong. From a moral and humanitarian angle, these weapons generate inhumane ethics and security systems, as well as divert resources from social development. They come with unacceptable risks that we can never prepare for. Are there any viable long-term solutions for the situations in North East Asia and the Middle East, asked Mr. Frerichs, which do not involve radical improvements in the current nuclear disarmament regime? Many of us would argue no. Keeping with his substance addiction analogy, Jonathan Frerichs argued that non-nuclear weapons states need to “plan their intervention” with the nuclear weapon possessors, and make clear what the consequences will be if status quo remains. They can also rest assure that civil society is determined to keep the humanitarian and moral imperative for disarmament at the centre of the debate, until we have built a system of ethics where nuclear weapons simply have no place.

Side event report: Moral and ethical imperatives for nuclear abolition

Sofia Tuvestad | WILPF Sweden
This side event, organized by Peace Depot, featured Wooksik Cheong of Peace Network, Ichiro Yuasa President of Peace Depot, Colin Archer of the International Peace Bureau (IPB), Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute, Alyn Ware of the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Jonathan Frerichs of World Council of Churches, and Takao Takahara of Peace Depot.

Wooksik Cheong explained that the “no need for diplomacy” policy is not working in the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and argued that the United States and the Republic of Korea have ignored the requests by the DPRK for a peace agreement.

Cheong noted that the six-party talks stopped in 2008 and believed that it wasn’t likely that the US and the Republic of Korea would restart this process. In addition, Cheong argued that the sanctions imposed on the DPRK by the US have not been very successful in achieving results and believed that the US should use diplomatic efforts to help the DPRK understand that it would be better to abolish nuclear weapons.

Ichiro Yuasa highlighted that Cold War thinking still exists in these situations, as evidenced by mutual distrust, military tension, and development of nuclear weapons. Yuasa noted that the six-party talks that started in 2003 never managed to achieve its goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Yuasa argued that Japan and the Republic of Korea should propose the Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone (NEA-NWFZ) in order to achieve legally-binding denuclearization and continued by saying that support of the public opinion and of parliamentarians is necessary to achieve results.

Colin Archer analysed the similarities between Europe during the Cold War and the situation in North-East Asia. He gave examples such as the political division, the violent history of national struggles, presence in the region of big powers, militarization, fear of land invasion, propaganda, and economic crisis. He argued that it can be helpful seeing the DPRK economic dimension with the lens of the collapse of the Soviet communism, and noted that it’s not possible to have citizen’s diplomacy because of the lack of civil society within the country.

Peter Hayes argued that the creation of a NEA-NWFZ would be helpful for the US, China, and the DPRK. He argued that the US has vital interests in the region and it should be a priority to maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia and to reduce regional insecurities. Hayes argued that such zone would also be useful for China, in order to consolidate its influence in Asia. Hayes believed that such a zone would allow for better relations with other states and influence multilateral reforms. As a result, the DPRK would be guaranteed that it will not be attacked if a part of a NWFZ.

Due to lack of time, the remainder of the panel only made brief remarks. Jonathan Frerichs and Takao Takahara discussed what concrete steps can be done in order to achieve the NEA-NWFZ. They believed that civil society mobilization could get governments to resume the six-party talks and suggested a global day of action this summer. Alyn Ware reflected on the role of parliamentarians in the creation of an NEW-NWFZ.
News in Brief
Mia Gandenberger, Gabriella Irsten, and Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Disarmament

• Algeria, Austria, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, ROK, South Africa, and Switzerland criticized the slow pace of nuclear disarmament.

• NAM, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, and South Africa called for removal or reduction of nuclear weapons from security doctrines.

• Ireland, New Zealand, and Switzerland called for reduced alert levels for nuclear weapon systems.

• Switzerland highlighted its working paper on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament.

• Norway said FMCT will only achieve its full potential if it includes existing stocks.

• Australia, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland welcomed the OEWG and/or emphasized it does not undermine the NPT.

• China believes that “parallel fora” on nuclear disarmament are reverting limited resources.

• Australia, Finland, and Iran called for reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

• USA said NATO will consider non-strategic weapon reductions in step with Russia.

• Russia reiterated its call for other NWS to transfer their tactical nuclear weapons to their own territories, as Russia has done.

• China said it will present the P5 glossary of definitions in 2015.

• China, Japan, Russia, and USA said step-by-step approach is the most effective means to achieve disarmament.

• Russia said a timeframe for nuclear disarmament would be counterproductive.

• Brazil argued that distinction between incremental and comprehensive approach is a false dichotomy as both will require a roadmap.

Modernization

• NAM, Algeria, Iran, ROK, South Africa, Switzerland, and Syria criticized modernization programmes.

• Australia called for cessation of development and production of new nuclear weapons.

• South Africa noted that the public funds directed to maintenance of nuclear weapons is roughly double the assistance provided to Africa.

Humanitarian consequences

• Austria, Chile, Finland, Iran, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, ROK, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand echoed the South African statements made on behalf of 77 members yesterday on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

• Norway is pleased the joint statement drew a broad and cross-regional backing.

• Australia, Canada, and Japan, not signatories to the South African statement, also acknowledged the humanitarian consequences.

• Japan explained that it “carefully considered” the joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons but decided not to join, they may join in the future.

• Australia acknowledged the joint statement.

• Australia, Austria, Chile, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland welcomed Oslo and Mexico meetings.

• Austria, New Zealand, South Africa, and Switzerland emphasized these meetings don’t undermine the NPT.

• Russia and China explained that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are unacceptable but warned against focusing “too much” on this issue.

• Austria and South Africa replied saying that the humanitarian consequent discourse is in no way a distraction from implementing the NPT since the motivation behind the NPT and nuclear disarmament is the humanitarian imperative.

• Switzerland said boycotting these meetings doesn’t help improve transparency and confidence.

• Ireland said implementation of action 5 would help address humanitarian concerns.

Transparency

• Australia, Canada, and Japan highlighted the NPDI draft reporting form developed for NWS.

• Iran, Ireland, and New Zealand called on NWS to adopt standard reporting form.

Middle East WMD free zone

• China, Norway, Slovakia, and Turkey lamented that the conference on the MEWMDFZ was not held in 2012 and called for it to be held as soon as possible.

continued on next page
Non-proliferation

- Austria expressed that as the nuclear technological threshold is getting lower and thereof more accessible for states and non-state actors, a focus on non-proliferation alone is “doomed to fail”. Therefore nuclear disarmament needs to be done with “much greater sense of urgency”.
- Argentina, Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Slovakia, and Spain issued support for the GGE on FMCT.
- Canada urged states to submit their views to the UNSG report by 15 May.
- Spain highlighted working paper with Canada on FMCT (WP.13), which covers issues of the treaty’s duration, entry into force, and withdrawal.

Negative security assurances

- NAM, Algeria, Argentina, China, Chile, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Syria, and Turkey called for legally-binding NSAs. Most also encouraged NWS to ratify relevant protocols of NWFZs.
- Argentina called on NWS to revise interpretative declaration on the Treaty of Tlateloco.
- South Africa said NSAs should be given to states parties to the NPT that have forgone the nuclear weapon option.
- USA reiterated that it gives NSAs to NNWS in compliance with non-proliferation obligations; for those not eligible, US will only consider use in “extreme circumstances”.

Civil society

- Austria, Chile, Norway, and Switzerland acknowledged the contribution from civil society in providing information regarding the implementation of the NPT action plan; unfortunately, they all show that the implementation on nuclear disarmament is unsatisfactory.
- Japan on behalf of 32 states underlined the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education for empowering civil society and governments.

Available in English, Swedish, Norwegian. Now supplemented with summaries in Russian!

Learn About Nuclear Weapons is a comprehensive online education tool that provides easily accessible facts on nukes, suitable for users of all levels of expertise. It is frequently used by teachers as an aid for education in disarmament and peace.

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**CALENDAR OF EVENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:45</td>
<td>Interfaith prayer vigil</td>
<td>Pregny Gate</td>
<td>Christian CND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:00-8:50</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00-9:50</td>
<td>Government briefing for civil society: Chair of the NPT PrepCom</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Reaching Critical Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Plenary: Cluster two</td>
<td>Assembly Hall</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>A time for boldness</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Depleted uranium and ecological consequences</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>IALANA and ICBUW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Beyond verification, definitions, and scope: other issues to be addressed in an FMCT</td>
<td>Assembly Hall</td>
<td>UNIDIR and Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Plenary: Cluster two (if necessary)</td>
<td>Assembly Hall</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00-17:50</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons and human survival</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Human Survival Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>18:00-19:00</td>
<td>Preparing for simulated negotiations of a nuclear-weapons convention</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Regina Hagen</td>
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