EDITORIAL: BURdens OR RESPONSIBILITIES?
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

It is perhaps quite fitting that on Thursday, the continuation of the disarmament discussion was postponed until Friday so that states parties could first address non-proliferation. As Brazil and Ireland highlighted, there is a stark contrast between implementation of the provisions on these two “pillars” of the NPT, despite their inextricable link. This state of affairs underscores the need for non-nuclear-armed states to take the lead to make credible, concrete efforts to fulfill article VI and achieve nuclear disarmament.

As pointed out in yesterday’s editorial, the nuclear-armed states have no shortage of excuses for their failure to implement their disarmament obligations. In its report released on Thursday, Russia argued that “conflict potential” has prevented “consistent steps” in disarmament. It also included its usual shopping list of preconditions it considers “critical” for nuclear disarmament. The Russian government has also structurally diminished its commitment to disarmament, abolishing its Department for Security and Disarmament and replacing it with the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This change, made on 3 April 2014, is due to the government’s perception that “disarmament in the ‘classical’ sense is in many ways becoming a thing of the past.”

Other nuclear-armed states continue to focus exclusively on proliferation risks as their motivation for maintaining nuclear weapons. Ambassador Simon-Michel of France, for example, argued that proliferation crises threaten disarmament and that the “fight against proliferation” is central to collective security.

Most other states parties might argue that disarmament is equally central to collective security—and more importantly, that disarmament is central to preventing proliferation. Brazil’s Ambassador Motta Pinto Coelho described disarmament as the “best antidote” to proliferation, while Mr. O’Reilly of Ireland argued that failure to act on disarmament undermines the NPT’s non-proliferation achievements. States parties “need to move both processes forward urgently, if we are to succeed in lessening the ever-present and increasingly known risks to life on this planet represented by nuclear weapons.”

In his report to the PrepCom on his work to facilitate preparations for a conference on the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, Ambassador Laajava of Finland noted that sometimes, small steps are the only way forward. Slow progress and setbacks are disappointing, he said, but states need to focus on the way ahead.

Ways ahead are firmly on the table. Whether it is the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the 13 practical steps, or the 2010 outcome document, NPT states parties have no shortage of roadmaps for how to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. The key challenge is the lack of implementation of these agreed plans of action.

The burden of implementation, argued the Brazilian delegation, continues to fall exclusively on the non-nuclear-armed states. Given this situation, it would seem like the time is ripe for these states to take matters into their own hands and seek new and innovative ways to implement the whole treaty. For decades they have been told that nuclear weapons are the domain of those who possess them. This situation has proven untenable. Since non-nuclear-armed states are already shouldering the burden, they might as well take it upon themselves to ban nuclear weapons. Negotiating a framework treaty to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, even without the participation of the nuclear-armed states, will represent a good faith effort to implement article VI and subsequent commitments under the Treaty.
NEWS IN BRIEF

Gabriella Irsten and Mia Gandenberger | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Cluster two

Disarmament

- NAM called for establishment of an IAEA standing committee to verify nuclear disarmament.
- Egypt also emphasised that non-nuclear weapons states that host nuclear weapons and are under the nuclear umbrella violate article 1 and 2 and contributed to the lack of credibility of the NPT.
- Egypt said that NPT obligations are being implemented in an unbalanced manner.
- Brazil said that it is unacceptable that the burden of implementation of the NPT continue to fall exclusively on the non-nuclear weapon states.
- Switzerland called on the NWS to fulfill their obligations and engage in a constructive way on these issues.
- China recalled its policy of not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.

Reports

- Australia has submitted its report on its activities for implementing the Action Plan.
- Austria has submitted an update to its national report from last year.

Nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs)

- Thailand and Malaysia called on nuclear-armed states to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asian NWFZ.
- EU, New Zealand, Thailand, UK, Ireland, Philippines, China, and Australia regretted that the conference on a MEWMDFZ has yet to take place.
- NAM said the resolution on a MEWMDFZ is valid until it comes to the force.
- Egypt stated that they believe the conference on the MEWMDFZ should be held during 2014.

Proliferation concerns

- EU, New Zealand, UK, Switzerland, US, Argentina, Ireland, and Austria said they look forward to substantive progress on resolving outstanding issues with Iran and welcomed the recent agreement.
- New Zealand, France, EU, UK, Argentina, Republic of Korea, and Australia expressed concerns with DPRK’s nuclear programme.

IAEA safeguards

- EU and the US referred to the CSA and AP as the standard verification norm.
- NAM, Cuba, Egypt, Brazil emphasized the voluntary nature of the AP.
- Russia expressed support for the universalization of AP although they accept that it is still a voluntary measure.
- New Zealand stated that AP should always feature as a requirement for new supply arrangements and should be a prerequisite for supply of nuclear material and technologies.
- Egypt is unhappy with the efforts towards universalize Additional Protocol, while some states don’t even have comprehensive safeguards.
- US welcomed the IAEA verification of US down blended fissile material that has been taken out of their military programs.
- South Africa thought it disappointing that no progress has been made on the declaration of fissile material no longer used for military purposes.

Export controls

- NAM emphasised that all supply arrangements for nuclear technology and material must in accordance with the treaty.

NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

2 MAY 2014 | Vol. 12, No. 5

Reaching Critical Will
a programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

777 UN Plaza, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10017
ph. +1 212.682.1265
email: info@reachingcriticalwill.org
web: www.reachingcriticalwill.org

Editor: Ray Acheson

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.
Japan said it will continue to assist other states in their efforts to strengthen export control systems including through the Asian Export Control Seminar held annually in Japan since 1993.

France raised concerns about the trafficking in sensitive technology and the need to have universal controls over the most sensitive technology and material.

Australia highlighted the crucial role of export controls, and stressed that safeguards are a prerequisite for the authorization of Australian uranium exports.

Other:

- NAM called for verification arrangements for fissile materials removed from military programmes.
- France and US said that withdrawal from the NPT is a right under the NPT but must not be misused.

Cluster two specific issue: MEWMDFZ

- The facilitator reported that he has held three informal meetings in Glion with the states of the region, where they addressed issues such as the agenda, modalities, and rules of procedure.
- The facilitator highlighted the willingness to engage by the states of the region.
- The majority of speakers regretted that the conference on the establishment of the MEWMDFZ was postponed.
- Arab states decided not to deliver national statements under this section, to express their dissatisfaction at the postponing of the Helsinki Conference.
- Russia said Iran and Syria should be included in the next consultation in Geneva. They both recalled their readiness to participate in the conference.
- Canada thought it could be counterproductive for future establishment of the MEWMDFZ if the conference would be a forum to single out one state.

Nuclear weapon states usually point to their reductions in nuclear weapon arsenals as evidence of their compliance with article VI. However, while the total number of nuclear weapons has been reduced since the cold war, the amount of spending on nuclear arsenals has increased significantly. This panel explored the implications of the modernization of US nuclear weapons for the NPT.

Jay Coghlan of Nuclear Watch New Mexico encouraged the audience to follow the money, pointing to the $355 billion that the Congressional Budget Office has estimated will be spent on revamping nuclear weapons programmes during the next 10 years. At the same time the Office indicated that at least $1 trillion will be spent over the next 30 years on nuclear weapons. This is an all time record, surpassing the record that President Reagan set in 1985 during the height of the cold war.

According to Coghlan, this cuts through the NPT rhetoric and explains what’s really happening with the Treaty. Marylia Kelley of Tri-Valley CAREs agreed, arguing that it is country’s budgets that are in fact policies in action. Pointing to the reason behind the accelerating nuclear weapons-maintaining budgets in the US, Kelley points to the nuclear weapon-labs, calling them, and especially the directors of the labs, the tail that wags the dog. The labs have a lot of clout with politicians who put their faith in nuclear weapons, enabling the lab-directors to keep their facilities going by compelling increased spending on new and modified weapons designs.

Following disagreement from a State Department audience member, it was made clear that there is an ongoing debate of what constitutes building a new weapon or endowing an existing weapon with new capabilities, something then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared four years ago would not be done by this administration. However, modifications are being made to US nuclear weapons. The US is actively building major facilities for all three components of the nuclear bomb: the plutonium component, the highly enriched uranium component, and the non-nuclear components.
Conference Room C

NPT PrepCom 2014

Monday, May 5

1:15-3:00 pm: Arctic—an essential Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, Room C

Chair: Erika Simpson, Professor at Western University and Past Vice-Chair, Canadian Pugwash

Speakers:
- Dennis Bevington, Canadian Member of Parliament, Western Arctic
- Adele Buckley, past Chair, Canadian Pugwash; Council member, Pugwash Conferences
- Randy Rydell, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Office of Angela Kane, High Representative for UN Disarmament
- Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

Wednesday, May 7

3:00-5:15 NATO and the NPT: Implications of alliance membership for the NPT

Chair: Erika Simpson, Professor at Western University and Past Vice-Chair, CPG

Speakers:
- Paul Meyer, Ambassador (retired), Senior Fellow in Space Security and Nuclear Disarmament, The Simons Foundation, Fellow in International Security, Centre for Dialogue (SFU)
- Douglas Roche, Ambassador (retired), author, parliamentarian, diplomat, founder and Chairman Emeritus of the Middle Powers Initiative
- Rick Wayman, Director of Programs & Operations, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
- Wilbert van der Zeijden, Nuclear Disarmament team, IKV Pax Christi, the Netherlands

Thursday, May 8

3:00-5:15 New Ideas and Initiatives, Room C

Chair: Erika Simpson, Professor at Western University and Past Vice-Chair, Canadian Pugwash

Speakers:
- Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute in New York City and Philadelphia
- Erika Simpson, Professor at Western University and Past Vice-Chair, Canadian Pugwash
- Michael Simpson, Executive Director at One Sky and Co-Director, Integral Development Team
Some allies of nuclear-armed states have argued that "simply banning nuclear weapons will not guarantee their elimination". Underlying this argument is a commitment to maintaining the status of nuclear weapons. These states have called for recognition of the "security" dimension of nuclear weapons alongside humanitarian concerns, even though the risk of catastrophic nuclear violence is intrinsic to the practice of nuclear "deterrence" and the existence of the weapons.

Banning nuclear weapons is a pragmatic way to confront this risk and to make progress in an area that has been deadlocked for decades and where belief in disarmament is in danger of withering away.

The step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament has proven ineffective. Continued insistence on this approach becomes problematic when it prevents progress, especially when lack of agreement on one step is used as pretext for no progress at all and when it seeks to legitimise the continued possession of nuclear weapons in the meantime.

A regulation of nuclear weapons based only on the prohibition of use could entrench the legitimacy of indefinite possession and further remove political pressure for disarmament. It would not bring international law on nuclear weapons into line with that on the other weapons of mass destruction in the same way that a comprehensive ban treaty would.

A treaty framework to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons could provide for disarmament within agreed timeframes for those states with nuclear weapons that join or that negotiate other agreements consistent with the treaty. In this way it is not inconsistent with a nuclear weapons convention, which is seen as a treaty negotiated by the nuclear-armed states providing for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. The key difference is that negotiation of the nuclear weapons convention as currently conceived places the onus on the nuclear-armed states to lead the process, in which they have indicated no interest.

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<th>When</th>
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<tr>
<td>8:00-8:50</td>
<td>Abolition Caucus</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
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<td>9:00-9:50</td>
<td>Government briefing for NGOs: United Kingdom</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Reaching Critical Will</td>
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<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Trusteeship Council Chamber</td>
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<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>The future of the B-61: Perspectives from the U.S. and Europe</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</td>
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<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Effective measures for nuclear disarmament</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Reaching Critical Will and Article 36</td>
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<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education</td>
<td>Room B Conference Building</td>
<td>Austria, NAPF, CNS, SGI, Peace Boat, Hibakusha Stories, IPPNW Costa Rica</td>
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<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>US-UK: Technical challenges in verifying nuclear disarmament</td>
<td>Room 5 North Lawn Building</td>
<td>US Department of State</td>
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<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Trusteeship Council Chamber</td>
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<td>15:00-17:50</td>
<td>WMD free zone in the Middle East: where is it heading?</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs</td>
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NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

NPDl: NOT PARTAKING IN DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES?
Susi Snyder | PAX

The NPDl states—Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates—met in Hiroshima in April 2014 for their eighth Ministerial Meeting. They produced a lengthy outcome document, with 29 arduously negotiated paragraphs. The outcome document builds on previous NPDl ministerial statements, but still seems to forget the national responsibilities leading towards nuclear disarmament of some of these countries.

Although the previous NPDl ministerial statement encouraged all states to participate in the Nayarit conference on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, this time around NPDl members seem to be quite hesitant. It is clear that the NPDl fought hard for compromise language to agree “it is in the interest of all nations that the nearly 69 year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.” They also appeared unable to do more than “take note” of Austria’s offer to host a third conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It is encouraging, however, that a number of NPDl members have already publicly committed to attending the Vienna meeting, although whether they will present ideas for overcoming the global disarmament deadlock before or during that session is unknown.

There are still seven NPDl members who currently rely on nuclear weapons in their security strategies. As NATO members, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey share in the alliance agreement to keep nuclear weapons as long as nuclear weapons exist. This calls into question their stated “commitment to achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons,” especially since one of the most emphatic elements of NPDl efforts has been to call for the reduced role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, as agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

These countries should demonstrate leadership by fulfilling their 2010 NPT Action Plan commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies. They could take this kind of positive step by issuing national declarations that their security arrangements do not include a nuclear retaliation option. They could also publicly recognise that retaliation with nuclear weapons would cause immediate casualties in the thousands (or millions) and that it has the potential to cause environmental destruction leading to global famine. NPDl members must clearly state that it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances.

Germany’s report to this NPT (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/2) includes mention of Action 1 (not to do anything that contravenes the Treaty), yet does not note the role Germany plays as a host nation to US nuclear weapons, does not reflect the German efforts since 2010 to have those weapons removed, nor does it include any forward looking plans towards ending the questionable practice of nuclear sharing in this regard.

As the NPDl members have made the issue of reporting on the Action Plan one of their significant themes, it will be interesting to see how they assess the reports that the nuclear-armed states will be making at the NPT PrepCom. It will also be quite interesting to see how the nuclear-armed countries report on their modernisation plans or if they simply exclude that information. Ending the nuclear arms race includes ending efforts to make existing nuclear arsenals more usable—but the NPDl doesn’t seem to include this in its calls for further disarmament action by the nuclear-armed countries.

It is an unusual time for the NPDl overall. Now is the moment that the group may be thinking about what next, after the 2015 Review Conference. One option is for the NPDl states to move closer to the middle ground. That middle ground has changed significantly. This was seen clearly during the Nayarit Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. During the final plenary session, over 70 states took the floor. Of those, only five or so raised concerns with any new approaches to address the longstanding deadlock on multilateral nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming majority called for action, and a significant percentage called for negotiations on a new legal instrument. The average response, mathematically, is to call for the start of negotiations on a new legal instrument. In doing this, the NPDl has the opportunity to participate thoroughly in the global rejection of nuclear weapons, and engage with the nuclear-armed states as the bridge-builder it aspires to be. •
NUCLEAR CROSSWORD

Across
5 The CD, then known as ENCD, started out with this number of members in 1962
7 On 26 September 2013, which nation became the 161st to ratify the CTBT?
8 Finish the telegram from Einstein: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled…”
9 The dangerous dust that falls to the ground after a nuclear explosion
11 David Krieger, NAPF President, defined what as the “ability to destroy humanity and other complex lifeforms”?
12 Which Defense Secretary said nuclear weapons are “not inherently evil”? (last name)

Down
1 The two last names of the chair of the Second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons, held in Nayarit. He is also the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.
2 Marie Skodowska-Curie died from aplastic anemia, contracted from her long-term exposure to what?
3 A unit for measuring the power of a nuclear explosion, equal to the power of the explosion of one million tons of TNT
4 At the 2010 Review Conference, how many points did the States parties adopt to the action plan on moving forward?
6 In which city was the atom split off for the first time?
10 As of 22 November 2013, how many NPT non-nuclear-weapon States parties have not yet brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement?

Facing the Dangers of 21st Century Great Power War
A Conference on the Centenary of World War I
Saturday, May 3, 2014, 9 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

Assembly Hall, Judson Memorial Church
229 Thompson St., Manhattan
(South of Washington Square Park)

This conference will provide an opportunity for reflection and discussion on the world wars of the last century, and about the risks of great power war today. The conference will bring together activists and academics with knowledge and experience relevant to emerging dangers in key regions, from wars, resource conflicts and profound ongoing political realignments in the Middle East, to growing tensions in the Western Pacific over territory and resources, as well as the U.S. strategic “pivot” to Asia. Speakers will address the risks of great power war, the implication of those dangers for peace and disarmament efforts, and the kinds of movements we will need to build to forge a path to a more peaceful world. (Both NGOs and diplomats welcome).


For registration and program information, see http://wslfweb.org/whatsnew.htm
Next Steps in Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks for Nuclear Disarmament

Opening Remarks: Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast
Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament

Speakers: Zia Mian
IPFM and Princeton University

Alexander Glaser
IPFM and Princeton University

Closing Remarks: Ambassador Toshio Sano
Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament

Monday, May 5, 2014, 1:15-2:30 p.m.
Conference Room 7, United Nations, New York
REPORT: STATE OF PLAY

Gunnar Westberg | IPPNW Sweden and WILPF

The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs invited a group of experts to evaluate the progress—or lack of progress—on article VI, the provision obligating nuclear disarmament. Ambassador Benno Lagnér from Switzerland opened by highlighting that four years have gone since the last Review Conference, and asked, with one year to go, where do we stand?

Beatrice Fihn of Reaching Critical Will noted that 22 points in the Action Plan of 2010 referred to disarmament, and of these, only five received the green light indicating implementation. Six got a yellow light, indicating limited success, while there were eleven red signals, indicating no progress. It is clear that the nuclear-armed states will continue to rely on their nuclear weapons. Ms. Fihn warned that a treaty cannot sustain contradictions of this type forever, and warned about sacrificing progress for the sake of consensus. At the same time, positive signals originate from new initiatives. The Oslo and Nayarit conferences and the emphasis on the humanitarian consequences introduce both a new theme and a badly needed urgency into the NPT.

Gaukhar Mukharzhanova from the Center for Non-proliferation Studies discussed a 2014 Monitoring Report with an extensive analysis of the 22 points relating to disarmament. These indicate a mixed picture. Even where there is progress, such as in the increase in transparency from the US, there are steps backwards. The small reductions in nuclear arsenals are off-set by transparency from the US, there are steps backwards. The small reductions in nuclear arsenals are off-set by continued modernization programmes.

The five NPT nuclear-armed states have held meetings since 2009. Andrea Berger from the Royal Services Institute reported that there has been some progress in producing a “glossary” to use in the analysis of the NPT. She also argued that some non-quantifiable values had been achieved, such as increasing confidence between the parties.

James Acton from the Carnegie Institute argued that nuclear disarmament is connected to a wide range of issues, including conventional weapons. He said he was a professional pessimist, arguing that nuclear disarmament will impossible as long as states feel the risk of invasion. In response, Ms. Mukharzhanova pointed out that nuclear weapons only make such situations even more unstable.

The discussion centered around the credibility of and trust in the NPT and how different processes can be complementary.

REPORT: UK-NORWAY INITIATIVE

Josefin Lind | IPPNW Sweden

This seminar discussed the United Kingdom/Norway Initiative, which examines how a non-nuclear weapon state can verify a disarmament process in a nuclear-armed state. It builds upon exercises that started in 2008. Follow-up exercises since then have focused on how trust and confidence correlate and if one can exist without the other.

The all-male panel consisted of Ambassador Sten-Arne Rosnes from Norway, Ambassador Matthew Rowland from the UK, Keir Allen and Matthew Moran from King’s College in London, and Ole Reistad from the Institute for Energy Technology and University of Oslo. While Ambassador Rowland chaired the discussions, Ambassador Rosnes made opening and closing remarks that highlighted the success of the project and the potential expansion to include more states. Ambassador Rosnes said that an overview of complete results will soon be compiled.

Mr. Allen briefly went through the results from past exercises, which look into the process of dissembling of nuclear warheads. The project learned that highly sensitive areas led to security concerns, but while 100% proof or confidence was not achievable there could be a “high level of confidence”. In the extended project, a set of key research questions was set up, such as what does confidence mean and do human factors affect confidence and what impact could it have? This research is carried out by King’s College and will be concluding 2017.

Mr. Moran conveyed that it’s difficult to study the human factor since trust and confidence are developed intuitively and fluidly. The study was designed to isolate human factors through a variety of methods. He noted that preliminary findings shows that confidence levels tend to fluctuate due to level of facility access, direct observation of facilities, and consistency of information provided. Human factors that influence the process are attitudes of the host team and most importantly the speed and manner in which information was provided.

Mr. Reistad highlighted the potential for this project to develop education and outreach, training for technical and policy personnel, and a possibility for more engagement with other institutions. The long-term benefits from the exercises so far have shown a better understanding of interactions between trust and confidence and an understanding on how trust affects an overall verification process. Mr. Reistad as well as other speakers strongly encouraged others to take part, both experts and governments.
One of the fundamental questions surrounding the NPT is the difference between “peaceful” and “non-peaceful” development of nuclear programmes. On Thursday, the relationship between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons was explored through the lenses of personal stories, legal framework, history, and national politics.

The panel consisted of Jackie Cabasso, Western Legal States Foundation; Hiroshi Taka, Gensuikyo; Peter Becker, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA); and was chaired by Reiner Braun, Executive Director of IALANA.

Ms. Cabasso gave an overview on “confronting the two-headed dragon”—nuclear energy and nuclear weapons—arguing that each exists as a result of the other. Throughout every step of the nuclear chain, Ms. Cabasso noted, there are serious environmental and health effects. Furthermore, it is indistinguishable whether the process will result in energy or weapons. She noted that a major impediment to the argument against nuclear energy exists in article IV of the NPT, which grants an “inalienable right” to states parties to develop, produce, and use nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes”.

Mr. Taka delivered a powerful personal narrative against the use of nuclear energy. Highlighting the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, Mr. Taka described the consequences on land, health, and quality of life. In addition, he noted that the Japanese population became increasingly opposed to nuclear energy after this experience. The story of Fukushima is not new—we only need to look to nuclear power plant failures in the former Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, and more. Therefore, it is our collective responsibility to avoid future accidents through creating a means to encourage alternative energy development.

Mr. Becker outlined how to reduce nuclear energy nationally, using Germany as an example. Through three mainstays—public opposition, political will, and the passage of renewable energy laws—Germany has turned to alternative energy sources. Mr. Becker also pointed out the high feasibility of Germany’s path for other countries, and its necessity for a safe, nuclear weapon free world.

Although most of the discussion focused on the nuclear energy policies of the United States, Japan, and Germany, some questions were posed regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy, regional conflicts, and nuclear medicine. It was agreed upon that the development of nuclear energy, whether for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes, poses a great risk for humanity, and should be addressed further by countries.

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**Students negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention**

Monday, 5 May 2014,
10 am – 1 pm, 3 pm – 6 pm
in Room C, UN Conference Building

Tuesday, 6 May 2014,
10 am – 12:30 pm, 3 – 6 pm
in Conference Room E, UN North Lawn Building

30 German university students simulate the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In four sessions, they will negotiate Article I (Obligations) of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (UN document A/62/650).

**Chairs:**

*Delegates to the NPT PrepCom*

**Participants:**

*30 German university students*

Come to observe for an hour or the whole day!

Contact: Regina Hagen, Technische Universität Darmstadt
kontakt@reginahagen.de; mobile 1-617-335-8700
Arctic—an essential Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Monday, May 5, 1:15- 3:00 pm, Room C

Chair

Erika Simpson, Professor at Western University and Past Vice-Chair, Canadian Pugwash

Speakers

Dennis Bevington, Canadian Member of Parliament, Western Arctic

Adele Buckley, Past Chair, Canadian Pugwash;
    Council member, Pugwash Conferences

Randy Rydell, Senior Political Affairs Officer,
    Office of Angela Kane, High Representative for UN Disarmament

Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator,
    Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Effective measures for nuclear disarmament
Friday, 2 May, 13:15-14:45 Room C

Speakers:
Michael Hurley, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland
Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Tim Caughley, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Moderated by Thomas Nash, Article 36

Article VI of the NPT obligates all states parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. This event explores potential measures and related issues.

A light lunch will be served