EDITORIAL: DOGMA 95
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The cracks in the NPT edifice are widening. The divide is not just over how best to achieve nuclear disarmament. It is about whether nuclear disarmament can or will be achieved at all. On the one side, nuclear-armed states and some of their allies cling dogmatically to self-serving concepts of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. On the other side, mounting resentment from non-nuclear-armed states is fuelling consideration of innovative ways forward—in particular through a new treaty providing the framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Reports and statements by the nuclear-armed states’ during this PrepCom indicate a retreat from previous commitments and an entrenchment of possession. These states do not see nuclear weapons as inherently unacceptable, as UK Ambassador Rowland said openly. He argued that nuclear weapons “have helped to guarantee our security, and that of all allies, for decades.” Furthermore Ambassador Simon-Michel of France made it clear that the nuclear-armed states do not perceive the continued possession of nuclear weapons as a violation of their obligations. “Since it may only be used in extreme circumstances of self-defence,” he declared, “the French deterrent does not violate international law in any way.”

But article VI is clear. It is not about what a state may or may not do with their nuclear weapons. It is about possession. Its clear, unambiguous objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

As Mr. O’Reilly of Ireland pointed out, it is illogical to claim that nuclear weapons are legitimate tools of security for some states but not for others. Either the NPT is “a blueprint for wholesale weaponisation” or for achieving a nuclear weapons free world. And while some states call for a balance between the humanitarian impact and the “security dimensions” of nuclear weapons, only the elimination of nuclear weapons appropriately addresses both concerns. Nuclear disarmament is the only way to preserve the security of all over the security of a handful of states seeking to retain a position in which they threaten the rest of the world with total destruction.

Yet over four decades after the NPT entered into force, elimination is still perceived as a distant goal.

Austria, Brazil, Egypt, and Ireland, among others, critiqued the stark lack of progress reflected in the reports from the nuclear-armed states. Austria’s Ambassador Kmentt noted that the reports failed even to offer a perspective on how to facilitate negotiations on nuclear disarmament as mandated by article VI and the ICJ opinion. These countries expressed concern that no concrete work has been taken to achieve elimination.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with some of their allies such as Canada and the Netherlands, stressed the continued relevance of the step-by-step process and said there are no “quick fixes” for achieving nuclear disarmament. Those critiquing the current situation, though, are not looking for a quick fix. As Brazil and Egypt noted, nuclear disarmament should have been achieved within 25 years. Yet nearly 45 years after the NPT entered into force, said Ambassador Motta Pinto Coelho, “we are dealing with a world infested by some 17,000 nuclear weapons.”

Vocal dissatisfaction with this lack of progress is nothing new. This PrepCom, however, has painted a more worrying picture than previously. The failure to comply even with the simple commitments of action 5 of the 2010 NPT action plan, coupled with aggressive modernization programmes and a dismissive approach to the initiatives of other states, signals an intention to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely.

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This is provoking a new determination among many non-nuclear-armed states. They recognize that what article VI lacks is not a clear objective, but a mechanism to make it happen. This is why the demand for a new legally-binding instrument is growing.

Opinions may yet vary on the exact nature of this instrument, but discussions at this PrepCom suggest that most states believe the most effective measure for nuclear disarmament is a new treaty—not to replace the NPT, but to help implement it. The idea of a treaty framework for prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons has provided a feasible approach around which states should be able to coalesce.

“The time has come for a new diplomatic process to negotiate a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons—even if the nuclear-armed states are unwilling to join such a process,” declared Ambassador Otto of Palau. Such an agreement, he argued, would devalue and stigmatize nuclear weapons, put them on the same footing as chemical and biological weapons, and help achieve their elimination.

The nuclear-armed states, for their part, treat this position as impractical. Ambassador Simon-Michel described it as “dogmatic,” arguing that recent initiatives undermine the NPT review process, disregard the “real strategic context,” and “turn away from concrete measures.”

In reality, of course, it is the nuclear-armed states’ insistence on preserving their nuclear arsenals and justifying this on the basis of theories of “deterrence” and “strategic stability” that is dogmatic. They discuss these concepts as if they were facts and refuse to acknowledge the true implications of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. They assert their full compliance with article VI despite having never engaged in negotiations for nuclear disarmament and while continuing to modernize their arsenals.

The accusation that new initiatives undermine the NPT has been heard ad nauseum since Norway announced the first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. This accusation has been leveled against the open-ended working group and the high-level meeting—even though both were embraced by a majority of UN member states. How can initiatives designed to foster multilateral discussion on nuclear weapons undermine the NPT? How could a treaty prohibiting and seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons challenge a Treaty that itself shares that goal?

The accusation of disregarding the “real strategic context” is equally dogmatic. “The right political and security conditions for an outright ban on nuclear weapons do not yet exist,” argued Ambassador Rowland. The conditions specified for elimination vary among the nuclear-armed states, but they will be very difficult to achieve, especially all at once. And as Mr. O’Reilly firmly explained, the conditions for nuclear disarmament were put in place on 5 May 1970 when the NPT entered into force. There is no conditionality or exceptions written into the Treaty’s disarmament obligations. Furthermore, he argued, “re-
fusing even to countenance the possibility of prohibition will almost certainly guarantee that these weapons will never be eliminated.”

The dogmatic nature of the nuclear-armed states’ engagement on nuclear disarmament perhaps developed most strongly after the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. Since then, it seems that the worst fears of the non-nuclear-armed states have come true—indefinite extension of the NPT has been interpreted as allowing indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

Now, some nuclear-armed and allied states seek indefinite extension of the 2010 action plan. Several non-nuclear armed states have objected to this, arguing that rolling over the action plan will further undermine the NPT’s credibility and prevent the pursuit of concrete initiatives for nuclear disarmament.

This is the central issue for the rest of this NPT review cycle: whether states parties will allow countries possessing or relying upon nuclear weapons to dictate the pace and direction of nuclear weapons-related initiatives, or whether they will take action against the imbalanced, unjust, and untenable system of nuclear weapon possession.

### CALENDAR OF EVENTS

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BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A NATO MEMBER

Susi Snyder | PAX

NATO has already made provisions for divergent opinions on the future of nuclear weapons. In the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO recognised that national decisions regarding arms control and disarmament “may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members” and committed itself “to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.”

In doing this, NATO reaffirmed that each member state must make disarmament and arms control decisions based on its national priorities and that there is scope and space within the alliance for all positions.

NATO member states need to address the inherent proliferation push resulting from their own refusal to end their reliance on nuclear weapons. With three nuclear-armed member states, five states hosting US nuclear weapons, at least 15 states actively involved in planning nuclear war, and a consensus document re-emphasising the intention to keep the ability to threaten others with nuclear weapons as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO continues to set a bad example. This special responsibility deserves more attention from NATO member states and should be an incentive for member states to be forward-leaning with regard to discussions on a treaty banning nuclear weapons for everyone. A nuclear ban treaty would strengthen the push for a system of verification to prevent production of nuclear weapons for all states, including those that are of strategic importance to NATO.

The current Dutch government policy on nuclear weapons states that as “NATO decisions are taken by consensus, NATO must reach unanimity on this [the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons] before discussions with Russia on the reduction or elimination of NSNWs in Europe can begin.” This is an unhelpful and incorrect interpretation of existing NATO agreements, and it is one that some very vocal NATO states are pushing.

First, it equates consensus with unanimity. These are conceptually different. Consensus is the community resolution when opposing parties set aside their differences and agree on a course of action that is agreeable to all, even if only barely. Even if parties disagree, there is still overall ‘consent’ to move forward in order to settle the issue. This requires co-operation among those with different interests and opinions. Consensus is not the same as unanimity.

Insisting on unanimity can allow a minority opinion to stop the process. If someone knows that the group cannot move forward without their consent, they may harden their position in order to get their way. This is what seems to be happening inside NATO discussions and decision-making.

A discussion, such as that on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO policy, might involve several issues: deployment, cost responsibilities, modernisation, varied security interests, alliance solidarity, transparency, confidence-building measures, etc. Some issues are more controversial than others. But a disagreement on one issue should not prevent consensus on another. By unpacking the different issues, and not insisting on unanimity on the whole at once, there are more opportunities to move the debate forward.

NATO member states need to answer for themselves whether they believe that a treaty banning nuclear weapons for everyone will contribute to or detract from the central objectives of the Alliance. They will also have to consider whether they believe that a ban treaty is irreconcilable with the protection of the European and North American citizens they represent.

Doubting a Ban...

Wilbert van der Zijpeen & Susi Snyder
May 2014
States party to the NPT committed in article VI to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures” relating to nuclear disarmament. Yet, 44 years after its entry into force, we seem no closer to achieving this objective. But non-nuclear-armed states do not have to wait for the recalcitrant few, according to presenters at the side event hosted by Reaching Critical Will and Article 36.

Michael Hurley of Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade started the discussion with a presentation of the new working paper from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). The paper outlines potential proposals for action on the “effective measures” called for by article VI. Hurley stated that the NPT should be seen as an “incomplete treaty” and a “placeholder” intended to stem further proliferation at the height of the Cold War arms race. It was intended to make disarmament possible. The NAC paper does not recommend a specific way to achieve disarmament; rather it “simply calls for a process we believe is long overdue.” Non-nuclear-armed states also want more of a say in how that process will occur, said Hurley.

Elaborating on one of the possibilities outlined in the NAC paper, Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will presented a joint RCW-Article 36 paper, A treaty banning nuclear weapons. The paper envisions a global ban that builds upon the foundations laid by the NPT and the regional nuclear weapons free zones treaties, aiming to prevent humanitarian catastrophe, prevent proliferation, and achieve disarmament.

Acheson asserted that the NPT establishes that disarmament is the responsibility of all states. Thus non-nuclear-armed states can “take the initiative.” In order to spur progress towards elimination, goals of a ban treaty include stigmatization of nuclear weapons, provoking public discussion, and reducing the incentives for nuclear weapons ownership. Thomas Nash of Article 36 stated that a ban would “fundamentally change the debate in the UK,” forcing the government to justify its continued possession of nuclear weapons. Acheson agreed, stating that a ban treaty process would not be about antagonizing the nuclear-armed states, but about changing the legal and political context in which nuclear weapons exist.

Tim Caughley of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research provided some background on this context. He said the “blockage” in discussions of nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament and other venues has put the “credibility” of the NPT at risk. It is thus “hardly surprising that new approaches have been pursued.”

One such approach is the emerging awareness of humanitarian dimensions, which is shifting the discussion “from the perceived military and security benefits of nuclear weapons to their impact.” This has demonstrated that “a nuclear war in humanitarian terms is an unwinnable war and an accidental detonation is not a hypothetical scenario.”

In summary, Hurley stated that disarmament “is a matter of unfinished business in the NPT...despite best efforts over decades we are simply not getting in sight of zero, which is what the NPT is all about.” In working toward this goal, said Acheson, “we don’t have to rely on the nuclear-armed states—if the rest of the world believes these weapons are abhorrent then they can put that into law and policy.”
REPORT: BURN THE NPT
Susí Snyder | PAX

Wildfire>, the rumour-generating and whispering-stimulant to what are otherwise sometimes dull discussions in the disarmament diplomatic corridors, has made his NPT debut. During the past week, there have been a number of provocative posters and flyers circulating the conference. These have included wanted posters calling for a backbone, and plays on weasels (and words about weasels). Wildfire> tried to go public in Geneva recently, but was shut out through some technical issues. During his event last Thursday, Richard Lennane, Chief Inflammatory Officer of Wildfire>, gave a face to the fame. Despite the name of the event, it featured no physical pyrotechnics, only the metaphorical and figurative type.

In one of the more engaging beginnings to a side event seen at an NPT meeting, Wildfire> asked people in the room to write down a word or two that first comes to mind when they think about the NPT. Responses around the room included elaborate delaying tactic and asymmetrical contract. Not a single person said disarmament. Wildfire> argued that if you’re looking for disarmament, you’re not going to get it at the NPT.

Wildfire> went on to talk about some of the criticisms towards the proposal for a ban treaty. For example, the idea of engaging and not enraging nuclear-armed states. Why worry about enraging the nuclear-armed states, he asked. Are they going to stop the negotiations they are obliged to undertake but aren’t doing? The ones that should be enraged are the non-nuclear weapons states. Wildfire> asked, “Where is the outrage?” How is it that some representatives have said that just because it doesn’t work, doesn’t mean we should try something new?

Wildfire> highlighted that a ban treaty isn’t something for which states or civil society can be reproached. What possible complaint can be laid against a NNWS that wants to ban nuclear weapons? It is completely in line with the NPT, in line with article VI, and can only strengthen non-proliferation and nuclear security. He highlighted that the NPT nuclear-armed countries can’t object to this publicly, as it would make them look insincere and duplicitous.

How can it be inflammatory to ask for what is already promised? By likening the reliance on nuclear weapons to addiction, he argued that with addicts there is often nothing you can do, except take steps to protect yourself. “For your own dignity and self worth, sense of purpose and pride, you have to stop pouring money into the problem.” The Wildfire> event made the case that it is time to quit the problem and negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.

Come and observe

Students negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Monday, 5 May 2014,
10 am – 1 pm, 3 pm – 6 pm
in
Room C, UN Conference Building

Tuesday, 6 May 2014,
10 am – 12:30 pm, 3 – 6 pm
in
Conference Room E, UN North Lawn Building

30 German university students simulate the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In four sessions, they will negotiate Article I (Obligations) of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (UN document A/62/650).

Come to observe
for an hour or the whole day!

Chairs:
Delegates to the NPT PrepCom
Participants:
30 German university students

Contact: Regina Hagen, Technische Universität Darmstadt
kontakt@reginahagen.de; mobile 1-617-335-8700
Next Steps in Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks for Nuclear Disarmament

Opening Remarks: Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast
Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament

Speakers: Zia Mian
IPFM and Princeton University
Alexander Glaser
IPFM and Princeton University

Closing Remarks: Ambassador Toshio Sano
Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament

Monday, May 5, 2014, 1:15–2:30 p.m.
Conference Room 7, United Nations, New York
Nuclear disarmament

- France, China, UK, US, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, and the Netherlands said nuclear disarmament can best be achieved with a step-by-step approach.
- UK said it does not see nuclear weapons as inherently unacceptable and that the conditions for banning nuclear weapons do not exist.
- Canada said security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons need to be balanced.
- Ireland noted that refusing even to consider the possibility of prohibition will almost certainly guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be eliminated.
- France said that its nuclear weapons are defensive and therefore do not violate international law.
- Brazil highlighted that nuclear weapons are incompatible with international humanitarian law since they do not respect the principles of distinction, proportionality or unnecessary harm.
- Palau welcomed the initiative of the Marshall Islands to hold all nine nuclear-armed states to account for their failure to disarm.
- Chile and Argentina criticized the slow disarmament pace and Chile stressed that this could gradually weaken the NPT and further proliferation could increase.
- EU, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, and Turkey urged further nuclear arms reductions.
- US said it remains open to further reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons.
- Ireland said all reductions to date have been part of a voluntary parallel process outside of the NPT.
- Egypt said reduction efforts should not only be directed towards NWS arsenals, but also the nuclear-armed states outside the NPT and in particular in the Middle East.
- Finland called for an international treaty covering tactical nuclear weapons.
- Malaysia called for a legally binding instrument eliminating nuclear weapons.
- Palau called for a new diplomatic process to negotiate a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons, even if the nuclear-armed states are unwilling to join such a process.
- Slovenia stated, while it recognizes the importance of the initiative on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, it believes that this process could be streamlined in the context of the NPT review process and that calls for the immediate and categorical ban of nuclear weapons or weapons linked to nuclear technology might not serve that process.

Reporting

- US welcomed the institutionalized regular dialogue between the NWS on nuclear weapons-related issues such as the standard reporting and the glossary.
- Switzerland criticised the reporting by NWS due to the big difference of information contained in the reports.
- Austria expressed great concern that the NWS reports show no indication of changes to the continued reliance on nuclear weapons.
- Australia, Canada, and Japan welcomed the reports by NWS as a useful first step, but expected them to build on them in the future.
- Australia underlined that the NPDI template remains the preferred level of detail for reporting.

De-alerting

- The De-alerting group welcomed the NWS reports but concluded there has been no progress in reducing alert levels since 2010 and regretted that this issue is largely ignored by the NWS.
- Australia, Austria, and Nigeria called for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons.
- Iran called on NWS to de-alert, de-target, and withdraw from deployment their nuclear weapons.

Action Plan

- Australia understands the action plan as a road map and the critical question is how to measure progress.
- Brazil and Ireland called for a turning point in 2015 and stated that a simple roll-over of the 2010 Action Plan at the RevCon is not possible.

Modernization

- Brazil said it is difficult to agree that there has been an appropriate implementation of the NPT in all its pillars when they are undertaking modernization.
- Switzerland worried about the lack of regard to qualitative and quantitative improvements of arsenals, which runs contrary to action 1 or 2.
Kazakhstan, Philippines, and Austria expressed concern with ongoing modernization nuclear arsenals.

Austria regretted that NWS had not included what resources they allocate to the maintenance and modernization of their arsenals in their reports.

Malaysia and Cuba questioned the allocation of resources to nuclear weapons.

NAM called for the halt of modernization efforts as these undermine reductions.

**Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW)**

- Brazil, Ireland, Egypt, Argentina, Chile, and Slovakia highlighted the HINW and welcomed its renewed attention since the last RevCon.
- UK recognised that many delegations were disappointed that they did not attend the conference in Mexico, but said it is deeply concerned with the HINW and that is why they continue to prevent their use.
- UK also expressed disappointment that the HINW initiative has not focused exclusively on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, but asserts that NW per se are inherently unacceptable.
- France expressed its belief that recent parallel initiatives disregard the “real strategic context” and undermine the Action Plan and the NPT review process.
- US said that it’s because it understands the HINW that it continues to devote resources to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.
- Chile, Malaysia, Slovenia, and South Africa said the HINW should be included in the NPT review process.
- Nigeria stressed that no member of the UN should feel the need to possess a weapon that is known to have such a catastrophic humanitarian effects.
- Netherlands thought the conferences on HINW could invigorate the drive towards global zero.
- Australia welcomed the renewed focus on HINW, but cautioned that there are no short cuts to nuclear disarmament.
- Malaysia would welcome the participation of nuclear-armed states and non-states parties in the Vienna conference.

**Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ)**

- UK, France, and US expressed support of the principle of NWFZ and said they would sign the protocol to the Central Asian NWFZ together with the rest of the NPT NWS.
- UK hoped this will encourage progress towards signature of the Southeast Asian NWFZ.
- France and US expressed readiness to sign SEANWFZ.
- France said it signed a parallel declaration with Mongolia on its NWF status.

**Ukraine**

- EU recalled that Russia has committed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest memorandum of 1994 on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.
- Russia responded to the “alleged breach” of the Budapest Memorandum and the current situation in Ukraine.
- US reaffirmed its commitment to the Budapest Memorandum.
- UK refereed interested states parties to its statement to the UNSC on Ukraine.

**Other**

- Austria and Czech Republic highlighted the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education.
2014 NPT Preparatory Committee

Wednesday, May 7

3:00-5:15pm: NATO and the NPT: Implications of alliance membership for the NPT, Room C

Speakers:

Paul Meyer, Ambassador (retired), Senior Fellow in Space Security and Nuclear Disarmament, The Simons Foundation, as well as Fellow in International Security at the Centre for Dialogue (SFU)

Douglas Roche, Ambassador (retired), author, parliamentarian, diplomat, founder and Chairman Emeritus of the Middle Powers Initiative

Rick Wayman, Director of Programs & Operations, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Wilbert van der Zeijden, Nuclear Disarmament team, IKV Pax Christi, the Netherlands

Thursday, May 8

3:00-5:15pm: New Ideas and Initiatives, Room C

Speakers:

Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute in New York City and Philadelphia

Erika Simpson, Professor at Western University and Past Vice-Chair, Canadian Pugwash

Michael Simpson, Executive Director at One Sky and Co-Director Integral Development Team
REPORT: FUTURE OF THE B61
Arianna Framvik Malik | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

This event, hosted by Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, examined the modernization programme for the US nuclear weapon the B61.

The Obama administration is about to upgrade the B61-4 into the B61-12 to enhance “safety and security”. However, Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, explained that safety and security are not the big drivers behind this upgrade. The planned safety upgrades are modest. The real motivation, Kristensen highlighted, is that the B61-12 has a new feature, a guided tail kit. The guided tail will increase the bomb’s accuracy, bringing the peak of explosion closer to the target. This is despite the administration’s claim that the upgrade will not entail new capabilities. The kit for the 480 planned weapons will cost 1.5 billion USD, leading Kristensen to also question the argument that costs will be reduced in this endeavour.

Jay Coghlan of Nuclear Watch New Mexico explained that the Obama administration is planning on cutting the budget of the non-proliferation programme by 20% and the nuclear weapons dismantlement programme by 45%. He argued these cuts are funding the B61 upgrade. The US is sending signals that it is not interested in disarmament.

Susi Snyder of PAX, the Dutch affiliate of Pax Christi, was at the seminar to present a European perspective to the B61 upgrade. Among the states hosting nuclear weapons in Europe, Snyder reported on possible changes in attitude in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

In Italy, newly-appointed foreign minister Federica Mogherini used to be part of Parliamentarians for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and organized and briefing on nuclear weapons issues. The disarmament movement is eagerly waiting to see if these priorities will remain with Mogherini in his new position.

Belgium has an election coming up and there is a lot of talk of nuclear weapons in the party platforms, especially by the Flemish Socialist Party (SP). Previously a part of the government for decades, the SP is taking a stand on refusing to be part of a government if the B61 is employed in Belgium.

In the Netherlands there has been a lot debate and hearings on the issue of nuclear weapons, in which MPs are ramping up pressure on the government. Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans says the Netherlands does not rule out the possibility that nuclear weapons will be removed from the Netherlands, even without NATO consent.

REPORT: US-UK COOPERATION
Jessica Erdman | Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

This side event, hosted by the US Department of State, explored various methods of verification of nuclear disarmament through the experience of cooperation between the US and UK. The panel, moderated by Jeffrey Eberhardt of the US, consisted of Matthew Rowland (UK Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament); Attila Burjan (Atomic Weapons Establishment); and Michele Smith (National Nuclear Security Administration). The technical discussion focused on the history of cooperation between the US and UK, joint simulation exercises, and lessons learned, and an interactive question and answer session.

Mr. Rowland began the discussion by saying there is nothing “easy” about verification. There is a risk of sharing sensitive proliferation information when states work together in verification. However, he suggested that verification exercises should move forward to include non-nuclear weapon states as well.

Mr. Burjan gave a brief overview of the ten-year US-UK cooperation. When conducting verification studies involving the interaction of two nuclear-armed states in an arms control scenario, there are naturally security issues regarding information protection, facility access, and intrusiveness. However, a managed access model for a nuclear-armed state can be developed based on past regulatory actions—for example, utilizing lessons learned from regulatory inspections by an environmental agency.

While these simulated exercises may seem like simple steps in the large scope of the disarmament regime, Mr. Burjan stressed, “the devil is in the details,” as the process can be weighed down by classification, access, and technological and legal problems, which require careful planning. However, all panelists stressed the importance of these exercises and the possibility for expansion in the future.

Ms. Smith delved into a specific simulation conducted by the US and UK, “Tachnoia” and “Avalonia,” which took place over a full calendar year and resulted in a simulated negotiated agreement and protocol to dismantle nuclear devices. As a result, the US and UK both realized differences of opinion existed that require further collaborative work. Mr. Burjan summed up the lesson derived from the process: “Even the simplest things can be misunderstood.”
As this third Preparatory Committee is meant to provide recommendations for the work of the Review Conference, this year the working paper review focuses on this particular aspect of the papers. It is not a comprehensive review of all working papers.

**Nuclear disarmament**

- WP.9 submitted by NPG addresses suggests the RevCon urge the US and Russia to engage in a new round of negotiations in line with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. It notes further build up of nuclear arsenal runs counter to the obligations under the action plan and article VI.

- WP.10 also submitted by the NPG recommends that the RevCon reiterate the importance of the principles of transparency, verification, and irreversibility for the realization of nuclear disarmament.

- WP.11 on behalf of the states members of the League of Arab States recommends calling on nuclear-armed states to declare that they have ceased modernization efforts and to take genuine measures to complete the implementation of commitments under the 13 Practical Steps as well as the Action Plan.

- WP.11 also recommends that the RevCon urge the CD to resume work and begin negotiating a comprehensive treaty prohibiting and eliminating, an FMCT, and legally-binding NSAs.

- WP.17 from NAM outlines several recommendations dealing with nuclear disarmament, including calling for the full implementation of the 2010 action plan, in particular action 5, reductions of nuclear arsenals, and an end to the modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing the qualitative improvement of NW.

- WP.18 submitted by the NAC outlines four different options for achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. It suggests these options should be explored, discussed, and tested against the requirements of article VI.

**Nuclear non-proliferation**

- WP.8 by the Vienna Group of Ten recommends the RevCon underline the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need nuclear security.

- WP.8 also suggests recommendations on cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with existing verification instruments.

- WP.22 from Iran focuses on non-proliferation obligations of nuclear-armed states. It recommends among other things that the RevCon establish a verification mechanism for the implementation of article I to prevent proliferation.

- WP.26 submitted by the NPG says the RevCon should recommend that states subscribe to the IAEA fundamental principles for nuclear security and continue to improve the effectiveness of their nuclear security regimes and operators’ systems. Furthermore, states should ensure that non-civilian nuclear material is at least as well protected as civilian nuclear material.

- WP.17 from NAM recommends supporting verification but without hampering a state’s right to nuclear energy. It also recommends support for furthering the establishment of safeguarded global nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally-binding verification arrangements.

**Peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

- WP.12 submitted by the League of Arab States recommends the RevCon should, apart from reiterating the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other issues, reaffirm the role of the IAEA, emphasize the respect for states’ national decisions, and ensure that no technical support is provided to states not party to the NPT.

- WP.8 by the Vienna Group of Ten recommends to the RevCon, among other things, that it acknowledges the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, emphasizes the importance of nuclear safety, and highlights the important role of the IAEA.

- WP.17 by the NAM recommends to underscore the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to express concern with attempts that could hamper that right. Also the central role of the IAEA’s work should be recognized.

**Other issues**

- WP.17 from NAM states parties recommends reaffirming the full, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the so-called three pillars and implementing commitments from 1995, 2000, and 2010 RevCon.

- WP.6 submitted by the NPG and WP.24 of the Dealerting Group gives recommendations for the RevCon to address the need for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons. WP.6 focuses on the implementation of Action 5 (e) and (f) of the 2010 Action Plan. WP.24
suggests that, if no significant further progress is achieved before 2015, the RevCon should agree on concrete action steps on de-alerting and reaffirm de-alerting as a practical disarmament measure.

- WP.7 of the NPDI and WP.27 by the League of Arab States address the issue of the WMD free zone in the Middle East. Both papers give recommendations focused on the time until the RevCon and the ongoing efforts to hold the conference to establish such a zone.

- WP.17 recommends holding the conference on the establishment of a MEWMDFZ in 2014, with all states of the region participating in the meeting.

- WP.17 recommends among other things to call for further efforts aimed at establishing NWFZs in the regions where they do not exist, in particular in the Middle East. Additionally the RevCon should call on nuclear-armed states to withdraw reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations to treaties on existing NWFZs.

- WP.8 by the Vienna Group of Ten and WP.11 on behalf of the League of Arab States suggest the RevCon reiterate the importance of universalizing the CTBT. WP.8 suggests continuing to support the work of the CTBTO and urges all states to refrain from actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

- WP.17 from NAM recommends calling on NWS to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests. It also recommends to call for the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites and stresses the importance of the entry into force of the CTBT.

- WP.10 from the NPDI suggests the RevCon should urge the nuclear-armed states to make regular reports on their nuclear disarmament activities and to continuously work to improve the quantity and quality of information provided in the agreed standard form during the 2020 review cycle. It should also call on those without nuclear weapons to continue to submit reports on their progress of implementing the NPT.

- WP.31 and WP.32 submitted by Iran underlined the importance of NSAs and recommend that the RevCon establish an ad hoc committee to work on the matter.

- WP.17 also gave recommendations on nuclear security assurances, suggesting the RevCon should strongly support legally-binding instruments providing these assurances and call on nuclear-armed states to amend their military policies and doctrines.

**REPORT: WMDFZ IN THE MIDDLE EAST**
Arianna Framvik Malik | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Hosted by the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, former Ambassadors Dr. M Mounir Zahran and Dr. Mohamed Shaker held a seminar Friday on the issue of a WMD free zone in the Middle East.

Implementing the 1995 NPT Middle East Resolution and fulfilling the plan of action agreed to in 2010 is an urgent matter, they argued. Many governments are greatly disappointed that the Helsinki conference is yet to be held. Dr. Shaker believes that if the conference is not held this year, the 2015 NPT Review Conference will fail.

In an effort to demonstrate that holding such a conference with the participation of Israel and Iran is a realistic endeavor, the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs is proposing a mock-up conference. NGOs could participate in the conference and represent governments, while government representatives would be there only as observers with a right to submit papers. Facilitator Laajava is said to be enthusiastic about the project, offering to provide the mock-up facilitator with all the information this person needs in order to make the project a success.

ECFA further presented a paper on the elements of what the zone could entail. Among the six components of the possible zone that the paper discusses is geographical delimitations and the issue of whether Turkey, being a NATO-member with American tactical nuclear weapons and defense missiles system on its territory, would be able to join or not. As Turkey is an active participant in Middle Eastern politics, the paper suggests that Turkey could be accredited special status as a neighboring state. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, interlinked with the region, are considered for the provision of security assurances to the member states.

Among the audience members, Sharon Dolev of the Israeli Disarmament Movement (IDM) encouraged Dr. Shaker and Dr. Zahran to invite broader civil society participation in the mock-up conference. Dolev shared that in the Israeli process, IDM has observed that the majority of negotiators do not believe in the process. She suggested that civil society perspectives could contribute to the end result of the mock-up conference, and Dr. Shaker agreed. She also suggested that the mock-up conference should be held regardless of the success of planning the official conference, arguing that the mock-up meeting can demonstrate possibilities for success.
SIMPLY BANNING NUCLEAR TESTING AND PRODUCTION OF FISSION MATERIALS WON’T ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
TIME TO GET SERIOUS ABOUT ARTICLE VI