EDITORIAL: WHICH SIDE OF HISTORY?
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Main Committee I will meet this morning to go through the most recent changes to the draft outcome text on nuclear disarmament. The latest version is the weakest yet, with some particularly troubling backward steps, replacing elimination with reductions, detonation with conflagration, and narrowing the reflection of support for initiatives and undertakings that the vast majority consider most important.

Reductions are not the new elimination. The nuclear-armed states’ apparent attempt to rewrite article VI in preambular paragraph (PP) 18 must not be accepted. The paragraph “underlines the importance of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts for the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”

Article VI is not about nuclear weapon reductions. It is about multilateral negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament. This revision describes nuclear disarmament as the “ultimate” goal, after general and complete disarmament (GCD), which is not how it is framed in the Treaty. GCD is explicitly decoupled from nuclear disarmament in article VI. This revision overturns the language on GCD from the First Special Session on Disarmament, language that was reconfirmed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Given the NPT’s clear rejection of nuclear weapons and objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it is unconscionable for the nuclear-armed states to attempt to distort reality in such a manner. The majority of states have made clear, as CARICOM did on Friday, their frustration with “the lack of meaningful progress in the implementation of disarmament commitments.” Due to the resounding call for its reinsertion, the draft outcome once again reflects the “slow pace” of nuclear disarmament.

The states that wield nuclear weapons seem to feel threatened by the continued attention to their lack of progress. The UK complained on Friday that saying disarmament has not taken place does not move the debate forward. Neither does asserting that disarmament has taken place. The insistence of the nuclear-armed states to have their stated future commitments and their declared past actions reflected in the outcome only highlights their ongoing failure to advance disarmament in any practical or meaningful way during the last review cycle. Their refusal to accept any commitments with timeframes or benchmarks in this outcome suggests they are unwilling to advance disarmament beyond this conference either.

This is why at least 84 countries (and growing) have so far endorsed the pledge issued at the Vienna conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW) to pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Egypt, Marshall Islands, Mexico, and several others reemphasised the need for a new legally-binding instrument on nuclear weapons during Friday’s meeting. On Thursday, Thailand described the legal gap as a “fac
tual assessment” and called for a new legal instrument. “Can we not be courageous enough to say that we will begin in earnest, FINALLY, to discuss how to address the very last weapon of mass destruction left without any legal prohibition?” asked Thailand. “This request is not propaganda, not unreasonable, not illogical, not far-fetched and in our view, very acceptable. It is long overdue and it is a responsible first step.”

Of course, the nuclear-armed states are increasingly desperate to present their counter-narrative that momentum is not building for such an instrument and that there are no legal gaps to be filled. This nar-

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Rhetoric rings hollow with other states, though, because it does not reflect reality. As Ireland noted on Friday, the view put forth by some delegations that “the current arrangement of voluntary ad hoc reductions” will “satisfy or somehow ‘keep faith’ with Article VI’s demand for effective measures for disarmament ... cannot in our view be sustained.”

What governments, international organisations, and civil society have learned about the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons “has changed the parameters of our discussion forever,” declared Ireland. “That is the new reality.”

Dogmatically trying to push aside this new reality, a few delegations whose governments perceive benefit from nuclear weapons are trying to assert that effective measures can be non-legal provisions, such as unilateral measures, or that they could be constituted through the building blocks or step-by-step approach. This view has made it into the draft outcome document, but does not reflect the new reality highlighted by the 159 states supporting the joint statement on the HINW, nor those endorsing the pledge.

Ongoing attempts to downplay support for the humanitarian approach represent a submission of majority interests to those of the minority. This is unacceptable. Of the 185 non-nuclear-armed states parties to the NPT, only seven have signed neither the Austrian-led nor the Australian-led joint statements on the HINW (Albania, Bhutan, Monaco, Republic of Korea, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Therefore, more than 96% of NPT non-nuclear-armed states parties have shown “a growing interest ... in the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons” by joining these statements. In addition, Albania, Bhutan, and the Republic of Korea have participated in all three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, while Syria and Uzbekistan participated in the Vienna conference. (Monaco and Turkmenistan participated in none of the conferences.)

The states subscribing to the two joint statements do draw different conclusions about how to address the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons. On Friday, for example, Australia declared that it is a common position that nuclear war must never occur. This of course does not reflect the position of at least 159 countries that have declared that nuclear weapons must never be used again under any circumstances. But it has been reflected in the latest MC I text, with a dangerous reference to the humanitarian impact of “nuclear conflagration” rather than simply of any detonation of a nuclear weapon.

Yet despite these differences, the common interest of 96% of non-nuclear-armed states parties in the HINW cannot be denied or degraded by the nuclear-armed states. As Brazil said, the security of all states is important, not just a few. Or as South Africa put it, what is so special about the security of the nuclear-armed states that makes it so important for them to have nuclear weapons? The overwhelming majority are concerned with the HINW. A majority are also demanding concrete and effective nuclear disarmament and have expressed frustration with the slow pace so far. These are the views that must be represented in the outcome document. If not, the minority of states parties blocking progress will only risk shining an even greater spotlight on the NPT’s history of being misused and forced into outcomes that perpetuate the status quo of nuclear injustice and discrimination.

Regardless of what any potential outcome might say in the end, though, in this final week of the Review Conference, states committed to multilateral action on nuclear weapons must hold their nerve, uphold the purpose of the humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons that has brought so much promise, and stick together on the basis of their common pledge to fill the legal gap. It seems clear that this pledge will be what is remembered from the ninth Review Conference. For states that have not yet endorsed it, there is one week left to be amongst the states making history at this Review Conference.

NPT NEWS IN REVIEW
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Reaching Critical Will
a programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

777 UN Plaza, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10017
ph. +1 212.682.1265
e-mail: info@reachingcriticalwill.org
web: www.reachingcriticalwill.org

Editor: Ray Acheson

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.
This brief only highlights changes from the last texts.

**Main Committee I**

- PP1 adds “and nuclear disarmament” to the regime of nuclear non-proliferation.
- PP2 and 4 are switched, regarding articulation of article I and the bargain of non-proliferation for disarmament, though in PP4 notes only that NNWS entered into this bargain rather than “the overwhelming majority of States”.
- PP5 “reaffirms the commitment of States parties to the effective implementation” of the outcomes from 1995, 2000, and 2010, rather than “underlines the urgent necessity of implementing” them.
- PP6 removes “at all times” from the reaffirmation of the strict observance of the NPT’s provisions.
- PP6 adds “and use” to the shared objective of preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- PP7 adds explicit reference to NNWS and NWS when talking about compliance.
- PP7 deletes the reference to the UN Charter.
- PP8 reinserts “slow” regarding the pace of disarmament and “obligations” to disarmament commitments.
- PP8 deletes the reference to “as perceived by some States parties” in this regard.
- PP8 returns to referencing the Treaty rather than ND, NP, and PUNE.
- PP9 is new, recalling the commitment of all states parties to pursuing policies fully consistent with the Treaty and achievement with NWFW.
- PP12 adds “is an urgent priority” to universalisation and adds reference to making “every effort to achieve this objective”.
- PP13 reinserts “ensuring” rather than “promoting” the equal participation of women and men and adds PUNE to ND and NP.
- PP14 is new, it reaffirms the provisions of article V on “peaceful” nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in light of CTBT.
- PP17 now “reaffirms” instead of “urges” the NWS to comply fully with nuclear disarmament obligations. It also now references the 2010 action plan.
- PP18 changes “recalls that the ultimate objective of efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament” to “underlines the importance of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts for the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”
- PP19 deletes the reference to the glossary of nuclear terms.
- PP20 adds a long description of the meetings of the NWS and references the glossary there.
- PP21 adds “their declaration of” in reference to Russia and US dismantlement.
- PP22 adds “as declared” to the UK, China, and France’s undertakings or commitments.
- PP23 adds “pursuant to article VI of the Treaty as reaffirmed in action 2 of the ‘Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions’ agreed by the 2010 Review Conference”.
- PP24 reinserts the reference to “many hundreds” of nuclear weapons on high alert.
- PP24 changes concern with the HINW that would result from “any use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances” to “any nuclear conflagration”.
- PP24 incorporates a separate para stressing “that reductions in deployments and in operational status are welcome but cannot substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons as required under article VI of the Treaty.”
- PP25 changes back “indefinite extension of possession” to “indefinite possession”.
- PP25 adds language stating that “any such assumption is incompatible with the objective and purpose of the Treaty, with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.”
- PP26 adds note that all states parties are committed to nuclear disarmament under article VI.
- PP26 changes reference to the need to revitalise “multilateral disarmament negotiating efforts and bodies” to “UN disarmament machinery”.
- PP27 now notes instead of welcomes the HLM on 26 September 2013 and adds reference to the relevant resolution.
- It also notes instead of welcomes the establishment of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
- PP28 changes “use” to “detonation”.
- PP30 now “recognizes and notes” rather than “welcomes” the growing interest in the international discourse on the HINW.
- It also now refers to a “majority of NNWS parties” in this context.
- It changes “added to the understanding of this matter” to “added to the knowledge of”.
- It moves the reference to the Austrian Pledge to a new para 32 and the 26-state joint statement to para 33.

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Drafts review, continued.

- PP31 now “welcomes” instead of “notes” the 159-state joint statement on HINW. It also describes the content of that statement.
- PP32 is a new para that “notes” instead of “welcomes” the Austrian Pledge.
- PP33 is a new para noting the 26-state joint statement on HINW.
- PP35 adds description of the ICJ opinion.
- PP36 is modified from the old PP34; rather than reiterating deep concern at the continuing stalemate in the CD and the persistent failure to agree on and implement a programme of work, it now reiterates this concern that the CD “did not agree on and implement a comprehensive PoW and did not commence negotiations on any nuclear disarmament related instrument during 2010 to 2015.”
- PP37 is a duplicate para (PP27), though with the language from the previous document.
- PP43 adds reference to “unconditional and conditional” treaty-based NSAs.
- OP1 changes “any use of nuclear weapons” to “any nuclear weapons detonation”.
- OP2 deletes claim that effective measures can be multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, or unilateral.
- OP3 reinserts reference to “international stability, peace and security and based on principle of diminished and increased security for all”.
- OP4 deletes “strategic” from “strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons”.
- OP4 acknowledges the importance of specifically Russia and US “addressing all issues relating to strategic stability” rather than all countries addressing issues of different weapons.
- OP7 adds “or eliminating” to reducing substantively the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
- OP8 adds “unintended, unauthorised or accidental use of” NWs in regards to addressing risk.
- OP10 now calls on the NWS to “continue their engagement on a standard reporting format”.
- It calls on NWS to report on measures to “reduce” rather than “diminish” and adds “or eliminate” role of NWs in doctrines.
- It adds “unintended, unauthorised or accidental use of” NWs in regards to reducing risk.
- It adds a declaration that “The 2020 Review Conference will review the progress made in implementing this reporting mechanism and decide on next steps regarding its further development.”
- OP13 adds “with a view to their withdrawal” regarding review of reservations on NWFZ treaties.

Main Committee II draft report

- The new draft of the MCII Draft Chairmen’s report includes some changes to existing language and several new paragraphs.
- The section on regional issues still is not included.
- Additional P2 recalls that the overwhelming majority of states entered into legally-binding commitments for non-proliferation while the nuclear-armed states have corresponding legally-binding commitments for nuclear disarmament.
- Former P6 on non-compliance was split up into P7 and P8.
- Additional P9 calls on states parties to exert all efforts with regards to universalisation and not to undertake any action that could have negative effects on it.
- Former P7 was deleted.
- P10, former P8, was extended and now directs states parties concerns with possible non-compliance to the IAEA to “consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.”
- Additional P11 expresses concerns with non-compliance.
- Former P10 was split into P12 and P13.
- P12 includes an additional sentence on the importance of complying with the Treaty’s non-proliferation obligations.
- Additional P14 emphasises that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
- Additional P15 stresses that non-proliferation and safeguards commitments are vital for peaceful nuclear commerce.
- Former P12 was split into P17 and P18.
- P21, former P17, has been modified significantly. It now recognizes that CSAs have been “successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding
declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and, therefore, about the State’s compliance with Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.”

• Further, it notes that APs provide, “in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are an integral part of IAEA safeguards.”

• Additional P22 notes that for those with both CSAs and AP in force, that represents the verification standard.

• Additional P23 stresses the importance of the IAEA exercising its mandate and to provide assurances about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with respective CSAs and, where relevant, AP.

• P26, former P16, was slightly modified and calls on the IAEA to facilitate and assist “upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation” of CSAs and APs.

• In P27, former P19, the first two sentences were deleted.

• P28 was extended and now includes after “IAEA’s Statute” “and its confidentiality regime” as well as an additionally sentence noting the steps taken by the IAEA Secretariat in that connection.

• P29 includes some new language: “technically based, effective” was inserted before “transparent, non-discriminatory, ...,” “assurances” has been added in line 4, before clarifications; an additional sub-sentence on the “intention of the IAEA’s Secretariat to continue to engage in open and active dialogue with States on safeguards matters”; in line 10 “and develop” was inserted between effectively and implement; in line 12, “to support” was inserted before “and implement”; and a sentence on the regular evaluation and assessment of safeguards and their implementation.

• Additional P 30 welcomes efforts to strengthen safeguards and notes the IAEA Secretariat’s activities in verifying and analysing information provided by member states.

• Former P22 was split into P31 and P32.

• In P31 a reference to the assistance provided by “Member States and relevant organizations to the IAEA” was inserted.

• In P32 “and effective partnerships with” replaces “among” before member states. Further, after the final sentence of former P22, a sentence encouraging states concerned to “promote early consultations with the IAEA at the appropriate stage on safeguards relevant aspects of new nuclear facilities in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation.”

• P33, former P23, “notes” instead of “recognizes” the primary responsibility for nuclear security rest with individual states.

• P34 is a new paragraph with only the first sentence having been taken from the old draft P23. The P calls on states responsibility to achieve effective nuclear security and take into account the nuclear security fundamentals contains in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

• P35, based on old P24, now welcomes, in addition, the nuclear security guidelines committee in the development of the Nuclear Security Series publications.

• P36, former P25, now encourages the IAEA to assist states parties “upon request” in strengthening their national regulatory controls if nuclear material.

• The former Ps 26 and 27 have been deleted in the new draft. P26 called on states to contribute to resources for the IAEA to implement its nuclear security activities. P27 called on states to apply, as appropriate, the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear and to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

• P37, former P28, does no longer highlight the contribution made by the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in the development of the Nuclear Security Series. The P has also changed calls on to encourage all states to adhere to the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

• P38 former P28, no longer notes “with concern” the issue of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

• P39 is new except for first sentence that originates from old P30. The new language recalls obligations under 1540 and other related UNSC resolutions such as 1673, 1810, 2055.

• P40 is new and encourages states to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

• P41, former P31 has new language on the IAEA central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework and it underscores the importance of inclusive international process that enables states to promote the shared nuclear security goals and carry forward these goals in the context of IAEA.

• P42 is the old P32.

• Former P33 have been shortened and divided up into P43 and 44.

• P45 is new and requests that any supplier arrangement be transparent and take appropriate measures to ensure export guidelines, in conformity with article I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

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Drafts review, continued.

- P46, former P34 now has a new introduction sentence recalling the 1995 Extension and Review Conference noting the supply arrangement the transfer of source fissionable materials.
- Former P35 was split into P47 and P48.
- From P49, former P36, the final sentence referring to the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has been deleted.
- P50, former P37, the reference to the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia has been deleted.

SBII draft report
WMDFZ in the Middle East

- The first two paras of the 2015 draft and the 2010 text on the ME remains the same except that the reference to “timely implementation” is now gone.
- The 2010 reference to Israel’s accession to the NPT is gone from the 2015 draft and now calls on all states in the ME that have not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States.
- The new 2015 draft emphasises the practical steps adopted at the 2010 Review Conference for full implementation of the 1995 resolution.
- The new draft takes note of the overwhelming support for convening the conference on the ME.
- The new draft sets up a new date for the conference, 15 December 2015, and if the states from the region are not able to agree on the arrangements by 15 November 2015 the UNSG will send out invitation to all states in the region.
- The new draft, in addition to the states of the region, calls on the IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO, BWC-ISU, and the League of Arab States to be invited as observers.
- The draft also stresses that the Conference shall take the 1995 resolution as its term of reference and the UNSG and the three co-sponsors of the resolution guarantee that the Conference will not be postponed.
- The UNSG will also invite all states parties to preparatory meetings that will primarily deal with reaching consensus on an agenda to ensure convening a successful event that will be a practical first step towards the long-held, common goal of the establishment of a MEWMDFZ.
- The new draft states that the UNSG will inform the 2020 Review Conference and its PrepComs on the progress made in implementing the 1995 resolution.
- The draft also calls on states to assist in preparation and holding of the Conference and contributing to necessary funds to proceed with the arrangements as outlined above in accordance with the established UN financial regulations.

SBII draft report
WMDFZ in the Middle East

- The 2015 draft does not cite the “requirement of maintaining parallel progress, in substance and timing, in the process leading” up to the conference as it did in 2010.
- The 2015 draft also regrets that the 2012 conference was not held and welcomes the continued effort of the facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland, the states of the region, the UNSG, and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution in undertaking preparations for the convening of the conference, including through a series of informal consultations among states of the region.
- The draft also encourages all states in the region to take voluntary steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the establishment of the zone and calls upon all states to refrain from undertaking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.

Other regional issues

- The new 2015 draft has deleted the reference to India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-NWS and place all their nuclear facilities under safeguards and strengthen their export control measures.
- The new draft continues to call on DPRK to fully comply with its obligations under all relevant UNSC resolutions and the 2005 Joint Statement.
- The 2015 draft also adds a call on DPRK to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests and ongoing nuclear activities and urges it to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces.
- The Conference reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party talks.

Main Committee III CRP.4

- This document includes the procedural report of the committee listing all the working papers, documents, and conference room papers relevant to the work of MC III.

Main Committee III CRP.5

- The paper includes four proposals by the NAM on the revised draft of the Chair’s working paper as contained in NPT/CONF.2015/MC. III/CRP.1/Rev.3.
- On P7 on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it refers to recommendation 66 of WP.24 submitted by the NAM.
- On P13 on exports of nuclear materials to other states parties, it recalls recommendation 72 of WP.24.
- On P63 on attack against nuclear installations, it highlights recommendation 83 of WP.24.
- On P68 on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, it refers to recommendation 80 of WP.24.

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EVENT: NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION - HARDER THAN EXPECTED
Julia Berghofer

During a two-day session German students simulated negotiations about a Nuclear Weapons Convention. At the end there was little consensus, but a growing understanding why getting multilateral agreements is such a tough business.

It took four strenuous sessions for almost 30 students from the Universities of Hamburg and Darmstadt to come to a final decision. Although far less time than the NPT negotiations usually take, this reveals how hard multilateral agreements are to achieve—especially in the delicate environment as the ongoing disarmament debate.

The fictional scenario on which the simulation was based assumes that the Arab League threatens to leave the NPT regime if there was no consensus to be achieved in the Middle East region concerning Israel adhering to the treaty. Thirteen states were represented, each by two or three students: the P5 (except for the United Kingdom), Iran, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, South Africa, Germany and Brazil. These states had a tenacious debate about the first article of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) as it was already drafted by non-governmental organisations in 1996.

During the sessions the delegations had to follow the rules of procedure, write their position papers and amendments and were free to draw up working papers. As most of the students had contacted the official delegations of the nations they represented, they had a better understanding of the particular strategies and national interests they had to defend in the simulation.

It quickly became clear that the process was harder to handle than many of the participants had thought at the outset. As some of the students admitted after the end of the simulation, they would not have expected that reaching consensus in the Middle East that Israel should be fully recognized as a State and that India and Pakistan should accede to the NPT in order to eliminate nuclear weapons within a given time frame—would develop in such a complex way.

A number of interesting working papers were submitted, for example by Iran, Israel and Egypt on behalf of the Arab League. It included an Arab-Israeli Peace Conference to be held in the next two years as well as the formation of a counter-terrorism alliance and a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. On the other hand Brazil and Pakistan proposed an agreement to eliminate the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and replace it with Brazilian-sponsored conventional weapons.

Most of the amendments submitted by the state parties were rejected whereas key points of the NWC were accepted. Despite the narrow consensus and some rather hopeful approaches it was a fruitful debate that highlighted many of the actual benchmarks and reasons for deadlock in the NPT negotiations. It also emphasised the need for sensitivity and a deeper understanding of one’s neighbours’ interests.

Drafts review, continued

SBIII Chair’s working paper
- This year’s SBIII Chair’s working paper includes a section on Article V affirming that the provisions in the article are to be interpreted in light of the CTBT.
- It also includes a section on Article VIII addressing ways to strengthen and improve the review process.
- The 2010 section on the treaty support unit has been deleted.
- P4 recalls the need for increased transparency through states parties’ reporting as agreed to in Action 20 and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.
- P6 recognizes the importance of enhanced engagement with civil society.
- The section on Article IX has been significantly shortened down compared to 2010 and includes one paragraph welcoming the accession by Palestine and calling on those remaining outside to join.
- Section on Article X has been modified compared to 2010 to reflect the debate and the different views of participants.
- P8 instead of reaffirm that a state party “shall […] have the right” to withdraw (as contained in the 2010 document) it now reaffirms that each state party “has the right” to withdraw.
- Further, it underscores that any consideration of Art. X should take into account, “in a holistic and balanced manner all, three pillars of the Treaty and the importance of demonstrating tangible progress in their implementation.”
- P10 encourages that states parties “could undertake efforts to consult” with a state party considering to withdraw.
- P12 notes the proposal of some that nuclear supplying states could consider, “without prejudice of articles IV and X,” clauses in their arrangements or contracts detailing measure to be taken in case of withdrawal.
News in Brief
Mia Gandenberger and Gabriella Irsten | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of all statements. It highlights positions on a few critical issues covered during plenary discussions.

Main Committee I

• Iran called for deleting references to the UN Charter.
• CARICOM, Iran, Marshall Islands called for “slow” to be inserted before pace in PP8.
• Iran further suggested inserting “nuclear” before disarmament in PP8 and other paras.
• CARICOM, Iran suggested deleting “as perceived by some states”.
• Colombia supported the Ecuadorian suggestion to insert “lack of advancement”.
• Canada thought PP10 and PP11 are duplications and suggested moving them to MCIII report.
• CARICOM welcomed the inclusion of PP12 and suggested using language as contained in UNGA resolution 69/61.
• African Group, CARICOM, Brazil, Colombia expressed concern about the diluted language in PP21 and called for “catastrophic” and “under any circumstances” to be inserted.
• Germany, Hungary thought that would introduce redundancies and stressed the sentence should end with “use of such weapons”.
• With regard to PP22, Austria suggested including that the total estimated number of NWs still amounts to more that 16,000, many of them on high alert.
• Canada did not agree with all of the things mentioned in PP26 and PP29.
• Iran suggested amending the language in PP26 to reflect the correct information.
• Germany suggested deleting the language after the date of the HLM.
• Marshall Islands suggested deleting “that are designed” in OP6.
• 159 states recalled their deep concern with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and call for them to be never used again under any circumstances. This should be reflected in in the paragraph referencing the joint humanitarian statement.
• Australia, Czech Republic, Italy suggested focusing on the common ground in the debate about the humanitarian consequences using more balanced language.
• CARICOM supported the Ecuadorian proposal to include a reference to the CELAC support at high level for the Austrian Pledge.

• Germany highlighted that it was only enhanced understanding of the humanitarian consequences.
• Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy suggested a more balanced expression for acknowledgement.
• Mexico called for including the language of the ICJ opinion in OP31.
• Italy, Hungary, Estonia suggested welcoming the work of the GGE on FMCT, rather than noting.
• Iran suggested deleting PP32.
• Italy suggested referring to UNGA resolution 66/66 in PP33.
• CARICOM welcomed the reference to increased engagement with civil society.
• Mexico regrets that the grave concern is not highlighted as in 2010 in OP1.
• The UK stressed that until the conditions are right, it will retain nuclear weapons.
• Austria stressed that modernising nuclear arsenals goes against legally-binding commitments and the treaty.
• Marshall Islands called for “and eliminating” to be inserted after substantively in OP7.
• Mexico, Sweden, Chile, stressed that the risks of the consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation are considerably graver than previously believed.
• Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland did not think that was the case.
• Ireland stressed that the information emerging from the conferences on HINW has changed the parameters of discussions forever.
• Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Libya, Philippines, Poland supported the re-inclusion of the reference to visiting Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
• Chile stressed that the anniversary should not be used to celebrate non-use, but to remember the devastating effects of nuclear weapons.
• China protested the inclusion of this reference, highlighting the Japanese conduct during WWII.
• Iran said OP19 should have at least as strong language as the on the FMCT.
• Marshall Islands called for replacing “encourages” with “calls” and “engage” with “begin” in OP19.
• Australia, Germany, Italy, Poland stressed that OP19 should not only refer to legal instruments.
• Mexico suggested deleting OP20.
• Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy suggested merging OP19 and 20. continued on next page
News in brief, continued

- Austria stressed that building blocks and steps could not be seen as an alternative to an improved legal framework.
- Austria, Mexico regretted that not many references to timelines and benchmarks had been included and called for more in the operative part of the text.
- African Group, Austria, Mexico, Sweden stressed that concessions of the minority need to be made to the majority.
- Iran suggested replacing nuclear weapons “use” with detonation in relevant Ps.
- Iran further commented on PPs 11, 16, 18, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, and 36 as well as Ops 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 15, 17, and 20.
- Cuba had specific amendments for 20 Ps, suggested the addition of 4 new Ps and deletion of 1 paragraph.
- The UK stressed that a ban treaty would be nothing more than a referendum on the NPT.
- The UK stressed it could not agree to a timeframe for nuclear disarmament.
- The UK asked whether the meeting of all the NPT nuclear-armed states or the HINW with almost all non-nuclear armed states had the greater impact on nuclear disarmament.
- Brazil highlighted the absurdity of advertising non-proliferation without nuclear disarmament.
- Ireland reiterated that the outcome text needs to acknowledge reality.
- Egypt underscored that practical steps had been agreed to in 2000 and 2010, therefore did not represent a novelty.
- Egypt further expressed concern with retracted language on some issues, such as the FMCT.
- Egypt highlighted the role and commitments of states under nuclear umbrella alliances.
- South Africa delivered a comprehensive statement highlighting questions around prolonged possession of nuclear weapons, security considerations, the equality of states, timeframes for nuclear disarmament, consensus, and the grand bargain of the NPT.

Main Committee II

General

- Both a morning and afternoon session on Friday was dedicated to the chair’s second draft in MCII: NPT/CONF.2015/MC.II/CRP.2/Rev.I.
- The main disagreements remain the same as earlier this week, including: Additional Protocol (AP); non-compliance, forums other than the IAEA, such as Nuclear Security Summit; export controls; NWS reservations to NWFZs; and the 2015 Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to NWFZs.
- The morning meeting also heard from the chair of Subsidiary Body 1 that summarized that four meetings have taken place in the last two weeks on the regional issue of the Middle East, and the new draft presented Friday afternoon will be the basis of discussions on Monday.
- The Chair of MCII summarized that almost 30 countries submitted language and suggestions to the Rev.1 draft. He also highlighted that many disagreements still remain.
- NAM stressed that some suggestions from NAM had not been reflected in the new draft including the reference in Para 12 to non-discriminatory implementation of article I and II and that NWS should not permit nuclear weapon sharing under any military cooperation.
- The US noticed some duplicate language in MCI on article 1 and 2, and proposed that a chapeau that could address numerous crosscutting issues and re-address the three pillars.
- Egypt suggested adding a special reference on the obligations to disarm in para 1, which was supported by Iran and Yemen.
- The US disagreed and said that this text should concentrate on non-proliferation obligations.
- Egypt and Iran also suggested that para 3 should also reflect the stockpiling, deployment, and receiving of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-NWS.
- The UK objected to this reference being added.
- Egypt suggested to add the word “obligations” in para 6 in relation to shared commitments, as the total elimination of nuclear weapons is not a shared objective but an obligation in the Treaty.

Non-compliance

- Iran suggested adding language on non-compliance with nuclear disarmament, not just non-proliferation obligations.
- Canada, UK, and France opposed this suggestion and believed it better to leave all references to disarmament in MCI.
- Iran said it cannot agree on the new wording on non-compliance in para 11, since there is no mention of non-compliance in MCI or MCIII.
- Cuba agreed and said it can only agree on para 11 if a reference to MCI is added.
- South Africa suggested that this para get moved up to the chapeau and have it relate to all obligations under the NPT and not just non-proliferation.

continued on next page
News in brief, continued.

- This was supported by Brazil, Egypt, Yemen, Cuba, Vietnam, Argentina, and Syria.
- Egypt also highlighted this should be the case with all the references to non-compliance in the draft.
- Canada, Finland, Australia, Norway, UK, France, Republic of Korea, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand supported the para as it is since it is in line with the Vienna Group of 10 proposal.

Universalisation

- Egypt wanted stronger language in para 9 on universalisation.
- The US highlighted that this is agreed language from action 23 from 2010, and added that since universalisation is addressed in para 1 this language could be moved up to para 1.

Export controls

- Cuba suggested adding the word sole after IAEA and deleting system after safeguards in the whole text.
- This was supported by Chile, Yemen, Egypt, and Brazil.
- Finland, Canada, UK, US supported keeping the word “system” or adding if it is not included after safeguards, as this is the language used in the AP.
- Canada and US also believe that using the word “sole” in reference to the IAEA limits the action of other important bodies.
- Iran wanted to know what other forum Canada and the US were talking about that could be on equal footing with the IAEA.
- Morocco stressed that other forums could play a role but we are talking about authority.
- Brazil suggested to add language to para 12 so it says: “the conference undertakes compliance with all the articles of the treaty to uphold the regime.” This was supported by South Africa.
- Brazil also suggested to clarify para 13 as only the IAEA board has the authority to refer cases to UNSC and UNGA; therefore second line of para 13 should be deleted.
- This was supported by Iran, Egypt, Cuba, Syria.
- The US supported the para and said that it is agreed language from 2000.
- Iran, Brazil, Egypt, Cuba stressed that para 15 is redundant and should be deleted.
- Finland wanted to keep para 15.
- Russia wanted to delete the language “to comply with article IV” in para 16.
- Brazil, Iran, Egypt want to delete para 18 as they don’t see it as in compliance with the Treaty in itself.
- US, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Australia supported the paragraph as they believed it fundamental tenant of safeguards.
- Finland also added that it does not want to open up agreed language just to adjust the balance or because it suits some countries.
- Argentina wanted para 24 to be relocated as the new para 19.
- New Zealand believed that there might be language in the Vienna Group of 10 suggestions that could be agreed on in regards to how to refer to safeguards, to make it clear that this language would only affect states that have an AP.
- Finland stated that removing the reference to the AP cannot happen due to the number of states that have signed them.
- Turkey stated that universalisation of AP is important and must be supported.
- South Africa stated that it has implemented AP, but we must be fair and since no additional obligations are added in MCI the same should apply here.
- The US said we should not be concerned on what is going on in other MCs.
- Cuba could not understand why so much time was being spent on something that is voluntary.
- Russia said it is not ready to use the word “implementation” of NWS voluntary safeguards agreement before they are completed; should therefore be changed to “call upon” in para 27.
- China said that since state-level safeguards has no consensus it wants to use agreed language under the framework of IAEA discussions.
- Brazil wanted to delete this para since it is not clear what “strengthen safeguards” means.
- Egypt and Iran agreed.
- France and US wanted to keep the para.
- Iran, Brazil, Egypt wanted to delete references to non-open and non-multilateral forums in para 31, 39, 41.
- Cuba, Iran, Egypt stressed that since the UNSC only consists of 15 members, resolution 1540 should not be mentioned.
- France, UK, Republic of Korea wanted to keep the reference to the 1540 UNSC resolution.
- Netherlands wanted language on the nuclear security summit series in para 34.
Turkey wanted to add reference to the Zangger Committee in para 40.
Cuba highlighted that it could agree on para 41 if an inclusion of the NAM summit and other forums could be included.
This was supported by Equator, Egypt, Iran.
South Africa and Brazil also raised concern of having the IAEA, Interpol, and the UN on same footing as other forum, but were willing to work to find agreement.
Morocco proposed to add language that differentiates the IAEA, Interpol, and UN and then note acknowledgement of other forums.
Netherlands, UK, US believe the contribution of NSS is indisputable as well as IAEA, but stressed that they can look at compromised language.
China stressed that since all NPT states parties are not members of some of the other forums the word “relevant states” could be added in relation to NSS.
Iran stressed that para 46 has been watered down and no longer reflects the language from the 2010 outcome document.
Egypt wanted to add language to para 46 stressing that all states receiving fissile material from a NWS must require full safeguards and accession to the NPT as non-NWS.

**NWFZs and NSAs**
- ASEAN wanted to add “the establishment of NWFZ should not be a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons” to para 49.
- This was supported by Cuba, Ecuador, South Africa and Brazil.
- France did not think such a reference is important.
- ASEAN, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Brunei, Singapore, Morocco, Mongolia, Australia, Brazil, Angola, Myanmar, UK and Laos noted that the reference to the 2015 Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to NWFZs has been removed and should be re-added in para 50.
- Namibia and Algeria said that the meeting referred to did not take place since it was flawed from the beginning so references should be kept out.
- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador suggested language calling on “NWS to withdraw reservations” to the NWFZs in para 51.
- ASEAN suggested that para 53 on the establishment of NWFZ where they do not exist could be strengthened by including “in regions were they do not exist and encourage the establishment of these zones in those regions”.
- France wanted the para to stay as it is.
- The UK could agree with ASEAN’s suggestion if it is clear that those arrangements should be by the states of that region themselves.

**Main Committe III**
- The NAM submitted comments, as contained in NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/CRP.5, to the latest revision Chair’s draft.
- The procedural report of MCIII was submitted as NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/CRP.4.
- Additionally the first draft of the SBIII Chair’s working paper was submitted to the Committee and is contained in NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/WP.1.
- NAM briefly introduced the proposal it submitted to the committee.
- The US, UK, Russia, France, Germany stressed their preference for the language of Action 64 of the 2010 Action Plan on the matter of attacks against nuclear installation as contained in P63.
- France, Russia highlighted the costs and risks related to the nuclear fuel cycle.
- Canada, France, Japan expressed the wish to approach the language from a positive angle.
- Germany stressed it could not agree with the NAM proposals and expressed its continued support for the revised Chair’s draft.
- Egypt, South Africa requested clarification for the reasons behind categorically rejecting suggestions from a great majority.
- Netherlands explained that the previous draft was a solid basis and the NAM proposal contained new language that would take states further away from consensus.
- Canada suggested that most of the requested points by NAM were contained in the draft already even if not using the exact language.
- US requested the possibility for informal consultations.
- South Africa seconded that.
- The meeting suspended and informal consultations took place.
- After reconvening the meeting, the Chair in outlined the changes he intends to make for the next revision of his report to be circulated on Monday, 18 May.
You are kindly invited to the Panel Discussion

“The other part of Article VI: General and Complete Disarmament”

Co-organised by SCRAP and Pace University

CHAIR

Ms. Maritza Chan
Minister-Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica in New York

PANEL

Dr. Matthew Bolton
Assistant Professor, Pace University

Dr. John Burroughs
Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Dr. Emily Welty
Vice-Moderator of the World Council of Churches Commission on International Affairs

Mr. Christopher King
Head of Strategic Planning Unit, UNODA

Mr. Paul Meyer
Senior Fellow, Simons Foundation and Fellow in International Security, Simon Fraser University

Date and time: Monday 18th May from 13:15 – 14:30 (light lunch, 1pm, Café Vienna-Top of ramp)
Venue: Conference Room C, United Nations, New York.

The disarmament conversation in recent years has focused too narrowly on "partial measures". While these are important it means that too few people have been talking about the bigger picture. However, losing sight of the bigger picture and focusing on micro-managing small problems are not advisable when the spectrum of issues to be covered is so large. In fact, the NPT implementation process can benefit from a more comprehensive understanding of the range of possibilities for disarmament. In this regard, the all too often overlooked concept of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) mentioned in Article 6 of the NPT has much more to offer than one might think.

This event aims at exploring the relevance and applicability of GCD in the NPT context, especially with regards to its practical contribution to overcoming the limits of the current fragmentary approach, and understanding the rationale behind its inclusion in Article 6.

For further information about SCRAP visit www.scrapweapons.com
ENDING ALL-MALE PANELS
Mary Wareham | Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

Mainstream media this week caught up on the Internet phenomenon of “all-male” panels or #manpanels when it discovered the “Congrats, you have an all male panel!” Tumblr site (allmalepanels.tumblr.com) by Finnish academic Saara Särö. Most seem drawn by the site’s effective use of humor in dishing out a “Hoffsome” Award to recipients, namely the participants in all-male panels at conferences, seminars, and other events as well as contributors to publications and “various other things featuring all male experts.” Each submission to the Tumblr site receives a stamp featuring the “thumbs-up” from actor David Hasselhoff of Knight Rider fame, described by Särö as “the epitome of a white masculinity.”

Humanitarian disarmament activists have been following the site for weeks now as all-male panels persist. Daily side event briefings held at this month’s Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York are providing the site with ample evidence that all-male panels still thrive in 21st Century disarmament diplomacy.

The initiative is just the latest in a long history of innovative efforts using the tool of stigmatization to end a bad practice and thereby help address a greater injustice.

The term “manpanels” is not new either, but assumed currency after it was adopted by women from the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and civil society at a meeting in Geneva one year ago in May 2014. They met at the end of a long day of deliberations at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on “lethal autonomous weapons systems.” They were at the first multilateral meeting on the topic to urge nations to preemptively ban the weapons to ensure that targeting and attack decisions are kept under meaningful human control. But an obstacle stood in the way: No female experts were down to address the CCW meeting.

France as chair had apparently invited female experts over its four-days of sessions examining technical, legal, operational, and ethical questions relating to the emerging technology of killer robots. Prior to the meeting, Ambassador Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel of France acknowledged the lack of female presenters in various other things featuring all male experts.” Each submission to the Tumblr site receives a stamp featuring the “thumbs-up” from actor David Hasselhoff of Knight Rider fame, described by Särö as “the epitome of a white masculinity.”

The campaign noted the lack of gender balance in its media materials and worked to ensure its coalition “walked the talk” in featuring women in its own delegation contributing to side events, media outreach, delegation meetings, plenary statements, and other activities.

But that was just the beginning. Until that point in the Campaign’s brief one-year history, gender diversity had been handled largely through back-door channels by the coordinator and campaigners raising it directly and privately with representatives of the events or publications concerned. A quiet chat followed by a friendly email would sometimes paid dividends in ensuring the inclusion of women. Norway noticed the campaign’s concern and acknowledged the lack of women at the CCW meeting, while Croatia urged greater gender diversity at the next meeting.

Yet the problem at the CCW was months in the making and indicative of a near-complete lack of women in the emerging process other than members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and its allies. All the meetings and initiatives convened in the five-month period on autonomous weapons leading-up to the 2014 CCW experts meeting failed to achieve a gender balance in terms of panel speakers and facilitators except one: the first Chatham House conference on autonomous weapons held in February 2014. Key publications and media coverage were similarly dismal in providing women’s voices on the matter.

Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams of the Nobel Women’s Initiative led the charge, drawing attention to the problem in her remarks to the CCW meeting, as well as in an interview with VICE Motherboard and piece in Foreign Policy. One media outlet reflected that, “the debate over killer robots is guy thing.” On the Just Security blog, Sarah Knuckey published a list of women experts available to speak on autonomous weapons systems, while other participants published on the problem included US academics Charli Carpenter and Heather Roff.

Campaign co-founder Article 36 launched a pledge that more than 50 men working in peace and security–particularly disarmament, arms control and the protection of civilians–have signed committing not to accept invitations to participate on all-male panels. It has created a dedicated “Say NO to #ManPanels” website (www.manpanels.org) to house the list.

Campaign representatives met twice with UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane to
Ending all-male panels, continued

discuss how to ensure women are included at the CCW and in other UN fora and institutions.

And while it can never constitute an “end” result, significant progress was evident at the second CCW experts meeting on killer robots held last month in Geneva. This time, women accounted for 10 of the 30 expert speaking slots with strong presentations by Sybille Bauer, Maya Brehm, Monika Chansoria, Bonnie Docherty, Sarah Knuckey, Elizabeth Quintana, Kathleen Lawand, Caitríona McLeish, Heather Roff, and Karolina Zawieska. The opening session featured an all-male panel, but women spoke in every session after that. The diversity in the friends of the chair also continued from the 2014 meeting, with female ambassadors from Albania, Chile, Hungary, and Sierra Leone each chairing a session.

It remains to be seen if the CCW has changed its ways and embarked on a path towards greater gender equality in its deliberations, let alone whether change can be achieved across traditional UN disarmament processes, including NPT meetings. At separate CCW meetings held the week before the killer robots meeting last month no women experts addressed the meeting on landmines or explosive remnants of war and there was an all-male side event panel on improvised explosive devices. The panelists have received their “Hoffsme” award. •


EVENT: PEACE AND PLANET MOBILISATION FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

Emily Watson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Organised by Peace and Planet along with Global Wave 2015, this event featured short videos, photos, and speeches by Jackie Cabasso, Peace and Planet; Alyn Ware, Global Wave; Natia Bueno, Peace Action; and Matt de Vlieger, United for Peace and Justice.

Jackie Cabasso explained that the mobilisation was driven by a desire for civil society to put pressure on NPT delegations. People from various civil society groups were united in a series of actions for disarmament leading up to the RevCon. An international conference convened the weekend before the RevCon was attended by over 600 people and included speeches by academics, church leaders, and Setsuko Thurlow and Sumiteru Taniguchi, Hibakusha nominated for Nobel Peace Prizes. On 25 April, Dag Hammarskjold Plaza was transformed into a “sea of people,” as the final destination for a peace march from Union Square. Petitions for a nuclear weapon free world were handed to Angela Kane and Ambassador Feroukhi, including 7 million signatures from Japanese citizens and 8000 from Mayors for Peace.

Alyn Ware explained that the Global Wave initiative allowed people not based in New York to participate by signing petitions, staging local events, and uploading videos of themselves waving goodbye to nuclear weapons. Participants hailed from 100 locations around the globe and expressed themselves in creative ways.

Natia Bueno stressed that youth do care about this issue. However, there is a lack of knowledge about nuclear weapons, so youth must be provided statistics on current stockpiles, and information about environmental and development costs of nuclear weapons. Initiatives have included hosting radio shows, screening films, and running workshops “for youth and by youth”. Natia called on civil society to share information online and to offer to speak at universities.

Some actions may seem trivial, however, initiatives can spark something for observers who may then be inspired to get involved, argued Matt de Vlieger. The challenge is to get members of the public to not just care, but to take action and take on leadership roles. State representatives can be directly targeted over Twitter. This allows for discussion between peace advocates, journalists, and government officials. Campaigners are making progress through dialogue and by exposing hypocrisy. Campaigners will keep up the pressure over the atomic bombing anniversaries and beyond. •
EVENT: DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION EDUCATION

Article 36

Action 22 of the 2010 Action Plan of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) encouraged all states to implement “disarmament and non-proliferation education ... in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.” At this lunchtime side event sponsored by Japan and Mexico, on 12 May, educators, UN officials, and diplomats shared their experiences promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education in a variety of contexts.

Ambassador Toshio Sano of Japan chaired the event, welcoming the “growing recognition of the importance of disarmament education”—evidenced by the joint statement of 73 states in Main Committee I. But he called on states to embrace a “culture of reporting” so that they can “learn from each other, create synergies and opportunities.” Only 10 states submitted relevant information to the UN for the 2014 Secretary-General report.

Tonie Jaquez, Mexico’s Deputy Director General for Disarmament and the UN General Assembly agreed, saying “education and promotion of values are crucial for attaining a nuclear free world.” Education is central, Jaquez said, to cultivating an understanding that “a peace sustained by weapons is not a sustainable peace.”

The Nayarit Conference on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons was for Mexico an expression of its commitment to disarmament education, said Jaquez. She also outlined a variety of initiatives of the Mexican government, such as the inclusion of disarmament education in the training of diplomats and military attaches, a short course for Latin American diplomats posted to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).

Virginia Gamba, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for UN Disarmament Affairs said that UNODA is “committed to promoting” disarmament and non-proliferation education as an “essential” but “often overlooked” element in the implementation of the NPT. She celebrated the contributions of “ardent young activists” in their efforts to “strip nuclear weapons of their prestige and power” and she called on states to “educate the younger generation” on the “catastrophic” impact of nuclear weapons.

UNODA’s John Ennis, Chief of the Information and Outreach Branch, provided an overview of its communication through internet and print media, conferences, public events, and briefings to teachers and students. He highlighted UNODA’s art and poetry contests, saying “art and literature form a meaningful way for a wide variety of people in the public” to engage with disarmament issues. He invited everyone to visit UNODA’s new disarmament education portal (www.un.org/disarmament/education).

Ennis also called attention to the UNODA’s partnership with Japan in the preservation and translation of the hibakusha’s personal stories. “These testimonies provide a window to empathy,” he said, by putting “the human dimension at the center of our efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The other three speakers were all university educators. Professor William Potter of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) outlined a variety of best practices for disarmament education. Rather than telling students “what to think,” he said educators should instead emphasize the development of critical thinking skills and empathy, using participatory and active learning methods (such as simulation) and new information technology.

Professor Nobumasa Akiyama of Hitosubashi University spoke about the importance of raising the awareness of the general student population at a university, beyond classes which reach only a self-selecting group of students already interested in disarmament and nonproliferation. He recounted his efforts to deepen students’ understanding of the stories of survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki through public events.

Dr. Matthew Bolton described the emerging role of Pace University in New York City as a hub for disarmament education, including convening the annual Humanitarian Disarmament Campaigns Forum and teaching undergraduates in classes offered by the Peace and Justice Studies, Political Science and Women’s and Gender Studies program. He shared his experience teaching an undergraduate “Global Politics of Disarmament and Arms Control” class and called on disarmament organizations to provide volunteer and internship opportunities to young people.
On the occasion of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Middle Powers Initiative invites you to a discussion on

Nuclear Disarmament: Where Are We and Where Do We Need To Go Now?

Hon. Tarja Cronberg, Chair, Middle Powers Initiative (chair); H.E. Ambassador Libran Cabactulan, Foreign Ministry of the Philippines, President of the 2010 NPT Review Conference; H.E. Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, Foreign Ministry of Austria; Mr. Joseph Cirincione, President, Ploughshares Fund; and Mr. Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute (respondent).

May 20, 2015
1:15 – 2:30 p.m.
Conference Room C, United Nations Headquarters

The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) is a program of the Global Security Institute (GSI).
www.middlepowers.org | www.gsinstitute.org

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