EDITORIAL: THE HUMANITARIAN PLEDGE
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

As the final week of the NPT Review Conference gets underway, the heat on the nuclear-armed states is being turned up by those fed up with the obstinence and arrogance of the five. The nuclear-armed states delivered statements railing against the humanitarian initiative and the demand for a legally-binding instrument to fill the legal gap on nuclear weapons. The majority of others speaking replied with critiques of the pace of disarmament, the lack of timelines and benchmarks in the latest draft text, the weak language on the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons, and the refusal of the nuclear-armed to compromise. And in a clear demonstration of what Ireland has called “the new reality,” Austria announced that the pledge it issued at the Vienna conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW)—which has been endorsed by 84 states with more on the way—has been “internationalised” and is now the Humanitarian Pledge to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear-armed states are certainly highlighting just how effective a measure an international treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons would be. The UK’s blanket statement that it would not accept an outcome document that leaves the door open to a ban treaty does more to signal that future treaty’s threat to the nuclear weapon establishments than it does deter other states from supporting such a treaty. Russia’s refusal to agree to timelines or a concrete programme for disarmament does the same. The US delegation’s assertion that the NPT is not a disarmament regime and its bizarre tirade against “referendums” and “political agendas” also feeds the frustration and sense of injustice at this Review Conference.

If the ban treaty is a referendum on the NPT, then it is only so in relation to an NPT as interpreted by the nuclear-armed states. It is only a referendum on the idea that five countries can continue to possess nuclear weapons (and share them with a handful of others). The US describes this as populist. But should not the majority of states parties be the ones to determine the direction and pace for fulfilling the objectives to which everyone has ostensibly agreed? Or is the US arguing that it knows best and the rest of the world should just let it run the show?

The nuclear-armed states pushed back against the idea that the “majority” supports the humanitarian initiative or condemns nuclear weapons. France argued that most of the world’s population lives in nuclear-armed states and therefore the “majority” receives security benefits from these weapons of terror. But the NPT is a treaty body of states, each of which, according to the UN Charter, is equal, regardless of size. With 96% of non-nuclear-armed NPT states parties expressing concern at the HINW and nearly half endorsing the Humanitarian Pledge, how can five countries assert their security concerns over the rest? For countries that are usually tightly wedded to the concept of sovereignty and the nation state, it is an unusual assertion to make that world population should determine the outcome of negotiations between states.

The nuclear-armed speak about “undiminished security for all,” but seem to expect their perceived security interests to override the security of the vast majority of states. This only serves to underscore the injustice of working within their framing of reality. And it is precisely this sense of injustice—and the sense of distance that the five are generating between themselves and the rest of the world—that fuels the courageous statements from so many non-nuclear-armed states at this Conference.

“Five years after the adoption of the 2010 Action Plan, it appears that the greatest achievements of this Review Conference are to legitimize the step-by-step approach, to mistakenly reinterpret Article VI of the
Editorial, continued

Treaty and to request ‘reductions’ when Article VI is clear in the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons,” argued Costa Rica. It and the Marshall Islands said the conference should stop patting the nuclear-armed states on the back and demand that they fulfill their legal obligations.

The idea that there are conditions on nuclear disarmament is contrary to the NPT, as Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Sweden, and others argued. Algeria, Austria, and many others rejected the assertion that the step-by-step approach is the only “practical” way forward or that benchmarks and timelines are “unacceptable” or “unhelpful”. The Philippines, Costa Rica, and others pointed out that the nuclear-armed and nuclear-dependent states’ emphasis on the “security benefits” of nuclear weapons only promotes proliferation.

What is happening at this Review Conference is not a referendum on the NPT, but it can and should be seen as a referendum on nuclear weapons—and even more pointedly, on the nuclear-armed states’ behaviour. The majority of states have rejected nuclear weapons since their development. But they have gone along over the years with whatever outcomes could be generated at NPT meetings in the interests of hopefully one day achieving nuclear disarmament as promised by the Treaty. This promise no longer holds water. The nuclear-armed states have severely undermined their credibility, and thus that of the Treaty, by consistently failing to implement their legal obligations and refusing to engage in any good faith efforts to remedy this situation. The majority of other states parties are now saying enough is enough.

Austria highlighted the crux of the issue when it critiqued the insistence of the nuclear-armed states to continue advocating a security concept that is “increasingly seen as illegitimate by the vast majority of States.” It is not so much the legality, but rather the legitimacy of nuclear weapons that is so profoundly challenged by the HINW initiative, argued Austria. “Nuclear weapons have catastrophic humanitarian consequences, their possession carries unacceptable risks, their use would be illegal—except maybe for a small range of largely hypothetical scenarios—and the combination of these factors together with the underlying readiness to commit mass destruction make them immoral.”

The nuclear-armed states say the HINW approach and the pursuit of legal measures to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons is divisive. It is nuclear weapons that constitute the greatest instrument of division. After all this time, 45 years since the Treaty’s entry into force, the refusal of the nuclear-armed states to take concrete measures for nuclear disarmament is unacceptable to the majority of states parties.

Ireland was clear that it cannot accept an outcome from this Review Conference that closes off any options for elaborating effective measures for nuclear disarmament before they have been discussed. Thailand, Brazil, and many others emphasised the importance of starting negotiations on legal measures to fill the legal gap now. If such a process is not endorsed by the NPT Review Conference, it only reinforces the idea that this Treaty has been misappropriated by the nuclear-armed states against the interests of the majority of states parties. As South Africa put it, only a few can reject an NPT outcome at any cost, so the Treaty is in danger of becoming a treaty of the nuclear-armed states.

What does belong to the majority (or will as more states sign up in the next few days) is the Humanitarian Pledge. Four days are left in this Review Conference, but this Pledge is a living document that will carry forward the momentum, the will, and the explicit commitment to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. There is no excuse for any state truly committed to nuclear disarmament not to join this international pledge. Now is the time to say “enough” to the nuclear-armed states.*
This brief only highlights changes from the last texts.

Main Committee I
- CRP.5 includes the procedural report of the committee listing all the working papers, documents, and conference room papers relevant to the work of MC I.

Main Committee III
- NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/CRP.1/Rev.4 includes an annotation with title in bold; does not have subheadings.
- New P1 was included as in other committees.
- P2 includes an amended last sentence reaffirming the need to uphold obligations and commitments and urging the full implementation of all previous agreements.
- In P3, former P2, the second sentence was deleted and replaced by two sentences recognising the right to PUNE constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Treaty and confirming the need to respect a state party’s choices and decisions.
- The Chair noted an omission in P5, which will be amended to include developing countries in particular.
- P6 includes a minor change in the reference to developing countries and article IV was added to the list of articles in line 6.
- New P9 focuses on the inalienable right to PUNE.
- New P10 encourages transparency and inclusiveness in export control policies, “which should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing States parties to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.”
- In P13, “with” was inserted after “to cooperate” and “enhanced international cooperation, including” was inserted before “the efforts of the IAEA.”
- In P21, “to ensure a balance between technical and cooperation and its other activities,” was replaced by “to maintain an appropriate balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the IAEA,” and “from” with “by” in the final line.
- P22 omits the reference to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) from former P19 and former P22 sentence 2 is added onto it.
- P23 is former P21, P24 is the first sentence of former P22, P26 is former P20, and P 27 is former P23.
- Additional P25 acknowledges the PUI as a flexible mechanism to mobilise additional resources for IAEA programmes.
- In P35 “recognizes” was replaced by “encourages”.
- In P36 reference to industry and academic institutions has been deleted.
- In P37 the reference to relevant conventions based on best practices has been removed.
- In P39, “in promoting international cooperation on” has been inserted after “the IAEA” in line 2.
- P40 now refers to “safety standards” rather than “standards at the global level”.
- In P42, “through instruments such as UNSCR 1540,” has been deleted. It also now refers to “international” rather than “multilateral” norms that should be “developed” rather than “negotiated”.
- P41 was deleted.
- In P46 “primary” was re-inserted before responsibility in line 1.
- P49 “notes” instead of “recognizes” and “including through international cooperation” was inserted after Action Plan.
- P50 “notes” instead of “welcomes” the Vienna Declaration.
- In P53, “which must be supported by States” was deleted and “coordinating” replaced with “facilitating”.
- In P55 “re” was inserted before cover.
- In P56 “to further minimize” before “use” and including by converting radioisotope production to low-enrichment uranium fuel and targets or by using other were deleted. “The Conference welcomes efforts to use” was inserted before “non-highly enriched”.
- P57 “notes” replaced recognizes and “areas” replaced “area”.
- P59 “and all aspects of their remediation” was inserted in line 3 after “programmes,” and “and technically and economically feasible,” was added after appropriate in line 4. The Chair noted ongoing discussion on that P, when introducing it.
- In P64 “positive” was inserted before “dialogue” and recognizes the positive developments in this regard, including the importance of was deleted and replaced by “notes the”.
- P65 had not been updated to include the language from discussions on Friday afternoon.
- In P66 the date of entry into force is introduced.
- In P67 the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage was reintroduced in the list of conventions.
- P68 includes some new language: after “in place” “both at national and international levels” was inserted; “and adequate compensation” was inserted after “prompt”; “nuclear” was inserted before “damage”; and “and exclusive liability” was inserted after “strict” in line 6. The Chair noted that debate is still ongoing on this P.
- P70 was extended and now includes a new sub-sentence at the end with references to the inalienable right to PUNE.
- P71, former 69, has a new beginning referring to the ultimate responsibility of a state for the safety of waste and spent fuel.
NEWS IN BRIEF
Mia Gandenberger and Gabriella Irsten | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of all statements. It highlights positions on a few critical issues covered during plenary discussions.

Main Committee I
General

- China stressed that the draft is a good basis for next steps but it still has concerns about language on transparency, test sites, and FMCT.
- Germany, Netherlands, Australia, and Spain think that MC1 document well-balanced and a good basis for agreement.
- Spain believed that consensus can be reached as long as the draft does not refer to prohibition of nuclear weapons.
- Russia stated that the draft document is not balanced and need more work.
- Mexico, Cuba, Thailand, Iran, South Africa, Brazil called for proper negotiations before no-agreement or agreement can be announced.
- Austria, Mexico, Ireland criticised the NWS for trying to reinterpret article VI, which clearly says ‘negotiate’ not “identify and elaborate measures” for disarmament.
- Philippines stressed that states that continue to reinforce their arguments for keeping nuclear weapons seriously undermine the NPT.
- Hungary argued that the statement on the HINW of 159 should be treated the same as the statement of 26.
- Ireland said it cannot accept an outcome that closes off any options for elaborating effective measures before they have been discussed.
- UK believes that a ban treaty would be a referendum on NPT and risk undermining the security that the NPT has created.
- The UK also said that the Nuclear Weapons Convention will not get us to a world without nuclear weapons, but is mechanism just to maintain it.
- South Africa stated that there is no major flexibility on disarmament from NWS and that there is a danger that the NPT is becoming a treaty only of the NWS.
- South Africa said that when we proposed that the NWS should engage on nuclear disarmament that did not mean developing a glossary, but rather, figuring out how to implement their legal obligations.
- Marshall Islands regretted the deletion of “UN Charter” in PP7.
- Austria expressed concern that the document keeps getting weakened despite calls from the overwhelming majority asking for it to be strengthened.
- France argued that there is no risk that French nuclear weapons will fall into hands of terrorists.
- NAC found it odd that the Conference would reaffirm the NWS’ unequivocal undertaking and not the NWS themselves in PP26.
- NAC stated that the outcome should reflect what has happened over the last five years and therefore referring to reductions of nuclear weapons as “significant” in PP21 is not appropriate.
- Japan stressed that the joint statement on disarmament and nonproliferation education should be included in the draft.
- Algeria, South Africa wanted non-NWS in alliances to report on what they are doing to reduce role of nuclear weapons too.
- Russia said it couldn’t agree that disarmament is proceeding too slowly.
- Russia also stated that non-NWS that have no experience with NW may have difficulties understanding the security dimension.
- Russia does not want to create grounds for higher expectations and obligations that would be problematic.
- Costa Rice and Cuba argued that the reference to “strategic stability” needs to be deleted in OP3 since it suggests a precondition for nuclear disarmament, when reality is the opposite, nuclear disarmament leads to international security.
- Sweden stated that there should be no precondition on disarmament and this was agreed in 2000.
- Egypt and Argentina called for regular reporting by nuclear host countries on weapons stationed on their territory.
- Egypt also pointed out that the obligations of umbrella states are missing in the new draft.

Modernization and doctrines

- NAM said that modernisation programmes need to be reflected in the draft.
- NAM stated that reductions cannot substitute disarmament and modernisation programmes undermine the reductions made.
- Cuba would not accept OP6 as this would give legitimacy to modernisation programmes that run counter to spirit of the Treaty.

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- NAM wanted a stand alone paragraph urging commencement of negotiations on a NSA treaty.
- Chile believed that the reference to “reductions” in doctrines should be removed since it runs counter to the majority call for the removal of doctrines.
- Austria said that claiming that nuclear weapons provide security provokes nuclear proliferation.
- Austria said that it is problematic if the nuclear-armed states continue to propagate a security concept that is not valid anymore for the majority.
- Spain believes that OP7 on military doctrines needs to integrate the security aspect.
- France claims 55% of global population currently lives in a country whose security is based on nuclear deterrence.
- Russia stated that their military doctrine has been drawn down to a minimum and will be more adapted in accordance with international and strategic developments.

Timeframe:

- US said timelines are a phantom issue and cannot prescribe appropriate security conditions.
- Philippines, Brazil, Chile, Thailand called for inclusion of benchmarks and timelines.
- Cuba stressed that without timelines we leave it up to NWS to decide when they want to disarm.
- Egypt said that the new draft does not provide benchmarks or timelines, which makes the draft go backwards from commitments from 1995, 2000, 2010.
- Algeria said that the step-by-step approach needs to have a clear destination and timelines and cannot be a simple promise.
- Austria lamented that the current draft doesn’t contain any timelines or benchmarks even though the overwhelming majority called for it.
- Costa Rica said OP7 needs to be deleted, arguing that NWS should not be called upon but rather demanded to disarm within timelines.

Way forward

- NAM wants this Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor implementation by nuclear armed of disarmament obligations.
- NAM also called for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to conclude a NWC.
- Cuba and Mexico stated that the current text re-writes article VI to mean reductions.
- US highlighted that the NPT is not a disarmament treaty but a non-proliferation treaty and does not ban the use of nuclear weapons.
- UK said disarmament is a process, not a clear-cut obligation in same way as non-proliferation.
- France stressed that it will not approach nuclear disarmament with ideology or dogmatism, but only with realistic and an pragmatic approach, which is the step-by-step approach.
- France wanted to delete the OP19 all together.
- US also stated that OP19 is unacceptable as it stands.
- NAC said it had hoped for stronger and urgent language in OP19.
- Australia believes that if consensus is found on OP19, then other issues will be easier to solve.
- Costa Rica stressed that the last sentence referring to building blocks in OP19 needs to be deleted.
- Brazil said that OP19 should give more than mere encouragement and should urge states to start negotiation on nuclear disarmament.
- Egypt stated that the current OP19 is unacceptable.
- The US said that the final step of nuclear disarmament will require some kind legal instrument, but we’re not there yet.
- US said that the 2010 Action Plan leads a way forward and should be built on.
- US stressed that referring to the majority view is populist.
- Japan said that the RevCon needs to recognize that the current P5 reporting framework is not a standard reporting form.
- Mexico wants the document to encourage states to pursue negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament.
- Mexico said that language on building blocks is unacceptable in the NPT.
- Sweden welcomed the language on building blocks in the draft.
- UK wanted to include P5 language on Para 7 and was going to provide the chair with text.
- Egypt asked for ban treaty to be negotiated in the CD with timeframes.
- Austria, Mexico, Costa Rica stressed that there are no circumstances that justify the use of a nuclear

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weapon and asked the NWS to explain when circumstances would justify the use.

HINW

- Costa Rica stressed that the three humanitarian consequences constitute the best achievement of past five years; therefore PP30 and 32 need to welcome the HINW and Pledge issued in Vienna.
- Costa Rica emphasized that we cannot forget the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of intentional use of nuclear weapons too, therefore the draft needs to address not only unintentional, but also intentional nuclear weapons use.
- UK wanted to delete action 1, because catastrophic humanitarian consequences do not compel more efforts then NW5 already are obliged to undertake.
- UK believes that the humanitarian concerns are an overarching issue, not just related to disarmament, so should be moved to the chapeau.
- Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, Philippines, Thailand believe that the main development of the review cycle has been humanitarian conferences and therefore this need to be reflected properly.
- Mexico stressed that even a “single detonation” of nuclear device would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences, whether accidental or intentional.
- France reiterated that there is no new info on humanitarian consequences.
- Austria stressed that it is not the legality but legitimacy of nuclear weapons that is profoundly challenged by the humanitarian initiative.
- Japan called for the issue of catastrophic humanitarian consequences to be referred to as unifying factor, like it was reflected in the first draft.
- Spain believed that harmony between humanitarian and security aspects could form a basis for consensus.
- Japan supports the humanitarian approach and the new fact-based studies.
- Austria explained that due to over 80 states having endorsed the pledge it is no longer just an Austrian pledge but an international pledge, endorsed by almost the majority of NPT members.
- Costa Rica, NAC, Chile, Austria, NAC, South Africa, Marshall Islands challenged the language “nuclear conflagration” in PP24.
- Marshall Islands stated that every nuclear detonation has catastrophic consequences, not just nuclear war.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki reference

- Japan’s deputy foreign minister was especially flown in to make comments on OP18, where he request to reinstate the invitation to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to learn about humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
- Australia, Japan and Philippines called for the re-insertion of the reference to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
- China and Republic of Korea opposed the language on inviting world leaders to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Gender diversity

- Costa Rica called for PP13 on equal participation of women and men to reflect UNGA resolution 69/61.
- Ireland and Sweden welcomed reference to the role of both women and men in nuclear disarmament.
- UK wanted a reference to UNSC resolution 1325 in PP13.

Main Committee II

- Subsidiary body II met in the afternoon in a closed meeting.
- MCII met following the session of SBII.
- No draft reports will be forwarded by MC II to the Plenary, but both drafts will be submitted as working papers.

Main Committee III

- Egypt called for a clear reference to Decision 2 of the 1995 outcome document.
- Cuba and Egypt expressed concern with the SBIII text.
- US highlighted that P 3,6,9,43 should be slightly amended to be in line with the text of the NPT.
- US suggested ending P2 after “commitments” in line 6.
- US suggested amending line 5 of P3 so that it reads “a fundamental pillar on which the Treaty is based.”
- Egypt stressed that the inalienable right to PUNE is based on the Treaty.
- US expressed confusion about the deletion of “especially” in line 7 of P4 before “in the territories”.
- Russia noted that in P4 the words “in accordance with the Treaty” have been deleted; despite its preference it would support consensus on this P and not insist on re-inserting these words.
- US suggested in P6 to replace “access” with “exchange”.

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- Brazil stressed some remaining questions regarding P9 and 10.
- Netherlands stressed everyone will have to live with the compromises.
- US stressed that in P9 the right to PUNE is not unimpeded and must be in line with other obligations.
- Poland noted that in P10 it should read “to the fullest extend possible” in all cases.
- Japan highlighted a slight deviation from its submission on P22 and suggested revising the language to maintain logical continuity by referring to the central role of the IAEA TCP in the first sentence and then recognizing the TCF as the most important mechanism for the implementation.
- Japan further suggested merging P25 and 26 by including a reference to the PUI in P26 in line 4.
- US highlighted a technical fix for P41 by inserting “member” before “states”.
- Russia suggested the following changes to P42: in line 2, “a central role in” should be replaced with “leading the coordination of international activities” and in line 4 substituting “international norms” with “IAEA”.
- Poland regretted that the reference to UNSCR 1540 was deleted.
- Argentina explained that it agreed to original wording of P48, but it will also agree to the changes, in order for consensus to be reached.
- US thought it unfortunate that “welcome” was replaced by “note” in P49 and 50.
- On P63, Russia suggested replacing “endorses” with “welcomes” or other similar terms. Further, “international” safety should be replaced with “IAEA” in line 4.
- Switzerland and Singapore suggested in addition to noting the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety including a line to the end of P50 “and also noting the decisions of the contracting parties contained therein on inter alia the reporting and review mechanisms.”
- Algeria regretted that the reference to weapons has been deleted from P59, former P57.
- Germany highlighted the new agreed language of P65 resulting from last week’s informal consultations, beginning after “implications and” it would continue with “could raise serious issues pertaining to international law and therefore call upon all states parties pursuant to action 64 of the 2010 Action Plan to abide by the GC decision (GC(53)/DEC/13) from 2009 on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.”
- China, Iran, US, Russia, Netherlands expressed support for that language.
- NZ expressed the preference for deleting P66; if that was not possible it hoped language from the GC resolution on nuclear safety could be re-introduced to P68.
- Ireland too hoped that the P could return to IAEA GC language.
- Russia could agree to P68 if “at national and international levels” would be removed from line 2.
- Luxembourg welcomed the proposal.
- NZ welcomed that proposal, additionally, it suggested deleting “nuclear” in line 3 of P68.
- Ireland supported that proposal, further “and adequate“ and “an” before accident could be deleted.
- Austria explained it could agree to P68, if it returned to GC language.
- Brazil suggested that the first sentence of P70 could read, “notes the discussions undertaken under the auspices of the IAEA…”
- Brazil failed to see developments in the discussions around the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle that would justify changing the language from 2010.
- Argentina supported that proposal.
- US said it could accept P70.
- Cuba, Egypt, Iran stressed that articles P9, 10, 65, and 70 had been negotiated last week Friday as a package and should not be reopened.
- In closing, the Chair summarised some areas of convergence: the “package” of P9, 10, 65, and 70 with amendments to P70 following the proposal from Brazil and specifying the GC decision reference; the Japanese proposal to merge P25 and 26; and the Swiss proposal for amendments to P50.
- The procedural report of MCIII was adopted with oral amendments noting the WPs of SBIII and MCIII both reflecting the status of discussions in respective meetings.
HIBAKUSHA IN NEW YORK CITY
Kathleen Sullivan | Hibakusha Stories

“We will absolutely never give up hope!” Reiko Yamada, Hiroshima Survivor

After programming in over 100 high schools and universities in the New York Metro Area, reaching some 30,000 students, Hibakusha Stories has concluded its eight-year project. Thousands of youth were moved by the opportunity to hear firsthand the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, making personal the abstraction of living in the nuclear age. Hibakusha Stories, an initiative of Youth Arts New York, has brought atomic bomb survivor testimony to young people, inspiring action for disarmament and educating youth about nuclear weapons and the dangers of ionizing radiation.

In addition to classroom visits, Hibakusha Stories created curriculum to educate students about the nuclear fuel chain through science and humanities. Staff have collaborated annually with United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to offer professional development in disarmament education for NYC public school teachers.

To celebrate years of bringing atomic bomb survivors’ message of courage and compassion to New York youth, Hibakusha Stories conceived and produced a concert on 2 May, “With Love to Hiroshima and Nagasaki” at New York Society for Ethical Culture. The evening of art and music for disarmament featured Masaaki Tanokura concertmaster, Osaka Symphony, who played a restored violin that was found in the rubble of Hiroshima. The Himawari Choir, entirely composed of survivors from Nagasaki, sang an anthem for nuclear disarmament with students from LaGuardia Arts High School that was written by Brooklyn based singer-songwriter Jean Rohe. Also commissioned for the event were animations on the arch of the nuclear age by London-based artist Amber Cooper-Davies. Paul D. Miller aka DJ Spooky’s Peace Symphony shared the stage with poet Anne Waldman & Fast Speaking Music. Nagasaki Mayor Tomihisa Taue communicated his commitment for a nuclear free world. The evening, featuring other authors, activists, and hibakusha, was hosted by Clifton Truman Daniel, the eldest grandson of President Harry S. Truman.

Setsuko Thurlow, an annual honoured guest over the last eight years said: “I found that young people really want to learn about the almost forgotten history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hibakusha Stories has been a remarkable project that I have been proud to be a part of. The fact that our testimony has reached 30,000 young minds is tremendous.”

Students have had a lot to say about their encounters with living history. “I didn’t really understand the atomic bomb until I heard about it from someone who was there,” said a student from Staten Island College High School for International Studies.

A student from Flushing International High School shared her experience from a political and personal level. “This experience changed my views on nuclear weapons. Now I feel that there should not be such destructive weapons existing in our world. This experience also made me value my life more.”

“When I graduate I would like to become a lawyer and try my hardest to help spread the awareness of the atomic bomb’s destruction,” said a student from John Bowne High School.

From East Side Community High School a student remarked “What impressed me most was the fact that she survived it all and still remains happy. That she is still full of energy after suffering so much and is willing to tell us about it is awesome.”

And finally a quote for all the delegates to the NPT RevCon in their final week of negotiations, from a student at Queens Collegiate: “I want to tell world leaders what Mr. Yamashita said: ‘In a war everybody loses, nobody wins.’”

Hibakusha Stories is a partner organisation of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and has collaborated closely with Peace Boat over the years. Although intensive bi-annual programs with hibakusha will no longer take place on the same scale in New York City, team members will continue to support atomic bomb survivors to share their testimony through independent travel, curriculum development, and documentary film. •
A treaty banning nuclear weapons will have a direct and powerful impact on countries that possess them, even if those countries do not participate in the negotiations or sign onto the treaty. This will occur not only through the normative effect of finally filling the legal gap by prohibiting the only weapon of mass destruction still not clearly outlawed by an international treaty, but also through the direct impact it will have on the companies involved in the nuclear weapons industry.

Currently, export control regimes play a significant part in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. By preventing the transfer of key components and materials necessary for nuclear weapons, the treaty is strengthened and proliferation risks are reduced. Although the export control regimes are not open to all states, and are often not transparent in their decision-making processes, many NPT states parties accept their recommendations and limit transfers. This is also a way to enhance and build upon the obligations set out in the Treaty. It is something that a few committed states have taken forward, and it contributes to the overall strength of the regime.

A nuclear weapon ban treaty will play a similar role. It can be negotiated by committed states, and by including prohibitions on investment it will set the stage for significant reductions in working capital for the companies that are involved in modernising nuclear weapons. With strong language in the treaty, as well as with some champion states to lead on national implementation legislation, this is likely to have an unprecedented impact on the companies involved.

This is what Don’t Bank on the Bomb’s sibling campaign, Stop Explosive Investments, has already demonstrated. The cluster munition ban treaty is impacting states not party to the treaty because companies have stopped making cluster bombs. They have done this for a host of reasons, but some of the biggest arms manufacturers in the world have made it clear that the pressure they have felt by being included on financial black lists, has been the incentive they have needed to stop producing inhumane and indiscriminate weapons. A nuclear weapon ban treaty can do that too, and will have a powerful impact towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

For more information, please see www.dontbankonthebomb.com and www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org.
EVENT: GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
Matthew Bolton | Pace University

This panel, chaired by Maritza Chan, Minister Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica, and co-hosted by Pace University and SCRAP, aimed to provide background and perspective on the concept of “general and complete disarmament” (GCD) found in article VI of the NPT. The side event was well timed, following a discussion in Main Committee I in which nuclear-armed states had misused the concept, seeing it as a precondition of nuclear disarmament.

All the panelists refuted this notion, arguing that GCD is an important concept and provided vision for thinking strategically about the disarmament process, but should not be seen as a prerequisite for progress on prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons.

Maritza Chan opened the discussion by critiquing the claim “that a course of action that could make the world a less violent, insecure, and unjust place is ‘unrealistic’,” saying that it “is often a claim about the limits of imagination and courage.” She pointed to the example of Costa Rica’s unilateral disarmament and demilitarization in 1948: “Since then, Costa Rica has been at the forefront of efforts to promote international disarmament and peaceful resolution of conflicts.”

She stated that the concept of GCD “is often dismissed outright as an unrealistic idea or it is used as an empty phrase to suggest a well-meaning though perhaps insincere commitment to eventual world peace. Lately, we have seen it used as a diversionary tool by those who claim progress on nuclear disarmament will only come in some far distant future of global stability.”

Dr. Matthew Bolton of Pace University in New York City then provided a history of the development of the idea of GCD from its roots in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, the League of Nations covenant, and early Cold War disarmament negotiations. He asserted that the humanitarian initiative—putting the human at the center of disarmament efforts—offered the most promise for progress on nuclear disarmament and offered a vision of an approach to proceed on conventional weapons disarmament too.

Following this background, Dr. John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, provided a legal analysis of article VI, demonstrating that the NPT obliges states to progress on nuclear disarmament as a key element of a broader goal of fulfilling GCD. Nuclear disarmament cannot and should not be held hostage by the misuse of the term.

“The practice of states parties and the agreements reached in the Final Documents adopted by NPT Review Conferences demonstrate that the third component of Article VI cannot be interpreted as requiring that nuclear disarmament is to be implemented through one Treaty covering other weapons and armed forces generally,” he said. “Rather, a nuclear disarmament convention (or similar instrument or instruments), like the conventions on biological and chemical weapons, would be a contribution to the objective of general and complete disarmament.”

Dr. Emily Welty of the World Council of Churches Commission on International Affairs challenged participants to root disarmament work in a broader vision of just peace. She dismissed claims that discussions should be solely “pragmatic” or “realistic”, noting that for people of faith, disarmament requires engaging in acts of “prophetic imagination”.

Christopher King of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) called on states to develop a “modern version of GCD” that acknowledges that disarmament and arms control must take place in the context of broader peacebuilding. He challenged participants to think about how to “bring these disparate partial measures together” into a cohesive “strategy” and “narrative.” He stated that “civil society and academia’s creative and innovative solutions” could help lead the way.

Paul Meyer of the Simons Foundation and Simon Fraser University rejected the “hard linkage” of nuclear disarmament and GCD, but called attention to the “soft linkages” between a security system rooted in “nuclear weapons” and “a world awash with weapons” of the conventional kind. He pointed to the progress in Europe toward the end of the Cold War on seeking both conventional and nuclear disarmament, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Meyer introduced the SCRAP “Basic Elements” proposal, developed at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, which aimed to show the possibility of moving forward on GCD. He said that it is “exactly in these times” of insecurity” that we must “consider what is possible”. •
MOTIVATION

Thomas Nash

Have you been trying to tackle that one big problem, the one that just feels too complicated that you don’t know where to start? Do you find yourself making excuses for your lack of action, like you are actually making genuine progress when you know that in fact you’re not? Do you blame other people for not understanding how hard you are trying and say that it’s really their fault? Do you sometimes lash out and say things like: “I don’t need any additional motivation for this task”?

If you are a nuclear weapons possessor (or a close friend of one) then you probably recognised yourself in answering these questions. That’s good. It’s a positive first step. You are not alone. There are others that suffer from your affliction and it has its roots in the history of the 21st century. Do not despair—there is a way forward and it is coming soon.

You cannot really be expected to change overnight. Certainly not before the end of this week. But rest assured, the world is going to help you find the motivation that you will need in order to pick yourselves up and deal with your nuclear addiction. You may not be able to find that motivation within yourselves. It’s for that reason that the rest of the world is laying the groundwork for an international motivational treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons.

This new motivational treaty will lead by example. It will show you that you can live without nuclear weapons. You can have security without nuclear weapons. You can have industry, prosperity, social cohesion and human rights. You can have tourism and culture and great parks with grand statues and monuments. You can have all of this and more and you can pursue it all in the good company of the vast majority of the world’s nations. You will no longer have to say that nuclear weapons are not banned or that the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime permits your possession of nuclear weapons. Because not even you will be able to argue that is true anymore. This motivational treaty will unshackle you from the complex that you have created for yourselves, from the enclosure in which you find yourselves trapped by your nuclear weapons.

If you are still thinking that you have to fight against this treaty, if you are more worried about it than ever—that is understandable. You will fight against it. As you do, you should try to listen to the voice inside yourself that is questioning your opposition. You might even start to ask yourself whether perhaps this ban treaty is that last piece of motivation that you need to tackle this problem head on. Try to hold onto to that feeling. It will be essential as you use the ban treaty to help pull you out of the quagmire. You will try to argue that your role models and peers are not joining so you can’t. This is understandable too. You need to show leadership, to reject this negative culture around you. You will make it. You will want to give up. Don’t. You may not see it right now, but you can do this.
### CALENDAR OF EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>EU as a non-proliferation actor</td>
<td>Conference Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Peace Union of Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement</td>
<td>Conference Room D Conference Building</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00 -18:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00 -18:00</td>
<td>Drafting Committee</td>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>18:30-21:00</td>
<td>Informal drinks</td>
<td>Cornerstone Tavern (961 2nd Ave, Corner of 51st)</td>
<td>INENS</td>
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