EDITORIAL: WE THE PEOPLE
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Last week more than 900 women and men from 80 countries gathered in The Hague to celebrate 100 years of peacemaking with the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and to set a new agenda for peace for the 21st century. Now WILPF is in New York at the NPT Review Conference. Our participation in these very different conferences has one thing in common: our intention is to confront and challenge the structures of power that privilege the few over the many, that undermine international law, and that impede human security.

WILPF’s 100th anniversary conference strongly confronted the corporate and military take-over of governments and the resulting preservation of power over the protection of human beings. “The UN Charter states ‘We the people,’ not ‘I, the hegemonic nation state’,” declared Madeleine Rees, WILPF’s Secretary General. The Charter and the rest of the UN system and body of international law surrounding it are designed to promote peace over violence, law over war.

But this system is not working effectively against the structures of power that prevent the achievement of peace and justice. The NPT has also failed in this regard.

The NPT demands that every effort be made to “avert the devastation of a nuclear war” and to take measures that would “safeguard the security of peoples”. It requires the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the total elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Yet five states parties continue to possess and even modernise and extend the lives of their nuclear weapons, while another 30 or so include nuclear weapons in their security doctrines.

The possession of nuclear weapons, argued South Africa’s delegation, privileges the security interests of a few states “at the expense of the rest of humanity.” And these few are so far unwilling to relinquish this particular tool of domination. The five NPT nuclear-armed state parties reiterated last week that “an incremental, step-by-step approach is the only practical and realistic option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament, while upholding global strategic security and stability.” 26 of their nuclear-dependent allies proclaimed the need to work “methodically and with realism,” imperiously asserting, “There are no short cuts.”

If these states were actually engaged in serious, concrete, time-bound, transparent, verifiable actions for nuclear disarmament, they might have a leg to stand on. But they are not. And their security doctrines assert the importance of nuclear weapons for security—principally, for deterring conflict by threatening massive nuclear violence.

The idea that nuclear weapons can prevent conflict or afford security to anyone has been firmly rejected by the vast majority of governments. And there is a new sense of empowerment developing amongst the peoples and governments of countries that reject nuclear weapons. While some states, such as Belgium, continue to believe that “nuclear disarmament will happen when nuclear-weapon states will no longer feel the need to have them,” most have shaken off this submissive position and are demanding real change, now.

We are told that we are being divisive by doing so. But just as we must stand up to those who abuse and then blame their victims for their abhorrent behaviour, we must reject this accusation. We must not
accept a framing that a ban treaty is polarising or divisive, said the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in its statement to the Review Conference. “Adopting a new international legal standard to prohibit nuclear weapons is a responsibility.”

It is everyone’s responsibility to challenge power and privilege and to fight for the rights of humanity over the interests of a few states. Whether we are at a women’s peace conference aimed at stopping war and violence or at a treaty review conference focused on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, this responsibility lies at the centre of all of our actions. Whether banning nuclear weapons or standing up to patriarchy we are demanding and designing a better world for all.

---

**HUMANITARIAN IMPACT**

**Why ethics is important to the politics of nuclear weapons**

Friday, 8 May 2015 - 13:15-14:30 - Conference Room C

Can certain acts be considered intrinsically wrongful, no matter how likely they may be to achieve their goals or however worthy such goals may be? Does the absence of a specific ban on nuclear weapons under today’s international law reflect a moral ambivalence about the weapons? This side event looks at the challenge of cultivating a political consensus around the view that nuclear weapons are so singularly inhumane we ought categorically to reject their use, whatever purposes they may be said to serve.

**Speakers and Moderators**

- **RAY ACHESON**, Director, Reaching Critical Will
- **JOHN BORRIE**, Senior Researcher & Policy Advisor, UNIDIR
- **TIM CAUGHLEY**, Resident Senior Fellow, UNIDIR
- **NOBUO HAYASHI**, Senior Legal Advisor, ILPI
- **GRO NYSTUEN**, Senior Partner, ILPI
- **CAMILLA WASZINK**, Programme Director, ILPI

The event is co-organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the International Law and Policy Institute. For more information, visit [www.effectivemeasures.org](http://www.effectivemeasures.org).

---

**Editorial, continued**

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.
TORTURE, HOSTAGE-TAKING, AND THE IMMORALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nobuo Hayashi | International Law and Policy Institute

Just as we consider torture and hostage-taking unjustifiable under any circumstances, we deem the use and threat of nuclear weapons fundamentally unethical. There is a need for a political consensus on their unacceptability, and this year’s NPT Review Conference is an important occasion to nurture it.

Our debate about the morality of nuclear weapons has mostly been framed around their ostensible purposes. Many, including political leaders of nuclear-armed states and states under their protective “umbrellas,” believe that nuclear weapons help maintain international peace. For all its bumps and scary moments, our nuclear world has so far held itself together. It is thanks to the credible fear of mutually assured destruction that no two nuclear-armed states have gone to war with each other. Strengthening the status quo - managing risks, ensuring that nuclear weapons remain in the hands of reliable players - may very well give us the best overall chance of continued security. Nobody knows for sure whether fewer nuclear warheads would have brought us stability, or whether a future world free of nuclear weapons would also be a secure one.

Opponents counter that nuclear weapons endanger peace. Nuclear deterrence might have “worked” between the two Cold War blocs, but it clearly failed to curb numerous conflicts that occurred elsewhere; in fact, it may even have made their incidence more likely as proxy wars. Even with the best of intentions, we repeatedly came close to the brink of catastrophic accidents and inadvertent escalations. Nuclear-armed states may also “go rogue,” collapse, or let terrorist groups get hold of their arsenals. In other words, it is despite nuclear weapons that we have kept our world more or less secure. There is no guarantee that we will continue to do so in the future.

One major trouble here is that it is impossible to prove the supposed superiority of that other world without nuclear weapons. Such a world might suffer from some other, but just as deadly, threats to peace and security. Preferring the devil we don’t know over the admittedly imperfect yet tolerable one we do know is hardly a compelling moral choice.

More importantly, debating whether nuclear weapons keep us safe misses the point of their intrinsic moral status. We should see nuclear weapons for what they really are, not what purposes they allegedly serve or how important such purposes are. Isn’t the morally relevant suffering that which nuclear weapons inflict, not suffering that is necessary or unnecessary for this or that end?

Most of us categorically reject torture. Moreover, we do so even where torturing one suspected ticking bomber might save thousands of innocent lives. Torture’s inherent immorality remains the same, not only since it often doesn’t work, but also even if it happens to produce the desired result in some situations. We reject torture because it robs its victims of their human qualities by reducing them to the status of mere instruments for the benefit of the rest of us.

Nor do we accept the idea that hostage-taking can be justified. Our unreserved condemnation of hostage-taking is independent of the act’s utility or disutility. Hostage-taking is indefensible because its perpetrators treat their victims not as ends in themselves but merely as a means towards some other end.

Using nuclear weapons can be considered analogous in moral status to torturing. Decimating population centers and leaving generations of survivors with horrific aftereffects of radiation in the name of some allegedly worthier goals, like restoring strategic parity between nuclear-armed adversaries and expediting war’s conclusion, violates the same fundamental moral premise upon which we condemn torture. Similarly, nuclear deterrence amounts to taking entire populations, not just of one’s enemy but also of third states, hostage. Nuclear-armed states impermissibly use the inevitability of their unspeakable suffering as a bargaining chip in order to deter attacks.

True, our moral outrage against torture and hostage-taking involved the gradual erosion of these techniques’ perceived utility over time, combined with the steady rise of human dignity as the centerpiece of our moral compass. Nevertheless, a similar change regarding nuclear weapons is arguably afoot. The end of the Cold War has diminished the perceived strategic value of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons have gathered mounting scientific evidence on the singular inhumanity to which these weapons are bound to subject their victims.

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a valuable endeavor for its own sake. But it is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and elimination, the NPT’s less successful pillar. The challenge now is to foster a broad political consensus on the inherent immorality of these weapons.

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of all statements. It highlights positions on a few critical issues covered during plenary discussions.

**General debate**

**Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW)**

- Argentina, ASEAN, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, CARICOM, CELAC, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, ICRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Liechtenstein, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, NPDI, Oman, OPANAL, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Ukraine, UAE, UK, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia highlighted the HINW.

- Austria delivered a joint statement on behalf of 159 states expressing deep concern with the HINW and demanding nuclear weapons never be used under any circumstances.

- Australia delivered a joint statement on behalf of 26 states calling for consideration of both humanitarian and “security” dimensions.

- Norway encouraged the nuclear-armed states to sign onto the joint statement on the HINW.

- NAC and Ireland highlighted the discriminatory humanitarian effects radiation has on women and children.

- Estonia highlighted “concerns of diverse nuclear risks and their impact on humanity.”

- Slovenia called for the HINW initiative to be streamlined into the NPT.

- Spain believes that the humanitarian consequences must be addressed realistically and gradually within the NPT framework, and include the nuclear-armed states.

- Viet Nam suggested exploring synergy between the humanitarian discourse and a nuclear weapons convention.

- Sweden believes that we need to put human beings at the heart of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

- UK said its nuclear doctrine and safety ands security measures were developed with full knowledge of the HINW.

**Prohibition and elimination**

- Austria argued implementation of article VI and disarmament commitments is “not sufficiently credible”. It reiterated its commitment to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and noted that almost 80 states have now endorsed the Austrian Pledge.

- CARICOM, CELAC, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Iraq, Ireland, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malta, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, and Zambia indicated they have endorsed the Pledge.

- Costa Rica and Palau called on all states to endorse the Pledge.

- Samoa indicated it will endorse the Pledge.

- South Africa echoed the call to action in the Pledge and supported the growing call for the construction of legally-binding agreement(s).

- CELAC, Nigeria, and Zambia reiterated they are committed to negotiating a legally-binding instrument for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

- NAC called for work to begin on the construction of a comprehensive legally-binding mechanism, whether that is pursued through the negotiation of a standalone agreement or a framework of mutually supportive instruments.

- CELAC, Costa Rica, Libya, Malawi, Palau, and Papua New Guinea called for a treaty banning nuclear weapons.

- Palau urged negotiations on a ban treaty to begin by the 70th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

- Costa Rica and Palau called for negotiations of a ban treaty to begin even if the nuclear-armed states refuse to participate.

- Malaysia called for a treaty to outlaw and eliminate nuclear weapons.

- ICRC recalled its call from September 1945 on states to prohibit nuclear weapons.

- Netherlands said, “Eventually, we need to ban the bomb”.

continued on next page
Laos welcomed the Bangkok roundtable on HINW and banning nuclear weapons.

CELAC and South Africa highlighted the anomaly that nuclear weapons are the only WMD that have yet to be subjected to a comprehensive, global prohibition.

Costa Rica noted that in the past, weapons with unacceptable humanitarian consequences such as biological and chemical weapons were prohibited and then eliminated.

Liechtenstein, Palau, and Samoa highlighted the Marshall Islands’ lawsuit against nuclear-armed states.

NAM, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Yemen called for a comprehensive convention eliminating nuclear weapons.

Tanzania called for treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons that also establishes clear guidelines against possession.

CELAC and Nicaragua supported the Cuban proposal submitted during the third conference on HINW.

Switzerland believes that there is a need for an inclusive discussion about possible additional instruments to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Ireland, Marshall Islands, Palau, and South Africa urged the RevCon to thoroughly consider options for “effective measures” for nuclear disarmament.

Japan, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland highlighted that eliminating nuclear weapons requires engaging with the nuclear-armed states.

Ireland highlighted that not a single warhead has been disarmed under the NPT as part of any multilateral process, and there is no structure for this to happen.

Belgium argued that nuclear disarmament will happen when nuclear-armed states no longer feel the need to have NW.

Step-by-step

- Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, UK, and US preferred the step-by-step or building blocks approach to nuclear disarmament.

- Joint statements delivered by the UK on behalf of the five nuclear-armed states and by Australia on behalf of 26 nuclear-dependent states suggested the step-by-step approach is the only realistic approach.

- Portugal emphasised that steps actually have to be taken and cannot be an excuse for stagnation.

- Bulgaria called for “inclusive and comprehensive” discussion on the “necessary steps” for nuclear disarmament with the “substantive participation” of the nuclear-armed states.

- Lithuania opposed “creating new structures for negotiation”.

“P5 process”

- Singapore noted regular consultations among the NPT nuclear-armed states but pointed out it is not transparent and that NNWS are concerned about their commitment to nuclear disarmament.

- UK delivered a joint statement on behalf of the NPT nuclear-armed states.

Reductions

- Russia and the United States both argued that the other was responsible for hindering further nuclear reductions.

- Germany called for the inclusion of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in a new reductions agreement.

- Brazil stressed that arsenal reductions, especially when carried out in the context of modernisation programmes and vertical proliferation, do not equal nuclear disarmament.

Modernisation

- The majority of delegations expressed concern with modernisation programmes.

- Austria described modernisation as dangerous for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and for international law.

- Belarus called for the prohibition of the creation of new types of nuclear weapons.

- CELAC, Brunei Darussalam, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Holy See, and Venezuela regretted the wasted money spent on maintenance and modernisation of nuclear weapons rather than socioeconomic development.

Nuclear “deterrence” and security doctrines

- Switzerland proposed that nuclear-armed states should limit the role of nuclear weapons to the sole
News in brief, continued

- purpose of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other states.

- US said its nuclear deterrence policy’s primary purpose is to deter nuclear threats from others.

- UK said it will retain a credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the security situation makes that “necessary”.

Nuclear sharing

- South Africa suggested states parties undertake a systematic analysis of articles I and II to develop a common understanding of nuclear sharing arrangements.

- NAM stated that any horizontal proliferation and nuclear sharing by states parties constitute a violation of articles I and II.

- CELAC and Venezuela called on relevant states to end their “extended nuclear deterrence” policies.

Nuclear safety and security

- Norway reiterated its work with Ukraine and others to strengthen the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, radioactive source security, and border control.

- Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, France, Latvia, Russia, Serbia, UK, and US underlined the importance of the IAEA Action Plan and / or the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.

- Latvia called for global governance of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities.

- Lithuania called for transparency around nuclear construction projects.

- CARICOM expressed concern at the transshipment of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea.

- Brazil highlighted the joint Nuclear Security Summit statement to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit titled “In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security”.

Safeguards

- Portugal welcomed the state level approach to safeguards.

- Brazil highlighted the debate about the state-level concept for new approaches to safeguards, but stressed the need for coordination with the state in question.

Fissile materials

- France recalled the draft FMCT it submitted to the CD.

- Luxembourg and Serbia welcomed this draft.

Ukraine conflict

- Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, and the US expressed concern with the crisis in Ukraine and its implications for the NPT.

- Austria opposed renewed nuclear brinkmanship over Ukraine and emphasised nuclear weapons and “deterrence” are not the answer to current tensions in Europe.

- Lithuania deplored rhetoric involving nuclear weapons by one nuclear-armed state in support of its political goals.

Iran’s nuclear programme

- ASEAN, CARICOM, EU, NPDI, Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, US, and Venezuela welcomed the framework agreement between the E3+3 and Iran.

- Saudi Arabia noted the agreement.

- Canada expressed its continued concern over this issue.

Middle East WMD free zone

- Arab Group, CARICOM, EU, OPANAL, NAC, NAM, NPDI, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, China, France, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Venezuela, and Yemen called for the conference on the MEW-MDFZ to be held.
A WMD/DVs Free Zone
For The Middle East –
Taking Stock, Moving Forward Towards Cooperative Security

Date: Monday, May 4, 2015
Duration: 1.15 – 2.30 p.m.
Venue: Conference Room D,
United Nations, New York

A light lunch will be served.
The 170-pp. study will be available in paper copy.

Introductory Remarks by
H.E. Ambassador Benno Laggner
Head of Division for Security Policy and Ambassador for Nuclear Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation of the Swiss Confederation

Presentation of the Compact Study by
Adj. Prof. Dr. Bernd W. Kubbig
Project Director of the Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East at the Peace Research
Institute Frankfurt

Special Guests
H.E. Ms. Angela Kane
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H. E. Thomas Countryman
Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. State Department

Concluding Remarks by
H.E. Ambassador Michael Biontino
Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament
News in brief, continued

- Kyrgyzstan called for convening the conference before the end of 2015.
- Arab Group call for the UNSG to convene a conference within 180 days of the 2015 RevCon to launch a process to negotiate a MEWMDFZ treaty.
- Syria argued that since it has joined the CWC Israel must join the NPT.

Universality

- Austria highlighted the impact that nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states has on the universality and credibility of the Treaty.

Withdrawal

- South Africa argued that proposals for developing a common understanding of the elements of article X should be extended to other articles of the Treaty.
- Bulgaria called for tightening the provisions of article X.
- Portugal believed there is a role for the UNSC in addressing withdrawal.
- Republic of Korea said there must be discussion on withdrawal during or after Treaty violations.
- Kazakhstan called for clear mechanisms to discourage withdrawal from the Treaty.

Review Conference outcome

- Australia, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, and US said the outcome should advance the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan.
- Brazil, Indonesia and Morocco stressed there should not just be a roll-over of the Action Plan.
- NAC does not believe that the Action Plan is a roadmap to long term actions.
- Cuba cautioned that the measure of success is not simply the adoption of an outcome document, regardless of its content.
- Cuba called for a well-defined plan of practical actions with specific timelines for compliance, particularly related to nuclear disarmament.
- Philippines stressed that the outcome document must reflect the calls for effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Kyrgyzstan, New Zealand, and Norway called for strong language on the HINW to be included in the outcome document.
- New Zealand expects the outcome document to reflect the increasing risk of a nuclear weapon detonation and to recognise the credibility of the NPT cannot sustain indefinite delay of the implementation of article VI.

Other

- Papua New Guinea thanked the Hibakusha that travelled to the RevCon to share their testimonies.
- Marshall Island said that the NPT has failed to listen to hibakusha.
- Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Philippines, and Sri Lanka highlighted the importance of disarmament education.
- Japan called for the nuclear-armed states to include numbers in their national reports to increase transparency.
- The NAC also encouraged an increase in transparency, including through more regular and detailed reporting.
- Denmark stressed that women are not yet adequately involved in many aspects relating to the NPT.

Main Committee I

Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW)

- The US said it participated the Vienna conference on HINW to emphasise the importance of taking realistic measures in nuclear disarmament.
- EU noted the severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasised that all states share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

Prohibition and elimination

- Mexico called for a substantive discussion in the RevCon on advancing multilateral negotiations on effective measures for disarmament.
- NAC expressed concern that states are using today complex situation as an excuse to not disarm and instead arm.
- Russia found it strange that some claim that nothing is being done on nuclear disarmament and said such continued on next page
News in brief, continued

claims can only be explained by lack of information or emotions.

Step-by-step

• Australia, France, and Poland prefer the building blocks or step-by-step approach.
• Cuba argued the step-by-step approach is used to prevent nuclear disarmament.

Reductions

• Japan said that further reductions will eventually lead to multilateral negotiations with all nuclear-armed states.
• Poland support the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in future reductions by US and Russia.

“P5 process”

• EU encouraged holding further P5 conferences.

Review Conference outcome

• France believes the 2010 Action Plan to be a long-term roadmap and said it must be strengthened by a step-by-step approach “without deviating from the chosen path”.

NPT RevCon Side Event

CAN NATO BAN THE BOMB?
The Humanitarian Initiative in dialogue with nuclear alliance states

Tuesday, May 5, 1:00–2:30 pm
Baha’i center, 866 United Nations Plaza
A light lunch will be served at 12:30 pm
EVENT: SCRAPPING TRIDENT
Sara Medi Jones | Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

CND’s panel discussed whether the UK scrapping Trident could break the log-jam in nuclear disarmament discussions. CND’s chair Dave Webb explained the current situation in Britain, highlighting that the upcoming election provides an opportunity for disarmament campaigners. Politicians Bill Kidd MSP (Scottish National Party) and Jean Lambert MEP (Green Party) expanded on the theme. Jean stressed the need for the international community to support politicians and political parties that support disarmament, as they are likely to be accused of giving up British influence in the world. In turn, the debate about scrapping Trident can influence decisions in other nuclear weapon states.

International disarmament expert Jean-Marie Collin explained that this is certainly the case in France, which also needs to imminently make a decision about the future of its nuclear-armed submarines. French media has increasingly been reporting the repercussions of the UK election result on Trident replacement.

Jackie Cabasso, the Executive Director for the US-based NGO Western States Legal Foundation, was slightly more pessimistic about the possible impact in the United States. She raised concerns about nuclear relationships and agreements that would linger between the US and UK, as well as the likelihood of what the money would be spent on instead—more war.

Tadaaki Kawata from Gensuikyo (the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) spoke of his frustration with the step-by-step approach to disarmament and said that scrapping Trident would provide a new impetus to international disarmament.

Contributions from the floor resulted in a debate about the role of corporations. The meeting provided many fresh angles to the campaign against Trident replacement, issues which CND will aim to incorporate into its work in the UK. •

EVENT: DON’T BANK ON THE BOMB
Susí Snyder | PAX

“We must have our own step by step attack on the financial edifice that supports the nuclear weapons industry.” - Jayantha Dhanapala

This was the thrust of the discussion during the Don’t Bank on the Bomb NPT side event on Friday, 1 May. Speakers included Jayantha Dhanapala, Chair of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension conference and current President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Ray Acheson, Director of the Reaching Critical Will programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and Wilbert van der Zeijden, Senior Researcher at PAX and co-author of the Don’t Bank on the Bomb report.

During the session three key elements were discussed related to the financing of nuclear weapons. The demand side, covered eloquently by Ray as she discussed the updated Assuring Destruction Forever report on nuclear weapons modernisation. All states are modernising their nuclear arsenals. The supply side, elaborated by Wilbert in discussing the findings of the report. And, Jayantha spoke forcefully on the need for concerted action and campaign efforts to withdraw investments from this evil enterprise.

The ensuing discussion among participants brought up several interesting approaches to strengthen efforts to stop the modernisation of nuclear arsenals by eliminating the financing that facilitates them. One suggestion worth further discussion is to include language at this NPT Review Conference to prevent the financing of nuclear weapons. Hopefully, delegates will take up the challenge and raise divestment as a tool to stigmatise, outlaw, and eliminate nuclear weapons. •
A nuclear war using only 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs against modern cities would cause prolonged global climate change and create an ozone hole encircling the entire Earth, according to data presented by Rutgers professor Alan Robock at an NPT side event sponsored by IPPNW on April 28. “Nuclear famine and the ban treaty: how prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons can prevent a climate disaster” examined the scientific and medical evidence supporting the conclusion that the number of nuclear weapons in the world must be reduced to zero without delay.

Robock explained that three independent computer simulations had arrived at the same result: five million tons of smoke and soot produced by firestorms and injected into the upper atmosphere would block sunlight over much of the northern hemisphere for a decade or more. Temperatures would plummet, rainfall would decrease, UV-blocking ozone would be destroyed, and crops would fail in major agricultural regions.

Lily Xia, a post doctoral graduate student working with Robock, presented data showing that nuclear-war-induced climate change would reduce harvests of rice, maize, and winter wheat in China by 20-40% during the first five years.

IPPNW co-president Ira Helfand said that an impact on agriculture of this magnitude would lead to food shortages placing at least two billion people—almost a third of the world’s population—at risk of starvation. Most of the victims, he added, would be in countries far removed from the nuclear conflict itself, though the collapse of agricultural and trade systems would affect everyone.

Robock noted that the scientific case for nuclear winter—first developed during the Cold War between the US and the former Soviet Union—had been strengthened by these new studies. Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan, he said, had been so influenced by the evidence for nuclear winter that they both came to the conclusion that nuclear weapons must be eliminated.

Both Robock and Helfand said that the only responsible policy in the face of this evidence is to fill the legal gap identified in the Austrian Pledge and to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons in compliance with Article VI of the NPT.

On Thursday, 30 May, Global Zero, New Zealand, and Sweden hosted an event on de-alerting. Mrs Annika Thunborg from Sweden explained that the issue of de-alerting is one that countries have championed since 2007, when a group of five states (New Zealand, Nigeria, Switzerland, Chile and Malaysia) first put forward a resolution calling on states to decrease the operational readiness of weapons. It took a few years for the issue to gain traction, but cross-regional consultations helped provide momentum. Today, 166 countries support the resolution, including most states under the nuclear umbrella. The countries who have not yet been persuaded of the merits of the resolution are the nuclear-armed states.

General James Cartwright and Dr. Bruce Blair also presented. Cartwright is a former Marine Corps general and current defense chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Blair is a former missile launch control officer and current research scholar at Princeton. Both were adamant that nuclear weapons must be taken off high-alert status. Cartwright believes that having systems on high-alert steals time away from rational decision-making. Officials need sufficient time to gather staff, assemble intelligence, and make an informed decision; miscalculations can otherwise easily be made. Weapons on high-alert are also prime targets for terrorism and cyberattacks.

Blair believes that it is tempting fate to keep thousands of launchers, which would be activated upon receiving short streams of messages (the length of tweets!), given that security systems are “not sealed with iron clad confidence”. He once discovered an electronic backdoor that would have allowed a terrorist to hack into a US naval network and launch a missile from a submarine. As co-founder of Global Zero, Blair has been involved in the production of an April 2015 Global Zero report, which recommends that US and Russia begin a process of de-alerting and that all states engage in a multilateral process to this end. This report is the product of a commission that is composed of 31 men and only one woman.

New Zealand Ambassador Dell Higgie stated that de-alerting is a key example of a practical step towards disarmament, which nuclear-armed states that reiterate their commitment to a step-by-step process should be willing to support. Higgie called on nuclear-armed states to sign up to the resolution and asked civil society to echo the benefits of de-alerting. •
After the Nuclear Deal with Iran
Next Steps towards a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Speakers: Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Frank von Hippel and Zia Mian
Wednesday, 6 May, 10:00–11:30 a.m.

The Global Challenge of Reprocessing and Plutonium Disposal

Speakers: Frank von Hippel, M.V. Ramana, Tatsuiro Suzuki and Mycle Schneider
Thursday, 7 May, 10:00–11:30 a.m.

Global Fissile Material Report 2015
Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production

Speakers: Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian
Friday, 8 May, 10:00–11:30 a.m.

All events will be in Conference Room C
United Nations, New York
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:00-8:50</td>
<td>Abolition Caucus</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00-9:50</td>
<td>Government briefing for NGOs: Austria</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Reaching Critical Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Main Committee I</td>
<td>Conference Room 2 Conference Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the problems of Korean A-bomb victims, and a film screening</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Contact &amp; Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Strategies and Priorities for the Comprehensive Reduction of Nuclear Risks</td>
<td>Room C Conference Building</td>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network for Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Evaluating the Concept and the Politics of a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East in the Context of the 2015 NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Switzerland and Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>The Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and All Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East</td>
<td>Conference Room 2 Conference Building</td>
<td>Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Action 22-Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education: The Tool for Advancement of the NPT</td>
<td>Baha’i Center, 866 United Nations Plaza</td>
<td>NAP, BANg, CNS, and PIR Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30-14:30</td>
<td>UK-Norway Initiative: Trust and Confidence Exercises</td>
<td>Conference Room 7 Conference Building</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 -18:00</td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 -18:00</td>
<td>Main Committee III</td>
<td>Conference Room 2 Conference Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Korean Denuclearization and Peace: Signing a Peace Treaty, Ending the Korean War and Creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</td>
<td>Conference Room C</td>
<td>People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Contact &amp; Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30-21:00</td>
<td>Informal drinks</td>
<td>Cornerstone Tavern (961 2nd Ave, Corner of 51st)</td>
<td>INENS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>