EDITORIAL: THE CHOICE BETWEEN COURAGE AND FEAR

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Progress or procrastination? This is the choice available to states participating in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Progress is based on courage. It requires serious discussions, now, in this Conference, about real effective measures for nuclear disarmament. And it requires bold, new commitments from all states parties—including the negotiation of new legal instruments that are truly designed to fulfill the objectives of the NPT.

Most states are demanding exactly this kind of progress. Austria called for the Review Conference to “put a credible process in place to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.” Mexico called for “the initiation of a clearly defined and irrevocable process for the negotiation of effective measures.” Costa Rica called for concrete, time-bound commitments. New Zealand called for “measures that, under international law, set the rules and the prohibitions to be followed by us all if we are to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world.” Anything less, Ambassador Dell Higbie argued, would not be a truly “effective measure” for nuclear disarmament.

The alternative to progress is procrastination, which is based on fear. Fear of change, fear of each other, fear of reprisal for stepping up and taking action.

It means continuing to be intimidated by the nuclear-armed states and their allies, states that accuse those wanting progress of being divisive, polarising, ignorant, and even emotional. Indeed, Russia mused that claims that nuclear disarmament is in stagnation “bear no relation to the truth and apparently can be explained either by lack of information or by a polemic fervor, when objective assessments are replaced by emotions.” But it is not the only one to use this sort of language. Its remarks are reminiscent of the Latvia’s comment at First Committee last year that assessing implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan is sometimes approached “in a rather emotional manner.” It also reminds one of Belarus’ warning in the Conference on Disarmament earlier this year about “topless ladies” starting to “scream and throw bottles of mayonnaise” from the gallery if broader civil society participation was allowed.

These accusations are highly gendered. When men want to assert their power and dominance and make women feel small and marginalised, they accuse us of being emotional, overwrought, relentless, repetitive, irrational. This technique has been employed for as long as gender hierarchies have existed, including within the nuclear weapon discourse.

It is no surprise to hear it leveled by some states against others in the NPT context. The states using this kind of language as a weapon are representative of those calling for procrastination. They want the 2015 outcome to reiterate or “update” what they describe as “reasonable,” “realistic,” “practical,” or “pragmatic” steps. These steps, of course, refer to activities that have been on the international agenda since the 1950s. And the states promoting them argue that anything else is ridiculous, because of the “strategic security environment.”

Most of the nuclear-armed states have argued that conditions are not ripe for nuclear disarmament because of current international tensions. Russia said the question “what next” cannot be answered now because the “strategic stability” is deteriorating. France said nuclear disarmament is only for “when the strategic context allows.” China argued disarmament can only be undertaken in a secure international environment.

Interestingly, the NPT does not include such a condition. The Philippines and South Africa pointed this out, with the Philippines
Editorial, continued

noting that nothing in the NPT sets preconditions for nuclear disarmament actions and South Africa arguing that the only necessary conditions for nuclear disarmament were created when the NPT entered into force.

But beyond that technicality, it should also be pointed out that the states deploiring the deterioration of the strategic context are themselves at the heart of rising tensions. “The United States, its NATO allies, and Russia—countries that together possess most of the nuclear weapons that exist,” noted Western States Legal Foundation in its presentation to the NPT last week, “have turned a civil conflict in Ukraine into a violent proxy war in the borderlands of Europe.”

One could argue that a rational perspective would suggest that now is the perfect time to get serious about nuclear disarmament. Fortunately a number of governments, including several in Europe, are being rational about this situation. Austria firmly expressed that “the current tensions in Europe, which unfortunately remains the continent most affected by the presence of nuclear weapons, make the focus on nuclear disarmament and the full implementation of all NPT obligations and commitments all the more important.” Lithuania deplored rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons in support of political goals.

But still, the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-dependent allies continue to insist that they are reasonable and practical and those who want progress on disarmament—the vast majority of NPT states parties—are irresponsible, ignorant, or emotional. And so as Brazil said last week, we find ourselves “in a stalemate akin to Zeno’s paradox.” Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota explained, “The ancient Greek philosopher claimed that movement was impossible, because before walking a certain distance, first one would have to walk half that distance, and before that, a quarter, and so on indefinitely.” In the context of the step-by-step approach, then, he argued, “the international community has been told that, before taking any first step, we should take half the first step, and before that, half of half a step, and so on.”

But movement is not an illusion nor an impossibility. Momentum for the prohibition of nuclear weapons is growing. And those who are driving this movement are not irresponsible, irrational, or emotional. On the contrary, they are the realistic ones. They realise that continuing down the same path of inaction for another five years will neither reduce tensions nor fulfill the NPT’s goals. They realise that waiting for the nuclear-armed states to lead the way will only lead us deeper and deeper into a world order where the many rule the few through the threat of violence and terror.

We are faced with a choice. We can spend the next five years watching the nuclear-armed states fail to implement the “actions” we roll over from 2010 and then reconvene at the next review conference in 2020 to lament the lack of progress. Or, we can try something new. •
**NEWS IN BRIEF**

*Gabriella Iristen and Mia Gandenberger| Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of all statements. It highlights positions on a few critical issues covered during plenary discussions.

**Main Committee I**

**Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW)**
- Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland, Iran, Italy, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland highlighted the HINW.
- Austria emphasised that the HINW raise profound moral and ethical questions.
- Canada argued both humanitarian and security concerns need to be taken into account.
- Austria, Brazil, and New Zealand believe that the HINW need to be in the centre of all disarmament forums.
- Finland, which signed on to both HINW statements, proposed merging them in the future, arguing there is no conflict between them.

**Prohibition and elimination**
- Austria, New Zealand, South Africa, and Switzerland called for a credible process to identify and pursue effective measures for nuclear disarmament.
- Austria highlighted its Pledge to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Switzerland suggested to address the different legal proposal in subsidiary body I.
- Costa Rica and CELAC indicated they have endorsed the Pledge; Costa Rica called on all states to endorse it.
- Costa Rica called for a legally-binding international instrument that clearly prohibits nuclear weapons based on their unacceptable consequence, which would build on existing norms and fill current loopholes.
- Costa Rica and Malaysia called for a ban on nuclear weapons.
- New Zealand said that a legally binding instrument is necessary to fulfill article VI and achieve nuclear disarmament and called for measures that set out necessary rules and prohibitions to be followed by all.
- Brazil and Iran called for a NWC, with Brazil saying it has to include all nuclear-armed states.
- Philippines called for a comprehensive NWC or a series of mutually reinforcing legal instruments with a credible system of verification.
- China argued disarmament can only be done in a secure international environment.
- Philippines and South Africa pointed out there are no preconditions for nuclear disarmament elaborated in the NPT.

**Step-by-step process**
- Finland, Italy, and Latvia supported a step-by-step or building block approach.
- Costa Rica stated that the step-by-step approach is not sufficient.
- Brazil said that the step-by-step process has failed.
- Philippines stressed that nothing in the NPT obliges us to limit our efforts within the steps of the Action Plan.
- Austria called for increased transparency, accountability, and to reduce risks in the interim period.

**“P5 process”**
- Latvia believes that the key to success is the P5 process.
- Republic of Korea and Switzerland said that the outcome from P5 is modest and called for intensified work.

**Reductions**
- Brazil, Costa Rica, Iran, Malaysia, South Africa, and Switzerland expressed concern that modernisation is contradictory to article VI and/or undermines reductions.
- The Nordic countries, Italy, and Latvia called for further reductions in particular including non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- China called on other NWS to reduce nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories.
- Switzerland called for further and deeper reductions, including of operational readiness.
- Canada argued that reductions will eventually lead to disarmament.

**Nuclear “deterrence” and security doctrine**
- Malaysia said nuclear security doctrines lead to instability.
- Finland and Iran stressed no state’s security should be based on nuclear weapons.
- China and Philippines called on other nuclear-armed states to adopt a no-first-use policy.

**Ukraine conflict:**
- Latvia expressed concern about violation of the Budapest memorandum.
- Philippines stressed that the current crises must compel us to immediately eliminate nuclear weapons.
FMCT
- China, Latvia, and Republic of Korea hoped that the report of the FMCT GGE will provide the necessary impulse to start negotiations in the CD.
- Canada as chair of the GGE on FMCT highlighted that there is consensus in the GGE to ban the production of FMCT.
- Canada indicated that although it prefers the CD for negotiations on FMCT, it is open to other forums due to the stagnation in the CD.

Review Conference outcome
- Costa Rica stressed that we need more than just adjustments to the 2010 Action Plan to have a successful RevCon; we need concrete, time-bound commitments. It emphasised it cannot accept an extension of the 2010 Action Plan as a basis of future work.
- Republic of Korea wanted a list of specific task that need to be worked on until next RevCon.
- Brazil wants annual reports on implementation of NPT commitments and a timeline no later than 2017 PrepCom.
- Finland, Latvia, and Switzerland believe the Action Plan is a good base for further work.
- Brazil, Morocco, Norway, and Switzerland insisted the HINW should inform the outcome document.
- Morocco called for a timeframe for implementing agreed measures.
- Morocco called for the establishment of an open-ended working group on transparency within disarmament.

Other
- Costa Rica and South Africa condemned the wasted money spent on nuclear weapons and not on social and economic justice.
- Finland stressed it supports civil society participating in disarmament processes.

Main Committee II
MEWMDFZ
- The Facilitator for the Conference on the establishment of a MEWMDFZ introduced the report on his work to the Committee.
- Many states thanked him for his efforts.
- Egypt criticized the consultations for being merely aimed at giving a false impression of progress and said they have brought parties further apart as a result.
- NAM, Arab Group, Brazil, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria expressed concern about long delay in implementing the 1995 resolution and 2010 decision on the Middle East.
- EU, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, China, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Thailand, and UK expressed continued support for the conference on the establishment of a MEWMDFZ.
- NAM, Arab Group, and Egypt highlighted WP.33 on “Implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2010 outcome on the Middle East” and the recommendations contained therein.
- Cuba supported the proposal.
- Russia did not rule out modifications of the mandate of the conference, should consensus allow.

Safeguards
- IAEA outlined the state level concept (SLC) and reiterated that it will not entail introduction of additional rights of obligations on either side.
- Brazil, Russia, and South Africa welcomed the IAEA’s assurance on SLC.
- EU, Norway, and UK said implementation of the SLC will strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system.
- Switzerland thought it crucial that the SLC results in tangible and quantifiable improvements.
- IAEA highlighted the conclusion of six new Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements, 24 Additional Protocols, and 17 Small Quantities Protocols since 2010.
- South Africa expressed disappointment that no progress has been made thus far on additional declarations of stockpiles of fissile material in excess of military requirements.
- Brazil called for wider application of IAEA safeguards in nuclear-armed states.

Iran’s nuclear programme
- EU, Argentina, Australia, China, Germany, Japan, Norway, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, UK, and IAEA welcomed the recent agreement of E3/EU+3 with Iran.

Other
- EU welcomed the LEU bank to be set up by the IAEA in Kazakhstan.
- Cuba criticised ongoing modernisation efforts of nuclear arsenals.
- Russia, Iran stressed that NATO nuclear sharing is a violation of the NPT.
- Netherlands and US disagreed.

continued on page 6
At the Abolition 2000 Annual Meeting on 2 May, the meeting was opened with a moving welcome and greeting sent to us from the Lenape Center with a call for a new cycle of consciousness to protect Mother Earth. The Lenapes were the indigenous first people living in Manhattan who welcomed the first Dutch settlers to New York City, initially explored by Europeans when Henry Hudson sailed up the river named after him in 1609. Please read this greeting and call and reflect on what is required of humankind to cherish, appreciate and preserve all life on earth.

A statement from Lenape Center

Welcome to the Land of the Lenape, Lenapehoking.

Mother Earth has provided for us everything we need to experience life since the beginning of time.

This generosity has been abused by the addiction of profit, and her body deemed a commodity. We have prostituted our life-giving Mother to our greed; our vicious lust for profit has caused great injury to her body, a body that sustains us. Climate change is the symptom, global warming is her fever and the disease is greed.

Had we kept a relationship of honor and respect with the Earth, we would not be in this climate change predicament, nor would we be here today to speak of peace and disarmament.

The root cause of climate change, the weapons race, nuclear proliferation, and the military industrial complex are one: Humans have lost their natural calibration to the life-giving cycles of our planet. Heart, consciousness, compassion, balance, have ceased to be spun into life, and into renewal: Humans no longer feel an obligation to honor Earth’s true role as the life-giver and respectfully follow her natural cycles. The overwhelming obligation is now profit, at all costs.

Welcome to Lenapehoking and into a call for a new cycle of consciousness. •
http://www.thelenapecenter.com/

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

presents a
documentary film series on

Nuclear Disarmament

2015 NPT Review Conference
DHL Auditorium
UNHQ, New York
www.nptfilms.org

In My Lifetime
Directed by Robert E. Frye.

It has been 70 years since the Trinity explosion on 16 July 1945. The documentary searches internationally for an answer to the question, “Is there a way beyond nuclear weapons?”. It is part wake-up call, part challenge for people to engage with the issues of ending the world of the most destructive weapon ever invented.

6 May, 1:15 pm
click RSVP here
Main Committee III Vienna Declaration

- EU and Mexico highlighted and welcomed the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.

Nuclear safety and security

- Czech Republic and Mexico stressed the importance of universalization of export controls.
- EU stressed the importance of robust security in the management of nuclear and radioactive materials, recognizing that this is a national responsibility. Argentina, Australia, Russia, and IAEA highlighted the Fukushima catastrophe and the important lessons learned from it.

Safeguards

- NAM expressed its concern regarding certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions imposed on developing countries that hamper the development of nuclear energy.
- Cuba said technical cooperation with the IAEA should be free of conditions for all members and stressed concerns that some states are trying to use the technical cooperating as a political tool.
- Mexico criticised that the IAEA does not verify nuclear military facilities in nuclear-armed states, arguing this creates asymmetry in the NPT.

Liability regimes

- EU called for all NPT members to join nuclear liability instruments.

Withdrawal

- NAM believes that international treaty law should govern the right of withdrawal from the NPT.
- Mexico considers that the analysis of article X is legal in nature and encouraged all states parties to invite legal experts to analyse this in accordance with international law.
- US presented its working paper on withdrawal.

Review Conference outcome

- Cuba suggested that a standing committee should be established that would have a mandate to consider issues of concern related to denial of transfer.

Other

- Cuba supports a prohibition on attacks on nuclear power facilities.

EVENT: A WMD/DVS FREE ZONE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Emily Watson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The speakers at side event on the creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ) organised by the Swiss and German governments included Ambassador Benno Laggner of Switzerland, Dr. Bernd Kubbig of the Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, Angela Kane of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Thomas Countryman of the US, and Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany. There was divergence on key questions such as: how much progress has been made? Why did Helsinki fail? What is the correct way forward?

Dr. Kubbig stated that the Helsinki difficulties reflect underlying regional tensions and that a successful MEWMDFZ would act as a “tool to increase [regional] security.” Kubbig tentatively suggested that the Helsinki conveners could have been more proactive in prioritising the issue. The United States should use its relationship with Israel to encourage full co-operation. The Helsinki stalemate results from competing Middle East policies, especially those of Egypt and Israel. Egypt should be more flexible in negotiations; other states could encourage Egypt towards this end. Positive steps include Israel’s NPT observer status, the improving US-Russia relationship, and the Lyon and Geneva meetings of all states bar Iran.

Kane suggested that the mere fact that states with different agendas have met is significant. She pointed out that the Treaty of Tlatelolco took around 20 years to negotiate. It is not necessarily the facilitator’s fault if negotiations do not run as intended; the facilitator does not have unlimited influence. Whilst Kane “[regretted] the absence of Iran” in these discussions, she praised the contributions of the UNSG and the EU. Other states should support the process; however, it should be noted that states cannot be forced to engage in negotiations.

Ambassador Countryman was less optimistic, declaring that traditional means of diplomacy—face-to-face contact, compromise, and small-group discussions—have “essentially been ruled out”. Unwillingness by Middle Eastern states to negotiate is the real holdback, and the US should not be expected to care more about the issue than regional states. The conference envisaged in the latest study would be meaningless by virtue of diminishing Israel’s role in negotiations. States should draw from the 2010 mandate, which although uncertain, would be more productive than the current agenda.
On 4 May, an all male panel presented the latest developments in the eight year UK- Norway Initiative (UKNI). The collaboration for this warhead dismantlement verification project began in 2007 and included an NGO (VERTIC) until 2009. The project has delivered progress reports to both this, and the previous NPT Review Cycle demonstrating progressive ability to verify warhead dismantlement without sharing proliferation sensitive information.

The initiative has worked to develop the practical aspects of verification, as well as academic studies on 'trust' and 'confidence' in cooperation with Kings College London. The academic exercises bring students together to verify mock situations including ones with a bit of chaos thrown in (imagine a fire at a holding facility for plutonium pits as an example).

Current work is going on in looking at how to deal with the information barrier. During the session, the information barrier was presented, and pictures of it look basically like a a box with a bunch of circuit boards inside and switches, lights and buttons on the outside. This information barrier requires the development of both hard and software to be be able to measure plutonium ratios in a secure manner.

Once the software is developed, the hardware is built, there are still challenges about how to actually use the verification technologies. There are questions about chain of custody measures, there are questions about how to take the information barrier from a contaminated area into a clean area without losing confidence in the validity of the data, and more.

During this process, the UKNI has developed something that it could build and maintain confidence in, and come up with a deployment process that seems like it could be followed and actually work. The group will continue to work on the mutual goal of practical verification solutions, sharing insights along the way and encouraging others to actively engage in pursuing an effective nuclear weapons dismantlement verification regime.

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**EVENT: UK NORWAY INITIATIVE - TRUST AND CONFIDENCE EXERCISES**

*Susi Snyder | PAX*

On 4 May, an all male panel presented the latest developments in the eight year UK- Norway Initiative (UKNI). The collaboration for this warhead dismantlement verification project began in 2007 and included an NGO (VERTIC) until 2009. The project has delivered progress reports to both this, and the previous NPT Review Cycle demonstrating progressive ability to verify warhead dismantlement without sharing proliferation sensitive information.

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**HUMANITARIAN IMPACT**

*Why ethics is important to the politics of nuclear weapons*

Friday, 8 May 2015 - 13:15-14:30 - Conference Room C

Can certain acts be considered intrinsically wrongful, no matter how likely they may be to achieve their goals or however worthy such goals may be? Does the absence of a specific ban on nuclear weapons under today’s international law reflect a moral ambivalence about the weapons?

This side event looks at the challenge of cultivating a political consensus around the view that nuclear weapons are so singularly inhumane we ought categorically to reject their use, whatever purposes they may be said to serve.

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**Speakers and Moderators**

- **RAY ACHESON**, Director, Reaching Critical Will
- **JOHN BORRIE**, Senior Researcher & Policy Advisor, UNIDIR
- **TIM CAUGHLEY**, Resident Senior Fellow, UNIDIR
- **NOBUO HAYASHI**, Senior Legal Advisor, ILPI
- **GRO NYSTUEN**, Senior Partner, ILPI
- **CAMILLA WASZINK**, Programme Director, ILPI

The event is co-organized by the the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the International Law and Policy Institute. For more information, visit [www.effectiveasures.org](http://www.effectiveasures.org).
On the occasion of the NPT Review Conference

the Permanent Missions of Ireland, Austria, Costa Rica, Denmark, Sweden and Trinidad and Tobago, to the United Nations, New York

are pleased to invite you to a Side Event on

Gender and Nuclear Weapons

On Tuesday, 5 May, 2015

1:15 -2.30pm

Trusteeship Council, UN Headquarters

This event will provide an opportunity to examine new research which indicates that there are disproportionate effects of nuclear weapons on women and children and to highlight the need for women’s empowerment to ensure women play an equal role in all disarmament and arms control discussions and the necessity of the inclusion of a gender perspective in nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Speakers will include:

Dr. Mo Hume, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Glasgow

Dr. Patricia Lewis, Research Director on International Security, Chatham House

Ms. Mary Olson, Director of the Southeast Regional Office of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), USA

Mr. Henrik Salander, Former Disarmament Ambassador, Sweden and Secretary-General of the Blix Commission

Sandwiches will be provided in advance near the Vienna Café.

RSVP to Ms. Aoife Lyons at aoife.lyons@dfa.ie
Finland is one of four states that have signed both the Austrian-led and Australian-led joint statements on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Yesterday in Main Committee I, it proposed that the two groups join forces in the future to present a united voice on this topic. But there is a good reason why so few states have signed both statements: the positions advanced therein are fundamentally at odds.

The basic position of the much larger, Austrian-led group is that nuclear weapons are unacceptable given their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. By contrast, the Australian-led, NATO-dominant group asserts that nuclear weapons are acceptable despite their catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

Of the 26 states that have signed the Australian-led statement, all subscribe to the doctrine of “extended nuclear deterrence” or, as in Finland’s case, align closely with NATO nuclear policy. They believe firmly in the utility and legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the doctrine of “nuclear deterrence”. Australia has summed up its own position thus: “It is precisely because the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use are so horrendous that deterrence works.”

The Australian-led group—deceptively named “The Humanitarian Consequences Group”—is not part of the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament at all. Rather, it is a group that was formed in 2013 with the specific objective of distorting the emerging discourse on nuclear weapons to help reinforce false ideas of the weapons’ legitimacy and security value. Freedom-of-information requests made in Australia have revealed this true agenda.1

Australia is now reportedly claiming that the Australian-led group is being “divisive” by insisting that the conclusions of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons be reflected in any outcome document agreed at this NPT Review Conference. Yet it was Australia that created a division in the first place by establishing its own separate group, instead of becoming part of the mainstream of states that reject nuclear weapons.

No one would mistake the United Kingdom as a supporter of the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament, but its position perfectly mirrors that of Australia. In First Committee last year, the British delegation said: “We are deeply concerned at the humanitarian consequences which could result from the use of nuclear weapons ... We do not, however, share the view that nuclear weapons per se are inherently unacceptable.”

In her opening remarks to this year’s session of the UN Disarmament Commission, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, noted that the humanitarian approach is “supported by almost 80% of the UN member states”, and “the numbers cannot be ignored”.

Her calculation rightly excludes those states that have signed the Australian-led statement. After all, there is nothing noteworthy about simply acknowledging that nuclear weapons have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. All parties to the NPT did so in 2010. Russia says that any child in the playground could tell you that nuclear weapons cause terrible harm to people.2

But states have drawn fundamentally different conclusions from the evidence presented on these consequences since the last Review Conference five years ago. For the overwhelming majority of states, nuclear weapons are clearly unacceptable and must be outlawed without delay. They should remain uncompromising in their opposition to these ultimate weapons of mass destruction. •


2 Russian statement to the UNGA First Committee, 22 October 2013.
## CALENDAR OF EVENTS

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<td>Abolition Caucus</td>
<td>Conference Room C Conference Building</td>
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<td>9:00-9:50</td>
<td>Government briefing for NGOs: France</td>
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<td>Reaching Critical Will</td>
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<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Main Committee I</td>
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<td>Gender and nuclear weapons</td>
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<td>Ireland, Sweden and Austria</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Why to Invest More?</td>
<td>Conference Room C Conference Building</td>
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<td>12:30-14:30</td>
<td>Can NATO ban the bomb?</td>
<td>Baha’i center, 866 United Nations Plaza</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>The Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and All Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East</td>
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<td>Understanding the Importance of P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms</td>
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<td>16:30-18:00</td>
<td>Toward Disarmament Securely: Clarifying the Nuclear Security and Disarmament Link</td>
<td>Conference Room C</td>
<td>International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists</td>
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<td>18:30-21:00</td>
<td>Cinco de Mayo drinks</td>
<td>Dos Caminos (825 3rd Ave, and 50th Street)</td>
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**TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS by David Krieger**

The islands were alive with the red-orange fire of sunset splashed on a billowy sky. The islanders lived simple lives close to the edge of the ocean planet reaching out to infinity. The days were bright and the nights calm in this happy archipelago until the colonizers came. These were sequentially the Spanish, Germans, Japanese and then, worst of all, the United States. The U.S. came as trustee bearing its new bombs, eager to test them in this beautiful barefoot Eden. The islanders were trusting, even when the bombs began exploding and the white ash fell like snow. The children played in the ash as it floated down on them, covering them in poison. The rest is a tale of loss and suffering by the islanders, of madness by the people of the bomb.