On Wednesday morning, the second day of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), the United States test-launched a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

The day before, in his opening remarks to the PrepCom, US Ambassador Robert Wood stated, “Today, our world faces no greater security challenge than that posed by North Korea,” citing that country’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programme. Ambassador Wood asserted, “The DPRK, for its own sake, must abandon its nuclear and missile programs if it wants to achieve the security, economic development, and international recognition that it seeks.”

This is true. But it is equally true of the United States, and every other country that possesses nuclear weapons, tests ballistic missiles, or purports to derive security benefits from these genocidal, suicidal weapons. “Talk today of a threat from North Korea pales in comparison to the threat posed to the U.S. by its own nuclear weapons programs and their hair-raising record of serious accidents and safety violations,” argued retired US Air Force lieutenant colonel William J. Astore in a recent article. “The U.S. has been very fortunate not to have nuked itself with multiple hydrogen bombs over the last 70 years.”

The risks from the possession of nuclear weapons are extreme and insurmountable, regardless of which government happens to be in control of them at any particular time. Yet at the NPT PrepCom, as elsewhere, focus tends to be disproportionately placed on actors described as “irrational” or “irresponsible” whilst those states with the largest arsenals escape critique.

“Conducting a test-launch of a missile whose sole purpose is to deliver nuclear warheads anywhere around the world is a glaring example of bad faith and violates the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” warned Rick Wayman of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation ahead of the US missile test. “It’s exactly this kind of double standard that undermines US credibility when insisting that other nations not develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.”

Unfortunately, double standards are rife within the NPT context, and are on full display at this PrepCom. There is also an almost impressive amount of “spin” to frame incredibly immoral and completely illogical assertions as “realistic” and “practical”.

For example, the nuclear-armed or nuclear-supportive states call on others to “create the conditions” for the international security environment to be conducive to disarmament. Yet these same states are currently investing billions of dollars into the expansion, development, or “modernisation” of nuclear weapon systems, extending the lives of these systems into the second half of this century and in many cases “upgrading” their capabilities.

These same states routinely assert that nuclear weapons provide stability and security. This myth has been categorically refuted by the series of conferences held to examine the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The lived experience of those who have suffered from the use, testing, and development of nuclear weapons stands in stark opposition to an image of these horrific weapons as instruments of safety or security for anyone. Moreover, “The world order has not become safer, nor more predictable thanks to nuclear weapons; quite the contrary,” warned Brazil’s Ambassador Biato. “Reliance on nuclear arms for national or regional security, and the belief that they are a means to superpower status are the greatest drivers of proliferation,” and their use will “vaporize illusions of peace and security built on nuclear deterrence.”

States that believe in the magic ability of nuclear weapons to uphold security and stability seem to also believe that the “international security context” is an entity unto itself, rather than something that is shaped by the actions of human beings that decide their government’s policies and behaviour. Belgium, for example—which hosts US nuclear weapons on its soil—asserted that the
Editorial, continued

international security context sets out the parameters for what is achievable and what is not. But the vast majority of states and civil society understand that nuclear disarmament, as a commitment and a practice, would serve to improve the international security context.

This is why the majority of states are supporting the negotiation of a multilateral instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, with the goal of creating stronger legal, political, economic, and social conditions for nuclear disarmament.

But the nuclear-armed states insist that this treaty undermines international security, and the NPT. So far this week, Russia has expressed concern about “radicalisation” of approaches to disarmament while the UK delegation has argued the ban will not “bring us closer to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.” The only thing really preventing a world without nuclear weapons, however, are the nuclear-armed states, which have not fulfilled their obligations under article VI and customary international law to disarm and that are investing in modernisation. It is it is the continued possession of nuclear weapons and flagrant disregard for agreed commitments to disarm that endangers the NPT—and our survival.

Some states believe the nuclear ban negotiations are insignificant because some countries have chosen to boycott them. Australia, which assists with targeting US nuclear weapons at the Pine Gap base, argued the only “realistic” path to nuclear disarmament is to be “inclusive” and not engage in “divisive” processes. France likewise spoke against initiatives “dividing” the international community. Of course, one could argue that states holding onto nuclear weapons are the ones being divisive and exclusive, not the 130 governments negotiating a multilateral treaty in good faith at the most inclusive intergovernmental forum in the world. It is the nuclear-armed states that are dividing the international community: into those that can commit instantaneous genocide and planetary extinction, and those that cannot.

As the Philippines said, “the only way to ensure the prevention of a nuclear holocaust is to take away the nuclear option from the hands of men who are so fallible.” When considering what they want to accomplish at this NPT PrepCom, or in the broader review cycle, or in the world at large to make it more safe and secure, states need to ask themselves what will really bring us closer to the elimination of nuclear weapons?

Despite all the spin doctoring going on at this meeting, there is only one logical, realistic answer. •
THE FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
Sarah Gräber

O

n Tuesday, 2 May, a panel discussion was held at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. As the Russian Federation and the United States of America are modernizing their strategic and non-strategic nuclear arms, including those for Europe, both are blaming the respective other to be violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Vice President of the International Institute of Peace, Angela Kane, moderated the discussion about the future role of nuclear weapons in Europe in general. Otfried Nassauer from the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security set the scene. He called the INF Treaty a game changer that 30 years ago helped to set a trend towards nuclear disarmament in Europe, which now is possibly about to be reversed again.

Hans M. Kristenen of the Federation of American Scientists joined via Skype. He gave the audience a short overview on plans to modernize the US nuclear arsenal and noted that this process began already under former President Obama. His expectation was that Donald Trump, the current President, would not make larger changes to these plans, partially because of limited resources. Angela Kane interjected that she expects certain changes due to the new military-heavy cabinet. They agreed that it will be possible to do more harm with weapons that could be used more “flexibly” in the future.

Igor Sutyagin from the Royal United Services Institute in London provided some insight into the Russian point of view. He told the audience that nuclear weapons act as a psychological tool and as a force multiplier for the Russian government, compensating for other military and economical weaknesses. He also talked about Russia trying to find a way around the limitations contained in the INF Treaty, e.g. by basing cruise missile launchers on small river-going ships as “floating batteries”. Susi Snyder from PAX, a Dutch-based organization, gave an inspiring and optimistic speech about the negotiations for a nuclear weapon ban treaty in New York. The results, in her view, could be a game changer in the future.

NUCLEAR NAVIES, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Thomas Shea and Charles Ferguson | Federation of American Scientists

T

he Federation of American Scientists (FAS) hosted an event on 3 May to introduce a “quid pro quo” (QPQ) initiative: a combined offering focusing on naval reactor programs and their potential impact on nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament with a view toward the NPT 2020 Review Conference. The provisions for non-nuclear-armed states require spelling out the safeguards and related confidence-building measures that could be embodied in future arrangements called for in paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153 and article 13 of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement. Similar measures could be opportunistic for nuclear-armed states, in that a technical pathway for phasing out use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in naval fuels is possible. The QPQ might provide a basis for a linked consensus.

Dr. Charles Ferguson, President of FAS, introduced the event. Dr. Thomas Shea, FAS Adjunct Senior Fellow, presented the QPQ, the risks it addresses, and the safeguards and confidence-building measures to be employed. Dr. Laura Rockwood, Executive Director of the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, provided a roadmap for understanding the legal aspects of paragraph 14 and article 13.

Ambassador Piet de Klerk, Netherlands, expressed support for moving to the norm and practice of low enriched uranium naval fuels in light of the Nuclear Security Summits and the aspiration of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

Mr. Kenju Murakami, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, MOFA, Japan, underscored the need to discuss and develop verification mechanisms relevant for naval nuclear fuels especially in the context of an FMCT.

Dr. Matias Spektor, Associate Professor, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil, described Brazil’s steps in relation to nuclear powered submarines. The program has been underway for a long time and with the current political situation, its success is uncertain.

Sébastien Philippe, a PhD candidate at Princeton University, described recent developments related to nuclear warhead verification and how they might apply to naval reactors. Andrew Reddie, a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, described a study of how naval reactors might be addressed in the mechanisms of international relations.

FAS is committed to advancing the QPQ within the NPT review process. At the 2018 PrepCom, FAS intends to present suggested arrangements as called for under paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153, providing a basis for non-nuclear-armed state adoption of safeguards and confidence building measures for nuclear powered naval vessels. At the 2019 PrepCom, FAS intends to present suggestions as to how naval reactors should be addressed in relation to nuclear disarmament.
On 3 May 2017, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation (VCDNP) held a seminar with Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Valerie Lincy, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, entitled “Transparency and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: New Goals and Norms.”

Ms. Squassoni shared the findings of a workshop held by CSIS on transparency measures for nuclear weapons and fissile material. She explained that in the context of the workshop, transparency was defined as the “voluntary release of information previously kept confidential.” She further underlined that the purpose of transparency was to provide confidence in intention rather than confirmation or verification of information. Within the NPT context, for example, transparency can help show progress in implementing disarmament obligations. Ms. Squassoni also discussed the issue of norm building, arguing that one nuclear weapon state (NWS) releasing certain type of information would, hopefully, lead other NWS to eventually follow. Such norms should be promoted not only among policy makers but also among the public. In the context of transparency, she explained the role that civil society plays in, for example, providing estimates about fissile materials or nuclear weapons numbers. She argued that civil society estimates help to put pressure on governments to be more transparent and also help in educating the public.

Ms. Lincy discussed the issue of transparency in the context of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). She explained that the JCPOA promised to increase transparency and to provide more information about Iran’s nuclear program. In her assessment, the promise of transparency has not been fulfilled. She argued that while initially, the lack of transparency might have been necessary in order to preserve the agreement, it is now hurting the agreement. Ms. Lincy discussed two aspects of the agreement in particular: IAEA reporting and inspections, and the decision making of the JCPOA Joint Commission. Concerning the IAEA, Ms. Lincy noted that there have been five post JCPOA implementation reports, but compared to reports issued before to the JCPOA, the IAEA is providing less information related to such subjects as nuclear material stockpiles, centrifuge operations, and certain R&D activities. Concerning the JCPOA Joint Commission, she explained that the decisions and deliberations of this commission are confidential, which leads to the lack official information about how the commission operates.

Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament
More than Just Words

Launch of BASIC/UNA-UK report
Meaningful Multilateralism:
30 Nuclear Disarmament Proposals
for the Next UK Government

The UK is in the middle of an election to be held on 9th June. Nuclear weapons have played a role in British politics recently, but not in a way that has been constructive. BASIC is looking to stimulate a national debate before and after the election on what constructive UK leadership would look like in achieving progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament independently of the recent decision to renew the Trident nuclear weapon system.

Come to discuss how best to realistically influence the nuclear weapon state that may yet be the best hope we have of any nuclear armed state changing course and establishing a responsible agenda.

Monday 8th May
9.30am - 10.30am
Conference Room M3
The news in brief is not a comprehensive overview of all statements. It highlights new or particularly salient recommendations or comments made during the general debate.

**Procedural**
- Poland was confirmed as the Chair of the 2018 PrepCom, scheduled for 23 April–4 May in Geneva.
- Ambassador Grossi of Argentina has been proposed as the President of the 2020 Review Conference.

**Arsenal reduction/operational status**
- Germany called for renewed dialogue and understanding between the US and Russia to engage in new disarmament talks, including talks about the future of the New START Treaty.
- Sweden and Italy called on the nuclear-armed states to make further deep reductions in their arsenals of strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons.
- Finland noted that non-strategic nuclear weapons are not covered by any legally binding verifiable international arrangement despite being possessed by all nuclear-armed states; they call to close the normative gap for these types of weapons during this review cycle.
- Poland also called for non-strategic weapons to be subject to arms control.
- Russia stated that implementation of New START is on track and it intends to reach the agreed levels by February 2018.
- Chile urged nuclear-armed countries to reduce the operational availability of their weapons with the aim of ensuring that all cease to be on alert.

**Modernisation**
- Austria said it is important to ask questions about modernisation programmes, and the relationship between the two largest nuclear arms possessors, particularly given the expiry of New START.
- NAM stated its concern over improvements being made to existing nuclear weapons, and that the development of new types of nuclear weapons violate legal obligations on nuclear disarmament. It also expressed concern that modernisation goes against commitments made to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in military and security policies and contravenes negative security assurances.
- The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) expressed concern about expensive modernisation programmes.
- Ecuador is concerned about nuclear weapon modernisation programmes and development of new types of nuclear arms.
- Brazil noted that the NPT has not been successful in curbing the modernisation of existing nuclear arsenals.
- South Africa said the development of new categories of nuclear weapons and ongoing modernisation programmes, including in relation to delivery systems, provide a clear indication of the intention to retain nuclear weapons, contrary to legal obligations and political commitments.
- WILPF described the modernisation activities being undertaken by NPT nuclear-armed states parties, noting this as contrary to the Treaty and calling for action during this review cycle.
- Indonesia noted that nuclear-armed states are modernising, advancing, and developing new types of nuclear weapons instead of eliminating.

**Doctrine, use, and threat of use**
- CELAC reiterated that states must eliminate the role that nuclear weapons, and their related doctrines, security policies, and strategies play.
- NAC expressed concerned about continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines and an increase in threats of use.
- Switzerland is concerned with the actions or statements from nuclear-armed states that go against the NPT, such as encouraging the development of nuclear capacities by non-nuclear armed states in response to regional tensions or reference to own capacities in the context of current tensions.
- Brazil expressed concern with the possible use of nuclear weapons preemptively or in response to political tensions in certain situations.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) called on nuclear-armed states must implement their commitment to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in national security postures, as well as de-alert.

**Transparency and reporting**
- Japan called for reporting of nuclear forces and of possessed fissile materials that could be used for nuclear weapons.
- The NAC will introduce two working papers on improving transparency as a step toward progressing disarmament obligations.
- Australia urged increasing transparency by improving arrangements for reporting by NPT nuclear-armed states on details of their nuclear arsenals.
- Poland called for transparency particularly of “non-strategic” arsenals.
News in brief, continued

- The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) called on nuclear-armed states to agree on a standard reporting form and to use this to provide regular reports to the NPT on implementation of their nuclear disarmament obligations to increase transparency and for greater accountability.

**Verification**

- Netherlands urged moving forward with the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and upcoming Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on verification through the UN General Assembly; the EU, NPDI, and Vienna Group of 10 also welcomed the establishment of the GGE.

- Nordic Group sees verification as a way to help improve confidence around the INF Treaty’s implementation or to motivate follow-on talks to New START.

**Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW)**

- Japan referenced the HINW but is convinced that only the promotion of cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear-armed states will lead to a world free of nuclear weapons.

- CELAC and Ecuador called on all states to address HINW whenever nuclear weapons are discussed and along with Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, and Qatar, commended the conferences held in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna as having illustrated the devastating effects of nuclear weapons.

- Ireland would like to see recognition of HINW in the outcome of this review cycle.

- NAC emphasised the significant research and testimony on the HINW confirming that there is no humanitarian response capacity to cope with the devastating effects of a nuclear detonation.

- New Zealand also noted that the humanitarian initiative has demonstrated clearly the reality of the threat.

- Nordic states support HINW “fact based approach”.

- NPDI and Thailand drew attention to the importance of education about HINW.

- Nihon Hidankyo, Gensuikyo, Faith Communities, and the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki illustrated in detail the HINW. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War emphasised the HINW and need for a prohibition treaty.

- Costa Rica said that nuclear weapons “flout” international humanitarian law; Indonesia said that nuclear-armed states have a moral obligation to begin disarmament.

- Namibia said that any use of a nuclear weapon is a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity.

**Prohibition**

- Austria, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Ecuador, CELAC, Sweden, Ireland, the Holy See, the NAC, New Zealand, Thailand, Brazil, Philippines, Chile, South Africa, Peru, Venezuela, Malaysia, Iraq, Singapore, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Tanzania, Algeria, Palestine, and Viet Nam welcomed the start of negotiations of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons. The International Committee of Red Cross urged all states to participate in the negotiations.

- Costa Rica, President of the negotiations, made comparison to prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons.

- The majority of states that are supportive of the prohibition treaty reaffirmed that the new instruments is meant to complement the NPT, not undermine it.

- Argentina noted that the negotiations, coupled with NPT review cycle, present a unique opportunity to overcome divisions.

- Iran said that this process should be seen as a collective protest from non nuclear-armed states for the over 47 years of non-compliance of nuclear-armed states with disarmament obligations.

- Belgium, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary, United Kingdom, and Spain reiterated their opposition to a legally-binding prohibition, touching collectively on issues of non-participation of nuclear-armed states and related challenges of disarmament and verification.

- Australia and France suggested the ban treaty is a “divisive” process.

- Russia said it cannot accept the logic of the sponsors of this treaty process.

- Turkey referenced “sharpened differences of opinion and an unproductive polarization” over the last year.

- Switzerland acknowledged that while views diverge on a prohibition treaty, all NPT states parties have a shared interest in overcoming current polarisation. It cautioned that the new treaty must not serve as an excuse for inaction in the field of nuclear disarmament obligations and other commitments under the NPT.

- The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) presented the complementarity between the prohibition treaty and the NPT.

**Gender**

- The EU stated that “promotion of gender equality, gender consciousness and empowerment of
News in brief, continued

women” is a priority including in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

• Ireland has funded research on the gendered impact of nuclear weapons, both in terms of the disproportionate effects of ionising radiation on women and girls and the need for greater engagement of women in disarmament fora. The NAC also noted this relationship.

Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK)
• The vast majority of statements condemned the DPRK’s recent missile tests and nuclear weapon developments as provocative and undermining of regional security. Most of these states further called on the DPRK to cease such policies and rhetoric that are in violation of a number of UN Security Council resolutions and return to the NPT. Some indicated that this PrepCom should be a space to address this challenge.

• Peace Depot spoke about challenges and importance of nuclear risk reduction and disarmament in Northeast Asia.

Middle East
• The majority of states expressed regret that the 2012 conference did not take place and that there has not been progress on advancing a WMD free zone in the Middle East.

• A presentation from the Israeli Disarmament Movement expressed the views of civil society from the Middle East that are supportive of progressing work on a nuclear weapon free zone, including ideas for how to make this a reality. The Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs also highlighted the importance of this.

JCPOA
• The vast majority of states welcomed this agreement and view is as a positive success.

• EU called on Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol and refrain from activities such as ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

• Netherlands said that this PrepCom should give a strong signal of support to the agreement.

• Iran noted that concern over its nuclear programme was a “manufactured crisis” and that the JCPOA negotiations clarified that it’s programme has always been peaceful. Iran also stated that the JCPOA has nothing to do with the prompt ratification of the additional protocol or with missile testing.

• The United States did not make reference to the JCPOA.

Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT)
• The EU, NPDI, the Nordic Group, Germany, Belgium, Australia, Italy, Sweden, Estonia, Slovakia, France, Turkey, Finland, Poland, Latvia, Chile, Spain, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Vienna Group of 10, Lithuania, Singapore expressed support for, or welcomed, the establishment of the high-level expert preparatory group and look forward to the commencement of a treaty to ban production on fissile materials.

• Canada, which chairs the Group, anticipates developing substantive recommendations for eventual treaty negotiations.

Nuclear testing
• Austria noted that we have been “going around in circles” on the CTBT’s entry into force and more action is needed.

• Ecuador called for nuclear-armed states to refrain from tests, including sub-critical ones, as contrary to the aims and goals of nuclear disarmament and the CTBT.

• Brazil stated that a ban on nuclear testing is only truly effective if it includes subcritical and other forms of testing.

• Belgium will be the co-ordinator of the Article 14 Conference of the CTBT and intends to bring EIF of the Treaty nearer through a series of focused demarches and initiatives.

• The CTBTO reported on its activities and collaboration with NPT states parties.

Nuclear energy
• Japan, the EU, Belgium, Italy, France and the United States, among others, outlined funding or other support to nuclear energy-related initiatives.

• Argentina noted the role for nuclear energy in meeting Objective 7 of the Sustainable Development Goals, a subject also referenced by the IAEA.

• The IAEA presented an overview of its activities and programmes.

• Portugal, as Chair of the Dialogue between Coastal and Shipping States (DCSS), is preparing a tabletop exercise regarding the transportation of nuclear waste, to be held in June this year.

• Jordan announced that the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) would be inaugurated in May.

Nuclear weapon free zones
• CELAC, Mexico, Ecuador, Ireland, Russia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Panama, Cuba, Argentina, Dominican Republic, and OPANAL, among others, noted the
News in brief, continued

50th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that occurred in February 2016.
• Ecuador appealed to states with interpretive treaty declarations to withdraw them.
• Thailand welcomed progress made by the states parties and the nuclear-armed towards the signing of the protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ.
• Mongolia noted that 2017 marks 25 years of its nuclear weapon free status.
• OPANAL pointed out that the conferences of nuclear weapons-free zones and Mongolia are a means of strengthening the exchange of views and information among the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Other
• Netherlands stated that the NPT must keep moving forward and evolving; which may require improving working methods.
• Romania stressed better continuity between PrepComs and the Review Conference and described practical steps for doing so.
• CELAC Germany, and Viet Nam said negative security assurances should become part of a binding treaty-regime.
• Germany supports the OPCW and the ongoing work of its fact-finding mission as well as the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism. France made reference to the use of chemical weapons in Syria; Syria responded by stating that this is not the forum to discuss those issues.
• Thailand and Chile acknowledged the contributions of civil society to the NPT, particularly in mobilising public opinion.
• Sweden urged risk reduction to be high on the agenda.
• Kazakhstan announced the low-enriched uranium bank will be launched in August.
• Panama, Morocco, Niger, Singapore, and Panama noted the imbalance in resources allocated for nuclear weapon programmes versus what is contributed to development.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS: FRIDAY, 5 MAY 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:00</td>
<td>Interfaith prayer-vigil for the success of the NPT PrepCom</td>
<td>Outside UN building</td>
<td>Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00-10:00</td>
<td>Nuclear Detectives to the Rescue: The Role of Nuclear Forensics in the Fight against Nuclear Terrorism</td>
<td>MOE100</td>
<td>Government of Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>A nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>INES, IBP, PNND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>De-escalation: Urgent Measures to Prevent Flashpoints from Going Nuclear</td>
<td>Press Briefing Room</td>
<td>Governments of Sweden and Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>NATO’s Enduring Commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Japan, Andromeda Tower, Floor 24</td>
<td>VCDNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Parliamentary actions for nuclear disarmament</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>PNND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>M-plenary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Missile defense impact on nuclear disarmament and space weaponization</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>INES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>