TOO LEGIT TO QUIT

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

“I gotta get mine and nobody’s takin’ it away... I choose to abuse, misuse and confuse competitors who think they’re makin’ up all the rules.”

Listening to the nuclear-armed states can sometimes feel like they have drawn from the lyrics of MC Hammer’s 1991 song. From Russia arguing that “no one will dispute the obvious fact that the [nuclear arms race] has not only stopped, but also reversed”—in the midst of the largest expansion or “upgrades” of nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War—to China calling on states to “abandon the practice of double standard and refrain from calculating out of selfish geopolitical interest”—whilst the nuclear-armed seek to maintain their monopoly on massive nuclear violence—it does seem that the nuclear-armed are out to “abuse, misuse, and confuse” in order to keep the world order as they like it.

They have created a network of fallacies to support them in this endeavor. The assertion of the “legitimacy” of their possession of nuclear weapons lies at the heart of this project. “In accordance with the NPT, the presence of nuclear arsenals in five nuclear powers is completely legitimate,” said the Russian Federation on Friday. This is the cornerstone fallacy of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—one that its nuclear-armed states parties have tried to perpetuate for nearly fifty years. It is propped up by a deeper fallacy that nuclear weapons provide security and stability.

Together, these myths have worked to foster the conditions for a handful of states to project their dominance over the rest of the world. Like all myths, however, these claims to power and stability through the right to inflict massive nuclear violence cannot be sustained forever. Their inherent contradictions and their tensions with reality will inevitably lead to their undoing.

“Nuclear weapons,” explained Ambassador Agbubga of Nigeria, “create an obscure system that characterizes a situation of fear, suspicion and mistrust, unhealthy rivalry as well as unnecessary competition amongst States.” This is true not only in relation to North Korea or Israel, or between India and Pakistan, or between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. The NPT nuclear weapon possessors are also clearly mistrustful of each other—and the tearing of the seams of supposed “P5 unity” on display during the last review cycle is becoming increasingly visible.

During their interventions to the cluster one debate on nuclear disarmament last week, the United States criticised “two NPT nuclear weapon states” for modernising their arsenals (without mentioning that the US itself is engaged in the most expansive and expensive modernisation programme of them all); the United Kingdom expressed concern with the “disturbing increase” in Russian rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons (without mentioning UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s unapologetic remarks that she would be willing to kill millions of innocent people with nuclear weapons); Russia highlighted the challenges posed by “US nuclear partners in the NATO bloc”; France and China seemed to express frustration with the states possessing the most nuclear weapons for not making more progress with their arsenal reductions.

The complaints the nuclear-armed states made about others’ arsenals were uniformly coupled with the assertion that nuclear weapons are important—even instrumental—to their own security. So, not only did they each project concerns about each other whilst overlooking their own behaviour, but they also condemned others for wanting nuclear weapons whilst justifying their own possession and modernisation of these weapons.

“The forceful proclamation of alleged security benefits of nuclear weapons is a powerful proliferator,” warned Ambassador Kuglitsch of Austria. This is one of the contradictions of the myths of the right to possess nuclear weapons that will not just go away. This is too volatile and unjust of
Editorial, continued

a situation to persist for much longer. “The way out,” said the Nigerian ambassador, “is total and complete disarmament.”

The next best step on this path is to ban nuclear weapons, which the majority of states are actively doing through the UN General Assembly. The hostility of the nuclear-armed and their nuclear-supportive allies towards the ban treaty is indicative of how effective this treaty is likely to be to breaking down the fallacies and myths they have perpetuated for the last five decades. As the Austrian ambassador noted, prohibiting nuclear weapons through an international treaty challenges the notion that nuclear weapons provide security and strengthens the legal and political norms against nuclear weapons, making possession and modernisation increasingly difficult to justify in social, political, and economic spheres.

The ban may not “eliminate a single nuclear warhead,” as the nuclear-armed and nuclear-supportive states insist ad nauseam—at least, not immediately. But the treaty’s evolution is already having an impact on nuclear weapon discourse, and its implementation will have even deeper implications for nuclear weapon policy and practices.

It is a profoundly meaningful and effective step towards nuclear disarmament, and this is the reason that the nuclear-armed do not want to take it. They are comfortable with their established pattern of engagement on nuclear disarmament: set up a plan with minimal requirements; explain why this plan is incredibly difficult to implement; fail to implement the agreed plan but do a bit of busy work (e.g. make a dictionary); threaten disaster and doom if states try to do anything to require them to comply with the agreed obligations (e.g. that it will ruin the NPT or result in nuclear war); rinse and repeat.

Indeed, if the bilateral and unilateral nuclear arsenal reductions that took place decades ago had been fulfilled in good faith, said the delegation of Brazil, “we would be moving, even incrementally, towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” Instead, the “progressive” or “building blocks” approach promoted by nuclear-armed and nuclear-supportive states has fallen into discredit—not just because of a lack of concrete action, but because the steps that are actually being taken are not those outlined in this approach but are steps in the opposite direction—i.e. a new arms race.

Such a pattern can only persist for so long before others—the majority—start moving forward on their own to see what they can do to change the parameters of this otherwise unending loop of making commitments and failing to implement them that is leading us ever close to the brink of nuclear war. Ireland has a “say something, do something” approach to nuclear disarmament, Ms. Nolan said in her cluster remarks. Where there is such a clearly identifiable threat to the public—to the planet—everyone must do their part to prevent catastrophe.

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Thus those negotiating a ban on nuclear weapons are carrying forward the legal framing for nuclear weapon free world, as Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand described. If the nuclear-armed refuse to join, so be it. There is no legitimacy to the positions or assertions of the nuclear-armed states, and they will eventually be compelled to quit. •
SIDES EVENT: GENDER, DEVELOPMENT, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Clara Levin | Svenska Läkare mot Kärn vapen (Swedish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons)

On Thursday, Ireland and Sweden hosted a side event on gender, development, and nuclear weapons. The speakers were Ms. Jackie O’Halloran, Deputy Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ireland; Dr. John Borrie, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); Ms. Ray Acheson, Director of Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); and Mr. Carl Magnus Eriksson, Director and Deputy Head, Department for Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Export Control, Sweden. The discussion was chaired by Ambassador Patricia O’Brien of Ireland. Note: Gender in the event and in this article means the social construction and phenomenon of gender, not biological sex.

Did you know that there is a persistent imbalance between gender in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation fora? According to a study made by UNIDIR and the International Law and Policy Institute, only a quarter of the participants at the 2015 NPT Review Conference were women. Even as gender imbalance is an issue in many fields, it is the worst when it comes to nuclear weapons, Dr. Borrie told us. This is a problem because who gets to talk about nuclear weapons also sets the agenda and shapes how we talk about the issue. This also has implications for the discourse around nuclear weapons.

Discourse is extremely important, Ms. Acheson explained, and nuclear weapons are no exception. To use or to have nuclear weapons is held up as a status of strength, which is built up by the patriarchy. In the nuclear weapons context, proponents of the ban treaty are described in a very gendered way as unrealistic, weak, and irrational, while nuclear weapons are a symbol of security, the ultimate protection.

In Sweden, Mr. Eriksson told us, equality is a goal itself and it should be integrated in everything the government does. For Sweden, representation is crucial and the government works in different ways to ensure that this is upheld. To strive for gender equality is a way to make a change.

Ireland has a gender perspective on conflict prevention, human rights, and other issues, according to Ms. O’Halloran. In 2015 Ireland developed a new women, peace and security national action plan. Ms. O’Halloran talked about how women are less represented in security, and that is an issue. One exception was the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament last year, where a diversity of voices was represented because an effort was made to ensure this.

This subject is very important to making progress on disarmament, and the more we learn, the more visible the problem gets. We know that everything links together, this is why gender equality is now part of the UN sustainable development goals. It should also be of every country’s agenda to strive for better representation in their own delegation and to work for gender equality. It is now time for the NPT and other nuclear forums to challenge the patriarchy! •
WEBSITE: WWW.REAChINGCRITICAlWILL.ORG

NEWS IN REVIEW

Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament
More than Just Words
Launch of BASIC/UNA-UK report
Meaningful Multilateralism:
30 Nuclear Disarmament Proposals
for the Next UK Government

The news in brief is not a comprehensive overview of all positions or statements. It highlights new or particularly salient recommendations or comments from the cluster one debate (including the specific issue debate). All available statements can be found on the Reaching Critical Will website.

Nuclear disarmament and arsenal reductions
- US and Russia said they expect to meet the “central limits” of New START by February 2018.
- Sweden strongly encouraged the US and Russia to initiate a dialogue on further deep reductions, including on tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed cruise missiles.
- Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, and Ukraine urged the US and Russia to pursue reduction efforts in advance of the expiry of New START in 2021; the Netherlands also referenced beginning discussions for a follow-on agreement early and said that all non-strategic weapons in Europe should be included. Spain said that New START must be preserved and expanded.
- The US critiqued China for increasing its strategic arsenal.
- Indonesia acknowledged the “claim” of the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons that thousands of their nuclear weapons have been retired and dismantled, but pointed out that this is yet to be verified.
- Poland feels that further reductions are necessary but the security context must be appropriate for this to happen.
- Iran believes that the three-phased time-bound action plan for nuclear disarmament put forward by NAM NPT states parties deserves serious consideration in this review cycle.
- Finland has commissioned a UNIDIR study on how arms control could contribute to lessening the danger posed by strategic nuclear weapons, which are not covered by any legally binding, verifiable international arrangement.

Operational status and risk
- The de-alerting group said that the current NPT review cycle should recognise the link between high alert levels, associated risks, and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences posed by nuclear weapons and recognise that de-alerting will increase human and international security.
- The UK explained that its nuclear weapons have been de-targeted for 20 years and that it has a well-established and on-going programme to protect defence networks and information from cyber attack.
- The Netherlands asked if states can agree on further steps to reduce alertness levels with regard to targeting, as an example, or if the ‘launch on warning’ concept could be taken out of nuclear strategies.

Monday 8th May
9.30am - 10.30am
Conference Room M3
Switzerland said the risks of nuclear arms have been underestimated and that new ones have risen; the use of certain weapons systems such as nuclear-tipped cruise missiles raises a number of specific issues.

Switzerland urged for risk reduction measures to be dominant on the conference agenda.

Negative security assurances (NSAs)
• Canada and Japan said NSAs should be offered to non-nuclear weapon states that fully respect their NPT obligations.
• Netherlands urged working toward negotiating NSAs to build trust and confidence as an important intermediate step towards global zero.
• Nigeria said that “incremental success” should include progress on an unconditional granting of NSAs to non-nuclear-armed states.
• Ecuador said an agreement on NSAs should not be in place of an international prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

Modernisation and arms racing
• Russia claimed the arms race has stopped and been reversed.
• The US criticized “two NPT nuclear weapons parties” for modernising their arsenals.
• The UK said that the replacing its nuclear submarines to “maintain the current posture” is not considered an upgrade of its capabilities.
• The NAM and Cuba called on nuclear-armed states to cease their plans to further invest in modernisation, upgrading, refurbishing, or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.
• Mexico is concerned that the current geopolitical situation might be used as justification for accelerated modernisation.
• Argentina said that calling for elimination must also include commitments to avoid increasing arsenals and their sophistication.
• Kazakhstan called for a halt to any production or modernisation of nuclear weapons and said a database on all types and status of such weapons should be recognised as obligatory.
• Brazil said that the so-called “step-by-step” approach is discredited from lack of concrete action but also in light of on-going modernisation programs.
• Belgium is concerned about the expansive modernisation of nuclear arsenals in certain states, and in particular the development of new nuclear capabilities.

• Iran noted that quantitatively, there are significantly fewer nuclear arms than during the Cold War era, but that that qualitatively, current destructive power is much greater.
• Ireland stated that the amount of resources being invested in nuclear weapons modernisation and the development of tactical, more usable, nuclear weapons is regrettable.
• South Africa said that the development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems indicate intentions to indefinitely retain these “instruments of destruction” and that the resources put into this could be allocated towards development assistance including achievement of the SDGs, a point echoed by Ecuador and Ireland.

Doctrine, use, and threat of use
• Thailand said that the actions of the DPRK call into question the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence doctrine and policy in ensuring collective security.
• Mexico warned that as long as nuclear weapons occupy a prominent place within doctrines - including deterrence - the risk of accidental or intentional use continues.
• Ecuador, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Philippines called for a diminution in the role that nuclear weapons play in military doctrines and NZ called for reporting on this.
• Ireland highlighted the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines and decrease in the “taboo” around possible use is as regrettable.
• China advocated for deployed nuclear weapons abroad to be withdrawn and repatriated and for an end to the policy of nuclear umbrella and the practice of nuclear sharing.
• Norway said that 2020 Review Conference should call for the reaffirmation of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security and defense policies through practical steps.
• Cuba called for a commitment to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of all NPT states parties.
• The UK said that the “unpredictable international security environment” requires the maintenance of its nuclear deterrent.
• Russia said the concept of “non-nuclear deterrence” in its military doctrine means a further reduction of the role of nuclear arms. Use is limited to two cases: an attack on Russia and its allies using WMD, or a situation when aggression could threaten the very existence of the state.

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News in brief, continued

Transparency and reporting
- France said it has shown transparency by declaring the composition of its nuclear arsenal.
- The NAC noted that NPT reporting does not provide for objective assessments of compliance. It called on states to provide accurate and comparable reports and recommended introducing benchmarks or other analytical tools.
- The Netherlands suggested that regular reporting processes, with an improved and common reporting format, along with other measures such as information on the locations and numbers of nuclear weapons as part of a positive agenda for progress.
- Switzerland noted that submission of reports are important but also is progress on their coherence and use of defined parameters to facilitate assessment.
- Argentina said this review cycle must include evaluation of the reporting system on implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000, and based on measures 5 and 20.
- Japan urged nuclear-armed states to commit to utilize the NPDI reporting form to make annual reports, including numerical information, during the 2020 Review Cycle.

Verification
- The EU, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Turkey, Belgium, Poland, and Argentina welcomed the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification advancing nuclear disarmament.
- The EU will continue to provide strong diplomatic and financial support to the NPT including enhancing the verification capabilities of the International Monitoring System.
- Bulgaria and Switzerland welcomed the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons
- The Netherlands wants to find ways to incorporate the important concept of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use with security and stability considerations, as the underlying basis for further disarmament.
- Austria noted there cannot be a 100 percent guarantee that nuclear deterrence will work in all cases; in its view, people living in a nuclear-armed state face a heightened danger of a possible use against their country.
- Kenya said that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons can help de-legitimize nuclear weapons not only in the minds of people but also the mainstream media.

Prohibition
- Thailand, Sweden, Ireland, Brazil, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Switzerland, Malaysia, Austria, Indonesia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Ireland, Cuba, South Africa, and Ecuador expressed their support for the start of negotiations of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.
- Thailand, Sweden, the Philippines, Brazil, Switzerland, Austria, Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa, and Ecuador articulated that the prohibition will strengthen the NPT, or is complementary to it.
- Austria emphasized the prohibition treaty will challenge the view that nuclear arms contribute to international stability; strengthen legal and political norms against the use; be a response to new challenges cyber-attacks or terrorists seeking acquisition of nuclear material. It said that the prohibition will be pursued in a realistic way, open to nuclear-armed states and could help to trigger additional measures and strengthens the NPT.
- New Zealand, supportive of the ban treaty, said that efforts to negotiate legally-effective measures must also happen in the NPT context.
- France said that the prohibition approach could divide the disarmament community, and generate more frustration rather than progress.
- Australia does not support the negotiations of a prohibition treaty for reasons of “principle and practicality”.
- China said its position on nuclear disarmament is in line with the purposes of the prohibition treaty negotiations, although it prefers a gradual approach. It is not participating but will “stay in touch” with relevant parties in this regard.
- Hungary expressed that the NPT’s prohibition norm constitutes a de facto ban provision for 185 non-nuclear weapon states and to move further on this path is only possible through substantial involvement and engagement with nuclear-armed states.
- The US said the prohibition treaty may make the world a more dangerous and unstable place. It said it must not become a distraction in the NPT review process, where it “risks creating an unbridgeable divide among NPT Parties”.
- Belgium said it does not hold the view that the disarmament agenda is best pushed forward by the immediate negotiation of a legally binding prohibition.
- Russia believes that the goal of prohibition negotiations are counter to the agreements reached under the NPT, including the 2010 Action Plan that

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call for phased reduction, and as such, the ban is “premature”. It said that decision-making by voting rather than consensus hampers its participation and it is concerned about what the prohibition treaty means for the future fate of the NPT, which makes “legitimate” the presence of nuclear arsenals in five nuclear powers.

Gender
- The EU said that promotion of gender equality, gender consciousness, and empowerment of women remains a key priority for disarmament and non-proliferation; it is committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and other relevant resolutions.
- Ireland said that gender and disarmament is a “horizontal priority” and allocates sponsorship funding to promote an improved gender balance in representation at meetings. It has funded new research on the gendered impact of nuclear weapons, both in terms of impacts and empowerment issues. Ireland is submitting a working paper on gender to this PrepCom.

Fissile materials
- The EU, Thailand, Bulgaria, Sweden, France, Ireland, Hungary, Australia, Italy, Ukraine, Turkey, Egypt, Belgium, Finland, Poland, Spain welcomed or positively took note of the establishment of the High Level Expert Preparatory Group on the FMCT.
- Canada expects that the expert group will be substantial enough to compel the Conference on Disarmament to move to negotiations.
- The Philippines called for nuclear-armed states to support the on-going work toward the negotiations of an FMCT.
- Australia encouraged the designation by nuclear-armed states of fissile material no longer required for military purposes and the development of legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure their irreversible removal. Kazakhstan also urged states possessing and producing fissile materials should declare all available data on such materials.

Disarmament education
- Italy said that educational efforts should be the root of any strategy aiming at strengthening a global response to WMD threats and preventing non-state actors from gaining access to sensitive material and knowledge, citing the International School on Nuclear Security established in Italy (Trieste) as a good example.
- Ireland said that raising awareness about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and an “informed public” is of key importance.
- The Netherlands called encouraging the role of academia in nuclear disarmament. To this end, it has set up a research program consisting of three PhD spots and organised a colloquium for young experts at the last NPT RevCon.
### CALENDAR OF EVENTS: MONDAY, 8 MAY 2017

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<th>When</th>
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<td>Revitalizing nuclear disarmament: more than just words</td>
<td>M3</td>
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<td>Plenary</td>
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<td>11:00-13:00</td>
<td>Mayors for Peace Youth Forum</td>
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<td>Paving the way for a resumption of meaningful communication on a zone free of WMD in the Middle East</td>
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<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Academic Orchestra Middle East</td>
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<td>US capacity building assistance</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>US Department of State</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the IAEA Milestones Approach: Practical Experiences from the Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Finland</td>
<td>MOE100</td>
<td>Government of Finland</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Disarmament under International Law (Book launch)</td>
<td>Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Andromeda Tower, Floor 13</td>
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<td>WMD Free Middle East - Achieving the Possible</td>
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<td>Israeli Disarmament Movement</td>
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### CALENDAR OF EVENTS: TUESDAY, 9 MAY 2017

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<td>Pugwash Conferences</td>
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