PROLIFERATION OF TOXIC TECHNOLOGIES
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

Speaking a few months after the disaster at Fukushima, Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami said, “Nuclear power plants, which were supposed to be efficient, offer us a vision of hell.” He spoke about how the nuclear power industry insisted that this was an efficient, clean, and safe source of energy—even though it isn’t. And he connected nuclear power to nuclear weapons, arguing that the experience of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have motivated the development of non-nuclear, renewable sources of energy.

Murakami was right to link nuclear power and nuclear weapons. They are connected through their effects, through their creation, and through their proliferation. Both are characterised by their inherent risks and capacity to unleash uniquely horrifying forms of devastation upon human bodies, the environment, and our socioeconomic infrastructure.

The immediate effects of even a single nuclear weapon detonation are horrifying and overwhelming. One detonation will cause tens of thousands of casualties and inflict immediate and irreversible damage to infrastructure, industry, livelihoods, and human lives. The effects will persist over time, devastating human health, the environment, and our economies for years to come. These impacts will wreak havoc on food production, natural disasters, and displace entire populations.

Meanwhile, nuclear power is the most expensive and dangerous way to boil water to turn a turbine. Nuclear power contains the inherent potential for catastrophe. There is no such thing as a safe nuclear reactor. All aspects of the nuclear fuel chain, from mining uranium ore to storing radioactive waste, are devastating for the earth and all species living upon it. Radiation is long lasting and has inter-generational effects.

Furthermore, the spread of nuclear energy around the world since 1953 has enabled the development of nuclear weapons in several countries and the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology that are becoming increasingly susceptible to terrorist attack or accidents. The continued existence of nuclear fuel chain facilities, technology, and material makes it more difficult to reach a world free of nuclear weapons. Eliminating all nuclear materials and technology is the only way to ensure it does not result in catastrophe, by accident or design.

Within the NPT context, nuclear energy is upheld by most states as an “inalienable right”. This means that most states laud its perceived benefits and promote its expansion, regardless of the risks to humanity, the environment, and proliferation. A few states parties recognise these inherent risks and have chosen not to pursue or to phase out nuclear power as part of their energy mixes. The more states parties that follow this path, the better for us all.
Editorial, continued

Many of the states supporting nuclear power are the same that support nuclear weapons. In both cases this is because they benefit from these technologies—in terms of power or economy. But whereas most developing states demand nuclear disarmament, some simultaneously seek to develop nuclear energy for various applications. But nuclear energy is not a solution to development or to the climate crisis. It continues being promoted as such—this has everything to do with capitalism and nothing to do with protecting the planet or its people.

For the nuclear energy industry, the primary motive for operation is profit. History shows us that increasing profit is often best achieved in ways that are not consistent with designing or operating the relevant equipment for the lowest risk to humanity or the planet. Scientists and activists alike have noted that nuclear power, which produces energy “in large, expensive, centralized facilities” is not useful “for solving the energy needs of the vast majority of [the world’s] population, much less so in a way that offers any net environmental gains.” Profit is less likely to be achieved by honestly exploring alternative sources of energy that might necessitate initial investments, or that might not be eligible for the same government (i.e. taxpayer-funded) subsidies as nuclear is in many countries.

“Nuclear weapons still exist today in thousands, a disturbing and sinister reality which the founders of the NPT would not have possibly anticipated, that 49 years after concluding the Treaty, the world continues to be threatened from the most destructive weapons ever created,” said Egypt during Monday’s discussion on non-proliferation. Part of the reason these weapons still exist is that nothing has yet been done to stop the production or possession of fissile materials or nuclear technologies.

Nuclear—whether for energy or weapons—is about destruction but its proponents sell it as security, as safety, and even as life itself. Yet just now, on 9 May 2017, there was an accident at the Hanford nuclear site in the United States. An evacuation was ordered after a tunnel at the plutonium finishing plant collapsed. This is the site where the plutonium for the bomb dropped on Nagasaki was made. It is currently the largest radioactive waste dump in the United States. The tunnel affected by the collapse was reportedly full of highly contaminated materials, including radioactive trains that transport fuel rods.

The bottom line for safety, security, environmental sustainability, and human well-being is that the production, spread, and use of these toxic technologies and materials must end.

Notes
2. For details, please see Unspeakable suffering: the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2013.
3. For a comprehensive overview of the problems of nuclear energy, please see Costs, risks, and myths of nuclear power: NGO world-wide study on the implications of the catastrophe at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, September 2011.
SIDE EVENT: ACHIEVING THE POSSIBLE: MIDDLE EAST WMDFZ DRAFT TREATY
Sharon Dolev, Sergey Batsanov, and Paul Ingram

The process of holding the conference on a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East, agreed in 2010 as part of the Review Conference final agreement, has run into the sand. The big question now is how to restart the process? It’s not good enough to simply state that we wouldn’t start from here, or to demand that others make the move if they do not seem ready to do so.

What can Israel be offered for giving up its arsenals? Should Israeli and regional security be on the table in a parallel process? What prospects are there for recognition and normalisation, and is this part of a new grand bargain? These are some of the questions raised by panelists at this side event hosted by the Israeli Disarmament Movement on Tuesday.

However, participants were also reminded that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only relevant conflict nor the only grit of sand in the oyster. In fact, it is in other conflicts that WMD (chemical weapons) have been used.

There are still a number of views that take the traditional line that Israel should begin by joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and place its facilities under safeguards. An opposite view expressed was that the Arab states and Iran should conclude a regional treaty without Israel. In this context, the draft WMDFZ treaty, Achieving the Possible, was presented—not as a definitive Treaty to be adopted or rejected, but to kick start the discussion of how we best move forward. It is also mean to signal that a treaty is possible if states and the people of the region are to engage with good will.

Not everyone agreed with this approach. One state representative said that civil society should not run too far ahead of governments in the region. But it’s not at all clear where governments in the region are now on this issue, beyond the statements they make at NPT meetings.

Now we need to find a venue and sponsorship for a process to discuss ways forward and how to attract engagement by new actors with experience in other fields. Such a process would facilitate further discussion of the draft treaty, with a view to presenting an improved version to next year’s PrepCom, and to canvass opinion with some governments, particularly the depository states, as to whether they might be involved in the process.

SIDE EVENT: REVITALISING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: MORE THAN JUST WORDS
Paul Ingram | BASIC

In launching BASIC’s latest report on Meaningful Multilateralism, Paul Ingram talked of the need for all parties interested in pursuing progress in global disarmament (which ought to be everyone!), to discuss what it actually means with a view to finding progress. Too often it appears that states, politicians, and NGOs are content with making statements of support of multilateral disarmament in NPT Preparatory Committees, election campaigns, or reports like this one. But action is currently in stalemate, and it appears that many are largely content to accept that as inevitable. As elections appear to support radical populist politicians (let’s not forget that Marine Le Pen received 35% of the vote in France), it appears that multilateral, cooperative diplomacy is on the back foot. But the framing that often supports nuclear deterrence (such as strength, influence, and national security) can be used along with others (such as the rule of law, verification, and global governance) to strengthen support for robust multilateral measures.

In the UK, where we are in the middle of an election campaign, the very term multilateral disarmament has become synonymous with an anti-unilateral, pro-nuclear, one that some believe is one of inaction. UK government opposition to the nuclear weapon ban treaty process on the basis that it is a distraction risks sending a strong message of hostility to the general understanding that multilateral disarmament is essential. If the UK government, and others, are genuine in their claim to support nuclear disarmament, this requires moving forward in delivering upon it—and that means taking a can-do attitude, rather than simply listing the obstacles. For example, why can’t the nuclear-armed states discuss a mutual no-first use agreement? Of course every state can imagine fictional scenarios in which they may face the horrific decision to use nuclear weapons first, but this attachment to such improbable, theoretical scenarios deeply harms the possibilities for agreement and feeds the frustration felt at the lack of progress.
SIDE EVENT: DISARMAMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non Proliferation

On 8 May 2017, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non Proliferation (VCDNP) hosted the launch of *Disarmament under International Law*, a book by John Kierulf, retired diplomat and former disarmament negotiator with Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book is an updated English version of the original Danish edition published in 2014. It provides a comprehensive review of the most important treaties, conventions, and other international instruments on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The primary objective of the book, the author explained, is to provide an introduction to international law and argue for stronger political action to enhance arms control and disarmament efforts through legally binding instruments. Divided into three parts, the book contains definitions, background, and historical developments pertaining to arms control agreements since The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

In examining how WMD are regulated in existing treaties, the book not only covers legal issues concerning nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, but also other categories including radiological weapons, cyber space, and WMD in outer space. It also contains a detailed examination of conventional arms regulations, including heavy and light conventional weapons. There is a special section covering anti-personnel land mines under the Mine Ban Treaty. Other topics of discussion include cluster bombs, Arms Trade Treaty, and global military expenditures.

The author put forward various recommendations to reduce nuclear risks, including removing nuclear weapons from high operational readiness status and keeping warheads separate from their delivery means. He emphasized the need to withdraw all tactical weapons from foreign territories. In commenting on the need to stop the modernization plans of the nuclear-weapon states, Kierulf argued that these plans are a direct violation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He observed that while there is a low probability of a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, the risk of radiological and/or nuclear terrorism is increasing. One important and necessary step to minimize such risks, he argued, is to raise awareness and educate the public and younger generation about the dangers of nuclear weapons.

Kierulf presented information and analysis on a comprehensive range of issues related to the current state of international security. Underlining the continued and serious threat posed by nuclear weapons, Kierulf appealed for increased and effective international efforts to reduce their numbers and ultimately eliminate them. •

SIDE EVENT: NATO’S ENDURING COMMITMENT TO THE NPT
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non Proliferation

On 5 May 2017, the VCDNP hosted a seminar, “NATO’s Enduring Commitment to the NPT,” with Rose Gottemoeller, NATO Deputy Secretary General, and William Alberque, Head of NATO Arms Control and Coordination Section. Both speakers discussed NATO’s role in non-proliferation and disarmament policies.

Ms. Gottemoeller delivered a concise but comprehensive presentation that highlighted the continuity over time of NATO’s effort to combine internal cohesion within the Alliance with non-proliferation and disarmament goals. While describing the NPT as a great success, she underlined that more work needs to be done. She recalled a number of arms control treaties and negotiations to underscore NATO’s support for efforts aimed at providing stability to the international environment. Ms. Gottemoeller argued that the US non-strategic nuclear weapons hosted in Europe do not constitute a violation of the NPT, and that “nuclear sharing” is a misnomer, as control over the weapons remains with the United States.

Mr. Alberque provided historical backing to Ms. Gottemoeller’s presentation. He presented the results of his in-depth archival research of the history of NPT negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union specifically pertaining to the issue of nuclear sharing. In an engaging and compelling way, he discussed the intricacies of intra-alliance negotiations that accompanied discussions between the US and the USSR. On the basis of his historical research, Mr. Alberque stressed that joint efforts are needed in order to promote significant political projects, calling in particular for US-Russian cooperation. In his view, the decision by a group of states to prohibit nuclear weapons “without dealing with the complex problems of verification” could make the world less safe. •
Mayors for Peace held its Youth Forum on 8 May as a side event to the NPT PrepCom. Representatives of the young generations from around the world came together to share their efforts and wishes for peace. Youth presenters were selected from Hiroshima, Okinawa, and Nagasaki in Japan, from Volgograd in Russia, from Santos in Brazil, from Malakoff in France, and also representing two NGOs: INESAP from Germany and ICAN from Austria. It was an inspiring and exciting gathering.

Ms. Angela Kane, the former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (currently senior fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation), started the forum by encouraging the youth to spread their knowledge about the terrible effects of nuclear weapons and to advocate for nuclear weapons to be outlawed. Next, the host of this event, Mr. Kazumi Matsui, the Mayor of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace, expressed his hope in younger generations and wished that this meaningful forum “will spark momentum toward freeing the world from nuclear weapons.” He reminded participants that the average Hibakusha is now over 80 years old, and he implored others to keep their message of peace alive.

Then the audience saw 10 powerful presentations from youth around the world about the diverse and creative activities they have been implementing to further peace and nuclear abolition. They explained how they got involved in peace activities and why they were so important. During a Q & A session, presenters and participants discussed education, advocacy, and campaigning strategies to influence public opinion and governments.

At the end, the Secretary General of Mayors for Peace, Mr. Yasuyoshi Komizo, summed up the meeting and thanked everyone for their efforts and their attendance. Ms. Keiko Nakamura of Nagasaki University’s Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, who served as a facilitator, closed the event. Everyone was inspired through the exchanges and left with renewed determination to contribute to the creation of a more peaceful world.
The news in brief is not a comprehensive overview of all positions or statements. It highlights new or particularly salient recommendations or comments from the cluster two and three debates, and the specific issue for cluster two. Full statements are available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Cluster two

IAEA safeguards
- Nearly every state that spoke on this subject reaffirmed the utility of safeguards and the valuable role of the IAEA in verifying adherence to them; as well as the need to ensure the IAEA has adequate resources.
- The NAM and Egypt called upon the nuclear-armed states to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. Indonesia called upon all nuclear-armed states and all states not party to the NPT to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Japan also called for wider application of safeguards on nuclear-armed states’ nuclear material. Brazil connected a future world without nuclear weapons as being one in which nuclear-armed states would be subject to full-scope safeguards and additional protocols.
- The EU, Japan, US, UK urged all NPT states parties that have not yet met the requirement to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement as soon as possible. They also urged concluding an Additional Protocol and, where applicable, the modified version of the Small Quantities Protocol, which Germany also supported.
- The UK said it is a strong supporter of the evolution of safeguards implementation to the State Level Concept (SLC). South Africa looks forward to the Agency’s report on this subject. Brazil reiterated the that SLC approach should be rigorously based on the supplementary document GOV/2014/41 and the assurances given by the IAEA Secretariat at the September 2014 Board of Governors. Russia said that the content of the reform has been modified to better reflect the views of member states, the reform is far from perfect. It believes that the development of new approaches to safeguards decisions should be open and decisions on modifications built upon wide support from Agency members.
- Several delegations said the additional protocol, together with a safeguards agreement, should be considered the verification standard. Brazil emphasized that the additional protocol is a voluntary agreement and that it should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
- Russia said that all information used by the IAEA Secretariat in preparing safeguards conclusions should have an evidence-based character to prove their accuracy and to ensure that this information may be relied on during political discussions in the policy-making organs. Russia said that verification activity would still focus on those materials and facilities that could represent a real proliferation threat, which is not found in declared intentions or the image presented in mass media.
- Argentina said it agrees with the importance of solving all cases of non-compliance with nuclear safeguards; regrettably some of them are still unresolved and create concerns.

Nuclear sharing
- Egypt urged states parties that engage in nuclear weapon sharing arrangements end such agreements under any circumstances and any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances.
- Iran said that any assessment of the implementation of non-proliferation commitments should include nuclear sharing.
- Ecuador called for reporting from nuclear sharing states.

Vertical proliferation
- Egypt said that the NPT has been deficient in addressing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons; and that non-proliferation cannot be addressed in isolation from disarmament.
- Iran urged that assessment of non-proliferation status include vertical proliferation, upgrading the existing nuclear weapons, developing new types of such weapons, and the construction of new facilities for the production of nuclear weapons; stating that this is a grave concern.

Iran/Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
- Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, and the UK expressed support for and/or welcomed the JCPOA as a success.
- The US said it is reviewing its policies regarding Iran, including the JCPOA. While that review is underway, the US remains committed “to ensuring strict and rigorous implementation of Iran’s commitments” and will “continue to fulfill its own commitments”.
- Russia encouraged others to refrain from any attempts to extend JCPOA verification mechanisms to other countries.
- France, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and US expressed concern with Iranian missile tests. Ukraine called
on Iran to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA and Resolution 2231.

• Sweden urged early ratification of the agreement’s additional protocol.

• Norway said the JCPOA could become a building block for a weapon of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

• China said Chinese and Iranian companies have initialed their first commercial contract on the renovation of the Arak heavy-water reactor in April, moving this work into the implementation phase.

DPRK

• Brazil, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and the UK condemned recent nuclear weapon and missile tests.

• The EU and the United States reiterated that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-armed state in accordance with the NPT.

• France and the Republic of Korea are submitting a joint declaration as a conference document of this Preparatory Committee.

• China has raised a “dual track approach” and “suspension for suspension” proposal on this issue, and requests relevant parties to consider it.

• Russia stated that US-centered military and political alliances in Northeast Asia, alongside the escalation of American military presence, contributes to DPRK’s continued testing and development.

• The US said that China has “particularly important role” to play and hopes it will alter its strategic thinking and partner with it.

Syria

• Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Netherlands, the UK, and the US spoke about Syrian non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for concluding and bringing into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

WMD free zone in the Middle East

• Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, the EU, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the NAM, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and the UK regret the lack of progress on establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East, are committed to moving it forward.

• Egypt said that the three sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East have a special responsibility in this regard.

• Iran said that the only way to establish a zone in the Middle East is through sustained pressure on Israel in order to compel it to accede to the Treaty. Cuba and China called on Israel to accede to the NPT. Egypt said this review cycle should demand Israel accede to the Treaty.

• Indonesia said it would like for this meeting to provide momentum to further political will by states in the region to launch negotiations at the earliest possible date on a treaty establishing this zone. Kazakhstan said it would like for this to be a focus of this PrepCom and Iran urged it to be a priority.

• Russia’s working paper on moving towards a conference on the establishment of a zone calls for regular preparatory meetings in Geneva, Glion, Cairo, or Moscow, if necessary. The paper states that decisions should be based on consensus; that it will require skilled facilitation, possibly by the UN Secretariat; a strong agenda and proper financial support.

• US supports a zone in the Middle East but cautioned that conditions must be right and that “misguided attempts to coerce an outcome, or to hold the NPT review process hostage” will lead to failure.

• Ireland said that the review conference format may not be conducive to progress on this issue and encouraged the development of a “food for thought” paper, possibly prepared by the co-conveners and regional governments. It also encouraged a “dedicated and consistent resource” on the subject.

• Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya, Yemen submitted a joint working paper (WP.30) on the Middle East zone calling on Israel to accede to the NPT and stating the UNSG and depository states should prepare for the immediate convening of the conference before 2020 and provide a complete plan and timeframe for the implementation of the relevant obligations.

NWFZs and other regional issues

• In 2016, Australia and Myanmar partnered to secure the East Asia Summit (EAS) Leaders’ Statement on Non-Proliferation that reflects a united voice reaffirming the region’s commitment to the international non-proliferation regime.

• Indonesia noted that NWFZs provide an effective means for preventing nuclear tests being conducted in a region; with the Philippines and Malaysia, they stressed the importance of consultations leading to early accession of the nuclear-armed states to the protocol of the Bangkok Treaty. France said that it is ready to do so. China said that it will be the first to do so, once ASEAN states agree to sign separate protocols with the other nuclear-armed states.
News in brief, continued

- Kazakhstan looks forward to the ratification by the US of the protocol on negative security assurances for states participating in the Central Asian NWFZ.

Export control
- Australia, Canada, the EU, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden, and Switzerland, among others, expressed support for the role of multilateral export regimes: the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
- Sweden said it is crucial that the regimes are updated to stay current with new and emerging technologies.
- The EU has assisted third countries with around €8 million with a view to improve their legal framework and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls.
- Netherlands called on all states to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the NPT.
- Ireland said it will seek to enhance the effectiveness of the MTCR through information sharing and awareness raising when it takes up the co-chairship with Iceland.
- Poland affirmed that as the Chair of the Hague Code of Conduct for the period of 2017-18, it demonstrates its commitment to the interlinked proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies.
- To prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the UK encouraged other states to work towards, or complete the process of becoming state parties of the MTCR.

Fissile materials
- NAM supported the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It urged the Conference to examine such arrangements and how to make them operational.
- Guatemala expressed support for the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes and reduce existing stocks through a binding instrument with a verification regime.
- South Africa is disappointed at the lack of progress in the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements with the IAEA to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-armed states as no longer required for military purposes. It regrets that no progress has been made for additional declarations of stockpiles of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Japan called for nuclear-armed states to declare fissile material as no longer required for military purposes.
- Sweden called on states that possess nuclear weapons to increase transparency and confidence in the effective security of such materials.
- Russia does not consider the conclusion of an FMCT as a priority for the nuclear non-proliferation regime but stands ready to participate in negotiations, understanding they will take place in the Conference on Disarmament.
- Poland announced it became HEU free last year.
- France said it is necessary to ensure that sensitive programmes, in particular the development of enrichment and reprocessing, are justified by a demonstrated economic and industrial need.
- Egypt called on states parties to the NPT that are engaged in cooperative exchanges with states not party to “reconsider such an approach with a view to halt such exchanges”.
- China called on states to “discard double standards and utilitarianism” in order to “enhance the authority and effectiveness of a fair and equitable” non-proliferation regime. It also called on states to “avoid setting non-proliferation standards according to the existence or absence of affinities between states.”

Nuclear terrorism
- France, Ireland, Italy, and Japan, Ireland referred to the recent review and related update to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 2325) as positive.
- Malaysia called on states to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking and encouraged states parties exchange information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in areas such as nuclear detection, law enforcement, forensics, and the development of new technologies.
News in brief, continued

- Japan will hold the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in June 2017. Romania will host a practical exercise on nuclear forensics.

Withdrawal
- Poland called for a solid and result-oriented discussion on strengthening Article X on treaty withdrawals; Australia encouraged review of suggestions from the Vienna Group of Ten. Canada drew attention to the Vienna Group of Ten’s Working Paper on ‘Vienna Issues’. Hungary stressed having more discussion on withdrawals.

Nuclear security
- The UK said that at the Nuclear Security Summit last year it announced it is undertaking the largest single movement of enriched uranium to the US and that it will lead international efforts to strengthen the cyber security nuclear plants.
- As a part of nuclear security and related conferences, Norway said a key deliverable is the pledge to minimize and eventually phase out the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.
- Ireland will introduce a Working Paper prepared with Chatham House on how this review cycle should take into account a broader understanding of security that includes poverty, development, climate, environment, and gender.
- Thailand announced that its new Nuclear Energy for Peace Act has entered into force on 1 February 2017 and focuses on nuclear safeguards, safety and security.

Cluster three

General
- China says it has submitted a working paper on the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy that elaborates China’s relevant positions.
- China, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Italy, the NAM, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Ukraine, and the US applauded the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and many cited specific projects or activities they are contributing to or have participated in.
- The US outlined that the American Assured Fuel Supply could enable access to fuel for domestic or foreign partners in the event of a supply disruption.

Nuclear security
- NAM confirmed that all states parties to the NPT shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to states not party, including in the context of military alliances, without meeting the conditions of IAEA safeguards.
- EU said that significant progress has been made in the last decade through the implementation of a EU-internal plan on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security.
- Indonesia announced that it is revising its law on nuclear energy, which will include all aspects of nuclear security.
- Republic of Korea and the US welcomed the entry into force of the Protection of Nuclear Material last year and urged all States to join its Amendment.
- Republic of Korea said it attaches particular significance to strengthening cyber security, as shown in a recent financial contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

Nuclear safety
- EU emphasised implementing the report on “Building on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety”.
- Republic of Korea said it received positive peer reviews at the recent meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety; the EU noted the action points produced by this conference.
- Republic of Korea said that management of spent fuel is the most critical issue that all countries using nuclear power are currently facing.
- Next month ROK will shut down its first nuclear power reactor, after 39 years of operation.
- EU referenced the 7th meeting of meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in March and April 2017 that resulted in agreed action points for its summary report.
- EU explained that risk and safety assessments were carried out after the Fukushima accident and the results confirm that EU member states are complying with high standards but recommended tangible improvements that are now being carried out.
- China updated that it is undergoing the legislative process of the Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear Safety Act, and the Nuclear Security Regulations.
- Czech Republic said that the update of its legislation comprehensively covering the nuclear area is complete; a new Atomic Act accompanied by a set of implementing regulations entered into force at the beginning of this year.
- New Zealand welcomed efforts to improve nuclear liability and will work to ensure the views of coastal states are reflected.
- Japan encouraged states to join the international nuclear liability regime.
Fissile materials
- Canada said IAEA should not engage in activities related to nuclear disarmament or securing fissile materials meant for military purposes as this will distract from Agency’s core mandate.
- New Zealand reminded states that 83% of nuclear materials are for military purposes.

Fukushima/Chernobyl/other accidents
- Ukraine updated on its post-Chernobyl activities; namely the transformation of Unit 4 into a safe system and a current project focusing on assistance for decommissioning and radioactive waste management.
- New Zealand noted that the Fukushima disaster showed that consequences of nuclear power accidents do not respect borders. We need continued vigilance on transparency and safety standards.

Phase-out of nuclear power/energy
- Italy announced that following two referendums it has decided to abandon its nuclear energy program and is consequently decommissioning its nuclear facilities in accordance with the highest international safety and security standards.
- New Zealand highlighted that it has chosen not to include nuclear power in its energy mix.

Environment and development
- Indonesia noted that 13 out of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) relate directly to the IAEA’s area of competence. China said that to promote the achievement of 2030 sustainable development goals, it is willing to use existing resources to provide assistance to the IAEA to support developing countries. The Netherlands believes the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme can play an important role in realizing the SDGs.
- Spain stated that the applicability of nuclear applications to medicine, especially for growing and ageing populations, is directly related to Millennium Development Goal #3.

JCPOA
- Italy and Czech Republic welcomed the agreement.
- Italy invited Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol without further delay in order to start the process that may eventually allow the IAEA to grant the “Broader Conclusion”.
- China said it upholds a “responsible attitude” to the implementation of the JCPOA, and has carried out fruitful cooperation with the United States, Iran and others to with respect to the renovation of the Arak heavy water reactor.

Other issues
- Republic of Korea said that discussion on treaty withdrawals (Article X) must consider the following points: a withdrawal should allow for other states parties to review any violations; and the materials, facilities, and equipment acquired prior to withdrawal must remain subject to the IAEA Safeguards; and the withdrawing state must return all facilities and materials acquired prior to withdrawal. Canada referenced the working paper submitted to the 2015 RevCon that outlines a number of principles governing the exercise of withdrawal.
- Canada said that regular reporting is one way to strengthen the NPT review process and referenced the NPDI working paper on transparency that sets out a common reporting template.

Corrections
We wish to note the following two corrections in “News in Brief” section of Vol. 14, No. 2 of NPT News in Review (4 May 2017):
- Ambassador Grossi of Argentina will preside over the 2020 Review Conference. There was a typo in the original.
- In the section on the JCPOA, Iran had stated that the JCPOA has nothing to do with the “prompt ratification” of the additional protocol, rather than the protocol itself.

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<td>12:45-15:00</td>
<td>Panel discussion on the CTBT as a Cornerstone of the NPT Regime</td>
<td>Andromeda Tower, PMJ Conference Room on fl. 24</td>
<td>Permanent Missions of Japan and Kazakhstan and VCDNP</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Assessing the transformative potential of the JCPOA</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Academic Orchestra Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Trends, activities, and priorities in nuclear safety</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-18:00</td>
<td>Student simulation</td>
<td>Donau City Church</td>
<td>INESAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:45-16:00</td>
<td>Disarmament verification: the role of scientists</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>VERTIC</td>
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