TRANSPARENCY AND DIVERSITY
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

States parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have been discussing how to improve the review process for the Treaty’s implementation for decades. The process does need some practical adjustments—shorter meetings, smoother appointments of chairs and facilitators, more interactive dialogue, better engagement with civil society, etc. But above all, as several delegations noted during the discussion on “strengthening the review process” on Wednesday, the best way to do this is to implement the Treaty’s provisions and subsequent commitments in full.

“The NPT is not a charter for the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons,” the Irish delegation reiterates in its working paper on gender, development, and nuclear weapons. This should be the mantra of all NPT meetings and the guideline for all actions and decisions related to its implementation and processes—including when it comes to transparency and reporting.

During Wednesday’s debate, Canada, Japan, and others critiqued the lack of a formalized or institutionalized transparency mechanism for nuclear-armed states, with Japan arguing that a strengthened review process “should be achieved by enhancing accountability” of the nuclear-armed states.

Transparency is instrumental for accountability, and NPT states parties are severely lacking in both. The nuclear-armed states failed to agree on a standard reporting form, as they committed to do in 2010; they also failed to report on any of the issues they were mandated to by that Review Conference. However, certain non-nuclear-armed states—those that include nuclear weapons in their security doctrines or that station nuclear weapons on their territories—have also failed in regards to transparency.

For far too long, these states have been largely unaccountable to the broader NPT membership. They have engaged in behaviour that they themselves would never tolerate of others. As a first step, they should become more transparent about their practices. Those that station nuclear...
Editorial, continued

Weapons on their territories should end their opaque policy of neither confirming nor denying this. These “host” states should provide details of the location, the number, the status, and the type of these weapons, as well as the vehicles that would be used to deliver them. If they expect the nuclear-armed states parties to be more open about their arsenals, what justification can there be for withholding such information themselves?

The NPT states parties that permit the transit of nuclear weapons through their territory, including their territorial waters, should inform the membership when, how often, along which routes, and at what risk to their own citizens—and to the citizens of the world. These are fundamental questions—reasonable questions—that should not go unanswered. Enhanced transparency is a responsibility for all states parties, especially those that continue to claim protection from these immoral, illegitimate weapons.

The draft outcome document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which was not adopted in the end, called upon all states concerned “to continue to review their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies over the course of the next review cycle, with a view to reducing further the role and significance of nuclear weapons therein.” It was useful that this applied not just to nuclear-armed states but was inclusive of all states that include nuclear weapons in their doctrines.

The draft outcome also encouraged nuclear-armed states to include very specific details in their reporting to the 2020 review cycle, including the number, type, and status of nuclear warheads; the number and type of delivery vehicles; the measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies; the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorised, or accidental use of nuclear weapons; the measures taken to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced; and the amount of fissile material for military purposes.

These are important steps that should be pursued in this review cycle, amongst others. Nearly five decades after the NPT was negotiated, we must be asking not only whether the nuclear-armed states parties are doing enough to fulfil their obligations, but also whether every non-nuclear-armed state party is doing enough.

This relates directly to another crucial issue for the NPT: gender diversity. States are not doing enough to ensure that women and others are meaningfully participating in the NPT process, or the broader disarmament sphere. Women are seriously unrepresented in nuclear disarmament; as a result, the discourse around and approach to nuclear weapons remains gendered, lending to ongoing stalemate in the field.

“Achieving gender equity in this and other NPT discussions is not just good policy but also has the potential to enhance the capability and effectiveness of NPT processes and their outcomes,” explained the Australian delegation on Wednesday. “Research has shown that more diverse teams are more effective, innovative, take more sustainable decisions and are more effective in resolving impasses.”

Furthermore, it is crucial that women are “equally engaged in discussions on weapons which affect them so disproportionately,” as the Irish delegation argues in its working paper. The Irish have called on states to assist and sponsor women participants in nuclear disarmament forums and for this review cycle to make a “conscious and genuine commitment to improving women’s engagement and participation in the work of the NPT.”

The issues of transparency and diversity are arguably related. Not that women or others are necessarily more transparent than men, but that a diversity of genders—and nationalities and ethnicities—can contribute to building a diversity of culture, which is beneficial to any process.

The US delegation argued that what the NPT process needs is to “rebuild” a “culture of consensus,” in order to “focus on our common interests”. While it’s always good to remember what we have in common and to recognize the common goods the Treaty provides, what the NPT needs is not more consensus but more diversity: space for different views and perspectives that are not overpowered or silenced by hegemonic cultures or actors. We need more transparency, more diversity, and more actions to fulfill the commitments that states have made over the past 47 years.

Women’s March NYC © Maria Butler, WILPF
MAYORS FOR PEACE EXHIBITION: THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Nuclear weapons: an absolute evil

Presented in the hall of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in Vienna, the updated exhibition of Mayors for Peace about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has attracted participants’ attention during the whole meeting from 2–12 May 2017.

For the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Mr. Matsui and Mr. Taue, the goal of this exhibition is to help “to understand that nuclear weapons are an absolute evil leading the human race toward extinction.” The first section of this 36-poster exhibition is dedicated to the atomic explosions that occurred on 6 and 9 August 1945. Impressive pictures and paintings of the destroyed cities show the direct indiscriminate effects of the bomb on thousands of people. Photos of a tile boiled by the fire 600 meters from the hypocenter, or of concrete buildings completely crushed, testify to the heat and violence of the explosion.

Watching the exhibition, students from Germany expressed that the terrible effects of nuclear explosions are the reasons why they are now campaigning against nuclear weapons and that they were especially impressed by the never-ending horror of the radiation, shown in the second section. Indeed, while 210,000 people died directly from the explosions over the two cities, many survivors have since suffered the devastating aftereffects of radiation. The most common aftereffects include keloids, cataracts, leukemia, and cancers that can appear 10, 20, or even 30 years after the explosion.

7295 cities for peace

The exhibition wishes also to inspire action and promotes Mayors for Peace campaign, the “2020 vision” to abolish nuclear weapons. To reach this goal, Mayors for Peace has increased its member cities in the recent years to 7295 cities in 162 countries and regions. They spread the message of the Hibakusha, the survivors of the atomic bombings, and call citizens all over the world to inspire their Mayors and their governments to be more proactive toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. As said a diplomat from Africa: “We think we know everything about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but seeing direct testimonies shows that it is even worse, and everyone should be aware of these dangers.”

All information about this exhibition and Mayors for Peace activities are available upon request at mayorcon@pcf.city.hiroshima.jp and http://www.mayorsforpeace.org.
The news in brief is not a comprehensive overview of all positions or statements. It highlights new or particularly salient recommendations or comments from the cluster three debate, including the specific issue, and the discussion on strengthening the review process. Full statements are available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Cluster three

Nuclear security

- Switzerland noted that even states not party to the NPT have security responsibilities and called on them to adopt non-proliferation norms and commitments that are both binding and equivalent to those of states parties.
- Switzerland stated that the nuclear security architecture is incomplete if it doesn’t cover materials for military purposes, which is 85% of material.
- Brazil likewise said that the vast majority of sensitive nuclear materials continue to be exempt from oversight, in hands of a few nuclear-armed states.
- Ireland welcomed the Ministerial Declaration agreed by consensus at the International Conference on Nuclear Security in December 2016 but said it wished that the Declaration could have included an explicit recognition of the clear link between nuclear security and nuclear disarmament.
- Ireland referenced a Chatham House report “Understanding Nuclear Weapons Risk” that includes lessons from the assessment of nuclear power plant risks, as well as the threat posed by non-state actors and potential cyber-attacks.
- Romania said it believes that the application of safeguards in the context of the State Level Concept will allow the IAEA to improve efficiency.
- Colombia highlighted the early warning function that IAEA systems play in identifying the development of programs for military purposes.
- Egypt and Iran expressed concern that some states parties are engaged in nuclear transfers with states not party to they NPT. Iran called on the 2020 Review Conference to address this issue and urged making a decision on complete prohibition of transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to non-parties to the Treaty and note that non-adherence Review Conference to recognize that non-adherence to the NPT undermines its objectives.
- Algeria said that concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear safety, and security should not be used as a pretext to limit the scope of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
- Nicaragua is concerned that many countries do not have a legally binding mechanism to properly store nuclear materials.
- Thailand described its new Nuclear Energy for Peace Act as providing a legal framework to implement its international obligations effectively and provide penal measures against illegal activities.
- Australia encouraged states to convert HEU research reactors to LEU models to reduce proliferation and security risks and has stated work on developing its indigenous waste form technology, Synroc.

Nuclear safety

- Norway and Ireland expressed concern that the safe transport of radioactive materials should be in line with highest safety standards.
- Multiple delegations referenced the positive outcomes of the 7th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
- The United Arab Emirates called on Iran to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
- Finland said that managing waste should be considered as part of the fuel chain.
- Romania underlined the need for transparency and trust between countries using peaceful nuclear energy in meeting the highest nuclear security, safety, and non-proliferation requirements.
- Switzerland said it is strongly committed to strengthening the Convention on Nuclear Security and is also working for the adoption of an IAEA safety strategy that will include a hierarchy of priorities and clear performance indicators.
- Colombia noted the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL) as helping to facilitate technology transfer within the region.

Phase-out of nuclear power/energy

- Ireland said that it does not use nuclear energy due to risks of nuclear power and technologies.
- Belgium is phasing out its 7 power reactors by 2025.

Environment and development

- Cuba, Ecuador, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK said that the IAEA Technical Cooperation can be applied to attaining the SDGs.
- Sweden referenced the contribution of the IAEA to the upcoming Ocean Conference in New York, which it said is the first major conference to focus on a specific SDG.
News in brief, continued

• Morocco and Cuba further referenced a role in attaining the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. Nigeria said that recalling Paris Agreement on Climate Change, it is important to seek more cooperation in enabling access to nuclear energy in the energy mix of interested countries.

• Ireland stated that the IAEA’s Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy, or PACT, helps countries devise comprehensive cancer control programmes in support of the third of the seventeen SDGs.

• Colombia said that the IAEA’s activities in the field of technical cooperation, energy, and non-energy applications can assist in meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

• Romania shared that its national institutions offer training and assistance bilaterally or through the IAEA TC program.

• Ecuador particularly appreciated the assistance of the Agency following the earthquake in its country last year, which included portable x-ray equipment and generators, radiation detectors, and ZIKA virus early detection equipment.

JCPOA

• France welcomed the agreement but expressed concern about the continuation of the Iranian ballistic program, and called for Iran to cease such activities.

• Ecuador believes in the essential and independent role of the IAEA to verify compliance with JCPOA.

DPRK

• France said it and the Republic of Korea are tabling a joint declaration addressing the nuclear and ballistic weapons testing of North Korea, as an outcome document of this meeting. It called on all states to support the declaration.

Syria

• France called for “light to be drawn” on Syria’s past and present nuclear activities and are lending its full support to the IAEA in this mission. Syria said that it is cooperating with the IAEA and that regular inspections are being carried out.

Withdrawal

• Japan referenced the principles that were outlined in a working paper presented at the 2015 Review Conference, which include giving notice to states parties and the UN Security Council; continuing to be responsible for treaty obligations prior to giving notice; other states parties should exert pressure to deter withdrawal; and nuclear material must remain in IAEA safeguards even after withdrawal.

• Iran expressed that there is neither necessity nor urgency to focus on issues relating to Article X, stating that there are more important priorities and challenges facing the NPT right now such as the transfer of materials from states parties to states not party. Iran called on the Review Conference to address this issue and take a decision about the complete prohibition of transferring equipment, material and technology to states not party, based on the recognition that non-adherence undermines the treaty’s objectives.

• South Africa urged that care be taken so that proposals to interpret Article X do not create ambiguities that could create greater uncertainties.

• Netherlands stated that clarity is needed about procedures and consequences, and that discussions relating to Article X are not about the right to withdraw, but about what happens when that occurs.

• The US said that it is a basic principle of international law that a withdrawing state remains responsible for any unresolved noncompliance prior to its withdrawal and this must be vigorously enforced. It said states must consider measures to ensure that a withdrawing state cannot escape its obligations to other parties not to misuse the fruits of peaceful nuclear cooperation, noting that many “of us” rely on binding bilateral assurances of peaceful use and safeguards that reinforce corresponding undertakings in the NPT.

• Thailand supported further strengthening of Article X.

• Ecuador is concerned about continuing to attempt to interpret this article by imposing conditions and creating assumptions because it opens the rest of the Treaty to interpretation, which per the Law of Treaties, requires agreement of all states parties.

• Canada noted that there are lessons learned from the experience of DPRK’s withdrawal and that there are no guidelines for the practical and procedural issues that come up when this happens.

Strengthening the review process

• Japan said that the primary objective of the review process should be a review of how nuclear-armed states are implementing their obligations, including through reporting. It urged nuclear-armed states to agree a standard reporting form and reiterated the importance of transparency.

• Japan also noted that there was not much interaction in the ‘interactive debate’ portions of this PrepCom.

• Netherlands stated that improving working methods should not be a “cosmetic issue” or distraction. It outlined three areas where there could be improvement: the inability of PrepComs to take substantive

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decisions or make substantive recommendations to the RevCon, resulting in too heavy a workload; there is too much repetition of issues across the three subjects; and there could be stronger links and closer cooperation between the chairs of different meetings and early confirmation of those roles.

- The US emphasized the importance of rebuilding a culture of consensus and asked if we might consider whether the topic of subsidiary bodies could be changed to reflect current issues rather than those that were current in 2000.

- Thailand suggested better integration and information sharing; adopting a streamlined and result-oriented approach so as to avoid revisiting the same issues each year; and doing more to monitor compliance. It encouraged all states parties to engage in discussions on a standard reporting format and appropriate reporting intervals.

- Iran stated that the main problems are ones of political will and flexibility.

- Canada said it believes in the “accountability principle” and reiterated its earlier call to improve on reporting practices as well as the means by which to assess reports. It referenced the template and suggestions made in the NPDI paper on transparency.

- Poland supports consensus and also the benefits of early nomination of future meeting chairs, which can facilitate cooperation and coordination. It stressed the need for good time allocation during NPT meetings so that speeches are not too long and referenced the ‘stop light’ approach used in this PrepCom. Poland said that the submission of reports is very important.

- Australia expressed preference for a “rolling outcomes” document as an example of creative thinking that could lead to ideas that gain consensus, even if that process hasn’t yet done so, and urged more continuity between meetings.

- Australia noted called for increasing the effective participation of women in the review process, and across the three pillars of the NPT more broadly. It noted that while it has been “heartening” to hear several statements delivered by women delegates, that “we are still too few”. Achieving gender equity has the potential to enhance the capability and effectiveness of the NPT.

### CALENDAR OF EVENTS: THURSDAY, 11 MAY 2017

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<tr>
<th>When</th>
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<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>M1</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>MOE100</td>
<td>Government of Austria</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>EU-IAEA cooperation in nuclear science applications</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Planning for the UN High Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<td>Unfold Zero</td>
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### Women's March to Ban the Bomb!

Supporting UN Negotiations to adopt a treaty to ban nuclear weapons

**Saturday June 17th 2017 in NYC**

Learn more at: www.womenbanthebomb.org