Discussion at the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has turned to the Treaty’s first pillar: disarmament.

This word has become inclusive of many things over time: security assurances, treaties that deal with facets or specific types of nuclear weapons or material, or certain parts of the world; alert statuses; testing bans or moratoria. In developing this elaborate framework of checks, balances, agreements, and systems many have lost sight of what disarmament should include. Destruction, reduction, elimination are evaporating from an increasingly diluted landscape that functions as a distraction from non-action on the part of nuclear-armed states.

In its statement New Zealand reminded PrepCom delegates that the obligation to achieve “progressively full nuclear disarmament” was not included in the first drafts of the NPT but inserted at a later point in the negotiations at the insistence of a number of states, becoming a “pivotal draw card” that facilitated their voting in favour of the Treaty in the UN General Assembly, under the belief that this would happen.

It was a clever ruse, but the jig is up. Dozens of countries and numerous civil society organisations called out the nuclear development and modernisation programmes of the NPT nuclear-armed states parties for being incompatible with their NPT disarmament obligations. While this condemnation is not by any means new in the context of pillar one discussions, the pace and scale of such programmes has sparked greater criticism particularly given the context of heightened nuclear posturing, public highlighting of planned new nuclear capabilities, and little to no pretense of intending to disarm.

The United Kingdom was quite clear in stating that to abandon its nuclear deterrent unilaterally would undermine its security, and that of all states, and not make anyone safer. While the United States has utilised a variety of window-dressing exercises this week to assure its fellow states parties that the policies and intentions contained in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review are in keeping with its NPT obligations, it defended the necessity of its weapons for global security. All nuclear-armed states parties are using the current “security environment” as an excuse for retaining their nuclear weapons, a point refuted by other states parties for its hollowness. “The global security situation can not justify the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament,” noted Mexico. “On the contrary, the context that we currently face reinforces the need for urgent actions to guarantee the elimination of this type of armament.”

Sometimes, the nuclear-armed states called each other out; the actions of one seen as a threat or affront to another that is provoking responses in kind, creating a “combustible mix” in the words of one civil society representative. As described by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “The existence of nuclear weapons and the “security” benefits attributed to them are root causes of the tensions themselves.” The increasingly vitriolic and accusatory rights of reply that have occurred at the end of each meeting this week are rare in the content of NPT conferences and expose the divisions and tensions between certain states, which are the true fault lines running beneath the NPT.

Frustration is rife in any discussion about security assurances, which formed an area of special focus in cluster one talks. It is evident that these assurances are not in themselves desirable but are the least that non-nuclear armed states should receive in return for their cooperation; an interim step in the so-called “step by step” process so valued by the nuclear-armed and their allies.

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“A call for negative security assurances should not be perceived as any sort of recognition for the continued possession of nuclear weapon,” noted South Africa, a point supplemented by Brazil when it stated that, “A treaty on negative security assurances is in principle a step in the right direction...but will not and cannot obfuscate the fact that the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons shall continue to be considered a violation of international law, particularly of international humanitarian law, the international law of human rights, and now of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”

Shortly before this edition was published, the leaders of two Koreas met for the third inter-Korea Summit, which constitutes a massive diplomatic step forward. Cautious optimism is still needed however, as much remains to be seen. It can be anticipated that this will be referenced in cluster two discussions on non-proliferation, in the context of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. The cessation of this programme is important and necessary for many reasons but should not take precedence over the disarmament obligations of nuclear-armed states or reinforce the two-tiered system and related notion of responsible nuclear-weapon possession. In the words of Costa Rica, “The obligation to disarm is not optional or conditional.” •
CHARM OFFENSIVE TAKES CENTRE STAGE
Rick Wayman | Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

In February, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was widely and I would say unfairly, criticised by the US media, politicians, and even diplomats for its participation in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games. By sending high-level, suave officials to the Olympics—or so the narrative went—the DPRK was engaged in a “charm offensive” to win over the world and make us forget about its serious human rights violations.

This week at the NPT PrepCom, the United States launched a charm offensive of its own, holding a well-attended side event during Wednesday’s lunchtime session. Friendly faces from the Department of State and Department of Defence told attendees that there is nothing to worry about in the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR); there is continuity with past US nuclear policy, and their actions to modernise their nuclear arsenal and build new types of nuclear weapons are being done benevolently for the security of the world.

The substance of the side event did not differ much from the content of the written Nuclear Posture Review, but it was presented with a smile and an assurance that everything would be ok. This is definitely not the prevailing mood of the written document.

Presenters applauded themselves for modeling transparency, saying that they hope other nuclear-armed states will publish Nuclear Posture Reviews and talk about them at future Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conferences. It’s true—other nuclear-armed states, both inside and outside of the NPT, have been less transparent than the United States.

A darker view of the Nuclear Posture Review was presented the day before at a side event organised by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Speakers from a range of non-governmental organisations discussed the implications of the US Nuclear Posture Review for the NPT and for humanity.

Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists criticised the US nuclear weapons complex as a “self-licking ice cream cone.” Many of the modernisation programmes and proposed new nuclear weapons systems are being undertaken in order to simply maintain nuclear weapons production capacity and know-how at extraordinary financial cost, not to mention the cost of additional decades of nuclear weapons deployment and the human and environmental toll that is inevitable if the weapons are ever used.

Jackie Cabasso of Western States Legal Foundation predicted the upcoming US charm offensive when she called the Nuclear Posture Review a “sales pitch”. Ms. Cabasso also believes the NPR was issued as a threat. The threats to use nuclear weapons are explicit throughout the document, and the issuing of the NPR’s executive summary in Russian, Chinese, and Korean can be viewed as a not-so-veiled threat to nations that the United States currently views as adversaries.

At the end of Wednesday’s side event, Christopher Ford, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, said, “This is how responsible nuclear weapon states should behave.” Self-congratulation and charm offensives will not hide the only purpose of nuclear weapons: to indiscriminately slaughter millions of human beings.

There is no such thing as a responsible nuclear weapon state. The only responsible action a nuclear weapon state can take is to tirelessly work to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide. Not later, not at some mythical future date “when the conditions are right.” Right now.
The development and opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a historic event in the field of nuclear disarmament. Its entry into force will have a tangible impact on the process of nuclear disarmament, placing nuclear weapons de jure off-limits, which in turn will affect many other documents of international law. The Treaty will gradually make it possible to “squeeze out” the threat and the very possibility of using nuclear weapons, and thereby move closer to the common goal of building a world free of nuclear weapons.

At this stage, we believe that signatories to the TPNW need to take the following priority measures:

1. Ensure its rapid entry into force.
2. Re-initiate a resolution of the UN General Assembly requesting the International Court of Justice to issue an updated advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons that takes into account the adoption of the TPNW.

In particular, as is known, in paragraph 2B of the relevant opinion of the International Court of Justice dated 8 July 1996, the following is delivered: “There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such or its application”. The following is particularly relevant:

Clause 2D: “A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons”.

Clause 2E: “It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; however, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”.

This conclusion needs to be revised to take into account the adopted text of the TPNW.

3. Future states parties to the TPNW will need to conduct a full audit of their international legal obligations with a view to avoiding a conflict with the TPNW.

For instance, questions arise regarding the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, with more than 100 states parties including nuclear-armed states such as the United Kingdom, United States, France, China, Russia and India.

Clause 4 of article 4 of this Convention, in particular, notes that “This Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States”.

This provision can be interpreted as recognition by the states parties to the Convention of the right to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons by one state against another, which is in direct opposition to the provisions and spirit of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

It is necessary, in our opinion, to initiate the states parties meeting with a view to deleting this clause.

Another example comes from the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Its states parties should recognise that, in accordance with article 1 of this Convention, nuclear weapons are illegal and should be prohibited.

Adoption of the aforementioned priority measures will make it possible to exert effective pressure on the “nuclear five” to fulfill their obligations under article VI of the NPT while also advancing the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

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Irrespective of these objections, the TPNW is an irrefutable part of the rules-based international system that the majority of states view arguably not as a means of weakening the NPT regime, but in the absence of satisfactory progress on disarmament, complementary to it and a measure for the fulfilment of states’ article VI commitment to work for a world free of nuclear weapons. By the end of the general debate on Wednesday, over 25 states as well as the African Group, New Agenda Coalition, and Non-Aligned Movement had welcomed the TPNW in the context of the NPT.

Little progress has been demonstrated on the steps towards disarmament agreed in the NPT’s 2000 and 2010 Action Plans. A simple answer to nuclear-armed states’ concerns that the TPNW is undermining the NPT is on offer: implement the NPT. And be ready to signal meaningful progress at an early date.

There is no shortage of states, civil society organisations, and UN bodies trying to build common ground for progress towards nuclear disarmament consistent with the agreed NPT Action Plans. Side events aimed at doing so are being hosted by Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Canada on issues ranging from declaratory policy, a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and on a possible future fissile material cut-off treaty.

The prospect of a new arms race goes jarringly against the grain of the majority of states calling for accelerated progress on disarmament, made apparent by another development since the 2017 NPT PrepCom, which is the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) with the support of 122 countries in July 2017.

Over the past year the five nuclear-armed states recognised under the NPT have variously (and changeably) attacked or ignored the TPNW; at the PrepCom it’s been similar. Russia and the United States framed it as a threat to international security. Doing so sets up the TPNW as a future scapegoat if the 2020 Review Conference fails to make progress (at both the 2015 and 2005 review conferences, states failed to agree an outcome document). China and France largely ignored it—although during cluster one France put forward more specific criticisms—emphasising existing frameworks and the need for gradual progress, while the United Kingdom took the step of lodging its objections to the prohibitions contained in the TPNW by contesting their emergent status under customary international law.

The edifice of the NPT is crumbling. At some point in the not-so-long-term the nuclear weapons states will have to demonstrate significant and unmistakable progress on disarmament or accept responsibility for a defunct non-proliferation regime along with terrifying attendant threats to international peace and security.
The positions conveyed here are not comprehensive but intended as overview of state position on key issues discussed during the final statements of the general debate, and all of cluster one.

**Nuclear disarmament and arsenal reductions**

- Ecuador regretted that there are non-existent tangible results in nuclear disarmament. Zimbabwe cited the lack of political will by nuclear-armed states as a reason for the obstacles to nuclear disarmament.
- The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Ireland, Panama, and Cuba stressed that the indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals.
- The European Union (EU) highlighted the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the states that possess the largest nuclear arsenals. Bulgaria and Belgium strongly encouraged further reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles in unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral context.
- Cuba suggested more specific, measurable procedures, and a specific timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons as part of a 2020 Review Conference (RevCon) action plan.
- The EU, Belgium, Austria, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, France, and Mexico encouraged the United States and Russia to extend the New START Treaty, and Ireland called upon the US and Russia to seek further reductions to their arsenals. The EU and Italy highlighted that this should include strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, whilst Sweden underscored the need to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, a category that was outside existing agreements. The EU further encouraged reducing the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons systems to the minimum level necessary.
- The EU and the Netherlands expressed concern at the Russian missile system. It along with Italy, Poland, and Germany called upon the United States and the Russian Federation to remain engaged in active dialogue to preserve the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Friedenswerkstatt e.V expressed concern about the future of the Treaty.

- The US maintained that focusing on numerical reductions and the immediate abolition of nuclear weapons, without addressing the real underlying security concerns that led to their production and retention, would advance neither the cause of disarmament nor the cause of enhanced collective international security. Australia said that in light of current challenges, disarmament should be pragmatic, smart, concrete and incremental. Turkey, Russia, Italy, France, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, China, Poland, and the UK also favoured a step-by-step process.
- The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and Panama stressed that they do not accept the notion put forward by the nuclear-armed states and those committed to extended nuclear deterrence that further progress towards nuclear disarmament required a more conducive international security environment, and that rather, in line with Ireland’s perception, existing obligations should be implemented which would contribute to improving the global environment.
- Mexico highlighted that the current security situation should not serve as justification for the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. Zimbabwe highlighted that it was not convinced of any notion of “progressive disarmament”. Switzerland underlined that if it accepted that the current international context did not allow for nuclear disarmament, it would like to highlight that it is states themselves that created such conditions.
- Cuba urged nuclear-armed states to withdraw nuclear weapons on territories of states parties that are considered under the NPT to be non-nuclear-armed states. China called upon relevant nuclear-armed states to put an end to the policy and practice of nuclear umbrella and nuclear sharing, and to withdraw all nuclear weapons that were deployed in other countries.
- China suggested that countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament.
- The UK maintained that abandoning nuclear deterents unilaterally would undermine its security and that of its allies and that of all states.
- The UK maintained that it was committed to a posture of minimum credible deterrence by outlining specific reductions.
- France also made indications about its nuclear weap
News in brief, continued

Operational status and risk

- Mongolia called upon nuclear-armed states to lower the operational status of nuclear weapon systems so to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe.
- The NAM, Cuba, and Nicaragua underscored that the reduction in operational readiness could not be a substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. The NAM and Cuba called on the nuclear-armed states to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems.
- The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons expressed concern about the lack of steps taken towards ending reliance on the so-called “nuclear umbrella”, nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil. Russia maintained that continuing NATO practice of nuclear sharing is in direct violation of the NPT provisions.
- Sweden maintained that the development of a risk reduction agenda was of the highest priority in light of risks that nuclear weapons might be used whether by accident, miscalculation or design. Malaysia and Thailand highlighted the need to reduce the risk for nuclear detonation. Ecuador raised attention to the threat of accidental detonation of nuclear weapons. Nigeria and Algeria highlighted the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Abolition 2000 Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction underlined the risk of cyber attacks compromising control mechanisms.
- The De-Alerting Group, New Zealand, Ireland, and Spain emphasised the need to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems by removing all nuclear weapons from high alert status.

Negative security assurances (NSAs)

- The NAM, Iran, Philippines, and Kazakhstan called for the early commencement of negotiations on legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-armed states by all the nuclear-armed states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances as a matter of high priority.
- The EU, Italy, Algeria, Viet Nam, Mongolia, Jordan, Venezuela, Indonesia, Kuwait, Colombia, Italy, Sweden, Nigeria, China, Iran, Iraq, and Finland either recognised the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-armed states or urged for them to receive unequivocal security assurances from nuclear-armed states as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. Ukraine maintained that such legally binding instrument could eventually replace the Budapest Memorandum.
- Kazakhstan suggested that a legally binding document could be adopted as additional protocol to the NPT or separately.
- Norway suggested that a key avenue through which to pursue NSAs is by establishing regional nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) that are freely agreed on by the countries concerned. Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa maintained that the assurances found in NWFZs do not replace a legally binding instrument to ensure NSAs.
- Argentina stressed that it was hard to understand why fifty years after the adoption of the NPT, no NSA commitment had been incorporated in a simple and clear legal instrument yet.
- Germany maintained that NSAs had been instrumental in building confidence and diminishing the role and prominence of nuclear weapons in national doctrines. Germany said it was time to take a fresh look at NSAs and to discuss whether these should be reaffirmed.
- The UK reassured that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-armed states party to the NPT not in material breach of the non-proliferation obligations. The US is not prepared to negotiate a legally binding instrument relating to negative security assurances. The Netherlands, while calling upon nuclear-armed states to extend NSAs to non-nuclear-armed states, perceiving it as a measure to increase transparency and trust building, did not call for a legally binding instrument. China underscored that it unconditionally granted to non-nuclear-armed states not to use nuclear weapons. France stated that it had robust NSA commitments in various regions as a pathway towards non-proliferation.
- Japan supported the concept of NSAs but maintained that they should only be provided if recipient states are in compliance with the NPT.
- Iran cautioned that the non-legally binding NSAs of nuclear-armed states are limited and insufficient and could justify the use of nuclear weapons in exceptional circumstances.

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Modernisation and arms racing

- Mongolia was alarmed at the current stalemate in nuclear disarmament. Many civil society organisations, including ICAN, Gensuikyo, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Project Ploughshares, Friedenswerkstatt e.V, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, Faith Communities Concerned about Nuclear Weapons, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) expressed grave concern about nuclear-armed states’ unabated modernisation of their weapons. Amongst others, WILPF provided a detailed account of specific modernisation initiatives by Russia, France, China, the UK, and the US.

- The League of Arab States and Nicaragua, the NAM, Austria, Philippines, Algeria, South Africa, Ireland, and Malaysia noted with grave concern the current extensive investment, by the nuclear-armed states on modernisation of their nuclear forces. The NAM pointed at the development of more effective and new, low-yield nuclear warheads. Switzerland maintained that states had to prevent a new arms race and lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

- Belgium stated that the cold war seemed to have been replaced by a new “Great Power competition” in which one nuclear-armed NPT states party is taunting the international community with the announcement of new “invincible” systems while another is building up the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Nuclear possessor states outside the NPT are also increasing their capabilities. Belgium regretted that the restraint in the nuclear discourse that was witnessed during many years was now being undercut by nuclear posturing.

- The NAM stressed that by increasing the role of these inhumane weapons in their military doctrines, the threshold for the actual use of nuclear weapons is being lowered. Chile stated that whilst there are fewer nuclear weapons, there had been on-going modernisation and remaining weapons are now much more powerful.

- The NAM, Morocco, China, and Indonesia strongly called for putting an immediate end to this new nuclear arms race. The Abolition 2000 Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction expressed grave concern at the arms race, pushing the world to the brink. South Africa and Costa Rica regretted that vast public resources were being diverted towards modernisation of nuclear weapons whilst basic human needs in developing countries could not be met.

Doctrine, use, and threat of use

- Many states, including Jordan, Algeria, Switzerland, Egypt, Austria, Switzerland, Malaysia, Kenya, and the Arab Group are concerned at the continued or even increased reliance on nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed states’ doctrines, according to Chile. Switzerland was alarmed at current rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons, and the erosion of international norms where nuclear-armed states publically highlighted their nuclear capability and new investments in the modernisation of nuclear weapons.

- China, Belgium, Mongolia, Italy, Spain and Philippines urged nuclear-armed states to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in national doctrines, policies and military concepts. Brazil said such renewed reliance on nuclear weapons went against international commitments and needed to be reversed. Costa Rica emphasises that a minority of states could not justify the possession of nuclear weapons with national security at the detriment of the security of the majority of other states.

- Canada reiterated that it, like its NATO allies, depends on nuclear deterrence for its security.

- The Russian Federation specified that the role of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine had been reduced. Their possible use was limited only to following extraordinary circumstances: the use of WMD against Russia or its allies and a hypothetical situation when aggression against Russia threatened the very existence of the state. These were provisions of a purely defensive nature. A concept of “non-nuclear deterrence” had also been included in Russia’s Military Doctrine.

- The US reiterated that the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) does not expand the role of nuclear weapons in US policy. It seeks instead to keep the threshold for nuclear use high by ensuring that any potential adversary would find the prospect of nuclear use profoundly unattractive. It further stated that any US decision to employ nuclear weapons would follow a deliberative process.
News in brief, continued

Verification

- The EU maintained that while verification is not an end in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities would assist in the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. Argentina and Germany pointed out the need of a solid verification system that is credible, professional, and robust.

- Many states including Brazil, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, Korea, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, support nuclear verification initiatives such as the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the establishment of the Group of Experts. Switzerland stressed that the nuclear disarmament verification initiative is an example that cooperation between non-nuclear-armed and nuclear-armed states is possible, demonstrating a shared will to implement Article VI of the NPT.

- Brazil emphasised that full scope solutions for verification would only be achieved and enacted when concrete disarmament commitments in the form of legally binding obligations and their corresponding implementation mechanisms were formally negotiated, agreed, and entered into force.

- The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership maintained that it could make a tangible contribution to the current NPT cycle in the area of capacity building through its hands-on practical experience of nuclear weapon-related verification.

Transparency and reporting

- Japan, based on the ‘Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament’ (EPG) suggested various measures to increase transparency; one of which would be the establishment of a reporting mechanism whereby states discuss their national reports in the next PrepCom session, followed by an interactive dialogue. Finland reiterated the benefit of such measure.

- Finland suggested codifying the issue of non-strategic weapons in Europe as a good practice into a verifiable arrangement. Finland maintained that the weapons are not operationally deployed and that the actual weaponry is stored separately from the delivery vehicles.

- Switzerland urged improvements in report from nuclear-armed states, particularly their quality, quantity and consistency. It referred to the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative’s (NPDI) suggestions as constructive basis.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

- Ukraine, Viet Nam, Jordan, Ecuador, Mongolia, Algeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the League of Arab States, the NAM, Costa Rica, Iraq, Thailand, Argentina, Austria, Nigeria, New Zealand, Panama, Indonesia, Switzerland, Egypt, Brazil, the Arab Group, Malaysia, Cuba, and Mexico welcomed or took note of the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017.

- Various states, including Panama, referred to the obligations of states under international humanitarian and human rights law.

- Ecuador, Kazakhstan, and ICAN, among others, urged all states, including nuclear-armed states, to ratify the TPNW as soon as possible.

- Kenya was of the view that the TPNW was an explicit recognition that nuclear war would result in devastation for human kind and that the Treaty was a catalyst for change of “attitudes, opinions and moral authority”. Brazil highlighted that the TPNW brings the humanitarian perspective on nuclear disarmament to the fore, and honours those who had suffered the consequences of testing, development, and use of nuclear weapons.

- Many states highlighted that the TPNW is fully consistent with the NPT, strengthening the implementation of Article VI. Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs called upon all states participating in nuclear disarmament to strive to identify and exploit complementarities between the NPT and the TPNW rather than looking for and exploiting possible antagonisms.

- Switzerland maintained that the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament had prompted “initiatives” taken outside the NPT framework and urged that these should reinforce the NPT.

- The NAC underscored that the division within the NPT community was not because of the humanitarian initiative or the TPNW, but because of the failure of the nuclear-armed states to act in conformity with Article VI. The NAC and Algeria highlighted that the TPNW does not stand in the way of the fulfilment by any state party of its NPT obligations.

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South Africa and Costa Rica maintained that the TPNW represents the highest non-proliferation standard that any state could commit to.

South Africa mentioned the Nobel Peace Committee’s acknowledgement of the TPNW in awarding ICAN the Prize for its work; the League of Arab States praised the important role by civil society organisations for the adoption of the TPNW.

Norway maintained that whilst it did not take part in the negotiations of the TPNW, it noted that a majority of states adopted the Treaty.

Canada stressed that it recognised the legitimate grievances of non-nuclear-armed states, it preferred to seek initiatives bringing together both non-nuclear-armed states and nuclear-armed states. Belgium cautioned against new initiatives carrying new risks that would abandon principles such as verifiability and irreversibility, stating that there was no short cut to disarmament. France also said that “hastily negotiated” TPNW and its “moralistic” approach could undermine the NPT by creating contrary and alternative norms. France stated that it would not accede to the TPNW and that it did not consider itself bound by it or created new obligations for France.

Russia maintained that since the TPNW was developed without nuclear-armed states, it preferred to seek initiatives bringing together both non-nuclear-armed states and nuclear-armed states. Russia noted that the TPNW and that it did not consider itself bound by it or created new obligations for France.

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Russia maintained that since the TPNW was developed without nuclear-armed states, the Treaty could not make a positive contribution to reducing nuclear weapons in the world.

Humanitarian impact

Ireland, the Arab Group ICAN, Nigeria, and Algeria, the NAM, Italy, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Panama, Nicaragua, Switzerland, Mexico, Korea, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) expressed concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and by their possible use or threat of use, and Sweden underscored that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences are well documented and irrefutable. Civil society organisations, including Gensuikyo, Hidankyo, and Mayors for Peace, provided powerful accounts of the devastating humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War outlined in great detail the devastating effects of nuclear weapons that could eliminate all forms of life.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Viet Nam, Nigeria, ICAN, and Kenya welcomed the DPRK’s diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful solution.

Kenya and Switzerland welcomed today’s meeting between the two Koreas and upcoming summit between the United States and DPRK. Peace Depot highlighted the upcoming summit between the US and the DPRK as a golden opportunity that the international community should take advantage of to build sustainable peace in Northeast Asia.

Peace Depot underscored the challenges of military threats directly related to the current fragile status in the Korean peninsula, pointing at the significant US military presence in the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Switzerland and the League of Arab States urged the DPRK to comply with its international obligations and to return to compliance with the NPT.

Middle East

Jordan, Viet Nam, Nigeria, Algeria, Kenya, Middle East, and the League of Arab States expressed support for a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and highlighted the importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

Many states, including Nicaragua and Jordan, regretted the failure of the 2012 International Conference on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and encouraged the acceleration of the implementation. Jordan highlighted that the outcome of the 2010 Review’s conclusions and recommendations should be followed by concrete and urgent steps for implementing these outcomes in the Middle East with respect to a NWFZ.

Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, and the League of Arab States called upon Israel to accede to the NPT without precondition.

Fissile materials

The EU, Italy, Japan, Czech Republic and the US called on all remaining nuclear-armed states to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
News in brief, continued

- The EU, Algeria, Ukraine, Nigeria, Viet Nam, Canada, Costa Rica, Korea, Bulgaria, Hungary, Philippines, Turkey, Poland, the Netherlands Germany, the UK, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Colombia Ireland, Australia, France, Egypt, Italy, Kuwait, and Mexico, South Africa, Morocco, the Arab Group, and France urged to immediately commence the negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Gender

- WILPF underscored the importance to include a gender perspective in nuclear disarmament and to improve gender diversity in disarmament, cautioning that this should not be tokenistic but meaningful and from the bottom up.
- Brazil lauded the TPNW’s inclusion of a strong gender perspective.
- Ireland said it was proud that the TPNW acknowledged the disproportionate effects on women and girls of nuclear weapons. It further was encouraged to hear gender issues referenced numerous times in the opening days of the PrepCom. Ireland stressed that the gender discourse has to be mainstreamed into the NPT discourse in two ways: awareness of the disproportionate impact of ionising radiation on women and girls and the evident need for women’s voices to be heard clearly and given equal weight in the nuclear weapons debate.
- Panama urged to prioritise discussions around the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, with consideration of the various gendered dimensions of this issue.

Disarmament education

- The EU said it supports activities to enhance disarmament and non-proliferation education, carried out by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, a European network of independent think tanks.
- Italy highlighted that educational efforts should lie at the root of any strategy aiming at strengthening a global response to threats of weapons of mass destruction.
- Morocco encouraged the provisional Secretary of the CTBTO to pursue awareness-raising and training activities for experts in developing countries, particularly in the African region.
- Panama reiterated the need to address the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education. It urged to explore new possibilities in this field, taking into account the 34 recommendations contained in the UN disarmament education report.

Other

- PAX called attention to the financing of nuclear weapons and illustrated other avenues to stop the nuclear arms race that could include the adoption of legislation prohibiting investment in nuclear weapons, amongst others.
- The cyber-related vulnerabilities of nuclear systems were noted by a small but growing group of states.
- Ireland called upon all states to step outside of narrow security concerns to acknowledge disarmament as a cross cutting issue with direct relevance to climate change and the environment; sustainable development; humanitarian objectives and aid; gender equality; migration; cultural heritage and cyber security.
- The Philippines recognised the contribution of civil society, NGOs such as ICAN, scientists, scholars and think tanks to the discourse on nuclear disarmament in “providing the backbone for the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons”.

Gender

- WILPF underscored the importance to include a gender perspective in nuclear disarmament and to improve gender diversity in disarmament, cautioning that this should not be tokenistic but meaningful and from the bottom up.

Disarmament education

- The EU said it supports activities to enhance disarmament and non-proliferation education, carried out by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, a European network of independent think tanks.

Other

- PAX called attention to the financing of nuclear weapons and illustrated other avenues to stop the nuclear arms race that could include the adoption of legislation prohibiting investment in nuclear weapons, amongst others.