POLITICAL GRIDLOCK
Allison Pytlak | Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

In conversation yesterday someone reflect- ed that after having attended meetings of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for over 20 years, very little seems to have changed in the content of the statements being delivered. In some cases it is almost as if the same statements are recycled year after year, with minor updates only, despite the fact that outside of the conference room the world is changing. Tensions rise and fall, policies shift, and, especially recently, the possibility of nuclear weapons use is more real than it has been a long time, but inside the PrepCom, both process and substance stays the same. To many observers, NPT review cycles feel like the political equivalent of being in a midtown Manhattan traffic jam—total gridlock, with sirens of alarm screaming in the distance.

This begs the question: what will it take to pierce through the apathy and instill some urgency into our work? How can we move beyond statements that “express disappointment” or “indicate strong disapproval” and instead take action that remedies the problems?

The Cluster 2 discussions held on Friday and Monday, with a specific focus on the Middle East and regional issues, demonstrate this conundrum. The NPT’s indefinite extension would not have been possible without the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East—it is yet another bargain underpinning the Treaty. Lack of progress here is, not un- likely, the result of frustration stemming from non-progress on disarmament commitments, eating away at both the NPT’s credibility and the trust and confidence among states parties. Yet, because it is so bound up in the broader geopolitics of the region, the subject remains trapped in gridlock.

There are also new dimensions of complexity emerging around the realised Middle East NWFZ. A working paper submitted by the United States on “creating conditions conducive to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems” suggests that the NPT need not be the primary mechanism for progress on a WMD-free zone. Other states parties re- futed this conclusion, because in their view it is a reinterpretation of, and backtracking on, the 1995 commitment.

Meanwhile, nearly all states parties have in their statements referenced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, given that it is up for renewal on 12 May but faces an uncertain future in the face of new—and suspiciously well-timed—evidence of violations on the part of Iran. Without prejudice to the validity of any newly-released violations, the source and the timing of the release can be seen as a provocation that will further exacerbate an already souring relationship between and Iran and the United States.

Through working papers and suggestions made in statements, there is appetite to break through these roadblocks but, as is noted frequently, the main obstacle may be political will. If true, then maybe the surest path to the destination requires changing the route. Many NPT states parties have regularly brought forward ideas and sugges- tions to improve working methods in order to generate outcomes. The PrepCom chair has tried to encourage interactive discussions since the end of general debate, but so far there have not been any takers (rights of reply do not count as such). Most states prefer to remain in the comfort zone of prepared statements. The practice of other treaties, including in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control offer ideas: mechanisms for intercessional work, such as working groups or committees, or shorter annual meetings with some decision-making capacity, could be useful in breaking down politicisation and alleviating the enormous pressure that builds up and

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Editorial, continued

is placed on review conferences. As another idea, cultivating space to address the contents of national reports might incentivize more states to complete such reports, as it would give purpose to what otherwise is perceived as an empty exercise.

The world also is changing around us in other ways, through the development of new technologies that can be harnessed for good, or for bad. The vulnerability of nuclear weapons systems to cyber or digital threats is something NPT states parties must consider and address, as has been starting to occur with greater frequency particularly at this PrepCom. However, it is not sufficient to address these threats only in terms of preventing hackers, terrorists, and criminals. Instead, we must view cyber and digital threats as further impetus to disarm completely and to eliminate any risk of a detonation through cyber “attack” or otherwise.

The old adage, it’s not the destination but the journey, could well apply in this situation; we encourage states parties to make best possible use of every part of the road between here and 2020.

Editorial Note: As clarified by a reader last week, a side event report published in Vol. 15, No. 2 “Don’t Bank on the Bomb” simplifies the content of article I of the NPT, in the context of the side event it was reporting on. It should be clarified that article 1 applies to “any recipient whatsoever” and to transfers of control that are both direct and indirect.

Arms Control Association

Progressive Measures to Prevent a New Nuclear Arms Race

Side event at the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2020 NPT Review Conference
Date: May 3, 2018
Time: 9:00 – 10:00 a.m.
Conference Room XVI

The Arms Control Association invites you to join us for a briefing and discussion on a common strategy to address key challenges to the NPT regime, including: the accelerating U.S.-Russian arms race and uncertain future of key bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements; North Korean nuclear and missile testing; and U.S. threats to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, through effective measures to advance key disarmament-related goals and objectives of the treaty, including the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Panelists:
Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association
Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Opening remarks from:
Jamie Walsh, deputy director for disarmament and nonproliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ireland
SIDE EVENT REPORT: THE INF-TREATY AND 2017 MUTLANGEN MANIFESTO
Arailym Kubayeva | Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V.

On 24 April, the Peace Workshop Mutlangen (Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V.), from Germany, hosted a discussion on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which was signed 30 years ago by the United States and the Soviet Union at Mutlangen¹, a nuclear-weapons free town in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg.

Within the framework of this event, the representatives of the Peace Workshop had intended to hand over to the Mutlangen Manifesto, which was signed at the end of 2017 by current and former mayors of Mutlangen, the deputy mayor of Schwäbisch Gmünd, the district administrator of Ostalbkreis, along with chairs of Peace Workshop Mutlangen and Peace and Community Center of Mutlangen, to the ambassadors of the United States, Russia and Germany. Unfortunately, only the ambassador of Germany, Michael Biontino, was present in the occasion. The Manifesto was delivered to the ambassadors of Russia and the US during the plenary.

The event was opened by a video message of the mayor of Mutlangen Stephanie Esswein, who said that Mutlangen has become a symbol of hope that disarmament is possible. She stressed that people in Germany are now concerned about the future of the INF treaty.

Wolfgang Schlupp-Hauck introduced the Manifesto, which has the motto “Disarmament treaties create security” and has two demands: to maintain the INF Treaty and to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Despite the fact that the number of nuclear weapons has been reduced during the past ten years, plans are steadily being pursued to technically upgrade US nuclear weapons, among them those deployed in Germany, and Russia has allegedly developed a land-based cruise missile. That puts in danger the future existence of the INF Treaty and every technical upgrade of nuclear weapons that might initiate an uncontrollable arms race.

Pavel Podvig of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project commented on the content of the Manifesto and said that the INF Treaty introduced a very powerful idea that nuclear weapons shouldn’t be part of the security policy of a nation. He also explained that the US and Russia accuse each other of violating the Treaty. However, the alleged violations happen not in the letter, but in the spirit of the Treaty. He also mentioned that deployment of missiles in Syria can be in conflict with the Treaty and it will not only be very difficult to resolve the conflict, but also to organize negotiations because of the nature of accusations. Pressure from civil society could bring two sides to the table and Europe could be a good start to make the world completely nuclear-free.

Jackie Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation spoke about her research on the INF Treaty Preservation Act of 2017, which demands that the US government “take certain actions to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance” with the INF Treaty. She ensured that she will continue to include this in her advocacy work in the US. She is concerned that the US is unlikely to sign the TPNW for a variety of reasons but that there could be a path forward in nuclear disarmament issues with respect to discussions with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Susie Snyder of PAX discussed the 2018 edition of their recent report Don’t bank on the bomb, the only report detailing the global investments by financial institutions in companies producing nuclear weapons. She mentioned that there’s no awareness in general public about which companies invest in nuclear weapons and the financial institutions work that with them. She named several banks based in Italy and other European countries, which work with American companies who manufacture nuclear weapons, in spite of the prohibition on doing so found in article 1 one of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One thing we can all do, is make sure that the banks we use are not involved in the financing of nuclear weapons in any way. The list of banks and pension funds that invest in companies having to deal with nuclear weapons can be found on the website www.dontbankonthebomb.com.

Notes

1. A US military base was located in the town, where thousands of people in the 1980s protested against nuclear missiles through blocking the base. As a result 3000 activists were arrested and fined; 200 went to jail. Büchel is the only city in Germany that is used presently as a nuclear weapons site.

²

Notes
On 26 April, the Junior Diplomat Initiative (JDI) and PEAC Institute organised a panel discussion at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies of Geneva on the nexus between NPT Article VI and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The event was introduced by Rebecca Irby, President of the PEAC Institute and hosted by Christian Ciobanu, also of PEAC Institute. It featured four panellists presenting perspectives from national governments, academia, and civil society. By exploring the relationship between the two treaties, the event laid the groundwork for explaining how the two are not contradictory, and how to better engage as many (young) people as possible in the fight for a nuclear-free world.

Representatives from the governments of New Zealand and Austria outlined the TPNW negotiation process and the history of the “humanitarian initiative”. An emphasis on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has been a focal point for many since the reference to it was included in the outcome document of the NPT 2010 Review Conference. This led to the founding of the Humanitarian Initiative, with its important focus on humanitarian consequences as confirmed further by the TPNW.

The panel discussed how the TPNW takes the NPT as its basis because of the NPT’s article VI. It reinforces the UN Charter and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Above all, delegitimising certain actions (or in this case, certain weapons—of the nuclear kind to be precise), can lead to strong new international norms and roles.

Sarah Bidgood of the James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies has been following the TPNW with great interest, and mainly spoke about the relationship between the NPT article VI and the TPNW. Together with the other panellists she identified some of the main arguments against the TPNW, such as that it weakens and undermines the purpose and goals of the NPT. By going carefully through the Treaty’s text and giving background about its current status, some panellists countered the main arguments against the Treaty, including that disarmament is impossible without taking the security considerations into account; verification is difficult within the TPNW; and that the article about safeguards is problematic in various ways.

Selma van Oostwaard from PAX spoke about the importance of youth participation in disarmament discussions. The Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW generated increased attention from non-governmental organisations to nuclear disarmament and to show that change is possible. Younger generations must be shown that activism can move the processes on nuclear disarmament and the TPNW is proof of this positive movement. The importance of youth participation should not be underestimated and states should also act upon this—we must all ask ourselves, what can we do to actively engage youth in working toward our goals? The PAX Nuclear Diplomacy Crash Course and the other youth delegations present at the NPT are good examples of how youth can, and should, be engaged.

Photo credit: PAX and PEAC Institute
### CALENDAR OF EVENTS

#### Tuesday 1 May

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<th>When</th>
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<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Next steps towards nuclear disarmament (simulated negotiations)</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>INESAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons and the law on human rights and future generations</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Basel Peace Office and IALANA</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>Room XII</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Nuclear safety as a key element for the peaceful use of nuclear energy</td>
<td>Room XI</td>
<td>The Swiss Federal Safety Inspectorate (ENSI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Next steps towards nuclear disarmament (simulated negotiations)</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>INESAP</td>
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#### Wednesday 2 May

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<tr>
<td>10:00-10:45</td>
<td>Government-NGO briefing: Argentina (for civil society only)</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>WILPF</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Benefits of the NPT - International cooperation in dealing with radioactive sources</td>
<td>Room VII</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Nuclear arms control at a dead end? Possible next steps for the INF and New START</td>
<td>Room XI</td>
<td>German Federal Foreign Office and Deep Cuts Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Preventing nuclear use: the roles of the NPT, TPNW, security assurances and NWFZ</td>
<td>Room I</td>
<td>The Permanent Mission of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00-16:30</td>
<td>Sliding into chaos: Resurgent nationalisms and the dangers of war among nuclear armed states</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Western States Legal Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:30-18:00</td>
<td>The roots of disarmament: Social movements in the global South, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the path to the ban treaty</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Western States Legal Foundation</td>
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The positions conveyed here are not comprehensive but intended as overview of state position on key issues discussed during cluster two, excluding the specific issues segment.

**IAEA Safeguards**

- The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), South Africa, Egypt, Sweden, Hungary, New Zealand, Nigeria, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore maintained that the IAEA’s mechanism is the most appropriate and/or essential way to address verification and safeguards issues.

- The NAM and Indonesia called upon the nuclear-armed states to accept full-scope safeguards.

- The US, Argentina, Germany, and Norway urged all states to ensure that the IAEA had the resources and political support needed to carry out its mission.

- Poland drew attention the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative’s Working Paper on evolving safeguard standards.

- The NAM called upon states to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to states parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Egypt also refused any such restrictions.

- The NAM underlined the necessity of the reporting by the IAEA on the implementation of safeguards to be factual, technically-based, and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

- The EU, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Spain, Romania, Philippines, Japan, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Mexico, and Turkey considered the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs), complemented by Additional Protocols (AP), to be the IAEA verification standard that best fulfils the objectives of Article III of the NPT. The US maintained that given its widespread adoption, its intrinsic connection to the purposes of the NPT, and lessons learned from past proliferation challenges, the AP is the de facto standard for assuring compliance with the Treaty’s safeguards obligations.

- The UK, Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Switzerland, Australia, Singapore, Ireland, Italy, China, Japan, Canada, and the US called upon all remaining states to sign, ratify and implement their CSAs and APs without delay. Egypt, Russia, and Brazil maintained that a clear distinction should be made between legal stipulations under the NPT and voluntary, optional confidence building measures that should not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. Brazil stated that the AP did not establish a safeguards standard under the NPT and that for countries that belong to NWFZ, that are committed to the NPT’s comprehensive safeguards and to additional layers of non-proliferation obligations and systems of verification and accountability, the AP was unnecessary.

- The EU and the US urged remaining states which had not yet amended their Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to accelerate their efforts in this respect.

- The EU, UK, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, and Turkey supported the development and application of the state-level concept as a means to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguards System and to contribute to strengthening the global non-proliferation efforts. Russia noted that based on the current and previous IAEA Director-General’s reports, the state-level safeguards could only be applied to non-nuclear states that have signed an AP.

- Following the UK’s decision to leave the European Union and Euratom, the UK is setting up a domestic safeguards regime to safeguard obligations.

- Singapore welcomed the IAEA’s readiness to resume safeguards verification in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including through the formation of a DPRK Team within the Department of Safeguards.

**Nuclear sharing**

- The NAM, Nigeria, and Iran urged states to put an end to nuclear weapon sharing under any circumstances and in the context of any security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances. Iran and Cuba said that the US violated or undermined the NPT by transferring weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states.

- Egypt noted that cooperation of some NPT states parties with non-states parties to the NPT in the nuclear weakens the incentive for these states to join the NPT, impacting universalisation.

- Iran suggested that the 2020 Review Conference call for a prohibition on cooperating with the Israeli nuclear regime.
News in brief, continued

Arms racing and vertical proliferation

- The NAM and Nigeria expressed concern over the on-going vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons through continued nuclear arms race, the expansion of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and the improvement and development of new types of these by these countries.

Relationship to disarmament

- Egypt and Cuba expressed grave concern at the vigorous modernisation of nuclear arsenals and maintained that one could not address non-proliferation without highlighting its immediate connectivity with disarmament.

- Switzerland reminded states that the NPT is based on the agreement that the nuclear-armed states will negotiate disarmament in good faith, and that nearly half of the nuclear weapons possessors are not party to the NPT. For this reason, Switzerland believes that universalising non-proliferation requires creative solutions that make adherence to norms a viable option.

Iran/Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

- The EU and France reaffirmed concern over Iran’s ballistic missile launches.

- Switzerland asserts that, according to the IAEA, Iran is faithfully implementing its obligations.

- The EU, UK, Canada, Austria, Russia, Spain, Brazil, China, Japan, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, New Zealand, Romania, and Turkey indicated their commitment to the JCPOA. The EU, Ireland, Malaysia, and Spain called on all parties to implement all its provisions fully and effectively.

- New Zealand characterised the JCPOA as a “truly critical agreement” that is key to regional peace and security, declaring that New Zealand will contribute another NZD 115,000 towards the IAEA’s monitoring and verification activities in Iran. The UK called said it “makes the world a safer place,” while Switzerland characterised it as a “historic success for the second pillar of the NPT.” Malaysia stated that the JCPOA is a success story for IAEA safeguards.

- Turkey and Norway were concerned about the on-going uncertainty regarding the future of the JCPOA. Brazil underscored that a possible denunciation of the JCPOA would have a destabilising effect on the Middle East affecting both the credibility of the UN Security Council and the IAEA, weakening multilateralism as a tool to effectively solve conflicts. Brazil and Russia stated that this will negatively impact the current discussions on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula by fostering uncertainty and therefore mistrust on possible legal arrangements.

- The EU called upon Iran to continue abiding strictly by all its nuclear-related commitments. The EU, Germany, and Belgium stated that the early ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol is essential.

- The Netherlands highlighted that the JCPOA is subject to the world’s most robust verification regime. Australia, and Singapore also supported IAEA’s verification work.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

- The EU, UK, Canada, Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, and Switzerland called upon DPRK to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and/or to re-join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state.

- Poland and France state that DPRK is in violation of its international obligations, while Japan stated that a nuclear-armed DPRK will never be accepted.

- The EU and China welcomed the UN Security Council’s active engagement on this threat to international peace and security and called on all states to fully and effectively implement its sanctions.

- The EU, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, Kazakhstan. Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Chile, Argentina, Ireland, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, and Turkey welcomed the high-level talks between the Republic of Korea and DPRK, which took place at Panmunjom. The EU and Malaysia regarded the announcement of a summit between the US and DPRK as a positive development to ease tensions in the Korean Peninsula, which summit Japan plans to monitor carefully.

- Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Thailand pointed to the JCPOA as a hopeful example for dealing with the challenge posed by DPRK.

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The EU, UK, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and Romania reiterated that efforts have to be supported by concrete actions. The EU and Japan maintained that the international community had to keep up maximum pressure on the DPRK until it embarked on a credible path towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation.

Syria

- The EU regretted that despite the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA of 9 June 2011, the Syrian pledge to respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s request to resolve all outstanding questions, and in addition the renewed calls by the Director General, Syria had yet to provide the necessary cooperation.
- The EU maintained that Syria remained responsible for urgently remedying its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for concluding and bringing into force the AP as soon as possible. Australia remained concerned about outstanding issues regarding the facilities and activities at the Dair Alzour site in the Syrian Arab Republic. Australia and Canada urged Syria to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Germany deplored Syria’s on-going failure to comply with its nuclear safeguards obligations. Germany urged Syria to fully cooperate with the IAEA by providing access to the information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Syria that the Agency had requested.
- Russia stressed that Syria had been complying with its commitments under the IAEA. It maintained that the IAEA Director General’s reports on implementation of the IAEA safeguards in Syria reaffirmed non-diversion of the declared nuclear material, which confirmed the meeting of direct obligations by Damascus under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Russia stated that the Secretariat could not provide a convincing proof that the site destroyed in Deir ez-Zor in 2007 was an unfinished nuclear reactor.
- France and Germany underscored that Syria’s unresolved issues in the face of on-going armed conflict showcase the risks and challenges emanation from the proliferation of WMD, escalating regional conflicts and the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) and other regional issues

- The NAM called for of the ratification by the nuclear-armed states of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk, and Bangkok, the removal of all related reservations and interpretative declarations incompatible with the object and purpose of treaties establishing such zones, as well as the provision of unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding assurances by the NWS to all states of NWFZs against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.
- Indonesia highlighted that the Bangkok treaty still does not enjoy support from nuclear-armed states. It called upon all remaining nuclear-armed states and non nuclear-armed states to accede both the treaty and/or the protocol to the treaty.
- Ireland, New Zealand, Mexico, and Chile reiterated that the range of coverage of NWFZs was a powerful demonstration of the determination of the majority of states to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. The UK, Panama, Cuba, Singapore, and Malaysia, similarly, supported the contribution of NWFZs, and their participation therein, to disarmament and/or non-proliferation. Malaysia called for concluding NWFZ’s in all regions where they do not exist.

Middle East

- The NAM, UK, Philippines, Chile, Spain, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Morocco, Nigeria, and Turkey expressed support for the establishment of a nuclear weapons and/or weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. The NAM called for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, while Poland, Mexico, Panama, Nigeria, and Singapore expressed disappointment at the failure to yet implement this resolution, along with the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Some, like Morocco and Panama, suggested that the credibility of the NPT rested on capacity of states parties to implement the 1995 resolution.
- Argentina welcomed also initiatives on other arms control in this region.
News in brief, continued

• NAM, Morocco, and Iran demanded that Israel, the only state not party to the NPT in the region, renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without precondition or further delay, and place promptly all its nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

• The EU called upon all states to become party to and strictly comply with the obligations of the NPT, the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In the context of the Middle East region, this would be an important confidence- and security-building measure, which could constitute tangible steps in the direction of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

• Iran emphasised that, by ignoring the Israeli nuclear threat, the US failed to abide the non-proliferation norm and exercised a double standard compared to other states.

Fissile materials

• South Africa regretted that there has been little progress to ensure irreversible removal of fissile material. It stated that neither had there been progress with regard to additional declarations of stockpiles of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

• Mexico and Panama expressed support for a treaty that prohibits the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Export control

• The EU, UK, Canada, Poland, Hungary, Norway, Russia, Japan, and New Zealand expressed support for, and/or invited all states to adhere to, the guidelines of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The EU further invited all states to adhere to the guidelines of the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to support the full participation of all EU Member States therein. The EU expressed support for the MTCR.

• Iran criticized the NSG for allowing nuclear cooperation between its members and a non-party to the NPT.

• Norway, Japan, and Malaysia maintained that effective export controls are an integral part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and that adequate domestic legislation was essential. Italy commended the contribution of multilateral export control regimes to preventing proliferation. Japan also cited the importance of not allowing loopholes in export control systems, in light of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. The Netherlands reminded that export controls are a fundamental part of the implementation of Articles I and II, as they helped ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes was not directly or indirectly used for the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It called on all states to adhere to and effectively apply export control mechanisms, in full conformity with the object and purposes of Articles I, II and III of the NPT. Australia maintained that strict export controls are the bedrock of effective domestic efforts to ensure that legitimate trade, including nuclear material, and equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Singapore similarly urged all parties to institute effective export controls.

• Australia noted the admission of India this year to the Wassenaar Group and Australia Group, which it said represented a significant strengthening of these two groupings.

Nuclear terrorism

• The EU, South Africa, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, and Italy expressed great concern at the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic, or use nuclear or other radioactive materials.

• The EU, Norway, Italy, Romania, Japan, and Singapore expressed their full support to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), calling upon all states to accede to the amended CPPNM as well as to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

• Japan held the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in June 2017, attended by government officials from 74 countries, and plans to intensify efforts to combat nuclear terrorism in advance of the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo. Romania conducted a regional and practical exercise, in collaboration with GICNT, to develop tools to combat nuclear terrorism. Thailand has enacted a Counter-Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Financing Act.

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Withdrawal

- Australia urged looking more closely at the article X withdrawal provisions of the Treaty with a view toward establishing principles to govern the right of withdrawal, and commended the related principles put forward by the Vienna Group of Ten.
- Germany and Hungary highlighted the need for arriving at a common understanding among states parties on how to respond effectively to a withdrawal from the NPT, such as in the case of the DPRK.

Nuclear security

- The EU encouraged preparing national action plans to identify needs for capacity-building with respect to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security.
- Sweden called upon all nuclear-armed states to protect nuclear and radioactive materials, including military material, and to increase transparency and confidence in the effective security of such material.
- South Africa noted that if all civilian materials were safeguarded and fully secured to the highest standards, this would cover only an estimated 15 percent of the weapons-usable material around the world. It called upon all states not to lose sight of the remaining 85 percent that are categorised as military materials and not subject to any international security standards or oversight mechanisms.
- Norway was concerned about the large amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) still in use in civilian nuclear facilities. It said that this posed a significant proliferation and security risk. The Czech Republic voiced similar concerns, noting its own success in repatriating HEU using the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
- Spain suggested introducing physical nuclear security zones, fostering innovative means of cooperation that enhance confidence building. Brazil and Argentina emphasised their innovative and effective approach towards nuclear safeguarding, confidence building and multi-party cooperation.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

- Nigeria, Thailand, Cuba, and Panama welcomed the adoption of the TPNW. Nigeria and Cuba noted that the most comprehensive safeguard against use of nuclear weapons is total elimination.
- Thailand stated that the TPNW will contribute both to disarmament and non-proliferation, given that the two are mutually reinforcing. Nigeria similarly asserted that the TPNW will strengthen the non-proliferation regime and fulfil obligations under the NPT, and called on all states to sign and ratify the TPNW.
- Nigeria welcomed the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

Cyber security

- Germany highlighted its work in improving the security of nuclear facilities from protection against cyber attacks.
- Japan encouraged states to take proactive actions in responding to emerging threats such as cyber attacks.

Other

- The UK and Italy called for the universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.