Honorable Ambassador Salander, Distinguished Delegates to this conference,

a decade after the end of the Cold War there are disturbing signs of grave new nuclear dangers. We are here to share with you the concerns of NGOs from around the world about these developments and to challenge you to meet your responsibilities to the citizens of your countries and the planet.

Nuclear Arsenals and Nuclear Planning

There are more than 31,000 nuclear warheads currently maintained, 95% of these in the United States and Russia, and more than 16,000 are operationally deployed. While France and Britain keep their current arsenals, China, Israel, India and Pakistan work on building up their respective nuclear capabilities.

In November 2001, Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin announced reductions in their operational strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads. This welcome move is being poisoned by a U.S. policy to not eliminate the weapons it removes from deployment but store them as an arsenal in waiting which can be brought into use whenever it wishes. Furthermore it seems that the US draft agreement gives either side the right to exceed the numerical limits merely by informing the other side of its intentions.

The recently completed U.S. Nuclear Posture Review clearly contradicts many of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference.

- The U.S. Department of Defense is to “reassess [each year] the need to resume nuclear testing”, and the NPR reiterates the recommendation to reduce the time to resume testing to well below one year.

    Seen as a requirement to refine existing warheads and design new weapon types, this puts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at risk (2000 Review Conference step 1) and undermines the adherence to a test moratorium (step 2).

- Production of tritium will be resumed in Fiscal Year 2006, which is likely to further hinder negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (mandated by step 3.)

- The U.S. has a “comprehensive set” of “nuclear force sustainment and modernization” programs planned or under way and these complicate any possible multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament (step 4).
• Step 5 calls for irreversibility of disarmament measures. The U.S. plans to keep thousands of retired warheads in reserve. In deed, some experts believe that by 1012 the US arsenal could well contain the same number of nuclear warheads as in 2002. This clearly contradicts commitment from step 5.

• Since the NPR sees that “the Russian resolution of ratification [of the START-II Treaty] contains unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic framework” of the U.S., START-II will not be implemented and START-III will not be concluded. This as well as the ABM Treaty withdrawal contradict step 7 to which the United States agreed in May 2000. To make things worse, according to the current provision START-I expires in the year 2009.

• Step 9 called for a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used”. The U.S. NPR elaborates scenarios when nuclear weapons – in particular those with lower yields - might be used and foresees a “wide range of target types” and a “broad spectrum of potential opponents”.

• The NPR includes plans for nuclear targeting against non-nuclear weapons states. This is a major violation of previous commitments. Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference explicitly refers to UN Security Council resolution 984 and the related declarations of the nuclear-weapons states concerning both negative and positive security assurances. This declaration was an important requirement for Decision 3 of the same conference to continue the NPT indefinitely.

• Lastly, the NPR envisages a U.S. nuclear arsenal and plans for its development for at least the next fifty years. This undermines the commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty article VI to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”, confirmed in step 6 just two years ago.

With this in mind, we propose the following steps:

• A declaration by all nuclear states of No First-Use against other nuclear weapons states and a commitment to No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

• Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and completing START III negotiations as necessary measures for nuclear states to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations in accordance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

• Drastic reduction in nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination, including the prompt elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, an end to reliance on nuclear weapons in military planning and negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Missiles, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Missile Defenses, and the Weaponization of Space

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The five official nuclear weapons states all have long range ballistic missiles and the ability to strike anywhere in the world with nuclear weapons. Another eleven countries currently have ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 km.

There exists only one framework to control the spread of missile technology, the Missile Technology Control Regime. Initiated 15 years ago, it has slowed down the flow of military technology but not prevented it. It has aimed at creating an international norm against missile exports, but not against missile development, possession or use.

Rather than engage in diplomacy to limit and eliminate the threat of ballistic missiles, the U.S. is pursuing a military capability to defeat ballistic missiles. The FY2003 Defense Budget proposes US$ 7.8 billion for various sea-, air- and space-based missile defense systems. In addition, the budget plan supports advanced “space capabilities” and the continuation of “promising space control initiatives.” Many scientists are convinced that such systems will face major problems, in part because of the difficulties in distinguishing between warheads and possible decoys. The effort to solve such problems will be long, costly and destabilizing and will worsen not solve the problems created by missile proliferation.

Citing possible ballistic missile threats, in December 2001 the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. If the U.S. completes its formal withdrawal from the treaty, in June, it will be the first ever withdrawal from an arms control treaty and as such deserves to be condemned. The ABM Treaty must be preserved until something more comprehensive can replace it. At an absolute minimum, there must be a low numerical limit on the number of missile interceptors deployed by any state.

There is an inherent link between ballistic missile defense and the weaponization of space through the technology used for both. The quest for dominance in space and the weaponization of space is destabilizing and not in the interest in humankind.

We believe that efforts to develop missiles and missile defenses go against the clearly expressed aim of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely:

“to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Instead of an expensive and futile arms race between missiles, missile defense systems and space weapons, the international community should start negotiating formal arrangements to prevent a missile race by controlling these weapons and creating an international norm against them. The negotiation process needs to identify the fundamental political and scientific issues involved in meeting the goals and provides a mechanism to tackle the problems in a systematic step by step manner. To resolve the problems before they become urgent, it is important to recognize the emerging dangers and risks by confidence-building measures and improved information exchange among key players. This would provide a basis for a comprehensive missile monitoring and verification system that could be extended for international control and common security in outer space.
To reduce the dangers we call for the following immediate steps:

1. Stop testing of missiles, missile defense systems and space weapons.

2. Initiate negotiations for an international treaty banning missiles and space weapons.

Statement convened by Regina Hagen, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP)

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