Mr. Chairman,

In accordance with recommendations of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and taking into consideration para.15, subparagraph 12 of the Document, our delegation would like to inform the participants of the Preparatory Committee about the progress made by Russia regarding Article VI of the Treaty and para.4(c) of the 1995 decision “Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

Having passed the test of time, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has confirmed its role as the most important instrument of deterrence against the threat of nuclear arms spread. Its action promoted the enhancement of both, regional, as well as global strategic stability.

Taking into account obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Russia takes consistent steps towards final objective – the complete nuclear disarmament. However, as we have already more than once emphasized, it is necessary to move in that direction step-by-step on the basis of a complex approach and with participation of all the nuclear powers.

At present the process of nuclear reduction is being implemented in the framework of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., as well as unilateral initiatives.

The Treaty Between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles has been an essential step in that direction. In the framework of the Treaty ground-launched missiles of two classes with ranges between 500 and 5500 Km have been completely eliminated and the ban on production and testing of such missiles was put in place.

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms – START I, which entered into force on December 5, 1994 when all the nuclear weapons of the former U.S.S.R. were brought back to the territory of Russia, and Kazakhstan, Byelorussia and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear states – has become the next step in the reduction of nuclear armaments.

The START I foresaw the establishment of lower levels of nuclear munitions quantities on deployed strategic vehicles. By the present time the nuclear arms reduction process in its framework has been completed. Ahead of the schedule Russia reached the level of 6000 munitions deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Within the obligations taken by us, by the present time more than 1200 ICBM and SLBM launchers, more than 2350 ICBMs and SLBMs, more than 40 nuclear submarines and more than 60 heavy bombers have been eliminated. The control mechanism, foreseen by the START I, will stay in force till the end of 2009.
The START II, which foresaw even more significant reduction of nuclear arsenals of Russia and the U.S.A., was signed on January 3, 1993. The Treaty foresaw the elimination of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs and a summary reduction of the number of munitions accounted with deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers down to the level of 3000-3500 units. If the START II were implemented, the total reduction of SOW in Russia and the U.S.A. would make approximately two thirds as compared to 1990.

In May 2000 the Russian Federation ratified the said Treaty together with the New York package of arrangements regarding the ABM. However, to our regret, the START II has never entered into force and it is not we who should be blamed for that.

In December 2001 the U.S. administration announced its decision to withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 ABM Treaty. On the same day the President of Russia said, that he considered such a unilateral decision as mistaken.

Our country made everything dependent upon it to maintain the Treaty. In so doing, Russia was first of all guided by considerations of maintenance and enhancement of international law foundations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty is one of the core structures of the legal system in this area. This system was being created by joint efforts all during three decades.

We are convinced that today when the world is facing new threats, we should not allow a legal vacuum to surge in the area of strategic stability. Keeping that in mind, the present-day level of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the United States should be used to elaborate new framework of strategic interrelations as soon as possible. It goes without saying that the military component of this framework is connected with a prospect for the achievement of new agreements regarding further reductions and limitations of strategic arms.

Today it is quite clear that together with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty limitations for strategic defensive arms can disappear. We are convinced that in the resulting situation it is necessary to reflect an interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive armaments in a new arrangement. Such an interconnection has already been fixed in the Joint statement of the Presidents of Russia and the U.S.A. after the results of their meeting in Genoa on July 22, 2001.

In the course of their last meeting in Washington the Presidents of Russia and the U.S.A. jointly underscored that a new level of strategic situation in the world required the creation of a new framework for the promotion of security of Russia and the U.S.A. and the world community at large. Both Presidents confirmed their commitment to considerable reductions of strategic offensive arms down to 1700-2200 warheads. As is well known, previously Russia declared that she was prepared to implement even more radical reductions.

We would like to see the maximum rapid progress in the elaboration of a respective legally binding agreement on a real, irreversible and monitored reduction of nuclear arsenals, which could be signed during U.S. President’s visit to Moscow next May. At present experts of our countries are actively working to elaborate such an agreement.
As regards the reduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons (NSNW), Russia is guided by the unilateral initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation (1991-1992). These initiatives of the Russian Federation are being implemented in accordance with the Federal objective-oriented program of elimination and disposal of nuclear warheads for strategic and tactical arms.

In the course of the implementation of the Program:
- all NSNW has been dismantled from surface ships and multiple-purpose submarines, as well from ground-based naval air force and placed for centralized storage; more than 30% of nuclear munitions of the total number designed for tactical sea-launched missiles and naval air force have been eliminated;
- all tactical nuclear munitions previously deployed outside Russia have been brought back to her territory and are being eliminated;
- production of nuclear munitions for tactical ground-launched missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines has been completely stopped; the destruction of nuclear reentry vehicles for tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells, as well as nuclear mines continues;
- 50% of nuclear reentry vehicles for surface-to-air missiles and 50% of nuclear air bombs of their total number have been destroyed;
- all Russia’s NSNW has been placed only within national territory.

So, Russia has practically implemented all the declared initiatives to reduce NSNW with the exception of elimination of nuclear weapons of the Army. The elimination of nuclear reentry vehicles for ground-launched missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear land mines is meanwhile restrained by insufficient financing, as well as by non-fulfillment of the treaty provisions on the elimination and reduction of conventional arms, strategic offensive arms (START I) and elimination of chemical weapons.

Russia plans to complete implementation of the initiatives in the sphere of NSNW by 2004 on condition of adequate financing.

As of today, all Russia’s nuclear weapons are placed within the limits of her national territory. In this connection we would like again to draw the attention to Russia’s proposal that all nuclear weapons should be brought back to the territories of possessor-states.

At the same time it is necessary to note that the nuclear weapons available in Russia are under reliable control. Higher effectiveness of this control is made through the adoption of organizational and technical measures. In particular, during the period from 1991 to 2001 the overall stockpiles of the available nuclear weapons has been reduced more than 5 times and the number of nuclear munitions storage sites – 4 times. All non-strategic nuclear munitions have been transferred to the central storage facilities of the Ministry of the Defense. It allowed to concentrate all the financial resources on providing for nuclear safety and secured safeguarding of nuclear munitions storage sites by using modern technical means of protection.

Now I would like also to draw your attention to a number of other important issues.
The statement of the President of Russia of May 27, 1997 regarding de-targeting of strategic nuclear weapons has become one of Russia's steps in the area of reducing the nuclear threat. At present as a result of implementation of that initiative all Russia's ballistic missiles are equipped with a so-called "zero" launch mission.

Side by side with treaties on limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, we attach a special attention to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Russia, having ratified the CTBT in the year 2000, maintains the policy line of principle to promote the entry of that Treaty – the most important instrument in the area of nuclear arms limitation and enhancement of the nuclear arms non-proliferation regime - into force as soon as possible.

At the same time the situation around the entry of that Treaty into force is viewed in Moscow with concern. As the second Conference on promoting the entry of the CTBT into force, which confirmed the support of the Treaty on the part of a predominant majority of states, demonstrated, a concern prevailed in the international community regarding the attitude to the CTBT in the United States – in that nuclear power whose participation in the nuclear test ban regime is critically important for the destiny of the Treaty.

We would like to express our hope that the U.S. administration will yet reconsider its position on the CTBT. An alternative to that can become not only a crisis of the said Treaty, but also of the whole regime based on the CTBT. It should not be allowed to happen.

It is important that also other countries, and first of all those the entry of the CTBT into force is dependent upon, signed and ratified the Treaty without any conditions and as soon as possible.

Our steps in the area of nuclear disarmament are accompanied by respective structural reductions in the nuclear weapon sector of the Russian Federation. The production potential, which is excessive for defense objectives, has been reduced by half.

Jointly with the United States we carry out the work to stop Russia's industrial uranium-graphite reactors – producers of weapon-grade plutonium. Russia does not use the material, which is being produced there, for military purposes.

In Russia production of uranium for nuclear weapons has been long discontinued.

Since 1990 the strength of the staff employed in Russia's federal nuclear centers and occupied with defense matters has been reduced by approximately one and a half times.

The Russia-U.S. Intergovernmental Agreement signed in the year 2000 foresees disposal by each side respectively of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium no more needed for defense purposes. We attach great importance to the soonest beginning of its implementation, as it would promote the start of the process of irreversible transformation of the excessive weapon-grade plutonium in Russia and the U.S.A. into a form unfit for production on nuclear weapon. We think that today the disposal of weapon-grade plutonium through mixed uranium-plutonium MOX-
fuel is the most acceptable technology, which has recommended itself sufficiently well.

Joint research programs for the use of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel in Russia's reactors and for the creation of plutonium conversion plants are continued within the framework of the tri-lateral Russia-France-Germany Intergovernmental Agreement.

A practical possibility to use uranium-plutonium fuel in the CANDU reactors is being studied jointly with Canada's experts.

At the Conference on Disarmament Russia consistently supports the beginning of negotiations regarding the elaboration of a draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

The Russian Federation speaks also consistently against militarization of outer space. Placement of weapon in outer space would not only mean an expansion of spheres of military competition, but also its qualitative thrust forward fraught with unpredictable consequences for the process of arms control, strategic stability and international security as a whole. We cannot agree with the arguments that putting weapons in outer space is an unavoidable fatality, which is brought about by technological progress and the logic of development of contemporary world. The outer space has once been considered as a potential source of conflicts. Happily, the world community was able to find strength of its own not to allow turning of outer space into a potential theatre of military actions, and so today it has become an arena of broad international cooperation.

We are deeply convinced that the use of outer space should be considered from a position of providing for a comprehensive security of mankind and serve two objectives, which are namely the maintenance of international peace and security and promotion of international cooperation. Russia's initiative with regard to an inadmissibility of putting weapons into outer space, refusal from the use of force and threat of force in outer space have been presented by Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor S.Ivanov in September 2001 at the 56th UN General Assembly session. It is important that we propose practically to introduce moratorium for putting combat objects into outer space before respective arrangements are elaborated. We support important specific proposals voiced by the Peoples Republic of China, Canada and a number of other states to prevent putting weapons into outer space.

So, the Russian Federation demonstrates its resolute intention to bring the matter really towards reduction of nuclear armaments and disarmament. We also call upon other nuclear countries to join us in this process.

At the same time it is necessary to underscore that the reduction of nuclear armaments requires tremendous both, financial expenditures, as well organizational efforts. That is why a forceful acceleration of this process may result in putting to its participants unrealistic tasks that would be difficult to fulfill.

Thank you for your attention.