Mr. Chairman, the primary goal of the NPT since its inception has been to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Articles I and II contain the Treaty's basic nonproliferation undertakings. Discussions in NPT fora have focused on two key issues relevant to these Articles - universality and compliance. The IAEA safeguards obligations in Article III also raise compliance issues and will be discussed during the next section of the structured debate.

The United States strongly supports universal adherence to the NPT. Only Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty. Early progress seems unlikely. Yet, there were times when it seemed hopeless that other states would accede to the NPT. Political or security reasons were advanced for not joining. Yet slowly over time, circumstances changed; many joined the NPT after abandoning nuclear weapon ambitions or altering political linkages that had stood for more than 20 years. These decisions contributed significantly to the security of us all.
While we recognize the regional factors that influence the nuclear policies of India, Israel and Pakistan -- we join all NPT parties in the hope that some day these nations will accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. In the meantime, we urge them to exercise restraint in their nuclear programs and to ensure that no persons or organizations under their jurisdiction help any others, including terrorists, to acquire nuclear weapons or related materials or technology.

Cuba's opposition to the NPT is the most difficult to understand. Cuba has no unsafeguarded nuclear activities and does not appear to harbor nuclear weapon ambitions. It cites long-standing political differences with the United States as its reason for not joining the Treaty. Cuba is the only nation in the Western Hemisphere that has not joined the NPT and is the lone holdout from the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. It is long past time for Cuba to step up and contribute to international nuclear nonproliferation by joining the NPT. These matters are too important to allow Cuba to claim that its differences with the United States stand in the way. The world is waiting for Cuba to join the NPT and Cuba should promptly accede to that universal expectation.

Strict compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT is critical to the long-term strength of the NPT. Virtually all NPT parties have strong commitments to the Treaty and are in full compliance. However, a few have violated the NPT and thereby undermined the security of the vast majority of responsible parties. Such behavior is not acceptable. Those who violate the Treaty must know that NPT parties will be relentless until they remedy their non-compliance.
The NPT has been severely tested over the past decade by Iraq and North Korea. Both willfully violated their NPT obligations. Inspections in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War revealed a major secret effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq has also produced undeclared nuclear material in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea was in violation of the NPT for many years by refusing to complete the IAEA safeguards agreement required by the Treaty. Then in 1993, after the safeguards agreement finally came into force, North Korea denied an IAEA request to conduct activities necessary to confirm North Korea's declaration of nuclear material.

These countries refuse to take steps asked of them by the international community to address these violations. The United States will continue its vigorous efforts in cooperation with many other nations to bring these countries into compliance with NPT.

We also must be vigilant about other NPT parties with nuclear weapon ambitions that have not yet been found to be in violation of the Treaty. These countries can often be identified by procurement patterns for which there is no reasonable civil purpose. Any state contemplating violation of the NPT to acquire nuclear weapons must know that such an action will be met with a strong and immediate response from NPT parties. Strong political support for compliance is essential if we are to affect behavior. No would-be violator can be allowed to hide behind hollow declarations of peaceful intent.

Another critical compliance issue concerns the undertaking of the nuclear weapon states in Article I of the NPT "not in any
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices." Implementation of this obligation
requires a comprehensive nuclear export control system. This
system must apply not only to special nuclear material and
equipment, but also to dual-use items and classified information
related to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Given
the knowledge and experience of the nuclear weapon states, they
have a special responsibility in this area. Compliance with
Article I also requires rigorous enforcement measures.

But an effective export policy to prevent nuclear weapon
proliferation requires much more. When dealing with NPT parties
whose commitment to the Treaty is suspect, all nuclear supplier
states -- not just the nuclear weapon states -- must be
constantly alert and vigilant in preventing exports from being
diverted to nuclear weapons programs. States seeking nuclear
weapons can find ways to utilize regular channels of nuclear
commerce to hide clandestine procurement or to divert supplied
items to military programs. Indeed, in some circumstances the
United States believes there is no alternative but to refrain
from all nuclear cooperation with a country where there is a
high risk of nuclear proliferation. In such cases, we believe
that proposed nuclear-related exports do not meet the admonition
of paragraph 10 of the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. This paragraph states that suppliers should authorize
the transfer of nuclear-related items "only when they are
satisfied that the transfers would not contribute to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices."

Finally, it is important to emphasize the linkage between
compliance with Articles I and II and the threat of nuclear
terrorism. States that violate the NPT as well as nuclear supplier states with ineffective export policies are vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists seeking nuclear material, whether for nuclear explosives or radiological weapons. Strengthening efforts to enforce compliance with the NPT not only help to prevent the instability caused by the spread of nuclear weapons, but also can help to prevent nuclear terrorism, which has the potential to inflict death and destruction far beyond that of September 11.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.