STATEMENT ON REGIONAL ISSUES BY AMBASSADOR YUKIO TAKASU
REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN
At the First Session of the Preparatory Committee
For the 2005 NPT Review Conference
(New York, 15 April)

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to add my voice of congratulation to you on your assumption of the Chair of this important session of the Preparatory Committee and assure you my full support.

I would like to extend my appreciation to you for providing the Committee with an opportunity to specifically discuss regional issues. The implementation of the NPT and the promotion of regional security in various regions of the world should be mutually reinforced. It is therefore important for States parties to take into account the perspective of regional security in addressing the problems related to the implementation of the NPT in certain regions. From this point of view, the establishment of a subsidiary body to examine regional issues at the 2000 NPT Review Conference was a positive step.

(Middle East)

Japan supported, and continues to support fully the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East which calls for the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Japan also welcomes the consensus adoption of the UNGA Resolution 56/21, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.” Despite these positive steps, Japan expresses its concern about the lack of progress in the implementation of these resolutions.

The establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems in the Middle East will require the adherence by all States in the region to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention. Japan has been actively taking part in the international efforts to encourage the universal adherence to these multilateral legally binding instruments on disarmament of weapons of mass destruction.

With respect to the NPT, in particular, Japan welcomes the accessions by several States before the 2000 Review Conference and urges Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards.

Japan also deems full compliance with the NPT obligations as extremely important and urges Iraq to accept UN and IAEA verification in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Japan is particularly concerned over the escalating violence and terror that have been taking place in Israel and the Palestinian autonomous territories. This vicious cycle of violence must be ended immediately. Japan fully supports the Security Council Resolution 1402 that has sent a strong message to both parties in this regard. Japan requests the parties concerned to implement it without delay. Japan urges both parties to respond constructively to the efforts by Secretary of State Colin Powell and make decisions to bring about a ceasefire and to resume the peace process.

(South Asia)

I would like to reiterate endorsement of the relevant paragraphs on South Asia and other regional issues in the 2000 Final Document. Serious efforts have been made to encourage India and Pakistan to positively respond to the calls in the Document. We regret, however, there has not been any major progress in their implementation.

The nuclear weapon capabilities of both India and Pakistan make the security landscape in South Asia ever more dangerous. In order to ensure the sustained security in the region, the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1172, which was adopted in June 1998 in the wake of the nuclear tests in South Asia, is of utmost importance. In the context of the NPT Review Process, Japan once again urges India and Pakistan, in particular, to accede to the NPT without delay. It welcomes the continued moratoria on nuclear testing by
both countries and encourages them to further continue their commitment to these moratoria.

(DPRK)

I would like to emphasize that the IAEA Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains in force and binding. The DPRK should abide by this Agreement as a State party to the NPT and should perform its obligations completely and faithfully.

Japan continues to be concerned that the Agency has been unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK and that the Agency has been unable to assure that undeclared activities have not been carried out in the DPRK because it has so far failed to extend full cooperation to the Agency.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that, in relation to the KEDO Light Water Reactor project, the provision of the key nuclear components to the DPRK is contingent upon full compliance of the DPRK with its Safeguards Agreement. We should take into consideration that the process leading to confirming its full compliance will be a long one. In this respect, we call on the DPRK to take full account of the expectations of the international community and normalize its relations with the Agency in due course.

Japan appreciates the fact that the visit of IAEA team to the Isotope Production Laboratory in Nyongbyon, the DPRK in January this year, and also some other recent moves are small steps, but in the right direction towards the normalization of its relations with the Agency.

Japan hopes that the DPRK will make a positive response to the Agency's proposal as the first concrete step as soon as possible.

(CTBT)

Last but not least, the progress towards universality of the CTBT is also a substantial practical step to ensure security and promote disarmament in different regions of the world. Japan has been making utmost efforts to accelerate the entry into force of the Treaty. We are determined to redouble its efforts to promote the signing and ratification of this Treaty
by all States, especially those States whose ratifications are required for the entry into
force of the Treaty.
Cluster 2

Mr. Chairman,

Assuring nuclear non-proliferation through the application of the effective safeguards is as equally important as to the nuclear disarmament under the NPT regime. In cluster 2, I would like to discuss Japan's view on strengthening the IAEA safeguards, integrated safeguards, export control and nuclear weapon free zones. I will discuss other important issues such as protection against nuclear terrorism and physical protection under the specific issue, "the safety and security of peaceful use of nuclear energy".

1. Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

IAEA Safeguards are the fundamental basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the strengthening of safeguards is the most practical way to reinforce nuclear non-proliferation at this stage. We need to seriously study how to improve the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, and how to cope with non-compliance with safeguards agreements. Among many important tasks, the universalization of additional protocols is
urgent. In the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was recommended that the IAEA and its Member States consider ways and means, including a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. We have been supporting the efforts by the IAEA according to the plan of action, and have been taking the initiative to encourage the universal adherence to the additional protocols. Our initiative was welcomed in the IAEA General Conference last year. More concretely, Japan hosted the international seminar for the Asia Pacific region last June in cooperation with the IAEA. We also provided financial and personnel support to the Agency's regional seminar in Peru for Latin American and Caribbean states last December and the one in Kazakhstan for central Asian countries last January. We would like to welcome the recent conclusion of additional protocols by several states, including Mongolia, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Haiti in the process of these efforts.

As for future activities, the regional seminar for African states is planned to be convened by the Agency this coming June in South Africa, also with support from Japan. We believe that this series of regional seminars contributes to deepening understanding of the importance of universalization, clarifying and addressing obstacles, and facilitating the conclusion of additional protocols and safeguards agreements. As a further step, based on the results of regional seminars, we are planning to co-host with IAEA a global conference in Tokyo this autumn, for the purpose of promoting the universalization of additional protocols to strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation. We would like to proceed with the preparation of the conference in cooperation with the Secretariat and other States concerned.

Full compliance with IAEA safeguards, including the additional protocols, should be regarded as a prerequisite for nuclear cooperation, especially for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This, we believe, significantly contributes not only to improving transparency of nuclear activities in a state, but also to building confidence in a region.

From these viewpoints, in addition to the importance of all countries to adhere to the NPT, we call upon countries that have not yet concluded the additional protocols to do so. We are seriously concerned that, at this moment, there are still only 24 states that have the additional protocols entered into force. In particular, we call upon states that have signed but not brought them into force to do so. In this context, we would like to express our appreciation to China, which is the first nuclear weapon state to bring its additional protocol into force.
2. Integrated Safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

Safeguards measures must be continuously reviewed with respect to technology development. In these reviews, improving efficiency and seeking the possibility of rationalization is equally as important as maintaining and enforcing the effectiveness of safeguards.

In the process of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards through the application of additional protocols, establishment and implementation of integrated safeguards is an indispensable task. In their implementation, we should pursue flexibility that enables the adoption of safeguards approaches that take into account state-specific features and characteristics, while maintaining the effectiveness of safeguards.

It is also important to make integrated safeguards attractive to the states that have yet to conclude additional protocols in order to give incentive to those States and facilitate universalization. From this viewpoint, it is necessary to demonstrate the benefit to the states of applying integrated safeguards. At the same time, there are a number of States that ratified additional protocols at an early stage that have still not yet drawn conclusion, and integrated safeguards have yet to be applied. If this situation is further prolonged, we are concerned that it may serve as a disincentive to other States.

3. Nuclear weapon states and the NPT

Mr. Chairman,

The application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States was introduced on a voluntary basis, as the NPT gives special status to nuclear-weapon States. However, the application of voluntary safeguards should not have restrictions. Nuclear-weapon States should make efforts to expand the application of safeguards to peaceful uses of nuclear materials and facilities as broadly as possible. In addition, in order to assure irreversibility of peaceful uses of nuclear materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should give serious consideration to placing such nuclear materials under appropriate international verification systems including the IAEA safeguards.
4. Export Control

Mr. Chairman,

We greatly appreciate the role played by international nuclear-related export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the control of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, without hindering nuclear trade or cooperation for peaceful purposes. We continue to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through our on-going role as Point of Contact for the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

We will continue to promote a better understanding of the importance of export controls in Asia by hosting the Asian Export Control Seminar and pursuing various outreach programs with other Asian countries.

With a view to making the nuclear non-proliferation system more effective in response to counter-terrorism, we consider it worthwhile to study, within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the idea of requiring the additional protocol as a condition of supply to non-nuclear weapon states and, we are prepared to discuss this again, at an appropriate stage, within the group.

5. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

We strongly support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. The establishment of such zones is generally expected to enhance global and regional security. We have been supporting efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish such a zone in their region. Indeed, the establishment of an internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is of special importance because this region is increasingly vital to international peace and security. We also support Mongolia’s aspiration to consolidate its nuclear-weapon-free status, and are closely following developments related to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, which is adjacent to our country. We commend the engagement of the Treaty Parties in a dialogue with all the nuclear-weapon States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.