Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Its global reach is reinforced by several regional nonproliferation arrangements which underscore the goals of the NPT. During the past thirty-five years, there has been steady progress in how nonproliferation is addressed by various regions and these efforts serve to strengthen our collective security. While much has been achieved, significant challenges remain, particularly in South Asia, North-East Asia, and the Middle East.

**SOUTH ASIA:**

The May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan defied international norms against the spread of nuclear weapons and the fundamental objectives of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Regrettably, both countries continue to advance their nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.

The United States remains deeply concerned by these developments. We continue to urge both sides to take steps to prevent an arms race, restrain their nuclear and missile programs, and reduce regional tensions. The United States has raised its concerns with Indian and Pakistani officials on many occasions, and continues to call on them to maintain their nuclear testing moratoria, refrain from assembling nuclear weapons, and bring an early end to production of fissile material. The current tensions in the region only underscore the need to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear and
We continue to hope that India and Pakistan will eventually agree to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. They are not eligible to join as nuclear weapons states (NWS) and should not be granted that status. U.S. policy is consistent with the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament” agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The United States urges other states to remain steadfast on this point. As a matter of law and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) policy, the United States requires full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear material, equipment, or assistance to India and Pakistan, and other non-nuclear-weapons states as defined under the NPT.

Although we recently lifted sanctions against India and Pakistan imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests, as well as certain missile sanctions imposed on the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, let me emphasize that our concerns over proliferation in South Asia have not diminished. We simply believe that we are more likely to make progress on our nonproliferation agenda through a cooperative relationship, in which sanctions are no longer a dominant issue. But we will continue to work with both countries to promote nonproliferation goals. Moreover, our determination to oppose proliferation globally remains as strong as ever.

It is important that the international community continues to send a common message to India and Pakistan to pursue nonproliferation goals, engage in cooperative dialogue, and agree on nuclear and missile restraint. This Preparatory Committee meeting affords each of us an opportunity to urge India and Pakistan to adopt concrete measures of restraint and to ensure that their activities do not lead to further proliferation or risk the use of nuclear weapons in anger or through miscalculation.

NORTH KOREA:

North Korea presents a significant proliferation problem and regional challenge. Let me briefly recall several key facts. In 1985, the DPRK joined the NPT but delayed accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards until 1992, years after the deadline established by the Treaty. When IAEA inspections began, discrepancies in the DPRK's initial declaration became apparent,
and the IAEA sought a special inspection to resolve them. The DPRK refused. In response, the IAEA Board of Governors found North Korea in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and referred the issue to the UN Security Council. In March 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, but suspended that action in June 1993 following bilateral consultations with the United States.

In 1994, the United States and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework. Through this Framework, North Korea undertook to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear facilities. In exchange, the United States undertook to arrange the construction of two modern light water reactors in North Korea. The Agreed Framework provides that North Korea will come into full compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement "when a significant portion" of the light water reactors was completed, "but before delivery of key nuclear components:"

The freeze is in place at North Korea's declared nuclear facilities, where the IAEA maintains an inspector presence. At the same time, the North has yet to allow the IAEA to verify the completeness and accuracy of the DPRK's initial safeguards declaration or account for all its nuclear material.

Although North Korea has recently taken several small steps to cooperate with the IAEA, it has yet to provide sufficient information to allow the IAEA to begin actual verification activities. The IAEA estimates that it will need several years to verify the history and scope of North Korea's past nuclear activities. Failure by North Korea to begin cooperation now on verification raises troubling questions about its ultimate willingness to comply with the NPT. This, in turn risks creating delays in reactor construction as provided under the Agreed Framework. We strongly urge North Korea to begin cooperating now with the IAEA and come into full compliance with its obligations under the NPT.

MIDDLE EAST:

In supporting nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East, the United States has three priorities. First, we support the Middle East Peace Process to help create the environment for establishing a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we work to bring all regional states into compliance with the NPT. Third, we encourage all states in the region to join the NPT and adhere to other nonproliferation treaties and regimes.
Mr. Chairman, the Bush Administration is deeply committed to forging a Middle East in which two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders. The core elements of the framework for promoting this goal are UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority have accepted the proposals set forth in the Tenet security plan and the Mitchell Committee report. These establish certain steps for restoring security and rebuilding confidence between the parties, and can lay the basis for resumption of political negotiations. In early 2002, President Bush named General Anthony Zinni (retired) as his special envoy to the region. General Zinni has made three trips to the region to help put in place a cease-fire and encourage the parties to begin implementation of the Tenet security plan.

On March 13, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 1397, which reaffirms the American vision for the Middle East, a vision shared by other world leaders including Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah. Furthermore, the United States welcomed the Arab League’s endorsement of Saudi Arabia’s vision. The UN Security Council resolution demands the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement, and destruction. It calls on both sides to cooperate in implementing the Tenet security work plan and Mitchell Committee report recommendations. On April 4, President Bush dispatched Secretary Powell to the Middle East, where he remains today, for consultations with regional leaders.

A true Middle East peace will not be achievable as long as states in the region doubt one another’s international nonproliferation commitments. This is why full compliance with the NPT is of paramount importance. During the 2000 NPT Review Conference, my government made clear its concern about non-compliance with the Treaty. Our concerns remain and bear directly on the prospects for attaining a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. Violations of the NPT cannot be tolerated. Responsible NPT parties need to act with resolve in response to this challenge to the Treaty.

The Iraqi nuclear weapon program violated Article II of the NPT. Its construction of secret facilities, including a facility for nuclear weapon development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq’s failure to apply safeguards to the nuclear material used in its nuclear
weapon program also constituted a violation of Article III of the NPT. Article III requires that safeguards be applied "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." UN Security Council Resolution 707, passed August 15, 1991, concluded that Iraq's non-compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement constitutes a violation of its commitments as a party to the NPT. Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions have reaffirmed this resolution.

In his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush stated that, "The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens - leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections - then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world."

Under relevant Security Council resolutions, the IAEA is charged with assuring the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear weapon program and inspecting Iraq's nuclear activities to guard against further violations of the NPT. But in his October 2001 letter to the President of the Security Council, IAEA Director General ElBaradei again reiterated that the IAEA cannot do its job. Since 1998 when Iraq denied access for IAEA inspectors, the Agency, "...is not able at present to provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under these [U.N. Security Council] resolutions. Clearly, the longer the suspension of resolution related inspections lasts, the more difficult it will be and the more time will be required for the Agency to re-establish a level of knowledge comparable to that achieved at the end of 1998."

In January 2002, Iraq did cooperate with an IAEA inspection of declared nuclear material. However, in his March 2002 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors Director General ElBaradei stated clearly that these measures "are no substitute for the broader and more intensive Security Council mandated verification measures that are necessary for the Agency to provide the assurances sought by the Council."

The United States is also concerned about other NPT parties in the Middle East region whose ostensible commitments to the NPT are belied by their covert programs to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. We urge all NPT parties to avoid nuclear
cooperation with these countries and underscore the absolute importance of abiding by their Treaty obligations.

Achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East remains a key U.S. foreign policy goal. We will continue to press our concerns about Iraq and seek Iraq’s compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We will work to establish conditions under which all parties in the region will feel secure enough to begin addressing the complex issues involved in establishing a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Other U.S. actions to promote compliance with the NPT in the Middle East and elsewhere include supporting the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, the negotiation and entry into force of Additional Safeguards Protocols, and the adoption of NPT safeguards agreements. Most NPT states parties in the Middle East have brought into force the required full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and one state party has brought into force an Additional Protocol. However, several countries in the region have still not concluded their full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA required by the NPT, and it is essential that each do so as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, the United States continues to insist that States parties to agreements uphold their obligations. We encourage the adherence by all Middle East states to nonproliferation treaties and regimes. These include the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological Weapons Convention; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia Group guidelines; and a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

CONCLUSION;

Mr. Chairman, much work remains to be done to strengthen nonproliferation norms in South Asia, North East Asia and the Middle East. We look forward to the day when this work is complete. Until then, the United States will support those who work for comprehensive and balanced solutions to regional nonproliferation issues. We hope others will do so as well. Committed parties to the NPT should do no less.

Thank you.