CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. First Session

Cluster two and three issues

STATEMENT

BY

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Mr. Chairman,

Safeguards

IAEA safeguards should be universally applied to all peaceful nuclear activities in all State Parties, in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. By providing assurance that States are complying with their NPT obligations, IAEA safeguards promote confidence among States and help strengthening their collective security.

It is highly regrettable that since the 2000 RevCon only one comprehensive safeguards agreement has been concluded, while fifty-one States have yet to fulfill their respective obligations under the Treaty. Progress in the implementation of the additional protocol is also disappointingly slow. So far only 61 countries have signed additional protocols, and only 25 of these are in force. We urge those States Parties that have not yet done so to conclude their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and call on more countries to sign additional protocols and to speed up their ratification procedures, so as to make the enhanced safeguards system as universal as possible.

The measures contained in the IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements will increase confidence in that no nuclear material and activities in a State are undeclared. Norway views the Model Additional Protocol as the new verification standard.

The completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards by the IAEA will usher in a system for verification that is more comprehensive, as well as being more flexible and effective than current mechanisms. Member States must have both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in place for the IAEA to be able to make full use of this improved safeguards system.

In performing its duties, the IAEA is clearly facing substantial verification challenges in the coming decades. While the Agency most likely must engage in some structural changes to meet new tasks and approaches in an optimal way, sustained and professionally performed activities require predictable and sufficient levels of financial support. Norway is, if necessary, ready to support increased funding for expanded IAEA verification activities.
Compliance

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should immediately fulfil its stated intention to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which remains binding and in force. We reiterate also the importance of the DPRK preserving and making available to the IAEA all information needed to verify its initial inventory.

The IAEA continues to be ready to resume its Security Council mandated verification activities in Iraq at short notice. Iraq’s NPT Safeguards are no substitute for the broader and more intensive UN Security Council mandated measures that are necessary for the IAEA to provide the assurances sought by the UN Security Council. We urge Iraq to co-operate fully with the IAEA to achieve full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and its international obligations under the NPT.

Export controls

Each State Party to the NPT has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by Article III of the Treaty.

Nuclear export controls are a necessary and effective means of implementing States Parties’ obligations under Article III of the NPT Treaty. Full scope safeguards should be the condition of supply to non-nuclear weapon states. A comprehensive (INFCIRC/153) safeguard agreement, coupled with an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), should be regarded as together constituting the full scope safeguards requirement.

Effective export controls are also central to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation.

The Zangger Committee plays an important role in meeting the obligation under Article III.2 of the NPT.

With the aim to further strengthen the obligations under Article III.2 and the need to control transfers of nuclear technology and dual-use items which can be used to develop nuclear explosive devices, Norway participates in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). We believe that the role of NSG and its contribution to greater transparency and dialogue with non-NSG countries will serve to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
Physical protection/Illlicit trafficking/Nuclear terrorism

Safeguards aim at deterring and detecting unlawful diversion of fissile material. To prevent such acts, however, safeguards must be supplemented with adequate systems of physical protection.

Today, there are huge and unfortunate variations in how states go about to implement systems of physical protection. Norway strongly endorses the ongoing work for strengthening and expanding the scope of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, particularly the direction of standardising minimum levels of physical security at nuclear facilities in all states.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September underscore the paramount importance of effective physical protection of weapons usable fissile material. We foresee the universal adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, welcome new accessions to it and note that UN Security Council 1373 calls on all States to accede to it.

In light of the recent events, IAEA’s work in support of States Parties’ efforts to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances seems more important than ever. Norway welcomes the IAEA’s efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials. This includes the Agency’s registering of sealed sources, its illicit trafficking data base, as well as its efforts to achieve enhanced co-ordination among States and among international organisations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illegal use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. IAEA is the primary and appropriate co-ordinating international body working in this field.

Norway welcomes the IAEA’s plan of action on protection against nuclear terrorism, covering the following eight areas: Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control, security of radioactive sources, the assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities, response to malicious acts or threats thereof, the adherence to international agreements and guidelines, and the enhancement of IAEA program co-ordination and information management for nuclear-related matters.

Norway endorses the IAEA’s plan of action on protection against nuclear terrorism, covering physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control, security of radioactive sources, the assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities, response to malicious acts or threats thereof, the adherence to international agreements and guidelines, and the enhancement of IAEA program co-ordination and information management for nuclear-related matters.
Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials

Norway recognises the IAEA Resolution IAEA GC (45RES/10) “Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transports and Waste Safety”.

Norway underlines the importance of effective national and international regulations and standards for the protection of States concerned from the risk of transportation of radioactive materials.

We encourage states shipping radioactive materials to provide, as appropriate, assurances to concerned states, upon their request, that the national regulations of the shipping state takes IAEA transport regulations into account and to provide them with relevant information related to shipments of such materials. The information provided should not in any case be contradictory to the measures of physical protection and safety.

Thank you,