Mr Chairman, we look forward to continuing the productive discussion in this second cluster and let me join those who’ve already thanked Tariq Rauf for his excellent presentation on the work of the IAEA.

I referred to Nuclear Weapon Free Zones – and the importance we attach to them – in my statement under Cluster One on Friday. In this statement I should like to focus on strengthening safeguards.

**Strengthening Safeguards**

Mr Chairman, as we stated in our opening statement the UK regards the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. It is central to addressing threats that confront us all. It is the UK's view, as we take this first step in a new review process, that we must continue to strengthen the non-proliferation measures that underpin the process of disarmament.

Upon signing the NPT, all non-nuclear weapon states commit to bringing into force Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs). This is recognised in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The UK has already noted with regret that over 50 states still do
not have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in force and we call on all state parties to the NPT that have not already done so to conclude and bring into force the CSAs required of them. It is of the greatest importance that NPT safeguards obligations are applied universally.

We also strongly urge those States who have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols based on the INFCIRC/540 model so that safeguards based on comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol become the norm. This norm must also include the full implementation of the so-called Part 1 safeguards strengthening measures including the early provision of design information for new facilities.

Additional Protocols strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime very significantly by enhancing the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. As such, the universal implementation of these protocols is required for the strengthened safeguards system to become fully effective. We also support the suggestion that it should be considered an obligation for NPT parties to bring Additional Protocols into force. [I would also add that the UK welcomes the announcement made by the Government of Japan that they are planning to hold a conference to examine ways to encourage States to sign Additional Protocols.]

We have agreed a Protocol additional to our safeguards agreement with the IAEA and EURATOM. It will enter into force when the rest of the EU has completed the necessary steps. Pending entry into force, we have provided the Agency with
voluntary declarations of the information that would be required of the UK if the Protocol were in force.

Mr Chairman, we very much share the view that the widespread implementation of such safeguards strengthening measures provides the basis for developing a truly integrated safeguards system. With increasing confidence in the absence of undeclared activities there will also be scope for reductions in the levels of safeguards effort on less sensitive nuclear materials.

The UK agrees with the US delegation that we must not shrink from ensuring that the IAEA applies strong safeguards and that we must be prepared to ensure that it has the resources to do so. The IAEA is to be commended for the progress it has made in taking forward the development of integrated safeguards.

We believe that the IAEA is likely to require additional resources and that therefore Zero Real Growth in the Agency’s budget may have to be set on one side for a period. We need to do this, both to maintain the quality of the assurance that the Secretariat gives, and to provide for the effective implementation of additional protocols and thus, in due course, widespread integrated safeguards.

**Compliance**

Mr Chairman, safeguards compliance provides the international community with assurance that the NPT’s integrity is being respected. We have already stated our
grave concerns that two parties to the NPT, Iraq and North Korea, have not respected the Treaty's provisions.

Once again, we urge the Iraqi regime to ensure that the country complies fully with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations and allows UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors to carry out the work with which they have been entrusted. Twice now, during this session of the Committee, we have heard the Iraqi delegation affirm that it is in full compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations. This is to miss the point. As the Director General's statement to the March Board of Governors of the IAEA made clear, the inspection of declared nuclear material subject to safeguards can be no substitute for the broader and more intensive Security Council mandated verification measures that are necessary for the Agency to provide the assurances sought by the Council. It is Iraqi non-compliance with the verification and monitoring provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707 that is the real issue, because it is quite possible that it masks non-compliance with Article II of the NPT. We urge Iraq to take the necessary action to comply fully with the Security Council.

Iraq has also twice reminded participants of its invitation to the British Prime Minister to visit any site where the development of WMD is suspected. I'm sure the absurdity of this point must be apparent to all. Mr Blair is a Prime Minister, not a trained IAEA inspector. It is trained inspectors, working for a body which enjoys the support of the international community, with a legal mandate underpinned by a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, to which Iraq should be giving unrestricted access, not the political leader of an individual NPT Party. Iraq's consistent efforts to obstruct
UN weapons inspectors between 1991 and 1998, and its repeated refusal since 1998 to allow in the IAEA Action Team belie their protestations of innocence.

We also repeat our call upon Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abide by all its obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework. We urge North Korea to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors to permit the earliest possible verification of the full extent of past nuclear activity.

**Physical Protection**

Mr Chairman, the UK takes very seriously the need to have in place high standards of physical protection, allied to effective systems of nuclear accountancy and control. We believe that it is a vital element of the non-proliferation regime – along with safeguards and export controls.

While the responsibility for physical protection systems within a State is a matter for the Government of that State, the UK is strongly supportive of international co-operation in this area. We have contributed to IAEA efforts to assist states, for example through our participation in International Physical Protection (IPPAS) missions and training courses and workshops. The UK is also committed to encouraging States to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to help to draft a well-defined amendment to the CPPNM in line with the May 2001 report from the Expert Group.

**Conclusion**
In conclusion, Mr Chairman, in our opening statement we said that we should embrace the opportunity offered by this Preparatory Committee to engage with one another on topics connected with the implementation of the NPT. By strengthening safeguards measures, encouraging co-operation in the area of physical protection and insisting on compliance with the Treaty we can make a major contribution to improving non-proliferation measures and thus to the implementation of the Treaty.

Thank you Mr Chairman.

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