Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for convening this session on the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes. The terrorist attacks last September forced a reappraisal of our security calculus and threat perceptions. It has also compelled a recognition of the threat posed by non-state actors. In particular, the attacks demonstrated that a relatively small group has the potential to inflict disproportionally high damage and high casualties.

This is especially salient in the realm of nuclear and radiological terrorism given the potentially catastrophic consequences of the release of these particular agents. The attacks have also compelled a re-evaluation of the threat of sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In sum, safety and security in peaceful nuclear programs have become critical.

There are a number of mutually-reinforcing ways to ensure the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programs. The first way is to strengthen measures to account for and secure nuclear and radiological agents in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport and to strengthen the measures applied to facilities which house these agents in order to protect against theft and sabotage.

Canada, for its part, has sought as a practical measure to maximize the safety and security of its nuclear facilities. For instance, new security measures at major facilities were required following September 11 and are still in effect, including: a capability for immediate armed response on site; enhanced security screening of employees and contractors; protection against forced vehicle penetration of Protected Areas; improved physical identification checks of personnel and searching of personnel and vehicles.

Other ways to better ensure safety and security include: strengthening nuclear and radiological export controls, strengthening border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological agents and related items, including installation of detection systems, and training of customs and law enforcement personnel in tracking these items. Such
measures would dovetail with the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and States Partiess' commitments under the NPT as reflected in paragraphs 33, 42 and 43 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Canada also welcomes the International Atomic Energy Agency's plan, "Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism" as a means to help member states to protect their nuclear assets. We believe that this program can lay the foundations for improved nuclear safety and security for the international community in the future.

In addition to these practical, programmatic measures, it is important to strengthen the existing legal framework of treaties and conventions whose aim is nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear or radiological terrorism. In this regard, Canada strongly supports and is actively engaged in the on-going discussions related to revising the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The amendments seek, *inter alia*, to expand the scope to cover nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and provisions relating to protection against sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

Finally, we note that the risk of a weak nuclear physical protection system in one country, in view of the terrorist threat, can have catastrophic consequences anywhere in the world. As a result, it is in all of our interests to maintain safe and secure peaceful nuclear programmes.

Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, the Canadian Delegation considers that this PrepCom, despite some initial difficulties, has initiated the review process on a sound footing. We have witnessed extensive, thoughtful statements, from both States Parties and NGOs, received a number of interesting Working and other Papers and had considerable discussion of key issues. The strengthened review process is thus off to a good start. In our deliberations, States Party have reaffirmed the value they attach to the NPT, as the world’s seminal non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaty. It has demonstrated the considerable efforts invested in implementing the Treaty, and reminded each of us of the importance to fulfil all the Treaty’s obligations. But it is also only the beginning of the review process. In our view, there are several ways in which we can carry forward our work and make the process even more effective. We would like to share some thoughts now, for reflection in the period until we next meet.

One issue of considerable interest and importance to Canada and a number of other countries is the role and involvement of NGOs. We have seen here their constructive role and contribution, offering views to States Parties in a session of the PrepCom, providing extensive and valuable literature and also organizing a variety of sessions and panels on the margins of our meeting, which my delegation has found interesting and valuable. The current arrangements, stemming from the enhanced review process and the 2000 Final Document, are sound, and can be built upon, looking ahead to the 2005 Review Conference. While States Party, of course, have the responsibility to implement the NPT, we can all profit from wider input, both nationally and in this setting. We will be reflecting on how to optimize NGOs’ participation and will develop some ideas for a Working Paper for the next PrepCom; we would welcome views.

We are also confident that the NGOs themselves are committed to this Treaty, and that they recognize that they do have a collective responsibility to work together to ensure, as they did with their statements last week, an effectively coordinated participation.

Mr. Chairman, it is indeed positive that there has been such wide engagement in our exchanges of views on a wide range of issues, in both the special time and the cluster sessions. Given the large numbers of States Parties desiring to intervene, in addition to international organizations, such as the IAEA and the CTBTO, and the NGO session - which also make important contributions to our deliberations - we may all want to strive next year for shorter general statements and interventions, in order to easily accommodate all within the time frames. As well, it would be desirable to have some opportunity for spontaneous exchanges and comments.

This first PrepCom benefited greatly from your wide consultations prior to its commencement, and we encourage the Chair of the next PrepCom to follow your lead, to enable good preparation by all delegations, as well as wide input into the Conference. The Indicative Timetable that was developed and which we are now following has proved its effectiveness, and provides a basis that will facilitate our work in the forthcoming meetings of the PrepComs.
In closing, Canada is pleased with the commitment to the strengthened review process that has been evident here, and we are looking forward to its continuation and evolution between now and the Review Conference.
Mr. Chairman:

In this first session of the Preparatory Committee we embark on the improved, strengthened review process of the NPT, according to which we are bound to consider principles and objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality.

The NPT is rightly regarded as the most successful multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament treaty in the world. It is for all of that a work in progress, as the review process attests. An important criterion by which the success of the Treaty is judged is that of compliance, a matter of essential concern, as we indicated in our statement.

The system of safeguards is the indispensable mechanism for assuring compliance with the non-proliferation canon of the Treaty. IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are fulfilling their obligations not to divert nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and, as noted in the Final Report of the 2000 Review Conference, they make a vital contribution to the environment for nuclear disarmament, peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There is however an important issue which we believe deserves urgent and ongoing attention: there remain 51 States Parties that have not yet concluded with the IAEA safeguards agreements in fulfillment with their obligations under the Treaty. We call upon these States to conclude such agreements, so as to demonstrate universal adherence to Article III of the Treaty.

An important and positive development in the field of verification has been the creation of the Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements. Approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997, the Additional Protocol provides the Agency with enhanced information about a State’s nuclear activities and greater access to locations.

Implemented together, the Additional Protocol and a comprehensive safeguards agreement qualitatively increase confidence regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. Canada welcomes this development and urges all non-nuclear weapons States that have not yet done so to conclude additional protocols, and to bring them into force as soon as possible.

Canada supports the effort of the IAEA to integrate safeguards measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol, as we believe it will instill greater efficiency in what will be a strengthened system of verification.
Mr. Chairman:

We believe that an effective system of export controls is a critical component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Control of exports of material relating to nuclear activities enables a State Party to conform to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty, in particular as embodied in Articles I, II, III, and IV. Export controls are necessary also in order for a State to comply with reporting obligations contained in the Additional Protocol. Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy demands a high degree of confidence in order that the norms of non-proliferation can be maintained. Properly structured and implemented, export controls foster such confidence, and thus facilitate international cooperation and technological development. In this context, Canada reaffirms its commitment that nothing in the NPT should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Accordingly, we continue to support the promotion of transparency of export controls in the framework of dialogue and cooperation among interested States Parties.

Mr. Chairman:

There has never been a better time than now for States Parties to give urgent consideration to the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. We urge all States that have not done so, to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We welcome the progress that has been made in negotiating measures to strengthen the Convention by inter alia widening its scope to include application to domestic nuclear activities covering use, storage and transport. We hope that the amendments to the Convention can be agreed this year.

Finally Mr. Chairman, we join with others in strongly endorsing the continuing efforts to establish regional nuclear weapon-free-zones that are internationally recognized, where the States of the region concerned can so agree. We welcome the efforts underway to establish such a zone in Central Asia, and we would support similar efforts in regions such as South Asia and the Middle East.

Thank you.