Statement
by
H.E Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira
Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil
to the United Nations in Geneva

General Debate

The First Session of the Preparatory Committee to
the 2005 Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairman,

Allow me, at the outset, to congratulate you, Ambassador Salander, on your election as Chairman of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is a satisfaction for my delegation to see a representative of Sweden - a country fully committed to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a New Agenda partner - presiding over this meeting. It is an auspicious start for the Preparatory Committee to have an experienced diplomat like you chairing its First Session. Rest assured of my delegation’s full support and cooperation.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation is fully aligned with the statement delivered by the distinguished Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak of Egypt on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa.

At the start of a new NPT cycle, I wish to recall the essence of the position of Brazil regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Brazil has been critical of the asymmetrical obligations under the NPT. During the seventies and eighties, we watched the nuclear-weapon States increasing, instead of reducing, their nuclear arsenals. Against the letter of the Treaty, specifically of Article VI, this attitude regarding nuclear disarmament was against the NPT’s essential and fundamental bargain. It has always been our conviction that, without a process of effective disarmament, the dangers of proliferation cannot be avoided.

The end of the Cold War brought about promising prospects for nuclear disarmament. The nuclear escalation began to be rolled back, and deep reductions in nuclear arsenals seemed possible. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference extended indefinitely the NPT as part of a set of decisions including the strengthening of the review process, principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the Resolution on the Middle East. In this context, after a comprehensive decision-making process, Brazil joined the NPT in 1998. As party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which dates as far back as 1967, Brazil was already bound to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. Together with Argentina, we had undertaken, as from the beginning of the eighties, a successful confidence-building process, which, in 1991, resulted in the bilateral Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials – the ABACC - and in a Quadripartite full-scope agreement between the two countries, the ABACC and the IAEA, in 1994. Our commitment to the use the nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes had been enshrined in our Constitution, in 1988.

We decided to adhere to the NPT to act more effectively in favor of nuclear disarmament, and to join other Parties in their efforts to correct its imbalances and to contribute to its universality and enhanced credibility.

The Brazilian Congress approved Brazil’s accession on the understanding that “in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty, effective measures will be taken with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, as stated in the Legislative Decree that approved our accession to the Treaty.
Mr. Chairman,

The 2000 Review Conference was a major development and the preparatory process of the 2005 NPT Conference will be a test for the willingness of States-Parties to live up to their commitments and to the expectations they have generated.

The unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals was a major outcome. The possession of nuclear weapons cannot be accepted as a differentiating element among States. The decision made by 182 States parties to the NPT to forgo the option of nuclear weapons as instruments of security cannot live with the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States. Slow progress in eliminating the nuclear weapons carries with it an implicit presumption of an indefinite status.

Mr. Chairman,

At the start of a new review cycle of the implementation of the Treaty, there are worrying signs of initiatives regrettably not conducive to the achievement of the objectives of the NPT and the complete implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The Conference on Disarmament is blocked. The need for a treaty banning the production of fissile material, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, does not fully find echo in the Conference. The CD is not dealing with nuclear disarmament either, as it should.

There seems to be no sense of urgency regarding the entry into force of the CTBT. While the process of installation of the International Monitoring System is well advanced, there are no concrete prospects for the entry into force of the Treaty and, consequently, of the corresponding legally binding commitment to ban nuclear tests. Non-nuclear weapon States, which are parties to the NPT, are already committed to this effect. This situation reproduces the imbalances already contained in the NPT. It goes against the idea behind a universal and comprehensive test ban treaty.

Tensions in South Asia and in the Middle East are a motive of great concern, all the more for involving States that are not parties to the NPT and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The accession of these States to the Treaty, as non-nuclear weapon States, is crucial. Any accommodation with a “de facto” nuclear status for those States will contradict the letter and spirit of the NPT.

The notification of withdrawal by one of the States Parties to the ABM Treaty might have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The development of a new generation of nuclear weapons is also a disturbing rumor. It appears to signal a new role for nuclear weapons. New rationales for the possession of nuclear weapons continue to be re-stated or reinforced.

The use of nuclear weapons, so it seems, is being re-rationalized.

Mr. Chairman,
The nuclear-weapon States should live up to their commitments and take immediate steps to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defense doctrines.

Multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the nuclear-weapons States to all non-nuclear-weapon States, under the NPT. Such an undertaking should take the form of an additional Protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon free zones.

Brazil welcomes the announcements regarding substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. The principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. The fundamental principle of verification should be applied to all disarmament measures. There should be no possibility of re-deploying nuclear weapons in current non-operational status, for this would render unreliable nuclear weapon reduction figures and statistics.

It is imperative for all States Parties to pursue the full implementation of the agreements achieved in 2000.

Issues relating to international security affect all countries and require universal responses, within a framework of collective responsibility. Given the need for stability and predictability, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation cannot abandon multilateralism and the treaty-based framework. Internationally negotiated multilateral treaties in the field of disarmament have made, and will continue to make, fundamental contributions to international peace and security. Any action that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is of concern to the entire international community.

Mr. Chairman,

With respect to the verification and non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, Brazil commends the outstanding work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in applying safeguards under Article III of the NPT. We support the strengthening of the safeguards system based on the comprehensive safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, voluntary safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon States Parties and limited-scope safeguards agreements with non-States Parties.

The traditional safeguards system, in place since 1972, has been very effective, except for two isolated cases. The IAEA’s safeguards have adequately fulfilled their purpose of verifying compliance with international agreements on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The political and strategic international context in which safeguards are implemented should not be overlooked, for nuclear verification does not stand in isolation. The strengthening of the safeguards system and the maintenance of a robust non-proliferation regime for all weapons of mass destruction is not sustainable without parallel positive development in the fields of arms control and disarmament.

Brazil attaches great importance to nuclear safety in all its aspects and acknowledges the important work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency in this field. We reiterate our support for the strengthening of the international regime that regulates the matter.
Mr. Chairman,

The 1995 Review Conference mandated the Preparatory Committee, in the framework of a strengthened review process, to make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference, as well as to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. The 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the provisions on the strengthened review process, agreed upon in 1995, and recommended the Preparatory Committee to allocate specific time to address specific relevant issues. The purposes of the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality. To this end, the 2000 Review Conference agreed that specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, should be considered. In this context, we highlight the importance of specific discussions on nuclear disarmament and on the “13 Steps on Nuclear Disarmament”, the 2000 Review Conference’s major product.

Mr. Chairman,

Brazil shares the concerns about the risks of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. The risk that terrorist organizations get hold of nuclear weapons and material is indeed a regrettable possibility that only reinforces the need to work towards the objective of nuclear disarmament. We must be careful that the discussion about the possibility of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups does not result in any implicit justification for the indefinite retention of those weapons by States.

The dangers of international terrorism only highlight the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. As underlined by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, when addressing the General Assembly last October, “in the fight against terrorism, we must strengthen the global norm against the use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which means, among others actions, redoubling efforts to ensure the universality, verification and full implementation of key treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction, including those outlawing chemical and biological weapons and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty”.

Limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not enough, for non-proliferation cannot be attained without nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are indissolubly linked and trying to advance only in non-proliferation is not feasible. Without a process of effective disarmament, the dangers of non-proliferation cannot be avoided. Effective measures must be taken with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, at an early date.

If mutual cooperation prevails over mutual suspicion, and if States-Parties demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and a sense of responsibility, the new review cycle now starting will confirm the credibility and vitality of the NPT.

Thank you.
STATEMENT BY BRAZIL - PREPCOM I OF THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE- SPECIAL TIME ON SAFETY AND SECURITY OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Brazil attaches great importance to the work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency with respect to nuclear safety and security, and strongly supports the initiatives undertaken with a view to strengthening the international regime on the matter.

Brazil is party to the major IAEA conventions in the field of nuclear safety and security, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, the Convention on the Notification of Nuclear Accidents, and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, among others. Brazil has also signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which is currently being examined by our National Congress. Brazil has supported work on the strengthening of the Convention on Physical Protection since the very beginning of discussions on the issue at the IAEA.

Specifically with respect to nuclear safety, Brazil believes a strong safety culture is a key element in promoting public acceptance of atomic energy and in allaying many concerns that are associated with it. Brazil welcomes the progress achieved by the IAEA in shifting the emphasis from the development of safety standards to the application of these standards through the rendering of services and the implementation of technical cooperation activities in aspects of nuclear safety that correspond to the priorities defined by recipient Member States. Brazil has also been very supportive of the strengthening of the international regime governing the safe transport of radioactive materials.

Though many of the initiatives relating to nuclear safety and security precede the tragic events of 11 September 2001, we understand they have gained a greater significance in the light of our heightened sense of the dangers of nuclear terrorism. Brazil is committed to the endeavours undertaken by the international community in seeking to combat terrorism. If our efforts to combat terrorism are to be truly effective, however, measures related to ensuring nuclear safety and security should be complemented by concrete disarmament measures on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. Only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals will definitively relieve humanity of the fear that terrorist organizations may one day get hold of nuclear weapons.

Brazil is of the view that, in undertaking work through the IAEA on strengthening nuclear safety and security, our States should continue to be guided by a few fundamental principles:

1) the notion that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and security rests with Member States themselves and that the IAEA’s role in these areas is to assist Member States; and that

2) the strengthening of measures relating to nuclear safety and security should not in any way interfere with the priorities of the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Program, which are traditionally established by recipient States.