Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished delegates,

At the outset, let me extend my heartfelt congratulations to you, Ambassador Henrik Salander, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this very important Preparatory Committee of the NPT. I am fully confident that this session of the Committee will be most fruitful under your superb leadership and well-known diplomatic skills. I assure you that the delegation of Japan will fully support you throughout the session.

I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala, and the members of his department, for the professional assistance and support they have provided to this Preparatory Committee as its secretariat.
(I. International Security Environment)

Mr. Chairman,

More than ten years have passed since the Cold War ended. The relations among the major nuclear-weapon States are now showing signs of improvement that will benefit the international community as a whole. This is a very encouraging trend, which, as it continues, will greatly strengthen international security. Although nuclear weapons still exist in large numbers and there is little prospect of their elimination in the near future, the most acute threat to international peace and security is no longer the possibility of the major nuclear powers launching strikes at each other.

In this post-Cold-War era, the international community has been confronting a variety of other threats, however. Regional conflicts continue to cause massive carnage and suffering in many parts of the world. The attacks on the eleventh of September in the United States have shown that terrorism is a clear and present danger. Most significantly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is drastically changing the global security landscape, rendering regional conflicts and terrorism ever more dangerous.

Preventing and curbing the proliferation of WMD is thus a matter of great urgency. This goal should be pursued through multi-layered and mutually complementary efforts, encompassing unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches. However, I would like to emphasize, among other things, the importance of the multilateral regimes which address the problems of WMD proliferation and disarmament. The NPT, the main pillar of these regimes, should be further strengthened.
(2. The Role of the NPT and the Preparatory Committee)

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT is a treaty on both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It has been greatly reinforced with the achievement of the near-universality of its regime, with the 1995 decision on its indefinite extension, and with the introduction of the strengthened IAEA safeguards system, including the additional protocols.

Nonetheless, the proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to be a serious concern. Some non-member States are developing nuclear weapons, and there are also unresolved problems related to non-compliance with the Treaty. In addition, the threat of nuclear terrorism is growing greater. The NPT States parties need to address these problems.

The NPT obligates the nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is one of its primary objectives. In order to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, it is therefore imperative for States parties, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to reduce their dependence on nuclear weapons in their security policies with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons. Japan, as the only country to have experienced the horrific destruction of nuclear bombs, is in a unique position to promote nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, the Preparatory Committee should be guided by the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives" and the Final Document of the 2000 Conference. All States parties should recall the importance of the commitments made in these documents to further strengthening the credibility of the NPT.

States parties must work together in a spirit of solidarity from this initial phase of the review process while avoiding unnecessary confrontation and isolation of certain States. Japan organized a workshop in late February in Tokyo to facilitate the work of the Preparatory
Committee in this session. I hope that the preliminary but very substantive exchanges of views that took place in the workshop will be of use for the constructive discussions I expect we shall have here in the Preparatory Committee.

(3. Universality)

Mr. Chairman,

As of today, 187 countries are party to the NPT, but four countries remain non-member States. The fact that Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan have not acceded to the NPT constitutes a grave problem that challenges the Treaty’s regime. The States parties should urge those States which have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay.

(4. Compliance)

Any non-compliance situation must be redressed. The problems of Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), mentioned in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, remain matters of serious concern to the international community. Japan stresses that a situation of compliance by the DPRK should be ensured at an early stage and that any suspicion of non-compliance by this party should be completely resolved. Japan also urges Iraq to accept UN and IAEA verification in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Redressing non-compliance is an extremely difficult challenge facing the States parties to the NPT. What are the procedures States parties can follow if a suspicion arises as to a State’s compliance? What if a State that is accused of non-compliance denies the accusation and refuses to cooperate with the IAEA in its verification activities? What should the States parties do if a State about which there is concern announces its intention of withdrawing from the NPT? States parties need to address all these questions in order to ensure compliance.
In this regard, the IAEA safeguards system plays an essential and indispensable role in the prevention and detection of non-compliance, including undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Especially at this juncture, it is important to promote the conclusion of the additional protocols by all States. For this purpose, Japan organized the Tokyo Conference in June last year in accordance with the plan of action referred to in the 2000 Final Document and adopted at the IAEA General Conference. Japan also extended a financial contribution and sent experts to a number of similar regional conferences. Based on their outcomes, Japan is now planning, in cooperation with the IAEA, to hold a global-scale meeting this autumn.

(5. Nuclear Disarmament)

Mr. Chairman,

States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, are expected to faithfully strive to make progress in nuclear disarmament. Since the 2000 Conference, however, there has been little tangible progress with respect to the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives" and "the thirteen steps" in the 2000 Final Document, although Russia and the United States have announced their intention of reducing the nuclear warheads and have been engaged in negotiations to that end. It is critically important that significant progress in nuclear disarmament be made between now and 2005 in order to strengthen the NPT. At the UN General Assembly of last year, Japan submitted a resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons." The adoption of this resolution with overwhelming support clearly showed the world that the entire international community is as earnest as it has ever been in its desire for nuclear disarmament.

In the twelfth of "the thirteen steps," States parties are requested to submit regular reports on their implementation of Article VI. Japan will submit its report at this session of the Preparatory Committee, and looks forward to all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, putting forward reports on their efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and measures they intend to take in the future.
With regard to nuclear disarmament, I would like to touch upon the following specific issues.

First, it is encouraging that both Russia and the United States announced that they intend to reduce their nuclear arsenals and have been engaged in serious negotiations to achieve this goal. This is a positive step by the two major nuclear-weapon States. Japan strongly hopes that the successful conclusion of an agreement will bring about truly meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons.

Second, other nuclear-weapon States must also make good on their commitment to nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we once again welcome the unilateral nuclear disarmament measures taken by France and the United Kingdom before the 2000 Conference. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to further reduce their nuclear arsenals and oppose their build-up.

Third, I would like to stress that the CTBT will not only contribute to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also to constraining qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, like the IAEA safeguards, is one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and a realistic and concrete measure that contributes to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is truly regrettable that the CTBT has not yet come into force more than five years after its adoption in 1996. This lack of progress is making the future of nuclear disarmament less certain. Early entry into force of the CTBT should be achieved. We would like to take this opportunity to urge those States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. Also, efforts to establish the monitoring system of the CTBT should be continued. And, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the moratoria on nuclear test explosions should continue to be observed by all states concerned.

Fourth, the Conference on Disarmament must resolve the deadlock on its program of work. It is extremely disappointing that the CD has neither commenced negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons nor established an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. I firmly believe that it is high time for CD member States to overcome differences relating to mandates and resume their substantive work toward the
common objective of strengthening international security through the multilateral disarmament regime. Japan fully supports the so-called Amorim formula, which, I believe, will not at all jeopardize the national security of any member State of the CD.

Fifth, the nuclear-weapon States are requested to enhance transparency with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and their implementation of Article VI. It is also important for these States to place their so-called surplus fissile material under the IAEA safeguards system or some other international verification system.

Last but not least, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons should be kept as high as possible. In this vein, we believe that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of use of nuclear weapons.

(6. Nuclear Terrorism)

Mr. Chairman,

The devastating terrorist attacks of the eleventh of September not only shocked the international community but also made it acutely aware of the ever-present danger of nuclear and radiological terrorism among other things. In order to prevent such terrorism, the international community should cooperate to take a wide range of measures including international exchange of information and surveillance on terrorists. Export controls under the NSG, border controls, a strict accounting and control system for nuclear materials, and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities are equally important issues to be considered. The nuclear-weapon States, in particular, are requested to place their nuclear weapons, nuclear material, related technology and equipment under strict controls.

The additional protocols can play a significant role in aiding the detection of undeclared activities and preventing such sensitive materials from falling into the wrong hands because it provides for the most stringent controls over nuclear materials, and mechanisms for reporting
on the export and import of nuclear equipments. Conclusion of the additional protocols should therefore be promoted for the contribution it would make to anti-terrorism efforts.

Thus, the IAEA has an extremely important role to play in the combat against terrorism. In order to facilitate that role, Japan announced in March to contribute $500,000 urgently to the Agency and would like to call upon other member States of the Agency also to make contributions.

(7. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones)

Mr. Chairman,

Japan strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. It has been supporting efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish such a zone in their region by, for example, twice hosting conferences in Sapporo addressing this issue. The region is becoming even more vital in the light of the current situation and recent acts of terrorism. Japan is ready to extend further cooperation and assistance to the efforts of these countries, if they wish it to do so. Also mindful of Mongolia's aspiration toward consolidating its nuclear-weapon-free status, Japan has been supporting the UN General Assembly resolutions on this subject. Japan also hosted the UN-sponsored non-governmental expert group meeting last year.

(8. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy)

Japan views the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as vital not only to securing a stable energy supply, but also to preserving the global environment. States parties therefore should reaffirm that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting their right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan continues its research and development efforts relating to the use of plutonium for fast reactors and light-water reactors in order to develop a nuclear fuel cycle
while fully complying with the IAEA safeguards agreement, including its Additional Protocol.

Japan is strongly conscious of the importance of safety with regard to nuclear activities and facilities. We expect that the Second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety will enhance the safety of nuclear material and equipment globally. In this regard, Japan recognizes the important role of the IAEA and will continue to make its contributions to the activities of the IAEA, in particular, to strengthen the global safety regime and to assist member States to establish training programs.

(9. Education on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation)

I would also like to address the timely topic of education on disarmament and non-proliferation. This initiative is very important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. Japan looks forward to receiving a useful report from the UN Group of Governmental Experts on this subject. Regional disarmament conferences and seminars such as the UN Disarmament Conferences held annually in Japan are very useful in raising the awareness of experts and public on this issue. Japan commends the strenuous efforts to that end made by the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the UN Secretariat.

(10. Procedural Matters before this Session)

Mr. Chairman,

Lastly, I would like to briefly touch upon procedural matters before this Preparatory Committee. My delegation looks forward to a very candid exchange of views during this meeting on the current state of affairs regarding the implementation of the NPT. We also understand that in accordance with the conclusion of the 2000 Conference, a consensus recommendation to the Review Conference will be negotiated at the third and, as appropriate, fourth sessions of the Preparatory Committee. We believe therefore that you, Mr. Chairman, are invited to provide us with a factual summary of the discussions that will take place over the coming two weeks. And
we have the full confidence that the Chair's summary will command the broad support of States parties.

Thank you.