STATEMENT

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FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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Mr. Chairman,

It gives me great pleasure at the outset to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of the First Preparatory Committee of the Seventh Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation treaty for the year 2005. I am quite confident that, with your diplomatic skills and wide experience in international affairs, you will conduct the deliberations of the Conference in such a manner that will realize the supreme interests of the states parties to the Treaty.

It is my pleasure also to express on behalf of my delegation our thanks to the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs as well as the members of the Secretariat, who spared no effort to prepare well for the Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

After thirty two years, since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, after six conferences held since 1970, to review and evaluate the implementation of the Treaty, and after the cold war has come to an end, which had been one of the main obstacles to the implementation of the Treaty, in letter and spirit. After all this, we must pause to reflect on the objectives with what has been achieved in practice, in order to highlight the goals that, until now, have been impossible to achieve; to deal with the causes that prevented their achievement and to make our best efforts to overcome such causes; and to work anew for the realization of the noble goals that the Treaty has sought to realize. We must also emphasize the important role which the Treaty has played, in the past years since it came into force, in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in the renunciation of the production and development of such weapons.

The Treaty has succeeded in associating the question of nuclear proliferation with an increase of the probabilities and dangers of an outbreak of a nuclear war in addition to drawing attention to the dangers of regional nuclear arms race. On the other hand, the Treaty has provided the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a legal authority and legitimate terms of reference to carry out the tasks with which it has been entrusted.

Mr. Chairman,

We now ask what happened during the thirty two years since the Treaty entered into force, and why have we not been able to achieve complete nuclear disarmament in implementation of the letter and spirit of Article VI of the Treaty? Why has it been impossible to achieve a less ambitious goal than
complete nuclear disarmament: a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, which we had hoped to help achieve part of the ultimate goal. Will it be possible in the future to achieve the ultimate goal - complete nuclear disarmament – following the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and another on cut-off of fissile material usable for the production of nuclear weapons? And how long should we wait to realize these goals?

Mr. Chairman,

Article VI of the Treaty, in letter and spirit, is quite clear in its aims and the obligations it imposes on nuclear states concerning three things: the cessation of nuclear arms race; nuclear disarmament; and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Part I, the cessation of nuclear arms race, has been achieved between the two superpowers following the end of the cold war, but it has not been achieved at the unilateral level. On the second obligation under this article, nuclear disarmament, in spite of the progress achieved at the bilateral level between the super powers, especially after the end of the cold war, we are still very far from the general and complete nuclear disarmament called for by Article VI. The situation is probably worse for the third obligation: general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

Perhaps the insurmountable obstacle that hinders the ideal implementation of the Treaty, in letter and spirit, consists, more prominently, of the refusal of certain states which possess nuclear capabilities to accede to the Treaty. This, undoubtedly, reduces the efficacy of the Treaty and the commitment of the states parties to full implementation of its provisions. If we look at the situation in the Middle East, we find full support for this statement. Israel has consistently refused throughout the past thirty two years to accede to the Treaty in spite of the fact that peace efforts, including the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Madrid Conference and its aftermath, has succeeded in laying the foundations for peace in the region, which has so far produced the Palestinian-Israeli Agreement and the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The accession by Israel to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA would help achieve a few positive results at the regional level as follows:
The implementation of IAEA’s safety measures on Israeli nuclear facilities would prevent the occurrence of such nuclear incidents with disastrous effects on the region in general and Jordan in particular. These facilities are located at a short distance from the Jordanian urban centers.

Israel’s accession to the NPT would facilitate and accelerate the negotiating process within the framework of Arms Control and Regional Security Group.

Israel’s accession to the Treaty would advance a tangible progress on other bilateral tracks of the peace process as well as enhance confidence-building between all parties and push forward the peace process in general.

Israel’s accession to the treaty would mitigate regional arms race and release huge financial resources spent on armaments and redirect them into economic and social development.

Finally, Israel’s accession to the Treaty would encourage other states non-parties to accede to it, a fact which would reflect positively on the universality of the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

Israel’s intransigence and reluctance, against the will of the international community, to accede to the NPT, should impede confidence-building and deepen psychological barriers among states and peoples in the region and thus abort progress so far achieved on the on-going peace process. It will also waste international efforts in this regard, a fact that should jeopardize the fate of the whole region. Jordan views it impossible to convince the peoples in the region of Israel’s credibility, seriousness and desire for just, durable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East if it continued to refrain from acceding to the NPT and placing its nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

Mr. Chairman,

The Jordanian-Israeli Treaty, in its Article IV calls for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction, conventional and unconventional. Israel’s accession to the NPT would thus be compatible with the Jordanian-Israeli Treaty and undoubtedly pave the way towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone, and perhaps a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the region. It is worth noting that the General Assembly has adopted in the last twenty eight years, twenty eight resolutions, all of which call for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. These resolutions have been marking time, non-implemented until now.
Security assurances given to the non-nuclear weapon states by way of compensation for their accession to the Treaty and the renunciation of the nuclear option, which assurances were embodied in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), and Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as in individual declarations by certain nuclear weapons, are not at all sufficient to provide security and reassurance to non-nuclear-weapon states. What is required is legally binding comprehensive, effective and unconditional security assurances, both positive and negative.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation, while re-affirming the utmost importance of the Treaty’s continuing to play its vital role in the international arena, also reaffirms the necessity for the nuclear-weapon states too do the following in fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty, in letter and spirit:

1. Intensify their efforts to achieve a general and complete nuclear disarmament in conformity with Article VI of the Treaty. In order to achieve this goal, current efforts must be intensified to conclude a Comprehensive Test-Ban treaty (CTBT) and proceed from there to negotiate and conclude a treaty banning the production of fissile material.

2. Make additional efforts to provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear states, especially developing countries, at a reasonable cost, in conformity with Article IV of the Treaty.

3. Work anew, collectively and through the Security Council to provide legally-binding comprehensive and effective security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon states, clearly and unequivocally.

4. Use their best efforts and diligence to secure the universality of the Treaty, exercising utmost pressure on states with nuclear capability which are still outside the framework of the Treaty, like Israel, in order to secure increasing effectiveness of the Treaty and put a definite end to the nuclear arms race at the regional level.

5. Enhance the role of the Security Council in the observation of the implementation of the Treat and the promotion of its universality in an equitable manner free from double standards.

6. Support the role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency, enhance its system of guarantees and increase its human and financial resources to make this role more effective.

7. Encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world and cooperate seriously, to that end with interested states in the various regions; and give priority to the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East, to avoid the various dangers to the continuation of the peace process in the region posed by the presence of nuclear weapons, and to consolidate regional stability and security.

Jordan’s position, Mr. Chairman, is motivated by its commitment to achieving peace consolidating stability and security in the Middle East and the world at large. If the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a main pillar of the international non-proliferation regime, it will be necessary, for the strengthening of the Treaty, enhancement of its vital role, and ensuring its universality to review the Treaty from time to time, make constructive criticism thereof in the interest of the lofty goals of the international community and in order to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons and from all weapons of mass destruction; a world in which the relations between states are based on cooperation rather than conflict; a world which directs all its resources to economic and social development and towards increased welfare for all mankind, in conformity with the constructive spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.