

Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the Mexican delegation I would like to congratulate you on your election to preside over the work of the Preparatory Committee and at the same time I would like to offer you all our support in what we know is a concern shared by our countries, that the review process of the NPT strengthens compliance of its provisions and advances towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and towards a better and safer world for all.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation supports completely the statement made by the delegation of Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda members.

This session of the Prepcom initiates a new cycle in the life of the NPT, characterized – in a positive sense – by the unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to take action on a set of practical steps to make progress towards nuclear disarmament, as provided for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The imperative to strengthen even further the non-proliferation regime and the international controls and safeguards that are applied to nuclear materials and technologies to prevent their use for criminal and/or terrorist purposes, also conveys a sense of urgency to the work we initiate.

It is a priority for Mexico for to achieve, in a real and effective manner, compliance of each and every one of the provisions contained in the Treaty and of the commitments that have been contained in the decisions and resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as well as in the Final Document adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
Mexico is convinced that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime established by the NPT is that all States Parties comply with its provisions. We have stated this on several occasions. For Mexico, the Treaty is not an end in itself, but a means to advance towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

In 1995, the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty was taken under the principle of "permanence with accountability". Accountability, irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament measures and transparency were the criteria established by the Parties of the Treaty to evaluate its operation.

There are preoccupying signs of the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and emerging approaches for ongoing justification of a future role of nuclear weapons as part of new strategies of security. These signs deteriorate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The negative or reticence of Nuclear Weapon States to be held accountable on the degree of compliance of their commitments and obligations as Parties to the NPT, increases the certainty that some States pretend to possess their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, weakens the international regime of non-proliferation and subtracts feasibility to the universality of the Treaty.

Undoubtedly, it is a sort of disappointment that the steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have not been implemented.

The calls to establish an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament and an ad hoc committee on fissile material are left aside persistently.

Recent announcements strengthen our conviction that an international legally binding instrument should be negotiated on negative security assurances against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons among States Parties to the NPT. The Nuclear Weapon States should also assume a legally binding commitment on non-first use of such weapons.

The Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) must enter into force at the earliest, and in the meantime, moratoria on all nuclear test explosions must be observed. It is imperative to strictly respect the purposes, objectives and provisions of the CTBT. We must not overlook that, being the entry into force of the CTBT an agreement reached under the umbrella of the review process of the NPT, the continued refusal to ratify it has a negative impact on the whole structure of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We consider the non-observance of past commitments, within the review process of the NPT, an additional form of non-compliance.
We must also promote the signature and ratification of the strengthened safeguards agreements of the States Parties to the Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a way to expand and strengthen the role the IAEA plays in the control of nuclear activities of States, and to increase the international confidence on the verification regime.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation believes that the Prepcom must consider the reports presented by the Parties on the application of article VI of the NPT and on the Middle East resolution of 1995. As has been expressed by the New Agenda members, these reports should cover the measures contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and include specific and concrete information on each one of them.

We wish to underline that, although all States Parties have been invited to inform it is the special responsibility of the Nuclear Weapon States to fully report on the steps taken towards reduction of their nuclear arsenals and their achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verification.

Mexico hopes we are able to go beyond expressions of good intentions into quantitative and qualitative advancements in nuclear disarmament that are objective and measurable.

Mr. Chairman,

The efforts that the States Parties carry out to strengthen the international regime established by the Treaty, must be enriched with the contributions of the non-governmental organizations and representatives of civil society. We are pleased that in this session of the Prepcom a meeting has been allocated to the presentations by ngo's. We are sure that their proposals and inputs will nourish our exchange of views on substantive issues.

I would also like to make reference to the importance that the government of Mexico gives to educational activities on disarmament and non-proliferation. We hope that the report which will be presented by the Group of Experts in this field at the 57th session of the General Assembly, includes recommendations that allows the governments and all sectors of society, to raise the level of awareness around the world on nuclear dangers, and ultimately, on the importance of strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation fully appreciates and supports your efforts to come to an agreement on the "indicative timetable" of this session. We support as well that you prepare a Chairman's document that serves to advance the identification of main elements and positions of our substantive debates, and as a basis for future deliberations.