Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, I would like to join the preceding colleagues in extending to you the warmest congratulations on your well-deserved election and to pledge my delegation's full support and cooperation. We are confident, like many others, that your diplomatic skill, experience in the field of disarmament and your dedication will bring this PrepCom Session's work to a successful conclusion. Our felicitations also go to the other members of the bureau on their election.

My delegation fully associates itself with the statement made yesterday morning by the distinguished Ambassador Makmur Widodo on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on the pressing issues of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the outcome of subsequent Review Conferences. In addition, I would like to make the following brief comments.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation fully subscribes to the consensus conclusion made by the 2000 NPT Review Conference that "the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Furthermore, the world leaders have also underlined their determination in the 2000 Millennium Declaration to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. In spite
of display of such a political will of the world community, my delegation shares the concern that no meaningful progress has been made towards realization of the commitments undertaken. Moreover, military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States still place emphasis on nuclear weapons in their defense and security policy. In this context, my delegation wishes to underline the need for providing by Nuclear-Weapon States of legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear States - Parties to the NPT.

NPT is the only international legal instrument that curbs proliferation of nuclear weapons and seeks to achieve the ultimate goal of their elimination. That is why strengthened review process of the NPT is vitally important for achieving the goals and objectives reflected therein. We believe that further concrete measures need to be taken to implement the 13 steps identified by the 2000 Review Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

Mongolia, like many others, believes that full universality of the NPT needs to be ensured. My delegation, therefore, joins others in urging the remaining 4 countries to accede to the Treaty. Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is of paramount importance for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. With this in mind, the States that have not yet done so, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, should ratify it as soon as possible and, pending its entry into force, uphold the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Also, earnest efforts need to be made at the Conference on Disarmament to proceed to negotiations on an early conclusion of a universal and verifiable Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

This first session of the PrepCom is being held in disquieting international circumstances, when international peace and security are being threatened by terrorist attacks of unprecedented magnitude. The tragic events of September 11 have highlighted the crucial importance of international community’s struggle for promoting international peace and security by reducing and eliminating weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear.

The tragedy of September 11 was a serious signal of the increasing danger of possible threat or use by non-State actors of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is important to promote closer international cooperation to upgrade the physical protection of nuclear material, combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources, and enhance protection of nuclear facilities against acts of terrorism. In this regard, the IAEA safeguards, export controls, and enhanced physical protection are crucial to prevent illegal acquisition or misuse of nuclear material by States or non-state actors.
Mr. Chairman,

Mongolia believes that, in the absence of the ABM Treaty, which for several decades served as a cornerstone of global strategic stability, a realistic and balanced alternative solution should be found in the interest of promoting international peace and security. In this context, Mongolia welcomes the commitment of the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 in coming years within a framework of a legally binding agreement.

Mr. Chairman,

Establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones are important for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. That is why the 2000 Review Conference encouraged the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East. In this connection Mongolia reiterates its deepest concern at the serious deterioration of the situation there and at continued failure to comply with Security Council resolutions 1397, 1402 and 1403 (2002). There can be no military solution to the problem. Mongolia believes that just and lasting solution could only be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) that could eventually lead to co-existence of the State of Israel and Palestine within secure and recognized borders.

At present, my country is working to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status at the international level. In this regard, I would like to refer to the document PC.112 distributed yesterday at the beginning of our session. I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation’s gratitude to DDA, especially to its Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and Japan, for organizing in September 2001 in Sapporo a meeting of independent experts of the P5, Mongolia and UN to discuss ways and means of strengthening Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. As a result, experts adopted the Sapporo Report containing concrete recommendations, including possible elaboration of a legal instrument or instruments between the States concerned in that regard.

Mongolia believes that the efforts of the international community to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons are greatly assisted by the IAEA work on promoting the global nuclear safety regime through Safeguards Agreements and their Additional Protocols. With this in mind, Mongolia has signed in September 2001 the Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to underline once again the importance that Mongolia attaches to this first session and to express my delegation’s readiness to work with you and other delegations in bringing our work to a successful conclusion.

Thank you.