GENERAL STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR TASSOS KRIEKOUKIS
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GREECE
ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

GENEVA, 28 APRIL 2003

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EU STATEMENT AT THE 2nd PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
OF THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

(GENEVA, 28 APRIL - 9 MAY 2003)

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Mr Chairman,

I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union. The Acceding Countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the Associated Countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and the EFTA countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this statement.

1. The EU regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The EU reiterates its support for the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and welcomes the consideration of relevant issues both in 2002, and in this, the second session of the Preparatory Committee.

2. There have been many developments in the international community concerning adherence to the NPT since the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2002. Some of these have been positive. Others have not. The NPT can only fulfil its role, if we are confident of the compliance of State Parties to the Treaty. We have seen the DPRK admitting to programmes, which draw into serious question their compliance with its obligations under the NPT. There are concerns about the nuclear programmes of a number of other countries. These relate in particular to the civilian nuclear programmes, which might be misused for military ends. The EU is committed to ensuring that compliance mechanisms under the IAEA are properly funded, robust and able to detect breaches of the provisions of the Treaty and the Safeguards Agreements, which underpin it.

3. The EU Member States deplore the announcement of the DPRK of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The EU continues to urge the DPRK to reconsider its course of action. We believe that the DPRK should fulfil its commitments under the NPT, retract its announcement to withdraw from the NPT and readmit IAEA inspectors. Any clandestine nuclear weapons programme should be dismantled immediately in a verifiable manner. The EU restates its firm resolve to contribute to the search for a peaceful solution, through negotiations, to the DPRK nuclear issue and welcomes the dialogue which has been initiated in Beijing.

4. In the 1990s, the international community discovered the existence of a significant nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, built in violation of its commitments under the NPT. In fulfilling its disarmament and verification task based on UNSC Resolution 687 and related resolutions, the IAEA, until December 1998, was able to obtain a coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme and dismantled what was known of that programme. So far, the IAEA has found no evidence that Iraq had relaunched a nuclear programme. Inspections need to be completed in order to resolve the remaining questions.

5. Recent challenges to the Treaty and to the non-proliferation regime have emphasised the necessity of full compliance and the need to actively work towards universal adherence. The EU will continue its efforts to maintain the authority and the integrity of the NPT. The EU is open to reinforce the efficiency of the regime, as well as instruments and procedures to react to cases of non-compliance.
6. The IAEA's international safeguards system is an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this respect the EU recognises the need for a properly funded and cost-efficient safeguards system and is prepared to consider increasing the IAEA safeguards budget whenever such requirements can be demonstrated. The universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, and additional protocols to them, is a pre-requisite to an effective and credible safeguards system. In particular, the measures contained in an Additional Protocol are crucial to strengthening the Agency's ability to detect possible undeclared nuclear material and activities and provide assurance about the absence of such activities. We regret that the number of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols actually in force continues to be well below expectations. We also express regret that 47 states have yet to fulfill their obligations under the NPT to bring Safeguards Agreements with the Agency into force, and that Additional Protocols have entered into force for only 32 States. All EU Member States have signed Additional Protocols and have either ratified them or are in the process of doing so - and we hope that the EU protocols will be in force by the end of the year. The EU therefore joins with others in urging States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force their respective Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols to them.

7. We welcome the conclusion of the Moscow treaty between the Russian Federation and the USA on strategic offensive reductions till 2012. It is an important step in the context of international security and a contribution to the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the principles of irreversibility and transparency remain important.

8. The EU Member States continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of, and universal compliance with the NPT. In this regard we welcome Cuba's accession to the NPT and its ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and we also welcome Timor Lorosae's internal steps towards the accession to the NPT. This brings us closer to universality. However, there are three countries, India, Israel and Pakistan, whom we continue to call on to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

9. We underline the importance of international co-operation for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction of which the G8 Global Partnership, the EU Co-operation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation as well as other bilateral initiatives, are the most significant expressions. Many of the realised and envisaged projects deal with the elimination of nuclear weapons and the disposal of nuclear fissile material. Such co-operation has therefore become an effective tool of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

10. The EU observes with genuine concern the situation in South Asia. We call upon India and Pakistan to meet all requirements set out in UNSC Resolution 1172. We note the declared moratorium by both countries on nuclear testing and their willingness to participate in the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We expect that they will take and apply all necessary measures towards fulfilling their aforementioned promises.

11. As to the resolutions on Middle East adopted by the UNSC and the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the EU remains committed to their full implementation and calls upon all states in the region that have not yet done so, to accede to the biological and chemical weapons conventions and to the NPT. The EU calls upon the states of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as of other weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that the accession of all states in the area to the IAEA's comprehensive Safeguards system and the Additional Protocol should be a priority for the international community as a whole and would represent a crucial contribution to an overall improvement for the security and confidence in the Middle East. Israel's accession to the NPT, and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA is of great importance to the EU as it would contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

Mr Chairman,

12. We all know that there are three pillars to the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses. In particular, non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing. The EU will continue to encourage the progress made towards systematic and progressive efforts towards disarmament, and we remain fully committed to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT and of the 1995 decisions and the 2000 Final Document. We call upon all State Parties to implement these as well. The EU would like to highlight the following areas in this regard.

13. 166 states have now signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, of which 98 have ratified. The EU, as stated on numerous previous occasions, attaches the utmost importance to the entering into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date. We call upon all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so without delay and unconditionally, in particular the 13 states whose ratification is required for entry into force. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the EU urges all states to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions, which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The EU looks forward to participating in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, to be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 3-5 September 2003 in Vienna and commends the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO. In particular we welcome the role of Finland, an EU Member State, as co-ordinator of that meeting.

14. The EU deeply regrets that the Conference on Disarmament persistently remains unproductive, for almost seven years. A solution has to be found to begin the negotiations on a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable legally binding instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU considers that such an instrument would make an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The immediate commencement of the FMCT negotiation constitutes an essential step. Until a cut-off treaty enters into force, all states are urged to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material destined for nuclear weapons. The EU welcomes the actions of those of the five nuclear weapon states that have such a moratorium in place.

15. For the first time in the NPT process, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was included in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Reductions in these weapons are an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. We look forward to the fulfilment of the US and Russian 1990-1991 presidential declarations on unilateral reductions of their holdings of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as of the commitments made by relevant states at the 2000 Review Conference and last year's Preparatory Committee. We encourage all states concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest reductions of these weapons.
16. The EU is convinced that the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures, contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability. Transparency by all NPT Parties in fulfilling all their treaty obligations and respective commitments in the NPT 2000 Final Document, further contributes towards international stability and progress in disarmament.

17. The EU recognises the continuing value of the existing security assurances as provided through the protocols of the nuclear weapons free zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear weapon states, noted by UNSC Resolution 984/1995 and reaffirmed at the sixth NPT Review Conference, as confidence building measures towards non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Legally-binding security assurances strengthen the NPT regime. The EU supports the call in the 2000 Final Document for the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on this issue to the 2005 Review Conference.

18. The EU acknowledges the importance of nuclear-weapons-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. They enhance global and regional peace and security, urgently needed as the present political environment indicates. The EU also underlines the importance of the concept of zones free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and others, and their means of delivery, as envisaged in UNSC Resolution 987 for the Middle East. We therefore welcome and support the signature and ratification by the nuclear weapons states of the relevant protocols of nuclear weapons free zones following the completion of the necessary consultations.

19. In accordance with Article IV of the NPT and Article II of the IAEA's Statute, the EU reaffirms the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes, without discrimination in complete conformity with Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty. In this context it must be made absolutely clear that a possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes has to be effectively excluded. As effective verification is a prerequisite for peaceful uses it is of utmost importance that all states parties to the Treaty subscribe to full transparency and the full range of verification instruments as offered in particular by the IAEA. This includes an early information on nuclear programmes by all states as foreseen by the IAEA Board of Governors decision of 1993 and the signing of the Additional Protocol. We fully support the activities of the IAEA to this end and strongly encourage the Director General of the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues with Iran.

Mr Chairman,

20. The EU continues to attribute great importance to the fight against terrorism and strongly supports all measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. We therefore supported and welcome the inclusion of an anti-terrorist clause in each of the export control regimes. The EU also supports the principles adopted by the G8 at the Kananaskis summit in 2002 to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.

21. The EU hopes that this session of the Preparatory Committee will allow states to work closely together to further strengthen and support the Treaty at a time when it is truly at the centre of
the world's attention. There are few more important issues facing us all today than the shared fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The EU believes the NPT is our most valuable instrument in this fight towards achieving our common goals of global nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We reiterate our commitment to the Treaty in all its aspects.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.
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