Statement by

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Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairman,

My delegation wishes to extend its congratulations to you on your unanimous election to preside over the Second Prep.Com. session for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. We remain confident that under your able guidance, we will make substantive progress in our on-going endeavors to adequately prepare for its successful conclusion. Such an outcome would reaffirm that multilateralism is the fundamental principle in negotiations dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament issues and that it will enable the international community to create conditions of peace and security. My delegation will fully cooperate with you and other member states in furthering these objectives and in ensuring the success of our efforts.

Indonesia fully endorses the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned countries by my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Rastam Mohammad Isa of Malaysia.

Mr. Chairman,

The sweeping changes that accompanied the post-Cold War era gave rise to heightened hopes for an international order of greater stability and durable peace based on significant reductions in armaments and a world free from the threat posed by nuclear weapons. There was also optimism of a renewed vision for common security based on a reassessment of strategic posturing and the delegitimization of these weapons, that would lead to concrete advances towards eliminating these deadly weapons. START I and START II as well as the recently concluded Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of last year were important milestones in limiting nuclear armaments.

Regrettably, however, our hopes were belied as efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament continue to be undermined by the persistence of narrowly conceived strategic considerations, by the unilateral assertion of national security interests based on an ever-increasing accumulation of armaments, by an expanded scope for the use of nuclear weapons and by a new, untenable doctrine of pre-emption even against non-nuclear states. These ominous developments have dangerous ramifications for the security and even the survival of humanity.
Underlying this crisis, are divergent strategic interests, growing concern at the prospects of an arms race in outer space and the unsettling impact of missile proliferation. The tragic events of September 11 have highlighted the possibility that terrorists could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Adding to these, our efforts in reaching an agreement on an international convention for the suppression of nuclear terrorism are yet to succeed and much more remains to be done to ensure nuclear safety world-wide and the physical security of nuclear materials.

It bears reiteration that the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons brings with it risks of proliferation and, sooner or later, of use, either by design or by accident, with its attendant consequences. Hence, in an insecure and dangerous world, nuclear disarmament has become an imperative. It is pertinent to note in this context that outmoded approaches and inflexible positions have for too long led to stagnation and hindered progress. We believe that since the NPT came into force which saw minimal progress and which led to the adoption in 1995 of “Principles and Objectives” and the Final Document of 2000, the time has come to give substance to the unequivocal undertakings as we prepare for this session and for the 2005 Review Conference.

Aside from dealing with issues peripheral to the nuclear agenda such as irreversibility of nuclear disarmament measures, transparency with regard to weapons capabilities and other confidence-building measures, our attention should be more focused on the implementation of those undertakings for the abolition of nuclear arsenals which must be accompanied by a time-frame, as this obligation can not be cast in terms of a remote, indefinite future. Such a commitment should prepare the ground for more drastic cuts to bolster the efforts for their total elimination.

However, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons can not realistically be contemplated as long as strategic doctrines remain unchanged and these weapons continue to underpin the security of major military powers. The integrity and sustainability of the non-proliferation regime, and indeed, the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security, would depend, to a large degree, on a reassessment of these military posturings. The NPT can only be viewed in the larger context of credible progress made and commitments fulfilled towards nuclear disarmament.
For this purpose, regular reports have to be submitted by all states parties to the NPT to demonstrate their responsibility to the Treaty and their commitments to the agreement and conclusions reached in 2000. In this regard, comprehensive information on all aspects of nuclear weapons should be submitted by the nuclear weapons towards the implementation of Article VI, in accordance with paragraph 15, sub para 12, of the 2000 Final Document. The primary objective of such reporting would be to instill confidence in the non-proliferation regime among non-nuclear states parties to the NPT who have long fulfilled their part of the bargain.

With regard to other aspects of our mandate, Mr. Chairman, my delegation has greatly benefited from the submission of numerous proposals by states and groups of states, especially by the Non-Aligned nations. Taken together, they delineate the obligations and responsibilities of both nuclear-haves and have-nots which is important in upholding the legal and political commitments undertaken by them.

Many of these proposals outline a step-by-step approach for a nuclear-free world by focusing our attention on specific issues that coincide with the priorities of member states and on which concrete progress could be made. Their main focus are on the following:

- The cut-off of fissile materials that would take into account both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives. Both stocks and future production should be an integral part of FMCT which should be implemented in a non-discriminatory system of verification. Such an approach would respond to the dual concerns over possible acquisition of fissile materials by terrorist groups and an important element in the progress towards nuclear disarmament.

- The trend towards the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free-zones and the establishment of new such zones have increased over the years, thereby attesting to the reality of their pre-eminence in contemporary disarmament agenda. They also bear testimony to their multiple roles in stemming proliferation, in promoting a more stable strategic environment, in ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and in the concerted efforts of the international community to rid the world of the menace posed by them.
• As regards the Bangkok Treaty which established the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, the nuclear weapon states are yet to accede to its Protocol which is an essential prerequisite for the unfettered effectiveness of the zone. This inordinate delay has raised unsettling questions concerning the right of States to create nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned and to ensure their security. We remain hopeful, however, that the successful conclusion of the on-going negotiations will not only affirm nuclear-weapon-free-zones as a modality to promote our commonly held objectives on nuclear armaments but also further reinforce the status of southern hemisphere and adjacent areas as nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

• The moratorium on weapon tests and the coming into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at an early date would constitute a litmus test of the sincerity of the nuclear weapon states in fulfilling their obligations. Its importance can also be seen by the recognition accorded to it as first among the 13 steps envisioned in the efforts to stem proliferation. It is gratifying to note in this regard that 166 States have signed the Treaty and 97 States have ratified it thus far.

• The 2000 review exercise agreed for a further reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. There have been persistent concerns about the reliability of their physical security. These arsenals which are not covered by any agreement were conceived in the context of the Cold War, and hence, have lost their rationale. Continued reliance on strategic armaments have rendered these weapons redundant. They have diminished military value, and have in fact, become obsolete. Still, genuine nuclear disarmament should begin with the elimination of these profoundly destabilizing weapons whose very existence is fraught with the danger of accidental or unauthorized use.

• In the context of reducing nuclear dangers and enhancing international security, these proposals identified the de-alerting of nuclear weapons to reduce their operational status; de-targeting measures; increased transparency in weapons
capacities; no-first use of nuclear weapons; non-deployment outside the territories of weapon states; and security assurances in an international convention.

- Finally, my delegation wishes to reiterate the central role of the IAEA as a fundamental pillar of the non-proliferation regime. In upholding the inalienable right of the developing countries to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Agency has continued its invaluable contributions through a strategy of unified approach to provide technical assistance, safety measures and verification mechanisms. As nuclear power is projected to expand in Asia to support overall economic growth, enhanced technical cooperation to facilitate sustainable development of the developing countries has become imperative. In addition, the Agency's new role to safeguard nuclear materials, to ensure their safety and security and to prevent their illicit diversion to non-state actors is of paramount importance. We also emphasize the importance of transparency in export control regimes.

In my delegation's view, many of these proposals that my delegation referred to are realistic and achievable and whose implementation under multilateral auspices would ensure that the international community need not endure the frightening prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear armaments. This Second Prep. Com. session has the opportunity to consider them in light of the evolving international situation with a view to formulating recommendations for consideration by the 2005 Review Conference. Our efforts during the First Prep. Com. session have highlighted the hurdles but also showed the way to reach a consensus. Given the political will, we are confident of bridging the differences that exist for the consolidation of our efforts and for the promotion of our common objectives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.