Statement
by
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at the II session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on the assumption of Chairmanship of the second session of the Preparatory Committee. You can rely, Mr. Chairman, on the delegation of Poland for its support and constructive cooperation in the discharge of your important mandate. We are confident in this delegation that under your able guidance an important and meaningful contribution will have been made to the strengthened review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

Poland is pleased to have associated itself with the general Statement by the European Union. Supporting - as we are - all that was said on behalf of the EU by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Greece, my delegation would like at this time to add a few observations and highlight issues which are of utmost importance to my country.

Mr. Chairman,

As other States Parties do, Poland considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime and a key element of international security. We firmly support the regime built on the Treaty as well as the relevant Documents adopted in the Treaty review process, more particularly those of 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Since the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, Poland has engaged with dedication and a sense of purpose in efforts to strengthen that instrument, to assure its integrity and universality and to upgrade the regime's efficiency and effectiveness. All these goals, Mr. Chairman, are yet to be attained. From today's perspective, the principal tasks of the NPT States Parties lay in staving off the steady and dangerous process of undermining the Treaty. Whether a State Party assaults the letter of the treaty or a State non-Party acts in contravention of its spirit – the effect is the same: steady erosion of the regime. Mind you – we are dealing with matters nuclear and the term chain reaction is rather familiar in this context. Complacency of the international community on the one hand, and security concerns, sometimes legitimate, or simply “second thoughts”, on the other, may induce States to reconsider forsaking the nuclear option. Worse, it may give ideas to terrorist groups. Such an eventuality must never be allowed to happen. The nuclear option must never become a plausible choice neither for State nor for any would-be non-State actors. Recent developments persuade us that the community of States Parties to the NPT regime should send a clear and unequivocal message that non-compliance with Treaty provisions creates a serious threat to international peace and security which they would most vigorously oppose. Poland supports all efforts, whether bilateral or multilateral, aimed at bringing the DPRK back into the fold of the NPT regime as a non-nuclear State.
Mr. Chairman,

Poland fully supports the decisions of the 2000 Review Conference and the steps taken by States Parties with respect to strengthening the NPT review process. Last year Poland duly submitted its national report on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". We consider the Decision to be an important step towards building broader confidence - if implemented - between States Parties and a helpful tool in advancing the objectives of the Treaty. We urge all Members of the NPT regime to use this tool in a constructive and comprehensive manner. While basically no new elements have transpired since 2002, the Republic of Poland is about to prepare and submit a report for 2003.

Poland believes that transparency, particularly in the nuclear area, should help promote confidence among States thereby discouraging any temptation to even think of repudiating the NPT. Confidence-building measures should, indeed, have a prominent place in the non-proliferation context, as they do in arms control.

In this light, Mr. Chairman, the upgrading of efficiency of the non-proliferation regime is most pressing. The treaty compliance and verification mechanisms must function as a fail-proof, early warning system which helps to sound alarm and stem in the bud any temptation to reach out for nuclear arms. The strengthened NPT review process is the instrument to help attain such a result. Poland has been happy to join the EU member States in their readiness to reinforce the efficiency of the NPT regime - its relevant instruments and procedures - in order to react resolutely and effectively to cases of non-compliance. In our considered view it would be advisable, indeed imperative, to work out appropriate measures in this regard without further delay.

Poland has, on many occasions, put on record its resolute support for steps taken by States Parties as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to advancing verification measures thus streamlining the Treaty’s compliance mechanisms. More particularly we lend vigorous support to calls for the universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with their additional protocols. Poland has been one of a score of States Parties – in fact 32 worldwide - that have so far ratified and fully implemented the Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. We, therefore, feel entitled to urge States Parties - other than the 32 - in particular those with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude as soon as possible additional Protocols and bring them into effect without much delay. We’ll also keep supporting every action towards an early elaboration of integrated Safeguards.
We are hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that the intrinsic confidence-building and international cooperation potential of the NPT, equipped with an efficient verification system will be perceived as crucial incentive to its universalization. Only effective and verifiable Treaty will be attractive by offering a credible assurance of security of its States Parties.

Mr. Chairman,

With the recent accession of Cuba, the goal of universalization of the Treaty has been brought closer to materialization. We welcome Cuba in our midst with satisfaction. Yet, while the NPT with its 187 States Parties clearly enjoys a record support of the community of States among all arms control accords – there are still members of the international community, not many but important, who shy away from the non-proliferation regime. Like many other members, we urge them to take necessary political decisions and accede to the NPT without further delay as non-nuclear weapon States. Incidentally, this call in the view of my delegation applies also to other WMD related accords – the CWC and the BTWC. We would like to take this opportunity to call on States not yet party to these important conventions to accede to them as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

Poland has been dedicated to the implementation of what remains of the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament set in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We consider that the support which those steps have received was a major success of the international community in its quest for a world rid of fear of WMD, nuclear weapons in the first place. It is our considered opinion that the first steps towards nuclear disarmament should include an accelerated rate of ratifications and the early entry into force of the CTBT as well as the elaboration of the FMCT. As a State which has ratified CTBT, Poland calls on all States which have not yet done so, to ratify and/or to accede to the Treaty. At the same time we are hopeful that the test ban moratoria now in effect will be continue until the CTBT goes into effect. We strongly regret the continued failure of the CD to work out its programme of work and expedite the most pressing business which is FMCT.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

It is commonly argued that the world after September 11, 2001 is not the same anymore. New threats make us strengthen all relevant multilateral instruments. Actions in this regard cover the issues of export control, non-proliferation and safety of radioactive materials. Such a comprehensive and multifaceted action is urgently called for in order to deal more effectively with the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. In our view, further consolidation of the NPT and the regime built around it will be one of the best vehicles to effectively address the issue of global terrorism today. At the
same time, Poland – a party to all export control regimes – supports every measure seeking to upgrade export control practices in the view of the growing terrorist challenge.

We also support the efforts pursued within the IAEA framework to meet the new challenges. We attach major importance to the Convention on physical protection of nuclear materials. We are hopeful that an accelerated rate of ratifications will result in a meaningful strengthening of this instrument. We also wish to stress the importance of and the urgent need for the strengthening of the existing instruments on safety of nuclear installations and radioactive and waste nuclear materials.

Mr. Chairman,

Pondering over challenges of the day, the international community must not forget existing opportunities. International cooperation in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is one of such opportunities. Let me commend all the IAEA efforts in this regard. Poland is dedicated to promoting international cooperation in regard to peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of IAEA.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

In concluding, I would like to voice my sincere hope that this session of the Preparatory Committee will send a clear message to the world at large that the States Parties to the NPT are united in their commitment to upholding the crucial importance of the NPT regime. Poland will not be found wanting in its dedication to bring constructive contribution to the strengthened NPT review process. My country stands ready to work with all States Parties to the NPT for the ultimate success of the 2005 Review Conference.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.