STATEMENT

by the delegation of the Russian Federation
at the second session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva, April 28, 2003
Mr. Chairman,

First of all the Russian delegation would like to welcome you as the Chairman of our Preparatory Committee. We are sure that under your guidance the work of the Committee will be successful and fruitful.

You may completely rely on our sustained and constructive cooperation in all the issues of holding the PrepCom and preparation for the 2005 Conference.

The twenty-first century has been marked with new trends and at the same time new challenges in the development of international relations.

We are convinced that countering these challenges is possible only through the consolidated efforts of the world community. As we see it, a new democratic world order should be built in such a way that would guarantee the harmonious combination of different approaches and of not always coinciding interests of states for the sake of preserving and strengthening comprehensive strategic stability in order to create a new multi-component system of security. The unilateral use of military force in circumvention of the UN Charter may result in undermining the system of international security and encourage individual countries to possess WMD.

Russia favors the further strengthening and development of the international legal basis for strategic stability and international security. We proceed from the understanding that political and diplomatic methods for resolving issues of non-proliferation and disarmament have been far from being exhausted and can be engaged with greater usefulness.

Strengthening the international regime of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and its foundation – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – has been and still is one of the most effective directions of our joint activity in order to achieve the said objective.

As a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and one of its depositaries, Russia is of the opinion, that the NPT is a time-tested document, which has become one of the main pillars of the international security system. The NPT confirms its role as the most important international instrument, which safeguards global stability and security.

The world community has practically come to a consensus regarding the scope of new threats and challenges. The problem of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction together with the problem of international terrorism are among the top items within that scope. They are the ones that represent by themselves the greatest and real danger now.

The Russian Federation confirms its position of principle in support of the efforts undertaken by the international community, including the UN, Conference on Disarmament and IAEA to fight terrorism and proliferation. Now it is important to unite efforts to create a global system of countering new challenges and threats, including also the ones in nuclear sphere. The proposed new measures should not
“compete” with traditional disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of security, on the contrary, they are called upon to make them more comprehensive and give them a new quality dimension.

In this connection we underline the importance of making universal the Principles, approved at G8 Kananaskis Summit, to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction, we stand for an enlargement of the number of countries committed to the said principles.

We believe that recommendations to further strengthen the NPT should become the main result of our joint work to prepare the 2005 Conference.

We proceed from the understanding that preparation of the next review of the Treaty implementation in the whole aggregate of its provisions is the main objective of the Committee. The basis for that is available – it is the Final Document approved in the year 2000. The scope of measures it contains at multilateral, regional and other levels is, in essence, the program of joint efforts to further improve the NPT effectiveness.

We are committed to decisions of the 2000 Conference and take specific steps to implement them. We consider the Final Document of the Conference as a real future program of multilateral, regional and other measures that contains benchmarks for negotiations on the step-by-step and consensus basis under strict observance of interests of security of all the NPT parties under conditions of stability and predictability and therefore it should be implemented entirely and not selectively.

The task to assure universality of the NPT remains to be of principal importance. Further efforts are necessary to get the states still not NPT parties into the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In this connection we would like to underscore the accession to the Treaty by Cuba on November 4, 2002 and depositing its instrument of ratification with Russia as the NPT depository. Having joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Cuba demonstrated its responsible approach to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and confirmed its reputation on the international arena as the state, which conducts consistent policy in matters of stability and security in the region.

It is with regret that we learned about the DPRK decision to withdraw from the NPT.

This step undermines the efforts of the international community to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and can bring negative consequences on the regional, as well as global scale, and also negatively affects the efforts of those states, which strive for the settlement of international problems, including those in the sphere of non-proliferation, by political, diplomatic and international law methods.

We believe that providing for nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula, observance there of the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction
on condition of preservation in that region of peace, security and stability corresponds to common hopes of the Korean people and mankind as a whole.

Russia is still of the opinion that the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is necessary and possible.

At the same time we think it is necessary to provide the DPRK with guarantees of security, sovereignty, as well as to restart humanitarian and economic programs which had been in place on the Korean Peninsula.

We call again for the political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis through negotiations. Russia will support any format, which would facilitate the achievement of this objective.

We would like to draw the attention of the audience to the initiative of President of Russia Vladimir V.Putin put forward at the Millenium Summit to develop proliferation resistant nuclear technologies. The work is actively carried out in the IAEA to put it in place (INPRO project). The first phase of this international project has been successfully implemented. We call upon all the States Parties to the NPT to join the INPRO in full scale.

Practically there is no alternative to our joint work in matters of non-proliferation and disarmament. We are strongly convinced that, for example, it is impossible to resolve problems of disarmament and strengthening non-proliferation regimes by military means.

For Russia the issues of nuclear arms reduction are a priority. Our country not only declares its commitment – as the ultimate goal – to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of a treaty on comprehensive and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control but also takes steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

By its practical actions our country confirms its commitment to strict fulfillment of its obligations in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Already today, regarding the actions of Russia, an essential progress has been reached in the implementation of key objectives of the Treaty including priority tasks agreed upon at the 2000 Conference.

The period of reduction of strategic offensive weapons foreseen under the START I Treaty ended in December 2001. According to the Treaty the parties committed themselves to reduce the number of their strategic delivery systems seven years after its entry into force down to 1600 units, and the warheads accounted with them down to the level of 6000 units to each of the parties. Russia completely and ahead of the time-schedule fulfilled its obligations under the above mentioned reduction provisions and by the deadline date of December 5, 2001 has actually lowered the number of its deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers) down to 1136 units, and the number of the warheads accounted with them – down to 5518 units.

In October 2001 the last nuclear warhead brought into Russia from the territory of Ukraine was eliminated.
At the beginning of this June the INF Treaty, under which the whole class of non-strategic offensive weapons was eliminated, will be 15 years old.

We have ratified the START II Treaty. It's not the fault of Russia that it has not come into force.

The conclusion at the Moscow Summit in May 2002 between Russia and the United States of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty has become a new major step forward in nuclear disarmament. This document legally fixes the agreement on mutual reduction of an aggregate number of strategic nuclear warheads down to 1700 - 2200 units by each of the parties by December 31, 2012, that means that it foresees the reduction approximately by two-thirds in comparison to the level established under START I Treaty. At the same time, the START I Treaty will stay in force till December 5, 2009 and, by agreement between the parties, it can be prolonged further. So, at least up to the end of the year 2009 the strategic offensive potentials of Russia and the USA will be under double mutually reinforcing limitations by the two treaties. Provisions for its further enrichment, strengthening and evolution have been put into the new treaty and specially created Bilateral Commission on its implementation will focus on them. At present the work to complete the process of ratification of the new Treaty is underway.

The SOR Treaty, as any other agreement, has been the result of mutual compromises and has become possible in many respects thanks to new strategic relations between Russia and the United States in the face of new threats fixed in the Joint Declaration signed at the same Summit, as well as thanks to the confirmation by the parties of close interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive armaments.

While concluding the new treaty in the sphere of the strategic offensive arms Russia and the United States took into account — and reflected it in its text — the commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Assessing the significance of this agreement, President Vladimir V. Putin underscored that “in the letter and spirit this is the confirmation of a choice our countries made in favor of reduction of nuclear arsenals and joint work to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction”.

Russia proceeds from the understanding that it is impossible to consider the issues of tactical nuclear weapons separately from other kinds of armaments. This is the reason why well-known unilateral Russian initiatives in the sphere of disarmament in 1991-1992 are of a comprehensive nature and, besides, the TNW touch upon other important issues which essentially influence strategic stability.

An essential argument in favor of the comprehensive consideration of issues of different kinds of weapons is that, for example, subdivision of nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical is very conditional and that fact is vividly testified by an analysis of combat characteristics of the TNW, as well as by the transformation of the role of such weapons depending upon location of their deployment. On our part we believe that removal of the tactical nuclear weapons, for example, from Europe and elimination of respective infrastructure there would become an important
practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the cold-war period. Such a decision in our opinion could serve the purposes of strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Naturally, the elaboration of specific proposals to reduce and limit nuclear weapons should be accompanied by adoption of specific measures also to limit other types of weapons including non-nuclear, as well as by prohibition or limitation of activities with such weapons within the reach of each other’s territories.

Russia still attaches an exclusive importance to an unconditional implementation of negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states provided in 1995. This provision is fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is an important measure of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We express our hope that CTBT which, as many are aware, has long ago been ratified by Russia will be joined by all the nations whose ratification is of principal importance for entry into force of the Treaty.

We positively assess the process of creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world that gained a noticeable potential. The establishment of the zones free from nuclear weapons is by itself an important measure of disarmament. Forming the zone the states seek strengthening the regional and international security, increasing the level of mutual trust and agreement. At the same time they accomplish another, not less important task: acting in the spirit of NPT Article VII they make an essential contribution into the development and consolidation of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime. Such a logical combination of mutually complimentary factors determines the significance of all the NWFZs taken together and each of them separately.

The international community has accumulated a great experience in matters of establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It testifies to the fact that when the process of institutionalizing the zones follows the principles and parameters, which have become a common practice, when it does not contradict the international law, then NWFZs receive recognition and respective assurances. And vice versa, non-observance of these conditions makes the process of recognition of a zone more difficult, as it happened to the NWFZ in South-East Asia. We express our hope that the dialogue between the SEA countries and nuclear powers will, in final analysis, allow them to resolve the outstanding difficulties.

The work on the draft treaty on nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is about to be completed. At the same time, efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East skid and that fact cannot but cause concern, especially taking into consideration a complicated situation in the region. Russia is still of the opinion that it is important to implement the resolutions on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference.
We are also convinced that the process of the post-war settlement in the Middle East and Iraq in particular should be brought back into international legal framework based on already available mechanisms accountable to the UN Security Council. That would also facilitate the solution of the tasks connected with the strengthening of the WMD non-proliferation regime in the region.

We express our concern regarding the stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. At the same time, we confirm our position regarding the earliest start within the CD framework of negotiations on non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We would also like to note that prevention of arms race in outer space is also of importance in the NPT context.

We consider it necessary to elaborate and adopt effective measures with the objective of further enhancing the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation regime without detriment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all the states.

In our opinion, under present conditions broad international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy is a potent and effective way of strengthening nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime at the global as well as regional levels.

In our view, basic directions of activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC) facilitate resolution of these two interconnected tasks. We actively support the line of activities carried out by these multilateral mechanisms to be more open in the work with non-member countries. We believe that there are some reserves to be exploited in this work. We are in favor of constructive interaction and intensive dialogue with all the countries, including non-parties to the NPT, first of all with the objective of establishing and improving national systems of export control.

Russia firmly adheres to the policy of implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a mandatory condition for nuclear exports to countries not possessing nuclear weapons. Together with other countries, which supply nuclear materials and equipment on a regular basis, we take part in the work on more detailed specification and review of the lists of goods for nuclear exports and strictly adhere to their provisions.

During the previous period we continued to improve our national system of export control. We made more specific practically all the control lists. Changes have been introduced into legal acts, which regulate the procedure of foreign economic activities regarding the goods under control. First of all, the scope of foreign economic operations which are subject to licensing was made broader. Besides, export operations with goods subject to control their transfer to foreign entities in the territory of Russia is also subject to issuing licenses.

Moreover, now the export control covers also the transfer of technologies in the so-called “intangible” form – through electronic means of communication, in the process of teaching, presentations at scientific conferences, symposia and other
events with foreign participation. It is explained by the necessity to close the above said channels for the leakage of "sensitive" information abroad. At the same, time the procedure to obtain permits has been significantly simplified and time-periods for consideration of applications of exporters have been reduced.

The work to establish internal programs of export control at the enterprises and in organizations is in progress. The mechanisms for identification survey of products are being improved. Criminal and administrative responsibility for violation of established procedure for the execution of foreign economic operations with the goods that are subject to export control has been made stricter.

Russia actively supports the IAEA activity. The priority directions of this activity are strengthening safeguards, prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, creation of effective verification mechanisms for member states of nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc.

We highly appreciate the efforts of the Agency to develop and introduce the concept of integrated safeguards. We also take note of the greater number of states which signed with the IAEA Additional Protocols to the Safeguards Agreements that significantly increases the confidence of the international community in the absence of switching of nuclear materials and equipment to non-declared activities.

We support the IAEA program to combat possible acts of nuclear terrorism and new trilateral Russia–US–IAEA initiative regarding safe treatment of radioactive sources.

Mr. Chairman,

Approaching the process of the NPT review with all the responsibility, the Russian delegation will make its contribution into constructive dialogue of participants of the PrepCom second session in order to enhance the efficiency and validity of this important international treaty. In the consideration of procedural issues of the agenda of the Committee, we consider it reasonable to use to the maximum possible degree the experience accumulated during six previous Conferences, and of course, taking due account of specific nature of the 2005 Conference.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,

In conclusion, on behalf of the Russian side I would like once again to state that Russia is committed to the efforts to achieve ultimate goal in the cause of nuclear disarmament. We are prepared to cooperate with all the interested states.

We wish a successful work to all the participants at the session.

Thank you for your attention.