STATEMENT
by Mr. Anatoliy SCHERBA
Head of the Delegation of Ukraine
to the second session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
(28 April -9 May 2003, Geneva)

Mr. Chairman,

May I start by congratulating you on your election as a Chairman of this session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. I am confident that under your skillful guidance the Preparatory Committee will deliberate smoothly and be able to meet our expectations. On its part the delegation of Ukraine is prepared to work in close cooperation with other delegations and will spare no effort in contributing to the successful completion of the current session.

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished delegates,

The time period that has passed since the last PrepCom session is characterized by abundance of dramatic developments, which had the number of implications to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Some of them were encouraging as they have consolidated positive trends while some have highlighted the fact that international security and stability continues to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Moreover, at the beginning of the 21st century those risks become more diverse and multifaceted than decades ago when the NPT was concluded. Today they include not only the major risk of a nuclear war being unleashed between competing nuclear superpowers but also quite a real possibility of nuclear blackmail from some odious regimes or attempts by non-state actors to use radioactive materials as weapons of terror.

As the NPT remains a basic instrument to prevent spread of nuclear weapons and related materials, promoting universality of the Treaty, ensuring strict and thorough implementation of its provisions should be priority tasks of the international community in the 21st century.

In the context of the efforts towards NPT universality Cuba's recent accession to the Treaty deserves our utmost appreciation. Delegation of Ukraine avails itself of this opportunity and calls upon the states that have not yet acceded to the NPT to do so at the earliest date.

One of the most positive events that have happened over the preceding year is the establishment of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction launched at the G-8 Kananaskis Summit. We regard this step as an essential contribution to enhancing multilateral efforts in the WMD non-proliferation field. We attach immense importance to practical realization of the Kananaskis initiative.

In May 2002 the international community witnessed the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America. As it is known the U.S. Senate has recently given its advice and consent to the mentioned Treaty and we hope that the Russian parliament will soon follow suit. Ukraine applauds and highly appreciates these steps on the part of the two major nuclear powers. Implementation of the Moscow Treaty provisions will pave the way to attaining the NPT disarmament goal. In its turn Ukraine as the state that has contributed essentially to the cause of nuclear disarmament within the START I framework hopes that the reductions in nuclear arsenals under the Moscow treaty will be irreversible.

Unfortunately, despite the above mentioned positive trends in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we have to admit that the progress in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards the nuclear disarmament as set forth at the 2000 NPT Review Conference remains far from desired. Prospects of the CTBT entry into force still look gloomy although it is this Treaty that is instrumental in advancing both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives as well as in upholding the pillars of the regional and global stability. As a full-fledged party to the CTBT Ukraine urges the states that still remain holdouts from the Treaty and thus impede its early entry into force to ratify or accede to it. We commend utmost restraint in conducting nuclear test explosions, exercised by the nuclear weapon states non-parties to the CTBT. We hope that they will further keep in line with their commitment to maintain the global nuclear weapon test moratorium.

In contrast to the background of the current security challenges stemming from the risk of the WMD and related materials proliferation the idea to conclude the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has acquired one more dimension. We firmly believe it is necessary to spare no efforts in order to surmount protracted political impasse in the CD and to commence the negotiations on the FMCT.

Precarious security environment in the present world increases the importance of fortifying the IAEA’s capability to verify declared nuclear activities and especially to detect and deter clandestine nuclear activities. The Agency continues to play a vital role in ensuring that civilian nuclear facilities are not diverted to military purposes, detecting covert weapons activities and reducing the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism. This can
be accomplished through faithful and universal application of comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols. Ukraine fully endorses measures envisaged by the Additional protocol. As of to date the preparatory activities for the ratification of the Protocol signed by Ukraine in 2000 have been underway. Within this process Ukraine has been trying to settle a set of economic, legal and technical issues that have arisen while analyzing the prospects of the Protocol ratification. We welcome the Agency’s efforts in finalizing the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards and look forward to their practical implementation.

Considering the international export control system to be an indispensable part of the global non-proliferation regime, Ukraine actively participated in major multilateral export control regimes. It strictly abides by the basic guidelines set out by those regimes and believes that they should be further enhanced.

Growing proliferation of WMD goes in parallel with the dissemination of ballistic missiles, which is particularly linked to nuclear proliferation. To curb this negative trend Ukraine along with many other states signed the International Code of Conduct against the Ballistic Missile Proliferation back in November 2002.

Ukraine believes that legally binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon-states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities. We strongly urge NWS to review their policies in this respect and to confirm the validity of the relevant decisions made by the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.

In conclusion I would like to stress that considerably much more efforts are needed to make the dream of the world without nuclear weapons a reality. No matter how difficult to achieve this goal may seem it is not unattainable. We just should follow the road map that we have charted for ourselves during the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. Hopefully, the current session will become a major point on that road map and will bring us closer to the desirable destination.

Thank you.