PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SECOND SESSION IN GENEVA
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STATEMENT BY

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Mr. Chairman,

I would like to join other speakers in congratulating you on your chairmanship of the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Norway is firmly committed to the NPT. We consider the Treaty to be vital for promoting global, regional and hence our own security. An effective non-proliferation regime is essential for denying terrorists access to nuclear materials and technologies. The NPT provides the best avenue for nuclear disarmament through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps.

We hope and expect that the current Review Cycle will further preserve and strengthen the integrity and authority of the NPT.

We have to deal with the new and serious challenges that the NPT is now facing.
- We must build on the positive outcome of the Review Conference of 2000.
- Compliance with all the provisions of the NPT is essential. We should consider reinforcing the instruments and procedures to react to cases of non-compliance.
- While stressing the importance of non-proliferation, we must also ensure further progress on Article VI of the Treaty. Disarmament and non-proliferation should mutually reinforce each other.

Mr. Chairman,

The 2000 NPT Review Conference unanimously adopted a Plan of Action containing 13 practical and wide-ranging steps for the systematic and progressive achievement of nuclear disarmament. Although there has been some progress in implementing these steps, we are still a long way from our goal, and so far we have fallen short of the targets that were set three years ago.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is essential for promoting both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to the CTBT and its early entry into force continue to be a priority for Norway. It is crucial that the nuclear powers ratify the Treaty. Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing are a useful measure. Such moratoria cannot, however, replace the legally binding commitment represented by the signing and ratification of the CTBT.

The verification system is at the core of the Treaty. Financial and diplomatic support for the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation must continue unabated.

Norway welcomes the Moscow agreement between the US and Russia on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. We hope this agreement will soon be ratified and enter into force. We regard the reductions in strategic arsenals as an important contribution to the implementation of the decisions from the 2000 Review
Conference. We call on the two countries to carry out these reductions in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner.

Norway underlines the need for more vigorous efforts to reduce the arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. We welcome the significant reductions in the numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons so far. However, this class of nuclear weapons remains outside any formalised arms control treaty. We need to address this challenge.

Norway urges all states, including those currently outside the NPT, to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Likewise, we encourage all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as possible, fissile material that is not required for military purposes under IAEA verification and safeguards.

In this regard we stress the importance of the Trilateral Initiative, taken by the US, the Russian Federation and the IAEA, to develop techniques and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards. This arrangement should be expanded to all nuclear-weapon-capable states. This would be an important step in the direction of an irreversible international control of excessive stocks of fissile material and deeper cuts in nuclear arms.

Increased transparency by nuclear weapon states with regard to their nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI are important. As we have stated before, Norway considers that reporting should not be an option, but an obligation. This would promote transparency and hence confidence in the overall NPT regime.

Pursuant to step 12, we are therefore distributing during this Preparatory Committee a report on actions taken by Norway in support of the implementation of the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Final Document.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has a special role in the implementation of the 2000 Final Document. Norway is deeply disappointed that the CD has not been able to adopt a Programme of Work. We have expressed our support for the draft Programme of Work as tabled by the five cross-regional representatives. The present impasse is undermining the credibility of the CD and the role of multilateralism in disarmament and arms control. It also prevents us from starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which we see as the next essential step towards disarmament and non-proliferation, and from making progress on issues like nuclear disarmament and the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”.

Mr Chairman,

Universal adherence to the NPT is essential. We welcome Cuba’s accession to the Treaty as well as its ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty. We call on the remaining three states outside the NPT to unconditionally accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. We also emphasise the importance of full compliance with all of the provisions of the NPT, even by non-States Parties.
Norway is deeply concerned by recent challenges to the NPT, especially the announcement by the DPRK of its withdrawal from the Treaty. This is a dangerous setback to the nuclear disarmament regime and to the security interests of all states. We call upon the DPRK to reverse its course of action, to comply with the provisions of the NPT and to co-operate fully with the IAEA. We hope the current consultations will yield positive results.

All allegations of non-compliance with the NPT regime must be dealt with in a transparent manner. In any well-documented case the IAEA must be able to investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary action in accordance with its mandate. It is in the interest of the countries concerned to co-operate fully with the IAEA.

The IAEA safeguard system is at the heart of compliance with the NPT provisions and confidence in the non-proliferation regime. Strengthening the effectiveness of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards system should therefore be a priority for all States Parties.

Furthermore, all States Parties, in particular those with substantial nuclear programmes, must be called on to sign safeguards agreements with the IAEA, including the Model Additional Protocol. So far only a small group of countries, including my own, have agreed on an integrated safeguard system with the IAEA.

It goes without saying that strict compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT will help prevent terrorists from acquiring fissile materials. We urge all States Parties to support the IAEA Plan of Action.

The G8 Global Partnership Initiative launched last summer, to intensify and improve the co-ordination of international efforts against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction is a very important step, which has our full support. Since the mid-nineties Norway and Russia have co-operated closely on nuclear safety and nuclear waste issues. Norway is ready to contribute to the G8 Global Partnership and is already engaged in projects we believe will fit very well with the Partnership approach.

We emphasise the need for stringent national control measures with regard to the export of sensitive nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies. We also stress the importance of co-ordinating national export policies and of following the understandings of the Zangger Committee and the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Likewise we emphasise the relevance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We urge all countries that have not joined this Convention to do so as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

With regard to regional issues, my country has supported the resolutions in the UN General Assembly calling for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East and calling on all countries in the region to join the NPT. We have also urged all countries in South Asia to accede to the Treaty unconditionally as non-nuclear weapons states.
Let me underline that the purpose of having regional issues on our agenda is to further strengthen the NPT regime.

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT has proved its relevance for our collective security. It shows that multilateralism is working. In the process leading up to the next Review Conference we must deal with the challenges facing the NPT. We must ensure full compliance with the Treaty and we must implement the commitments made at the last Review Conference. Through a balanced, step-by-step approach, we must set a course towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.