Statement by His Excellency U Mya Than,
Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar
to the United Nations in Geneva

on

Security Assurances

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva, 2 May 2003
Mr. Chairman,

I should like to address the issue of security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in this intervention.

Because of the time constraint, I shall not be able to submit a working paper or a separate document on this question. However, I should like to offer some comments on this subject.

Mr. Chairman,

The question of security assurances for NNWS has assumed greater importance and more urgency in the light of recent developments.

We are delighted to note that the States Parties are now paying more attention to this question.

We welcome the Working Paper presented by the representative of New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition at this session.

The Working Paper by the New Agenda Coalition is a valuable contribution and will serve as a useful resource paper for further discussions on this subject.

Mr. Chairman,

NNWS strongly favour a legally-binding international instrument on security assurances. We are, however, open to other forms of security assurances such as a political declaration or declarations by the nuclear weapons states (NWS).

Mr. Chairman,

If I may briefly outline some of the requirements for security assurances for NNWS, the scope covers two types of security assurances and the identification of who will provide security assurances and the identification of who will be the beneficiaries of security assurances.

**Scope**

Mr. Chairman,

There are two types of security assurances: -

(i) negative security assurances (NSA); and

(ii) positive security assurances (PSA).
In our view, security assurances by the NWS should cover both negative security assurances and positive security assurances.

As regards the identification of who will provide security assurances, NWS Parties to the NPT as defined in Article IX(3) of the Treaty are the states who should provide security assurances to NNWS.

As regards the beneficiaries of security assurances, the beneficiaries should be NNWS Parties to the Treaty who are in compliance to the Treaty obligations.

**Substance**

**Common Formula**

We have been striving to arrive at a common formula for legally-binding security assurances by the NWS.

**Unconditional Negative Security Assurances**

To-date, the only nuclear weapon state that has provided unconditional negative security assurances is the People's Republic of China.

Such unconditional negative security assurances is the preference of NNWS.

**Other Types of Negative Security Assurances**

The unilateral declarations of negative security assurances by the other four NWS are conditional. The main condition in their negative security assurances is the condition that NNWS do not carry out an attack, in alliance with another NWS, on them and territories under their control, their armed forces, their troops and their allies.

Any meaningful and adequate negative security assurances will require removal or reduction of the above-mentioned condition. In fact, a solution to the problem of negative security assurances lies in finding ways and means to remove or reduce the above-mentioned condition.

Mr. Chairman,

Another issue relates to the positions of some NWS that favour using nuclear weapons to deter attacks with biological and chemical weapons. Arguments, advanced in support of these positions, are neither convincing, nor valid. We do not believe that this kind of cross deterrence will work.
However, we recognize that there is a certain interrelationship among weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that bans on biological and chemical weapons and the restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons can be mutually reinforcing.

In this context, we believe that the reaffirmation of the commitment by the States Parties not to develop, produce, stockpile and use biological and chemical weapons can serve as a confidence-building measure and could be helpful in our endeavours to arrive at some form of security assurances by NWS not to use or threat to use nuclear weapons against NNWS.

It may, therefore, be useful to reflect somehow such a reaffirmation of the commitment by the States Parties in an Instrument on security assurances.

Mr. Chairman,

Nigeria, the Sudan and my own country had tabled a proposal on a draft Protocol on Security Assurances to the Treaty at the First PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This proposal is still on the table. We believe that it will serve as a useful basis for further discussions.

There are several other proposals by other State Parties. The New Agenda Coalition countries have just presented their proposal on security assurances at this very session. There are also proposals by China, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Sweden and other countries, presented at the previous PrepCom meetings and Review Conferences.

All those papers will be resource materials in future discussions and deliberations on this subject.

Mr. Chairman,

In view of the importance of this question, we hope that there will be more comprehensive and in-depth discussions at the Third PrepCom in 2004 and at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.