STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR HENRIK SALANDER,
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DISARMAMENT

SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE 2005 REVIEW
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CLUSTER I

GENEVA, 2 MAY 2003
Mr. Chairperson,

My delegation aligns itself with the statements in the cluster 1 debate made by Greece on behalf of the European Union, and by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition on the issue of security assurances.

In the cluster II debate, we will give our national views on the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-compliance with articles II and III, and IAEA Safeguards.

Today, we would like to elaborate a little more on the issue of nuclear disarmament on the basis of the discussion in the specific time on nuclear disarmament Wednesday and yesterday, and the start of the cluster I debate yesterday.

First, we would like to thank all delegations that have welcomed the working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons submitted by us on behalf of Austria, Mexico and Sweden, and we look forward to further discussion on this issue.

Second, we would like to thank the Canadian delegation for having put forward its second working paper on reporting. Reporting was the 12th of the 13 steps to nuclear disarmament agreed to by consensus by all States Parties to the NPT in the 2000 Final Document. It is our belief that reporting by States Parties to every session of the PrepCom and to the Review Conference would contribute to promote greater confidence in compliance with the Treaty and providing a tool for transparency and accountability. Canada's working paper provides a very useful background and description of the current situation with regards to the reporting issue. It should be used as a tool and a building block for the continued work on this issue with a view to make further recommendations in the Review Conference in 2005.

All States Parties are committed to the reporting obligation under step 12. Sweden has accordingly submitted its report also to this session of the PrepCom. We have chosen the format of the 13 steps since we think that this in a comprehensive way reflects the commitments countries have under article VI and paragraph 4c of the 1995 decisions.

Mr. Chairperson,

For natural reasons, we have a greater interest in reports by the nuclear weapons states than in those submitted by other states parties. We would therefore have preferred written reports by the nuclear weapons states. However, we do welcome their contributions also in the oral format they have chosen. We have listened with interest to their contributions both in the general debate, in the specific time on nuclear disarmament, and in cluster I. We would like to ask for clarifications on a couple of points that we hope to see included in future reports.

We would particularly like to thank the United Kingdom for providing information on past and present concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament. We would also like to thank France for its important contribution to nuclear disarmament in the late 1990s with
its ratification of the CTBT and the closing down of its fissile material facilities.

At the same time there was in particular one question that came to mind when we heard the statements by the United Kingdom and by France. We were wondering if you could elaborate on the concept of keeping your nuclear arsenals at a level necessary for your national security, and on the threats you see with regards to your national security today. This could be seen in the context of comparing your national security interests with those of the over 180 non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT: or in other words, more bluntly put, we would be interested in your explanations as to why a country like for example Sweden would not need nuclear weapons, if the United Kingdom and France need them.

We would also like to thank China for its contribution, which provided a background to China’s nuclear policy. We would however have liked to see much more substantive information on basic facts with regards to the Chinese nuclear arsenals and to concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament. What arsenals are we talking about; what weapons; are weapons being developed; are weapons being modernized; are weapons being dismantled? We would in this regard also be interested in hearing China’s views on the issue of transparency.

We would like to sincerely thank the Russian Federation and the United States for their contributions. We especially thank the United States for having made a decided effort to provide relatively comprehensive information. We note that both countries have provided interesting facts and information on policy doctrines. We also note that both countries emphasize the role of the Moscow Treaty to the disarmament process. As you know, Sweden together with the other countries in the New Agenda Coalition doubts whether this Treaty actually contributes to concrete disarmament. In this context, we would like both delegations to elaborate on a couple of points:

1. The possibility of irreversible cuts is not in itself precluded in the Moscow Treaty. Is the option of irreversible cuts under either bilateral or unilateral consideration?

2. The Moscow Treaty is also silent on the alert status of the still deployed weapons, but the possibility of them being de-alerted is not precluded in the treaty. Is the option of lowering the alert status under either bilateral or unilateral consideration?

3. The Moscow Treaty does not require any deployment reductions until 2012, but a steady rate of removal from deployment is envisioned. If that rate slows down, are there mechanisms available to ensure accelerated progress?

4. How was the 2012 date derived? I.e., which factors created the time constraint that ruled out earlier achievement of the projected deployment levels?

5. Are there any measures under consideration that would provide advance warning of redeployment after 2012? If so, how much warning would be provided?
Mr. Chairperson,

With regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons, we welcome the information provided by the United States that it now has completed the dismantling according to its commitments under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. We regret however that there so far has been very scant transparency with regards to the implementation of these commitments, and we especially would like to know the status of Russia's implementation. We welcome that issues on non-strategic nuclear weapons have been discussed between the United States and Russia, but would like this information to be provided to other states as well – in particular to countries like ours who have these weapons close to our borders. Information might include data on holdings and status of these weapons, safety provisions, types of weapons, yields, ranges of designated delivery systems, distribution by region, and weapons elimination.

We also wonder about the reasons given by the United States on why non-strategic nuclear weapons are not suitable for a more formalized agreement. As in all agreements, we believe it is up to the parties to agree on the definition of weapons, warheads and delivery vehicles. We wonder what the obstacle is for an agreement on these weapons under these new circumstances, when the United States and the Russian Federation emphasize their new partnership in a new era.

We also have one particular question that we would like to pose to Russia on this issue, namely, if your delegation could give us some information about the specific security and physical protection measures for transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials, that you have undertaken in the last decade, and not least during the last few years when terrorist acquisition has been a particular concern.

We note that the United States underlines that it is "not developing new nuclear weapons" and "has not identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons". Does this also mean that there are no plans or designs for new nuclear weapons?

We agree with what South Africa said yesterday about the danger for the integrity of the whole NPT regime, if countries start to be selective with regards to commitments agreed upon. The Final Document of the Review Conference in 2000 including the 13 practical steps to nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the NPT regime. It is therefore a risk to the regime if State Parties state that they no longer support some of the steps.

Similarly, this may also give rise to concerns about the future validity of today's commitments. We sincerely welcome that the United States is committed to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. At the same time we know that the United States was equally committed to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. We hope that we can be confident that a future Administration will not reject an agreed FMCT.
Mr. Chairperson,

Let me conclude by hoping that the issue of reporting can be taken forward through an interactive process between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. We hope to be able to elaborate on this issue in the process leading up to the next session of the PrepCom. In this regard, we would like to work together with the countries that have expressed a particular interest in the issue, including Canada and Mexico.

I thank you.