Mr. Chairman,

Assuring nuclear non-proliferation through the application of effective safeguards is a key component of the NPT regime. In cluster 2, I would like to address Japan's position on strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, integrated safeguards, export control and nuclear weapons free zones.

1. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards
The IAEA safeguards system provides a concrete guarantee for ensuring and underpinning nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, the universalization of the impartial and effective safeguards system by the IAEA represents a significant contribution to the non-proliferation regime. I would like to take this opportunity to express Japan's deep gratitude to Director General ElBaradei and his staff involved in safeguards responsibilities for their contribution to promoting non-proliferation.

The cases of Iraq and the North Korea in the early 1990s demonstrated clearly that verification through safeguards should be conducted not only on declared materials but also on undeclared nuclear materials and activities in order to ensure effective non-proliferation.

In the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was recommended that the IAEA and its Member States consider ways and means, including a plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Japan has been actively supporting the efforts by the IAEA to implement the plan of action. Japan has taken the various initiatives to encourage the universal adherence to the additional protocol by making both financial and personnel contributions to a series of regional conferences.

We express deep appreciation to the IAEA Secretariat and many Member States, including Estonia, Kazakhstan, Peru and South Africa, for organizing regional seminars. There is clear evidence of the fruits of such efforts.

However, one must say that progress in universal adherence to a strengthened safeguards system is
disappointingly slow. As the representative of the IAEA stated on 29 April, still 47 NPT parties have yet to conclude and bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. 72 states have signed an Additional Protocol, but only 32 out of them are in force. There still remain 18 NPT States with significant nuclear activities that have not even signed an Additional Protocol. We should, nevertheless, not be discouraged with the current status. Rather, we should intensify our efforts, identify obstacles and take necessary actions.

In this regard, I would like to stress the important outcomes of the International Conference on the Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards in Tokyo last December, which Japan hosted in cooperation with the IAEA. The conference reviewed the outcomes of a series of the regional conferences organized previously and examined the lessons learned and identified areas on which future efforts should be focused. At this conference, it was affirmed that impartial and critical inspections by the IAEA are a cornerstone of the NPT regime and that the Agency should be given the authority to provide credible assurance to the international community, not only on the diversion of declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

The Conference adopted the Chairman’s Summary and recommended States to take, in cooperation with the IAEA, collectively or individually, intensified measures. Copies of the Chairman’s Summary are available in the Conference Room. I would like to elaborate some of the salient points.

(a) The major obstacle for wider adherence to a strengthened safeguards is a low priority given to nuclear non-proliferation in many countries. It is essential therefore to maintain and raise political momentum. States concerned and the IAEA should cooperate closely in their outreach efforts, to encourage States to conclude Additional Protocol, share information and continue to bring the issue to the forefront of international discourse. Specifically, the Preparatory Committee and 2005 Review Conference of NPT are the most appropriate fora to do so. In order to enhance the political momentum, the possibility of issuing a joint ministerial statement was suggested.

(b) Other obstacles identified are insufficient understanding of legal requirement entailed, and lack of administrative and technical infrastructure to implement obligations of Additional Protocol. The Tokyo Conference recommended to extend legislative, administrative and technical assistance, through regional and national seminars, workshops and training courses, to overcome those obstacles. Many States expressed their willingness to do so. Following the suggestion by the Tokyo Conference, an informal Friends of the Additional Protocol, consisting of representative of concerned Member States including those which hosted a series of regional seminars, was recently launched in Vienna. The Group is coordinating, in cooperation with the IAEA, the approaches to promote and accelerate the momentum towards the universalization of the Additional Protocol. Japan continues to attach high foreign policy priority and to play an active role in its universalization of Additional Protocol.

Japan realizes that the early universalization of Additional Protocol and the conclusion of an IAEA safeguards agreement by NPT member states are of increasing importance for maintaining and strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan welcomes the presentation at this session by the IAEA representative and supports the implementation of the updated Action Plan by the
IAEA. We are of the view that a country-specific approach, combined with regional efforts, is most successful in addressing particular situation of a country. Technical Cooperation Programme could be fully utilized for this purpose. We propose that a strong message be issued through the NPT review process for the importance and urgency of wider adherence to a strengthened IAEA safeguards system.

On this occasion, Japan expresses its hope that all States that have signed but not yet ratified additional protocols, notably the remaining nuclear weapons States and EU Member States, redouble their efforts and play a leadership role by finalizing their national ratification procedures promptly.

We believe that the more advanced a state's nuclear technology, the greater its responsibility towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as transparency. Based on this viewpoint, we expect that Iran will further enhance the transparency of its nuclear activities through cooperation with the IAEA, and conclude an Additional Protocol as a matter of priority.

In view of recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, strengthening the IAEA safeguards capability is particularly urgent. Japan shares generally the concern that it is difficult for the Agency to perform satisfactorily its international verification duties under the current budget level. We also understand, in principle, that it is unavoidable to expand the budget for safeguards activities in order to strengthen IAEA safeguards, including its response to countries of concern in the current urgent international situation, and in order to fulfill its mandate. Japan will continue to examine the proposal in detail and consult closely with other Member States.

2. Integrated Safeguards
Safeguards measures must be continuously reviewed as technologies develop. Through these reviews, improving efficiency and seeking the possibility of rationalization is equally as important as maintaining and enforcing the effectiveness of safeguards.

In the process of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards through the application of additional protocols, the establishment and implementation of integrated safeguards plays a fundamental role. In their implementation, we should avoid mechanistic applications and pursue flexibility that enables the adoption of safeguards approaches that take into account state-specific features and characteristics, while maintaining the effectiveness of safeguards.

It is also important to make integrated safeguards attractive to states that have yet to conclude additional protocols in order to give an incentive to those States and to facilitate universalization. From this viewpoint, it is necessary to demonstrate the benefit to the states of applying integrated safeguards. At the same time, there are a number of States who have ratified additional protocols at an early stage, but integrated safeguards have yet to be applied. We are concerned that if this situation continues, it may serve as a disincentive to other States. Further efforts by the IAEA are required to expedite the move to Integrated Safeguards.
3. Nuclear weapons States and the NPT
Japan strongly hopes that the nuclear weapons States will apply safeguards, even though it is not mandatory. Nuclear weapons States should make efforts to expand as broadly as possible the application of safeguards to peaceful uses of nuclear materials and facilities. I also hope that nuclear weapons States will place such nuclear materials under the appropriate international verification systems, including IAEA safeguards, in order to assure the irreversibility of the peaceful use of nuclear materials.

4. Export Control
Japan greatly appreciates the role played by international nuclear-related export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee, that seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the control of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, without hindering nuclear trade or cooperation for peaceful purposes. From the viewpoint of reinforcement of the international nuclear non-proliferation system, and also in order to closely monitor the procurement activities of nuclear material, equipment, etc. related to nuclear weapons development in the North Korea and Iraq, it is necessary to strengthen international cooperation in export control through the NSG and the Zangger Committee. Japan continues to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through its role as Point of Contact for the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Japan will continue to promote a better understanding of the importance of export controls in Asia by hosting the Asian Export Control Seminar and pursuing various outreach programs with other Asian countries.

5. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security. In particular, Japan appreciates the countries of Central Asia for their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

Japan hopes that satisfying conclusions for all concerned states will be reached at the consultation between five nuclear-weapon States and five countries of Central Asia and that such an outcome will be recognized as a new achievement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this view, Japan has been supporting the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the U.N.Secretariat establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards

Chairman's Summary (10 December, 2002)

1. A total of 82 participants representing 36 States met in Tokyo on 9th-10th December 2002 to consider ways and means to bring about wider adherence to strengthened IAEA Safeguards.

2. The participants stressed the necessity of strengthening the IAEA Safeguards system, which plays a vital role in underpinning the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). This task is particularly urgent, in view of recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime e.g. verified compliance of Iraqi disarmament in terms of all weapons of mass destruction and reports of a concealed enrichment program in the DPRK. The participants reaffirmed the importance of universalizing the NPT regime.

3. In this regard, the participants agreed that impartial and critical inspections are a cornerstone of the NPT regime and that the Agency should be given the authority to provide credible assurance to the international community not only about the diversion of the declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

4. They discussed ways and means of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system - notably through universal adherence to additional protocols to safeguards agreements - in the light of the IAEA Action Plan and the outcomes of a series of regional seminars held in the past two years. The outcome of IAEA regional seminars for Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia and South Caucasus, the Baltic Region and Africa provided variable inputs to the discussions at the Conference. Appreciations were expressed to the Governments of Estonia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Peru, and South Africa which hosted the seminars, as well as support provided by Australia, France, Sweden, and the United States.

5. It was noted that certain progress has been made since the Tokyo seminar held in June 2001, with 12 additional States having signed protocols and 9 States having brought protocols into force. However, at the time of the Conference, there are still only 67 States that have signed an additional protocol, and merely 28 States in which the protocol has entered into force. Moreover, NPT safeguards agreements with 48 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are still outstanding. The goal of universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional
protocols is far from achieved. Intensified and concerted efforts are urgently required to make progress toward wider adherence to strengthened IAEA safeguards.

6. The participants shared the view that States should undertake in cooperation with the IAEA, collectively or individually, appropriate measures, specifically the following:

(1.) In order to maintain the political momentum for strengthening the safeguards system, States concerned and the IAEA should co-operate closely in their outreach efforts, share information and continue to bring the issue to the forefront of international discourse. Specifically, the importance of strengthened safeguards should be raised in connection with the NPT review process, with a view to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties, as well as UN General Assembly and other international meetings dealing with disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation issues. A possibility of issuing a joint ministerial statement was suggested to raise political interest.

(2.) The adherence by States to safeguards agreements that are further strengthened by additional protocols promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology and international collaboration in the field of nuclear activities. By fully implementing such agreements and protocols, States are able to further demonstrate transparency concerning their nuclear activities, which could lead to regional peace and stabilization, to the strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as to facilitating cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear application. States should consider deepening their contacts with other States and the IAEA to identify the area of cooperation and assistance toward this goal. The role of parliamentarians, the media and the civil society in general was emphasized in order to underline and disseminate the significance and benefits of strengthening IAEA safeguards system.

(3.) States should also recognize the role of the IAEA safeguards system in protecting against nuclear terrorism. The establishment of effective State Systems for Accounting and Control (SSAC), and co-operation between such systems and other relevant players are key measures in this regard.

(4.) In connection with efforts to strengthen SSACs, the IAEA should continue to play a significant role in facilitating the coordination of multilateral and bilateral assistance and cooperation, and sharing of related information among bilateral donors and the IAEA.

(5.) Bilateral and required collaboration should be promoted to the maximum extent possible, through the provision of necessary information and assistance by States that have already concluded an additional protocol to States that have not yet done so, in order to facilitate the universal conclusion of additional protocols. This applies in particular to these States that are not Members of the IAEA. In this connection, several representatives, notably Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, expressed their readiness to offer
expertise to help overcome technical and other obstacles that States might encounter in preparing for the conclusion and implementation of an additional protocol.

(6.) Regional and national seminars, workshops, briefings, and training courses to provide advice on policy, legal and technical aspects of strengthened IAEA safeguards continue to be useful mechanisms in order to promote wider adherence to strengthened safeguards. Due account should be taken of the different needs in this regard of States with nuclear material and facilities and those without, taking into account means available to meet these needs.

(7.) A suggestion was made to form an informal Friends of the Additional Protocol with participation of interested countries, particularly those having hosted regional seminars to coordinate their national and regional efforts and maintain the momentum.

7. The conference was seen as an excellent opportunity to review progress on the basis of the outcomes of a series of regional seminars and related efforts by States and the IAEA Secretariat. The participants were able to share information with each other on their experience with such activities and on their perception on relevant issues to be solved, and agreed on the importance of continuous co-operation in this regard. In that context, they stressed the significance of the Conference and hoped for the continuation of such efforts in order to achieve wider adherence to strengthened IAEA safeguards.

8. The participants expressed their hope that all States that had signed but not yet ratified additional protocols- notably, the remaining nuclear weapons States and EU member states - redouble their efforts to finalize their national ratification procedures promptly in order to maintain political momentum.

9. The participants expressed their appreciation of the efforts by some States, notably Japan, in hosting and supporting a series of regional seminars to States that supported these activities as well as the Secretariat of the IAEA.