STATEMENT

By

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Jane Marriott
Member of Delegation

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

On specific time attached to Cluster 2: Regional Issues

5 May 2003

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Mr Chairman,

I would like to take the opportunity of this time set aside for regional issues to examine three areas of concern: the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and South Asia.

Middle East

The UK has submitted a written report on the Middle East. I would like to highlight some of the comments made there today. I will begin by reaffirming our support for 1995 NPT Review Conference Resolution on the Middle East.

Mr Chairman,

We recognise that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians impacts on international efforts to create a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The United Kingdom is committed to efforts to move the Middle East peace process forward and welcomes the publication of the "roadmap" last Thursday. We are actively engaged in efforts to end the violence, build confidence and resume talks based on the various Security Council resolutions and the principle of "land for peace".

The United Kingdom has consistently supported resolutions in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone. We have continued to support the UN First Committee resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

We have also taken steps with other countries in the region to establish the conditions for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Together with our EU partners, we have carried out extensive lobbying activity to secure adherence by States in the
Middle East to key non-proliferation agreements. Since last year's PrepCom, we have lobbied those states on the question of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and agreement of an IAEA Additional Protocol.

Last week, one States Party asked why Israel had not received as high a profile as another state in the region. Israel, of course, is not a States Party to the NPT. The UK has always, and continues, to support the universalisation of the NPT. We therefore continue to call on Israel to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and to conclude an associated full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, in order to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. We have reiterated these messages to Israeli officials in recent months.

We call upon all states in the region which have not yet done so to conclude, bring into force and implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA Additional Protocols to those arrangements to demonstrate their commitment to international peace and security.

Last year, we noted that issues concerning Iraq remained one of our greatest concerns in the region. We now welcome the opportunity for the people of Iraq to determine their own future. We are confident that this future will not involve weapons of mass destruction. Coalition forces are now actively investigating Saddam Hussein's illegal weapons programmes. We recognise the value of independent validation of any discoveries they may make.

As we have mentioned in earlier interventions, however, the UK has concerns about another state in the region. We believe that non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT are entitled to a civil nuclear programme for energy provided the programme is pursued in accordance with the provisions of the NPT. But, like others, we remain concerned by the scale and scope of Iran's ambitious nuclear programme, which has until recently been pursued without scrutiny by the IAEA. We call on Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve the unanswered questions arising from the IAEA Director-General's visit in February. We look forward, with interest, to Iran's
presentation in the margins of the Programme and Budget Committee tomorrow in Vienna. We expect Iran to rapidly conclude, bring into force and implement an additional protocol, in order to demonstrate transparency and build confidence in its commitment to the NPT.

The Korean Peninsula

Mr Chairman, the UK has already commented extensively on the situation regarding the DPRK. I will merely highlight a couple of key points here. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee we noted our concerns regarding the DPRK’s continuing failure to comply with its international obligations. Unfortunately, since last year the situation has deteriorated. For example, last October, the DPRK admitted to the existence of a uranium enrichment programme. It then expelled IAEA inspectors, announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT and has sent opaque messages about the exact status of its nuclear weapons programme.

The UK welcomes the diplomatic efforts that are under way. DPRK attendance at the talks in Beijing was a very positive step forward. But the DPRK must go further and engage fully with the international community and demonstrate their commitment to disarm. We very much hope that multilateral talks resume. We demand a Korean Peninsula free from nuclear weapons. To this end, we urge the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons programmes in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. We believe that only strict compliance with the NPT and full implementation of IAEA safeguards can help provide the necessary assurances. We also call on the DPRK to clarify the exact status of its nuclear programmes.

Until the DPRK resolves the concerns of the international community regarding its nuclear weapons programmes, we urge all countries to prevent the export of nuclear-related materials, expertise and technology to the DPRK.

South Asia

Mr Chairman,
We remain concerned about the potential for nuclear conflict in South Asia. We strongly urge India and Pakistan to work together to reduce nuclear tensions in the region. And we call on them to continue to carry out confidence building measures, including implementing those envisaged in the Lahore Declaration. We continue to support contacts on Tracks II and III. All these measures are a vital pre-requisite to the fulfilment by India and Pakistan of the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1172. We urge both countries to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states as soon as possible and to place all their facilities under IAEA safeguards.

We welcome India and Pakistan's continuing moratoria on nuclear weapons tests, and urge both to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We hope for the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and hope that both India and Pakistan will participate in these. In the meantime, we urge both states to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Both India and Pakistan are potential sources of nuclear weapons technology. With this comes the responsibility to ensure they control these technologies effectively. We urge both to ensure that comprehensive, effectively implemented, export control legislation exists.

Conclusion

Mr Chairman,

In conclusion, I would like highlight our support for a peaceful Middle East and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. We call upon all States in the region to make this a reality. We urge the DPRK to take the necessary steps to ensure that the Korean Peninsula is nuclear weapons free. And we call upon India and Pakistan to also live up to their international obligations.

Thank you Mr Chairman.

Ends/
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By

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Duarte Figueira
Member of Delegation

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Cluster 2

5 May 2003

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the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Intervention by the UK in Cluster 2

Mr Chairman,

This session on cluster 2 covers safeguards as well as physical protection measures and
nuclear weapons free zones.

Strengthening Safeguards

Mr Chairman,

I will begin today by looking at the importance of safeguards. As you have already heard,
the UK, like most countries throughout the world, regards the NPT as the cornerstone of
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is of vital importance in addressing threats that
confront the international community. We must continue to strengthen and ensure
compliance with the non-proliferation measures that underpin the process of
disarmament.

IAEA safeguards are a key element in helping to ensure compliance with non-
proliferation obligations. Upon acceding to the NPT, all non-nuclear weapon states
commit to bringing into force Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, as agreed with the
IAEA. The 2000 Final Document further recognises such safeguards as a fundamental
pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The UK has already noted with regret that
47 states still do not have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in force. We welcome
the work the IAEA and others are doing to encourage these states to bring
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements into force. We call upon these state parties to the
NPT to conclude and bring into force the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
required of them.

We also strongly urge these and all other States who have not yet done so to conclude
and bring into force Additional Protocols based on the INFCIRC/540 model so that
safeguards based on Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol
become the international norm. It is especially important that all States with significant
nuclear activities are seen to demonstrate their commitment to transparency and hence
bolster international confidence in the peaceful nature of their programmes by concluding
and implementing an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. It is self-evident that the
international community would expect any State with a significant nuclear programme,
particularly those possessing or developing an enrichment or reprocessing capability, to
rapidly take such action.

Additional Protocols strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime very significantly
by enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. As such, the
universal implementation of these protocols is required for the strengthened safeguards
system to become fully effective. We therefore welcome the various initiatives in the
course of the last year to help promote more widespread take-up of Additional Protocols
—and we must all continue our efforts to speed-up the rate at which such protocols enter
into force and ensure that the IAEA is able to implement the measures they contain.

We have agreed a Protocol additional to our safeguards agreement with the IAEA and
EURATOM and the domestic legislation necessary to fulfil the UK’s obligations under
the protocol has been in place since May 2000. The Additional Protocol for the UK will
enter into force when all of the EU Member States and the European Commission have
confirmed that the necessary preparations have been completed. We very much hope that
this will take place soon. In the meantime we continue to provide the Agency with
voluntary declarations of the information that would be required of the UK if the Protocol
were in force.
Mr Chairman, we very much share the view that it is only the widespread implementation of such safeguards strengthening measures that can provide the basis for developing a truly integrated safeguards system. Increased confidence in the absence of undeclared activities will bring with it the scope for reductions in the levels of safeguards effort on less sensitive nuclear materials. We therefore welcome the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards as presented to the IAEA's Board of Governors last year and commend the IAEA Secretariat for the progress it has made in continuing to take forward the development and gradual implementation of integrated safeguards.

Whilst we will discuss nuclear terrorism under the special time attached to Cluster Three, it should also be recognised that the high quality nuclear material accountability that is essential for safeguards implementation is equally important in ensuring effective arrangements for physical protection of the material concerned.

We believe that the international community must not shrink from ensuring that the IAEA applies strong safeguards and we must all be prepared to ensure that it has the resources to do so. We are most concerned at the IAEA Director General ElBaradei's recent warnings that without additional resources in the 2004-2005 biennium, the IAEA will no longer be able to guarantee credible safeguards. This warning has been repeated in the IAEA's statement in the General Debate at this Preparatory Committee, which emphasised that there was a real risk that the ability of the Agency to discover evidence of a covert nuclear weapons programme will erode unless the Agency receives the necessary resources. Member States have a duty to ensure that the IAEA has the resources necessary to fulfil the safeguards obligations that it has entered into.

Mr Chairman, we believe that the Agency has made a convincing case for additional resources now and that Member States must ensure that these are made available. Therefore, we consider that Zero Real Growth in the Agency's budget will have to be set on one side for a limited period. We need to do this, both to maintain the quality of the
assurance that the Secretariat gives, and to provide for the effective implementation of additional protocols and thus in due course of widespread integrated safeguards.

Mr Chairman,

In an earlier statement to the Conference, one delegation claimed that no nuclear weapon state had placed excess fissile material under safeguards. In response, I would like to point out that in 1998, in its Strategic Defence Review, the UK was the first of the Nuclear Weapon States to declare the total amount of its fissile material stocks. We also said we were placing a quantity of stock no longer required for defence purposes under EURATOM safeguards and liable for inspection by the IAEA — which we have done.

Compliance

Mr Chairman,

The IAEA’s ability to apply the full range of safeguards measures contained in both Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols helps to increase confidence in the international community that non-nuclear weapons states are complying with their NPT obligations. In this context the UK would like to highlight the case of one country in particular: Iran.

Iran

We have noted carefully the statement made by Iran during this session of the Preparatory Committee on the 29 April. We welcome Iran’s solemn declaration that it does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons and the re-affirmation of Iran’s full commitment to all its obligations as a founding member of the NPT. While we welcome Iran’s recent co-operation with the IAEA, the IAEA Director-General’s report of his visit to Iran in February made clear that he was shown aspects of Iran’s ambitious and advanced nuclear programme that has until recently been pursued without scrutiny by the IAEA. Agency inspectors are working to resolve unanswered questions arising from the
visit, and we call on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency to achieve this. Inevitably, other questions arise, such as why such an extensive enrichment programme, developed so far in advance of apparent need, was not declared much earlier to the Agency.

We regret that Iran's statement contained no indication that it has any plans to bring an Additional Protocol into force. Frankly, we are at a loss to understand why Iran is so reluctant to bring an Additional Protocol into force if, as it asserts, it has no hidden agenda and does not seek nuclear weapons. This is what we would expect of any country with a major uranium enrichment programme.

Iran must surely recognise that as an NPT party it acknowledged during the last Review Conference that Additional Protocols provide increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and that measures to provide a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented by all States Parties to this Treaty.

In its statement here, Iran recognised that "more capability necessarily prompts more responsibility" but did not mention the Additional Protocol in this context. We urge Iran to recognise that the swift conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol are essential to re-establishing international confidence in the Iranian programme. The UK will be particularly interested in Minister Agazadeh's position on this point when he speaks in Vienna tomorrow.

Iran's seeming reluctance to bring an Additional Protocol into force is only one of the concerns we have about Iran's nuclear activities. We have difficulty believing that Iran could have advanced so far in its enrichment programme without having conducted research and development activities which ought to have been declared to the IAEA, but appear not to have been. We have difficulty understanding why Iran has chosen to invest so much money and effort in acquiring an enrichment capability so long in advance of having any obvious need for that capability. We note that reports have appeared in the
international media alleging the existence of nuclear sites which have not been declared or shown to the Agency.

It is in our view imperative that Iran does all it can to allay these concerns. We expect Iran to co-operate fully with the IAEA as the Agency seeks to resolve the unanswered questions to which the IAEA Director General referred during his report to the IAEA Board of Governors in March. We look to Iran to honour the commitment to complete transparency which it made to the Director General in February.

Physical protection

Mr Chairman, I turn now to the second topic of the day: physical protection. The UK takes very seriously the need to have in place high standards of physical protection, allied to effective systems of nuclear accountancy and control. We believe that it is a vital element of the non-proliferation regime - along with safeguards and export controls.

While the responsibility for physical protection systems within a State is a matter for the Government of that State, the UK is strongly supportive of international co-operation in this area. We have contributed to IAEA efforts to assist states, for example through our participation in International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions and training courses and workshops, and pledged some £750,000 to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. In addition, we participate in bilateral and multilateral projects to enhance physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

The UK is committed to encouraging States to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We played an active role in the discussions this year aimed at drafting a well-defined amendment to the CPPNM in line with the May 2001 report from the Expert Group. There is a draft text with some unresolved issues. The UK urges that all states work together to identify a way forward. We consider that it is crucial for states to continue to co-operate with each other to identify common ground and
achieve a common position on a text that could be submitted by one or more states to the Depositary to commence the formal revision process.

Nuclear weapon free zones

Last – but not least - I wish to make a few remarks about nuclear weapons free zones. We have already touched on these briefly in relation to the UK’s negative security assurances which are given under such zones. We have also mentioned our support for a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone. Indeed, our support for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear weapons free zones now cover the territory of more than half the world’s nations. They have a vital role to play from both a non-proliferation and disarmament perspective. The UK has signed and ratified protocols to the zones which cover Latin America and the Caribbean - the Tlatelolco Treaty; Africa - the Treaty of Pelindaba; and the South Pacific – the Treaty of Rarotonga. We welcome Cuba’s ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, making this zone geographically complete.

We have continued to work with the ASEAN States to produce a protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. We hope that a response to the nuclear weapon states’ non-paper will soon be forthcoming, so that we can take this issue forward.

The UK was pleased to be able to discuss the proposed Central Asian nuclear weapons free zone with both the five Central Asian states in question and with the other nuclear weapon states. We believe that our meetings in New York in October and December were useful, and look forward to a response from the Central Asian Five – the C5 - to our January non-paper on both the draft Treaty and draft Protocol. We welcome the fact that the C5 appear prepared to engage with the nuclear weapon states on both draft Treaty and Protocol.

Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr Chairman, we should embrace the opportunity offered by this Preparatory Committee to engage with one another on topics connected with the implementation of the NPT.

By strengthening safeguards measures, providing the IAEA with the resources it requires, insisting on compliance with the Treaty, encouraging co-operation in the area of physical protection and encouraging nuclear weapon free zones we can make a major contribution to improving non-proliferation measures and thus to the implementation of the Treaty.

Thank you, Mr Chairman

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Thank you, Mr Chairman

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