Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  

5 May 2003  

ORIGINAL: English  

GE.03-61331  

Second Session  
Geneva, 28 April–9 May 2003  

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
Report submitted by Brazil  

I. INTRODUCTION  

1. Brazil is unshakably committed to the cause of nuclear disarmament.  

2. The use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes is a principle enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution.  

3. The Brazilian Congress approved our accession to the NPT on the understanding that effective measures will be taken with a view to the cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Brazil thus joined the NPT with the determination to pursue, from within the Treaty, the objective of nuclear disarmament and the full implementation of Article VI.  

4. In the early sixties, Brazil, together with some other Latin American countries, took the initiative that culminated in the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967.  

5. Brazil was among the first States to sign and ratify the CTBT.  

6. At the United Nations, Brazil has been a leading sponsor of the General Assembly resolution on the Southern Hemisphere as nuclear-weapon-free zone.  

7. Together with its partners in the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil has also been a sponsor of the resolution “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a New Agenda”.  

8. As a result of our firm commitment, Brazil will continue to spare no effort to hold the nuclear-weapon states accountable for the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI and for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  

II. REPORT  

9. As an integral part of the “13 Steps” contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was agreed that “regular reports be submitted within the framework of the
strengthened review process of the Non-proliferation Treaty, by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Disarmament’, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996”.

Step 1: The CTBT

10. As stated above, Brazil was one of the first countries to ratify the CTBT, which it signed in 1996 and ratified in 1998; we expect that the goal of the entry into force of the Treaty may soon be attained. Six monitoring installations and one radionuclide analysis laboratory are located in Brazil: one primary seismic station and one infra-sound station (Brasilia), two auxiliary seismic stations (Amazonas and Rio Grande do Norte), two radionuclide stations (Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco) and one radionuclide analysis laboratory (Rio de Janeiro).

11. There are worrisome signs regarding the perspective for the entry into force of the CTBT. While the process of installation of the International Monitoring System is well advanced, there are no favorable prospects for the corresponding legally binding commitment to enter into in force and become applicable universally to the Parties to the Treaty. Non-nuclear weapon States, which are parties to the NPT, already have commitments to this effect. This situation goes against the idea behind a universal and comprehensive test ban treaty. It unduly reproduces the imbalances already contained in the NPT.

Step 2: Nuclear-Test Moratorium

12. Brazil urges all States to continue a moratorium on all nuclear weapon explosions, pending the official ratification of the CTBT.

Step 3: Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) negotiations

13. Brazil supports the immediate commencement of the negotiation of a fissile material treaty in the Conference of Disarmament. A non-discriminatory legally binding instrument banning the production of fissile material has necessarily to take into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives: a prohibition on future production must go hand in hand with provisions regarding control and disposal of existing stockpiles.

Step 4: Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament

14. For Brazil, nuclear disarmament has always been a matter of highest priority to be dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament. The establishment of an ad hoc committee on Nuclear Disarmament is imperative for the Conference to fulfill its mandate. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, all parties to the Treaty agreed on the necessity to establish a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament. Brazil is disappointed at the failure of the Conference of Disarmament to agree on a Program of Work. At a time when security aspects are prominent in the international agenda, States should act coordinately and show their will to move forward and resume
the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In July-August 2000, the Brazilian Presidency, on the basis of previous proposals, tabled a proposal for a Program of Work (CD/1624), which aimed at helping to break the deadlock of the Conference and which continues to be a reference for consultations. Following the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the possibility of the weaponization of outer space has also highlighted the importance of negotiations in the CD on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At a time when security issues are prominent in the international agenda, States should show the political will to move forward and resume the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

**Step 5: Irreversibility**

15. The principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. Without a clear and concrete perspective for disarmament, non-proliferation risks to become a mere freezing of power based on the possession of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons), which will prove to be unsustainable in the long run. Limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not enough, for non-proliferation cannot be attained without nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are intrinsically linked, and trying to advance only non-proliferation goals is not feasible. Effective measures must be taken with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, at an early date. Reductions of nuclear arsenals must aim at nuclear disarmament. They should not be seen as a mere adaptation of the logic of deterrence that followed the transformation of the strategic scenario after the end of the Cold War. Streamlining arsenals will not by itself contribute to disarmament and non-proliferation if the use of nuclear weapons is re-rationalized. There should be no possibility of re-deploying nuclear weapons currently in non-operational status, for this would render nuclear-weapon reductions meaningless.

**Step 6: Unequivocal Undertaking**

16. Brazil welcomed the achievements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and attaches the utmost significance to the agreement on the “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination their nuclear arsenals. It is imperative that all States Parties pursue the full implementation of the agreements achieved in 2000. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are expected to give the example to the international community by implementing their unequivocal undertaking toward the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

**Step 7: START and the ABM Treaty**

17. Brazil acknowledges that the decision by the two major nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenal in operational status, as envisaged under the Treaty of Moscow, represents a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Brazil regrets that these reductions have, to a great extent, ignored the principle of irreversibility. Streamlining arsenals will not by itself contribute to disarmament and non-proliferation if the use of nuclear weapons is being re-rationalized. The notification of withdrawal by one of the States Parties to the ABM Treaty has constituted a worrying signal of the possibility of weaponization of space.
Step 8: The Trilateral Initiative

18. Brazil supports the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and calls for its completion.

Step 9: Steps by the Nuclear-Weapon States

19. Among the achievements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the call for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies was of outstanding significance. Brazil is concerned at new rationales for the possession of nuclear weapons, which continue to be re-stated or reinforced, as well as at rumors regarding the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. The fact that evolving security policies and defense doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons, indeed entailing possibly new designs and generations of such weapons as a counter to conventional warfare, can only further destabilize the global security environment and the sustainability of the NPT regime. Non-proliferation also implies the cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Due to disturbing developments regarding new types of low yield weapons and plans related to their tactical uses, Brazil is also of the view that it is particularly important to focus on the non-strategical weapons.

20. Also of outstanding significance in this Step was the call for increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard their nuclear weapons capabilities.

Step 10: Arrangements by the Nuclear-Weapon States for verification of non-military fissile material

21. Brazil urges those nuclear-weapon states which have not yet done so to conclude arrangements to place their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification.

Step 11: Complete Disarmament

22. Brazil is Party to all multilateral instruments related to weapons of mass destruction. In its participation in the disarmament and non-proliferation multilateral regimes, Brazil consistently aimed at fulfilling the commitments of these instruments as means to achieve peace, security, cooperation, development and assistance. Brazil firmly believes that multilateralism is the most appropriate and effective framework in this regard. Brazil also firmly believes that the maintenance of a robust non-proliferation regime for all weapons of mass destruction is not sustainable without parallel positive developments in the field of disarmament. Brazil endeavored to play an active role in the negotiations aimed at the strengthening the BWC by means of an additional protocol. For Brazil, the OPCW has a decisive role to play a decisive role in addressing the increasing concerns regarding the existence of chemical weapons in the arsenals of States. A Brazilian diplomat was Director-General of the OPCW between 1997 and 2002, whose efforts to fully deliver the disarmament program of the OPCW during the financial crisis of the Organization that preceded the 1st Special Conference are to be commended. Brazil also works within the international community
on conventional weapons. Brazil will endeavor to continue playing an active role in all arms control and disarmament forums.

**Step 12: Reporting**

23. Brazil strongly supports the principle of regular reporting within the framework of the strengthened review process for the NPT.

**Step 13: Development of Verification Capabilities**

24. Brazil is of the view that the maintenance of a robust nuclear non-proliferation regime is not sustainable without parallel positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament. Brazil believes that verification of disarmament agreements lies at the heart of the disarmament process and is a key element for the credibility and sustainability of the NPT regime and for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world.