Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”

Report submitted by Sweden

Introduction

1. As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on: "Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

2. Sweden would hereby like to submit her report to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Since the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2002, Sweden has actively participated in the work on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This has been done, for example, through the European Union, together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, and through the Five Ambassadors' initiative in the Conference on Disarmament.

4. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms Anna Lindh, declared in the Statement of Government Policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign policy on 12 February 2003, that the long-term objective of the Swedish Government was a world free from nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. To contribute to this long-term objective, Sweden has initiated a discussion within the European Union on how to strengthen and further develop the Union's common policy on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, including export control.
5. Disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone in Swedish foreign policy and Sweden is a vocal supporter of efforts aimed at advancing progress in this field. In a newspaper article on 10 April 2003, Ms. Lindh together with Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Giorgios Papandreou, called for the strengthening of the NPT and for the nuclear-weapon states to live up to pledges to eliminate their nuclear weapons. They furthermore called for an immediate start of negotiations on a binding and verifiable agreement on the disarmament of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Together with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Erkki Toumioja, Ms Lindh in a newspaper article on 3 July 2002, called for the implementation of the 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament and for the nuclear-weapon states to reduce further their non-strategic nuclear weapons. In her statement at the 57th United Nations General Assembly, Ms Lindh, among other things, reiterated the importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and repeated that it was unacceptable that the Conference on Disarmament was blocked.

6. Sweden, together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, presented two resolutions at the 57th General Assembly, entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda (57/59) and Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons (57/58). The omnibus resolution emphasised the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the implementation of the 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Both resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly.

7. At the 57th UNGA, Sweden supported many resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, for instance the resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (57/55), on the conclusion of effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (57/56), on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (57/97), on bilateral strategic arms reductions and the new strategic framework (57/68), on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status (57/67), on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (57/69), on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (57/73), on nuclear disarmament (57/79) and on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (57/85).

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Sweden ratified the CTBT on 2 December 1998. Sweden has worked towards the early entry into force of the Treaty bilaterally and through the European Union. Sweden has continuously
supported the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. Sweden has promoted signatures and ratifications of the Treaty through demarches made by the European Union to a number of states. Sweden supported the resolution (57/100) entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty" adopted by the 57th United Nations General Assembly, which called for measures to enable the Treaty to enter into force. Sweden co-sponsored a ministerial statement on the CTBT, which was delivered by ministers in New York in the fall of 2002. Sweden supports the Article XIV Conferences as important instruments contributing to the early entry into force of the CTBT.

Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty
Sweden has continuously supported the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions by the nuclear-weapons states pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Co-ordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The CD is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
It is of great concern to Sweden that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree on a programme of work since 1998 and, as a consequence, that negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices have not yet commenced. Sweden believes that it is of paramount importance that the members of the CD agree on a programme of work as soon as possible. To this end, Sweden and four other states have presented a compromise proposal regarding the programme of work in the CD, the so-called Five Ambassadors’ proposal, which suggests, in brief, commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, and the establishment of subsidiary bodies to deal with nuclear disarmament and with the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Sweden has actively participated in conferences, workshops and seminars on the FMCT-issue. Sweden supported resolution (57/80) on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which was adopted by the 57th United Nations General Assembly.

Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the CD an appropriate body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The CD is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
Nuclear disarmament will be one of the issues the CD would deal with if an agreement on a programme of work could be reached. Sweden believes that it is of crucial importance for the
CD to resume its work and to, among another things, establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. This is a necessity for the implementation of the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
Irreversibility is a fundamental principle for nuclear disarmament. Only irreversible reductions can assure that re-deployment of nuclear weapons does not occur. Sweden continues to advocate that the principle of irreversibility should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control measures - unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to the nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI.
Sweden, unilaterally and together with the states in the New Agenda Coalition, continues to press for states to live up to their commitments regarding the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The unequivocal undertaking that the nuclear-weapons states committed themselves to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference – for the first time ever – is yet to be fulfilled.

Step 7: The early entry into force and the full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
Sweden notes the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the abrogation of START II, the withering away of START III, and the conclusion in 2002 of the Moscow Treaty on strategic offensive reductions. The Moscow Treaty is a positive step in defining the new relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. We question, however, the Treaty’s contribution to nuclear disarmament since it does not contain verification provisions, and ignores non-operational warheads. Reductions in the numbers of deployed warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.

Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Sweden supports the initiative. It should be applied in the context of disarmament undertakings.

Step 9: Steps by all nuclear-weapons states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their arsenals unilaterally.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to the nuclear-weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
• The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
• Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
• A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
• The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

Sweden fully supports these steps and continues to press for advancements in their implementation.

In particular, Sweden continues to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential for the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime that non-strategic nuclear weapons are included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Against this background, Sweden together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, presented a resolution on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (resolution 57/66), which was adopted by the 57th United Nations General Assembly. Sweden has followed up this initiative at the second session of the PrepCom through the New Agenda Coalition and through a working paper submitted by Austria, Mexico and Sweden.

Furthermore, steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear-weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI serve as a confidence-building measure and should be strongly advocated. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control efforts - unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

Sweden urges the nuclear-weapons states that have not yet done so to conclude such arrangements.

Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Sweden takes an active part in the work on disarmament of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons. We refer here to the relevant treaties and instruments that deal with these types of weapons. Sweden has also initiated a work within the European Union on how to strengthen the common policy of the Union in order to better address threats posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to more actively pursue disarmament and non-proliferation of these weapons.
Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. Sweden believes that reports on the implementation of the article and paragraph mentioned above enhances transparency, builds confidence and therefore should be encouraged. Sweden submitted a report to the first session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Step 13: The further improvement of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapons free world. Sweden continues to give strong support to the IAEA and a system of strengthened safeguards. The Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements represents the new verification standard for NPT safeguards. Sweden therefore continues to urge all states to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols.