Statement by
the Islamic Republic of Iran
Before
NPT 2005 Review Conference, PrepCom III
Cluster I – Nuclear Disarmament

Mr. Chairman

The mandate of this PrepCom as envisaged in the Final Document of the
2000 NPT Review Conference is to consider principles, objectives and ways in
order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, including Nuclear
Disarmament as one of its main pillars, as well as its universality. This
PrepCom has also an specific mandate of submitting recommendations to the
2005 Review Conference.

Dealing with the question of Nuclear Disarmament definitely needs a
reference to the past achievements and possibly devising new initiatives to
foster and further develop already achieved goals.

The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to
implement Article VI of the NPT could be considered as the most important
achievement of the 2000 Review Conference in the field of nuclear
disarmament. Last year in the course of our deliberations on Cluster I issues,
my delegation questioned progress in all 13 steps. Then the answers were not so
promising and it is very unopportune to have to say that today are even
less positive. Since 1978, when the final document of the SSO DI decided that
nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on disarmament agenda, we had
waited so many year to get to the 2000 Review Conference and we should not
permit the new hopes for revitalization of the issue of nuclear disarmament
fade out again.

Last year questions about the US’s new posture review were simply
refuted as being based on an unofficial paper and today, in spite of allocating
hundreds of millions of dollars to this project, questions about mini nuclear
weapons or the so called bunker busters are played down as their being simple
research programs.

One does not know when to expect any real answer to this international
close over violation of Article I obligations by a major Nuclear Weapon
State through vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold
of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger of using such inhumane weapons
in conventional conflicts and against Non-Nuclear Weapons States parties to
the NPT.

Should we still await the finalization of the research phase and begining
of its production? Or do we have to keep silent until they are deployed or rather...
when they are used. This concern is real and needs to be duly dealt with in the strengthened review process.

The US's nuclear cooperation with Israel, as hard evidenced after the agreement reached during the US Energy Secretary to Israel in February 2000 which is in fact another aspect of violations of Article I obligations, is another source of concern for all NPT members and specially the Middle East countries which are all members of the NPT family. Israel's unsafeguarded facilities and nuclear arsenal is a real threat to all countries of the region and to International Peace and Security.

Mr. Chairman

As he is being said about the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions as implementation of Article VI obligations, however there are many questions here too. Any member of the NPT family does have a right to question:

- Given the fact that the decommissioned nuclear weapons are to be stored, rather than being destroyed, is a real disarmament measure?
- What is going to be the fate of the decommissioned nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles?
- How will the implementation of the such agreements be verified?
- How the principle of irreversibility is going to be observed after or even within the ten year time limit?
- What would be the fate of thousands of the tactical nuclear weapons still deployed?

Mr. Chairman

Let me once again recall that when the 13 steps were adopted in 2000 in New York, all members of the international community but four were represented, very much similar to the situation we have here today. We believe the 13 steps have been too severe to us here to let it be so easily put aside and overlooked. The NPT Review Process should substantially deal with the implementation of the thirteen steps.

The Islamic Republic of Iran once again reiterates the global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon states at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as the highest priority and as soon as possible of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.
During the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear weapon states committed themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process". Despite their commitments, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states. This issue too needs to be duly dealt with and taken care of.

The nuclear weapon states should engage immediately and in good faith in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of their obligations under the Treaty, in particular Article VI and the commitments under the 1995 decision on principles and objectives and the resolution on the Middle East. Any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

The Nuclear Weapon States should comply with their commitments to the full implementation of Article I. They should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements among themselves with non-nuclear weapon states, and those not party to the Treaty.

We emphasize the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty without exception and in particular to Israel, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities pose a great threat to the security and stability in the Middle East.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I feel obliged to very briefly react to the statements by the representatives of the United States. We would have expected the US representatives to at least in one case brief us on their government's views and steps on implementing its obligations under Cluster I. This was something we were all deprived of. However, we are used to such practices of the US.

Contrary to the claims by the US representatives, Iran is not recognized by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT.

The very structure of the statements by the US representatives were so deceptive that it makes it very difficult for any one to take their claims of deception by others.

In concluding I would simply wish to recall that repeating a claim does not add credit to it. I feel so sorry for being obliged to be repetitive. 